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This study is about politics in Arabic rap. Specifically, it is about affective 
dynamics and material negotiations during rap concerts in three cities in the Levant. I 
analyze Arab hip hop culture in the context of three different but related histories of 
cosmopolitan, middle class growth, and gentrification. Using an ethnomusicological 
framework rooted in participant observation and performance theory, I compare concert 
conditions, audience behavior, and accessibility of music production in Ramallah, 
Amman, and Beirut.  
In Chapter One, I elaborate the discursive and theoretical frameworks that have 
pinned the political valences of Arab youth, Arab artists, and Arab rappers in particular 
into representations of “resistance.” A confluence of energies I call “neoliberal 
orientalism” drives the recent, widespread attribution of “resistance” to Arab youth and 
cultural production, especially rap and hip hop in the aftermath of local protests over the 
past decade. As an alternative, in Chapter Two I propose tracing the emergence of what I 
call political feeling when the music is performed live. In this chapter, I argue that tarab 
can be built and does emerge in contemporary Arabic rap. Based on this proposal, I build 
an ethnographic model for analyzing this subcultural music production that is attentive to 




question: how can we talk about politics in cultural production without talking about 
resistance? 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five are case studies centered on concerts in Ramallah, 
occupied Palestine; Amman, Jordan; and Beirut, Lebanon, respectively. They apply the 
theoretical frameworks built in the first two chapters in each context. In all three cities, I 
locate the overwhelming majority of hip hop concerts within the provenance of 
increasingly cosmopolitan middle class culture. Tracking how neoliberal urban changes 
like gentrification affect concert venues and programming, I consider how material 
realities influence the choices that rappers and their fans make. This puts musicians and 
audiences in the material context of the political concerns they relate without assuming 







That Palestinians expect of their children a particular commitment to education is 
a widely recognized phenomenon. I grew up keenly aware of the focus on studies that my 
immediate and extended family demanded of all of us cousins. However, it was perhaps 
only over the course of this degree that I clearly recognized the everyday diligence this 
commitment to education required from the family of the student – the shape of which is 
not constant from one individual to another, nor from one generation to the next. My 
parents, my sister, my partner, and his family looked for, found, and expressed 
remarkable patience and support in hundreds of their own ways. Their commitment to me 
allowed me to commit to this degree.  
In most unanticipated ways, the research and writing of this dissertation brought 
me closer to my maternal grandparents, Ismaʿil Faruqi and Lois Ibsen Faruqi, than I ever 
imagined. Finding their names in references and studies I pursued here, reading their 
work, and in different ways following their footsteps has been of the most surprising, 
challenging, but rewarding pursuits of the past years. I wish to dedicate this dissertation 
to my family: to the examples, academic and otherwise, that they have set and the lessons 
their experiences continue to provide. 
The generosity of my funders and their investment and trust in this project in its 
early phases made the research the follows possible. Dissertation research grants from the 
Palestinian-American Research Center (PARC) and the Wenner Gren Foundation 
supported my research in Ramallah. An IIE Fulbright Student Research Fellowship 




Grant and two travel grants from the American University of Beirut’s Center for 
American Studies and Research facilitated travel to and from Beirut for my research in 
that city. In addition, the June Bennett Larsen Theatre Alumni Award and generosity 
from Professor Judith Milhous’ chair helped to round out research in both Palestine and 
Lebanon. The assembly of these grants took three years of applications. The awards thus 
also speak to the tenacity of my chair and recommenders (who included at different 
points – in addition to Maurya Wickstrom, Jean Graham-Jones, and Christa Salamandra – 
Marvin Carlson and Judith Milhous). I am grateful for the opportunities these awards 
opened and for the support of the advisors who encouraged me to stay the course when 
my applications were initially not successful. 
Primarily, the research awards allowed me to travel and freed me from the loving 
constraints of the classroom. This manuscript was composed in five cities, outlined and 
edited in close to ten, based out of a seemingly endless stream of hotel lobbies, airport 
terminals, cafés, and shared apartments. Without their knowing, dozens of people 
contributed to my thinking. What follows is an incomplete, partial list.  
Barrak Alzaid was the first person to push me to write about the events shaking 
the Arab world in 2011. This research likely would not have been conceived without his 
encouragement, coupled with the invitation to collaborate with ArteEast in 2011. Rima 
Najdi has been a trusted confidant and constant interlocutor from the very beginning. 
Hamza Mahmoud and Khaled Al-Hilli offered initial (very patient) Arabic tutoring 
before I left New York.  
Anthony Alessandrini graciously penned the first criticism of my approaches to 




website Jadaliyya. The encouragement his work offered and the example of engaged 
scholarship he leads at CUNY have been significant. Christopher Stone has presented 
another important example of integrity, sensitivity, and earnest collaboration. Ted 
Swedenburg, Tarek El-Ariss, Marwan Kraidy, Hatim El-Hibri, Ammiel Alcalay, Alex 
Lubin, Tarik Sabry, and Deepa Kumar cheered me, made connections happen for me, and 
invited me to speak, participate, or write despite my not being their advisees or their 
students. Despite little face-to-face contact, David McDonald and Moslih Kanaaneh also 
eagerly offered earnest, scholarly reflections. Anny Bakalian integrated me into the 
MEMEAC community without me having to so much as ask: she was always ready with 
warmth and strength. The Grad Center will be a darker place without her, but the legacy 
she has built will not be so easily dismantled by administrative cutbacks. Aseel Sawalha, 
Jonathan Shannon, Mounira Solimon, Maha El Said, Mandana Limbert, and Stephen 
Blum generously advised grant funding and listened through early iterations of my 
research. In different ways, all of these individuals helped me recognize how to widen my 
horizons and play to my strengths. At times when I found myself stranded, they offered 
invaluable lifelines back to the academy.  
Marvin Carlson continued to read and offer insights on my writing about 
Palestinian theatre making in Lebanon and Jordan despite not serving on my committee. 
Jean-Graham Jones has read more of my writing as a graduate student than anyone 
besides Maurya Wickstrom. Her critiques have pushed me and her attention to my 
writing has helped me learn how to strengthen it. Christa Salamandra eagerly took this 
project on and has been a steady supporter and astute commentator. Mark LeVine’s 




Lynette Gibson’s attentiveness and willingness to forgive. Julie George and Kay Powell 
rescued this project and steered it through the IRB Board Reviews when it seemed 
irretrievably blocked by bureaucracy. In the registrar’s office, Vin DeLuca has been a 
quiet, steady source of reason and relief for the seven years I have been at the GC. I am 
thankful for the efforts of all of these individuals and humbled by the time they continue 
to spend on my behalf.  
If this research resonates it is because of the trust my interlocutors deemed me 
worthy. Their lives, reflections, contacts, ideas, and their work is the substance of this 
work. Many went out of their way to meet me, talk to me, correct me. Many tolerated my 
fumbling as I taught myself ethnographic practice, learned about the specifics of their 
industry and their work, and haltingly improved my Arabic. Their patience and 
corrections have taught me much; I am indebted to them all and most eager for their 
reactions to this write-up. I want in particular to recognize the attentive respect with 
which Boikutt and Shahid ʿAyan treated me and this project from the very beginning.  
In addition to the formal interviews conducted over the years, informal 
conversations with Mohammed Jabali, Rasha Hilwi, Mohamad Ismail, Nidal El Khairy, 
Yazan Ashqar, Abdellah Smita, Jackson Allers, Hassan Denaoui (Big Hass), Mohammed 
Zakaria, Tia Thorpe, Beesan Ramadan, Majdal Nijim, Myriam Fares, Faysal Bibi, Salim 
Abu Jabal, Walaaʾ Al Qaisiya, Tania El Khoury, Samer Al-Amaari, Siwar Masannat, 
Hala Ramadan, Dragana Kaurin, Nizar Ghanem, Dalia Abdaljawad, Racha Najdi, Hanna 
Nomadin, and Abdallah Shami were indispensable to my thinking, especially about 




At the GC, Nicole Berkin, Eero Laine, Julia Goldstein, Stefanie Jones, Donatella 
Gallela, Elizabeth Adams, Andrew Friedman, Kate Wilson, Catherine Young, Khaled Al-
Hilli, Mohammed Ezzeldin, Douaa Sheet, and Brad Krumholz shared much of this 
journey with me and their companionship, insight, and critiques have been an important 
part of my development. Outside of CUNY, I have cherished collaborations and 
conversations with Leila Tayyeb, Layal Ftouni, Sara Mourad, Mezna Qato, Susan 
MacDougall, Christine Sargent, Omar al-Ghazzi, Yaqeen Abdelmagid, George Potter, 
Gabriel Varghese, Kristin Flade, Cristina Moreno Almeida, and Tawfiq Haddad. To be 
able to be part of the formal conversations they elaborate is one of the compelling reasons 
to continue this work.  
My intellectual journey over the course of this degree has also been intimately 
wrapped up with a political one. Conor Tomás Reed, Carly Smith, Eero Laine, Stefanie 
Jones, Zoltán Gluck, Manissa McCleave-Maharawal, Alyson Spurgas, Jen Tang, 
Dominique Nisperos, Elizabeth Adams, Kalle Westerling, Héctor Rivera, Hillary 
Richard, and so many others were part of a transformation in how I see both education 
and political engagement – one I doubt very much would have taken place were I not a 
student and a teacher at CUNY. I owe so much of the future in and of education I 
envision to the struggles we elaborated in countless assemblies, collaborations, and 
marches in the streets, parks, and classrooms of New York. 
In Palestine and Jordan, friendships with Lilian Volat, Katja Jelliseva, Falastine 
Dwikat, Jasmin Saleh, Omar Qassis, William Abboud, Raya Ziada, Hamed Abu Shindi, 
and Hana Alnajjab were built far from home during periods of acute self-doubt. They 




to me. William’s detainment by the IDF came as a unique kind of shock in early 2015. 
The resilience with which his friends have taught me to approach the ordeal has been of 
the most important political lesson in years.    
Finally, I am fortunate that the project of the dissertation also coincided with the 
expansion of my immediate and extended family. In Palestine, love and warmth from 
Abdo and Iman Taji, their daughters Dima and Muna, and Iman’s parents Fayza and 
Farouq helped me feel at home in a place that startled me with its strangeness. I feel 
inordinately lucky to have met ʿAmmo Farouq before he passed in 2015. His and Aunti 
Fayza’s recollections of my grandfather were an unexpected gift of particular intimacy in 
Palestine.  
In New York, Tamara Maisashvili and Marine Burjanadze accepted me 
immediately and trusted me without question. Testimony to the selflessness they 
regularly demonstrate could fill volumes. In Tbilisi, Nodar Maisashvili tolerated the most 
dense and exhausting period of my writing as if it were all the most normal kind of 
everyday. The three of them have been steady, perceptive, incredibly patient, and 
important supporters, as well as generous hosts. 
 
* * * 
 
If, one day, I am able to mentor a student the way that Maurya Wickstrom has me 
I will perhaps feel that a cycle has come full circle. But I will still owe her a great debt. 
Her insistence in bringing out what she saw in me and in this project often baffled even 




because she insisted that I be committed to it. Her willingness to repeatedly engage with 
both my ideas and my written expression pushed me beyond what I thought I was 
capable. Maurya’s commitment to mentorship would have been a gift at any time and in 
any place. But in the trying past few years that she has navigated personally and through 
the continual pinching of public education that characterizes CUNY of late, the 
preciousness and tenacity of her commitment are all the more obvious.  
 My mother Anmar Faruqi El Zein has tried the hardest throughout this process to 
stay close to me. I fear she has faced the worst of the arrogance or coldness my 
questioning about the shape of the world sometimes carried with it. In some ways she 
understood better than others what I was going through, despite what seemed like the 
growing distance between us that the process brought. She will be the happiest perhaps, 
that this chapter is concluding. My father Muhammed Bachar El Zein father continues to 
surprise me with how precisely he can interpret my feelings. My attention to affect in 
politics perhaps ultimately stems from the emotional logic – the rational empathy – I feel 
he imparts on the world. My sister Danya and I have grown so much from when I started 
this project that it seems foolish to try to summarize how our relationship influenced my 
writing and research. Our cousin Kinda Akash has similarly accompanied and borne 
witness to the ups and downs of this process. Danya and Kinda’s company and example 
as well as those of our other cousins remind me of a world outside of academia that is 
also intimately connected to the political quagmires of New York and Beirut. They are 
part of a very dear network of extended family that daily sustain me via a host of 




deserves special recognition for assisting me in identifying some musical terms and 
structures.  
So many times in the past five years, the quiet company of George Maisashvili 
has calmed me and kept me going. He has been a very solid, very important source of 
strength, integrity, generosity, and compassion. In the years of researching and writing 
this study, we have built a relationship of which I am fiercely proud and upon which I 
very much depend. All the books, theories, and hours in the classroom in nearly thirty 
years of formal education have indeed sharpened my tools for critical observation and 
helped me to shape competing passions. And yet I find myself learning over, every new 
day, how to really understand and how to actually stand next to another human being. I 
am as in love with him and as grateful for his love in my life as I am humbled by the 
lessons and the practice we forge together. 
 
 
Rayya Sunayma El Zein 
 




















Readers should note that almost without exception, the Arabic in this study is 
Palestinian, Jordanian, Syrian, or Lebanese colloquial, not Modern Standard Arabic. In 
rendering this Arabic into the Roman alphabet, I have followed the simplified 
transliteration schema now common in academic studies in English of the Arab world, 
which follows the guide of the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies but leaves 
off the diacritics. When the letter # appears in the middle or end of a word I have used the 
common French transliteration pattern “ou” to differentiate from the sound of the plain 
“u” without having to resort to diacritics. So, the Syrian playwright would be 
transliterated as Mohammed al-Maghout, not Mohammed al-Maghut. Except in the 
prepositions fi and bi, the long $ is for the most part rendered “ee.” 
The rest of my adjustments reflect the phonetics of the colloquial in question and 
local spellings for commonly transliterated words and names. The letter % appears as “g” 
in the name of Gamal Abd Al-Nasser, following the Egyptian colloquial adopted in this 
instance. (Here, it sounds like the “g” in “game.”) The letter % also appears as a “g” in the 
common transliteration used in Lebanon of “Gemmayzeh” and in Gaafar Touffar’s stage 
name, as the artist himself uses. (Here the “g” sounds like the g in “George.”) The rest of 
the time, % is transliterated as “j.” I retained the qaf, even if it was not aspirated. I 
reflected the elision of some letters in definite article constructions, so as-siyaseh, not al-
siyaseh. The & I rendered ah or eh, reflecting pronunciation. Al and el are used 




The letter ) I have transliterated as [ʿ] with the exception of the musicians that 
have already romanized their names by using the number “3,” as is common on social 
media. El Far3i, Morabba3, Bil3ax, and Mashrou3 Leila follow this transliteration 
pattern. Readers should infer the Arabic letter ʿain, not the English number three. 
Similarly, the Lebanese protest movement “You Stink” is transliterated as “Tol3et 
Ri7etkom,” following the additional substitution of the number seven for the letter ha [*]. 
Commonly transliterated words are rendered without the [ʿ], as in “Amman” and 
“Abdullah.” Finally, when musicians transliterate their own names without an additional 
marker for the letter ʿain (as in Asifeh and Shua), I followed their preferences. When 
musicians include an apostrophe [‘], I used the [ʿ], as in Muqataʿa and Sheʿrab. 
When lyrics were provided by the artists I did not change or adjust the texts. 
When I transcribed lyrics myself or included transliterated excerpts from interviews, I 
reproduced the dialect heard in the recording. Which is to say, I made no attempt to make 
spoken or written Arabic conform to MSA. In notes and bibliographic entries, titles of 
songs and video clips given in Arabic are in italics. When the title is given in romanized 
script, it is not italicized. Full-length translations are collaborations with the artists, 
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This study is about politics in Arabic rap that are manifest in the affective 
dynamics and material negotiations during rap concerts. I analyze Arab hip hop culture in 
the context of three different but related histories of urban, cosmopolitan, middle class 
growth, and gentrification. In this dissertation, I build an ethnomusicological framework 
rooted in participant observation and performance theory in order to compare concert 
conditions, audience behavior, and accessibility of music production in Ramallah, 
Amman, and Beirut.  
The introduction that follows sketches the general terrain within which I consider 
the theoretical and ethnographic research that follows to operate. Research questions 
guide my use of feeling as a theoretical tool in the study of cultural production. In asking 
these, I begin to situate how I use “feeling” – both as a noun (a specific affect engendered 
by specific pieces or by particular live concerts) and as a verb (a process of sensation, 
used to discern what I call politics in process). In the first section, I identify the 
theoreticians of affect and cultural studies with whom I consider myself in dialogue in 
proposing this approach to rap performances in the Arab world. 
I also contextualize my pursuit of “politics” in a study of Arab cultural 
production. In the second section, I outline some of the stakes of locating the “political” 
in both Arabic and English language studies. This traces the emphasis on “modernity” as 




atmosphere in which most English language research on the Middle East has taken place. 
I conclude this introduction with brief outlines of each of the five chapters that follow.  
 
 
Part One: Affective Research 
 
 
I try to ignore it/ but politics she pulls at me/ I tell her, let go, 
I’m not interested!/ She tells me, I am part of your life, you 
won’t be able to resist me.  
 ~The Ramallah Underground1 
 
A 2008 recording by the Ramallah Underground, “From the Cave” [“Min il 
kaheff”] closes with a refrain that prefigures an internal monologue between the speaker 
and a woman, “Politics.” Stormtrap raps, “I try to pay no heed, but Politics, she draws me 
back. I tell her, ‘Let go of me! I am not interested.’ She responds, ‘I am a part of your 
life, you won’t be able to resist me.’” Others have identified this refrain as indicative of 
political ambivalence. For example, while arguing for the need to trouble the “resistance” 
attributed to Palestinian rappers, Ted Swedenburg suggests that this refrain 
communicates ambivalence about the artists’ political convictions (which they spend the 
preceding verses laying out) or even a certain “regret” about the conditions in which they 
                                                
1 “Ramallah Underground – ‘Min il Kaheff,’” YouTube video clip, 4:20, posted by “Unkown Solider of the 
Sick Side Army,” July 21, 2009, accessed January 10, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A7EtoUO9V-c. For a complete translation of the entire track, see 
Loubna Bilali and the Ramallah Underground, “Min el Kaheff,” in “Exploring Popular Literature: Arabic 





live (wouldn’t it be easier to be a musician somewhere else?). 2 Somewhat differently, I 
suggest it is a particularly excellent example of the capacity of this musical genre to 
conduct very powerful political feeling.  
This need not construct a framework for a binary interpretation of this refrain or 
others – a debate about whether or not it is political. Rather, I want to point to different 
ways that politics may be located, felt, and understood via the emotions and sensations 
aroused by interacting with this content. Ramallah Underground’s refrain frames the 
emotional pull that is present in political deliberation. It spins and inverts the Palestinian 
proverb “Politics runs in our blood,”3 instead illustrating a political process that does not 
champion (a) specific political objective(s). In doing so, it calls for the recognition of a 
feeling or emotional experience that can have a powerful affect on the listener. 
I remember that I was in public the first time I heard “Min il Kaheff” and I could 
not stop myself from crying. The recognition and voiced articulation of an internal debate 
over political engagement was both comforting and devastating. At other moments, 
different verses in this piece elicited other strong emotional or physical reactions – 
elation, clenching my fists, grinding my teeth, the urge to shout, the need to be alone, the 
desire to be with others. Conversations with other fans and performers of the genre 
suggest this personal experience is not unique to me or to this track. Others relate similar 
private experiences with other pieces of Arabic rap, and artists recount the impact of 
more public displays of these feelings during live performances. This process of 
                                                
2 Swedenburg’s chapter has been influential in spurring many of the questions that I pursue in this project. 
Ted Swedenburg, “Against the Struggle Paradigm,” in Popular Culture in the Middle East and North 
Africa: A Post-Colonial Outlook, eds. Mounira Solimon and Walid El Hamamsy (New York: Routledge, 
2013), 17-32. 
 
3 Qtd. in Helga Tawil-Souri, “The Necessary Politics of Palestinian Cultural Studies,” in Arab Cultural 




interacting with the material is not only affective but productively political, not 
withstanding the fact that, like the refrain quoted above, the lyrics do not always clearly 
articulate a specific political project.  
The experience interacting with this track in recording and others during live 
concerts drives in part the theoretical approach to ethnographic research I have pursued in 
this dissertation. The feeling generated listening to tracks like Ramallah Underground’s 
“Min el Kaheff” I call political feeling. These are instances of “emotional blending” 
generated by the various sonic elements in a recording – the samples, the beat, and the 
lyrical content – together with elements of performance – the tone of the rapper’s voice, 
and (in live performance) the gestures that accompany the verbal “spitting” of lyrics. 
These, as in the example I have offered here, evoke what the eighteenth-century scholar 
Murtada al-Zabidi called “the stirring of both joy and sorrow in the listener.”4 Al-Zabidi 
called this tarab – an ethnomusicological term with considerable history in Arab musical 
performance, religious recitation, and spiritual contexts. Tarab may seem alien to the 
technological “modernity” of hip hop and rap musical production, or the “post-modern” 
hybridization that rap in Arabic seems to embody.5 My proposition that tarab may exist 
in some Arabic rap concerts is the subject of a lengthy exploration in Chapter Two: 
                                                
4 Qtd. in Lois Ibsen al Faruqi, An Annotated Glossary of Arabic Musical Terms (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1981), 350. 
 
5 I am leaning here on the relationship of modernity to the use of technology that Tarik Sabry describes in 
Cultural Encounters in the Arab World: On Media, the Modern, and the Everyday (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2010), 19, and note 10, 196; and on Timothy Taylor and Simon Frith’s discussions of hybridity in so-called 
“World Music” since the mid 1980s. (See Timothy Taylor, “Some Versions of Difference: Discourses of 
Hybridity in Transnational Musics,” in Beyond Exoticism: Western Music and the World [Durham: Duke 
UP, 2007], Kindle edition; and Simon Frith, “The Discourse of World Music,” in Western Music and its 
Others: Difference, Representation, and Appropriation in Music, ed. Georgina Born and David 





Feeling Politics.6 Before we consider this proposal in more detail in that chapter, I 




“A mysterious force that everyone feels and no philosopher has explained… a 
force, not a labor… that surges up from the soles of the feet.”7 This is how Frederico 
García Lorca described the duende, the “dark sounds” that he argued reverberate with 
anarchic energy in Andalusian music and Spanish poetry. Ethnomusicologist A.J. Racy 
compares the duende with tarab. Both duende and tarab are concepts that speak to 
emotional engagement with embodied or vocalized creative expression (music, poetry, 
and dance) and have been analyzed in various musical and poetic contexts. One of the 
interesting intersections between duende and tarab is philosophers’ hesitancy to define 
them as a single emotion, sensation, or feeling.8 As such, the historical debates around 
tarab and duende are examples of the attempt to theorize affects generated by 
                                                
6 I acknowledge that the enthomusicological literature on music and trance is extensive, a review of which I 
return to in abbreviated form in Chapter Two (see for example, Gilbert Rouget, Music and Trance: A 
Theory of the Relations between Music and Possession [Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1985]; Judith Becker, 
Deep Listeners: Music, Emotion, and Trancing [Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2004]; and David Aldridge and 
Jörg Fachner, eds., Music and Altered States: Consciousness, Transcendence, Therapy, and Addictions 
[London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2005]). I single out duende and tarab of many other terms that refer 
to heightened emotion in different musical practices around the world because of the political resonances 
Lorca ascribed to the duende and the long and engaged history of traditional Arabic music and classical 
poetry and its attention to the arousal of an emotional state. As my analysis will make clear, it is less the 
loss of consciousness typically discussed in the arousal of “trance” that I am interested in analyzing here 
than how the rational processes of interpreting political ideas that are communicated as emotions or 
consumed as pleasurable bodily sensations.  
 
7 Frederico García Lorca, “Theory and Play of the Duende,” trans. A.S. Kline, accessed January 10, 2014, 
http://www.poetryintranslation.com/klineaslorcaduende.htm. 
 
8 For a concise summation of this debate around tarab see A.J. Racy, Making Music in the Arab World: 





performance. Tarab is frequently described as a mix of melancholy and elation.9 Lorca 
says the duende brings “totally new and fresh sensations” and “never repeats itself.”10 
Racy suggests both terms try to explain an affective “transformative blending,” where 
“new blends that are no longer identifiable in terms of their inner, mostly emotional, 
ingredients, or are no longer emotional in the familiar sense.”11 In other words, tarab and 
duende describe an affective process that plays with emotion and transforms it into 
something else. 
But what something else? The curiosity that attempts to track the evasiveness of 
this content drives an interdisciplinary approach in my research and is influenced by the 
so-called “affective turn” in critical thought.12 Borrowing from Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s explorations of the machinic body and built off the philosophical work of 
Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson, the critical concept of “affect” explores the 
“straddling,” as Michael Hardt has put it, of the long-held, cleanly segregated categories 
of mind and body, reason and emotion. 13 Constructed as opposite ends of unbridgeable 
poles in the Cartesian philosophical tradition, the harkening back to Spinoza has been 
used to open up critical thinking to an investigation of the subject as an open, as opposed 
                                                
9 Ibid., 205. 
10 Lorca, “Theory and Play,” 19. 
 
11 Racy, Making Music in the Arab World, 203. 
 
12 Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley, eds., The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham: Duke 
UP, 2007), 1-33. 
 





to closed, system.14 The philosophical as well as political aspects of this trajectory of 
thought as productive in how I conceive of the theoretical constructs in my project. 
 “Emotion,” “feeling,” and “sensation” are almost used interchangeably in this 
literature. “Emotions” typically refer to a state of mind or a mood, often involving a 
physical reaction or state (shaking, tears, etc), or a particularly intense feeling. “Feeling” 
is frequently associated, as Teresa Brennan notes, with “sensations that have found the 
right match in words”: love, shame, or anger, for example.15 “Sensation,” in turn, is 
sometimes used to describe physical manifestations of those feelings: the light step in 
love, the heavy heart in shame, or the hot head in anger. It is in particular the definitions 
of “sensation” that I find particularly evocative in these studies – what Brian Massumi 
describes, following Leibniz, as the “perception of perception.”16 Teresa Brennan 
deepens an understanding of this awareness of feelings, emotions, and affects by 
developing the concept of “discernment” – “a process whereby affects pass from the state 
of sensory registration to a state of cognitive or intelligent reflection.”17 My attention to 
feeling politics builds upon Brennan’s and Massumi’s work, furthering their elaborations 
of “sensation” and “discernment” with the formulation of my own theoretical concept 
that calls attention to the ways that certain affects are felt and discussed in cultural 
                                                
14 In addition, the so-called “affective turn” has elaborated discussions of power and ideology. This analysis 
combines Marxist critique with Foucauldian and post-Foucauldian analyses of control. Feminist studies’ 
theoretical focus on the body and queer studies’ theoretical emphasis on emotion are clear precursors of 
this aspect of the “affective turn.” 
 
15 Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004), 5. 
 
16 Brian Massumi, Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham: Duke UP, 2002), 14 and 
note 11, 258. 
 





production.18 I suggest theorizing affective engagements (the experiences of tarab or 
duende) as political processes in order to unsettle, and offer alternatives to, dominant 
models of locating “politics” in cultural production. Doing so pushes discussions of 
political agency in cultural production as well as theorizations of the transmission of 
affect in live performance in new directions.  
In other words, the presence of a political feeling is important. In the case studies 
that follow, I identify feelings of disgust, resignation, ambivalence, caution, and others in 
the concerts and recordings of the artists I study. But I also suggest that the awareness or 
sensing of this feeling are equally important in that it points us to politics in process. 
Analyzing these political feelings by feeling politics is an ethnographic method that 
factors the material realities of urban change and contextualizes concerts and concert 
venues within them. As I elaborate in more detail in Chapter Two, feeling politics is an 
ethnographic procedure to discern, analyze, and understand political feeling, or affective 
content. Pointing to politics in process, feeling politics borrows from Raymond William’s 
formulations of “emergent” and “pre-emergent” forms while it is in dialogue with other 





                                                
18 Brennan, Transmission of Affect; Massumi, Parables of the Virtual. I also lean on Sara Ahmed’s efforts 
to pay attention to how emotion and affect are implicated in the rational assessments of politics. (Ahmed, 
The Cultural Politics of Emotion [New York: Routledge, 2004].)  
 







In excavating the political feelings generated by some Arabic rap, I position the 
experiences of listening to and performing this creative content as tantamount. That is, 
my study of the development of politics in Arabic rap is an analysis of the processes of 
cultural production – as opposed to a more traditional analysis of cultural products as 
political artifacts. In contrast to much contemporary scholarship on the so-called “Arab 
Spring” that celebrates in rap lyrics, graffiti tags, and other products of youth culture the 
sudden appearance of new politics, my research instead analyzes how the practices of 
some of these creative expressions contribute to the development of other politics. That is 
to say, I am less interested in the presentation of works of art, within which it is possible 
to read symbolic or literal politics (what Williams called the “fixed, finite, receding 
forms”) than in the political experiences of audiences and performers when they engage 
with each other under the context of this genre of cultural production.20  
In this, my approach finds productive traction with William’s location of the 
“active and pressing but not yet fully articulated” that he frames as “structures of 
feeling.”21 In this research, paying attention to politics in process is not pinning lyrical or 
performative work in some Arabic rap to a specific correlate in political action or 
political efficacy. Rather, it testifies to the particular textures of deliberation, negotiation, 
and hesitating that rarely are accompanied with spectacular political action. I explore 
political action and visibility as politics in Chapter One: Locating Politics. My theoretical 
                                                
20 Ibid., 129. 
 





engagement in that chapter is related to my conceptualization of agency in the listening 
behavior of rap audiences. 
Studies of performance have recently identified the limitation that expectations to 
overcome spectator passivity have placed on determining a piece’s political 
effectiveness.22 An emphasis on the affective experiences during performances of Arabic 
rap allows me to consider the dynamics between spectators, and between spectators and 
performers, without reducing these interactions to readings of their “passivity” or 
“activity.” This follows Jacques Rancière’s encouragement that  
Everywhere there are starting points, intersections and junctions that 
enable us to learn something new if we refuse, firstly, radical distance, 
secondly the distribution of roles, and thirdly the boundaries between 
territories. We do not  have to transform spectators into actors… we have 
to recognize the knowledge at work… in the activity peculiar to the 
spectator.23  
 
Focusing on affective exchanges in live performances of Arabic rap thus allows me to 
consider the generative politics present as not confined to the genius of the art product 
(the lyrical rap), the person of the performer, or the radical action of the spectator taken 
as a result.  
My attention to affect in the experiences of performers and fans also differentiates 
the study that follows from literature on subcultures or “scenes” that emphasize the 
transgressive power of “resistance” in the execution of individual style. My own 
approach diverges from this dominant model in subculture studies (I will return to this 
                                                
22 See for example, Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship (New 
York: Verso, 2012), 37-38; and Maurya Wickstrom, Performance in the Blockades of Neoliberalism: 
Thinking the Political Anew (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 102-103. Both authors refer to 
Jacques Rancière’s analysis of “the paradox of the spectator” in The Emancipated Spectator, trans. Gregory 
Elliott (New York: Verso, 2009), 2-23. 
 





below). However, unlike the “post-subcultures” critiques that reify (intersectional or 
inter-subcultural) identity,24 I lean on Jasbir Puar’s work on queerness as “assemblage” as 
a way to reassess performances of agency. Puar’s postulation of assemblage as a way to 
“underscore feeling, tactility, ontology, affect, and information” in the construction of 
“self” and “other”25 (and the blurring of the boundaries between them) is useful in the 
theorization of the affective experiences of audiences and performers that I offer in this 
dissertation. I suggest understanding politics in Arabic rap not through the representations 
of resistance through style, or agents’ performances of visible political positionings, but 
in an analysis of emotional excess produced in live performance.  
In the development of this affective model I am influenced by the pioneering 
work of several scholars who have built in the theorization of cultural production in the 
Arab world invigorated models for the location and assessment of politics. The attention 
to affect in Tarek El-Ariss, Charles Hirschkind, and Marc Schade Poulsen’s studies of 
Arab literatures, listening cultures, and music respectively have proved inspirational to 
this project. El-Ariss’s development of the notion of “hacking” as a strategy of modern 
living, Hirschkind’s respect, in advocating for listening as political practice, for what he 
calls “visceral modes of appraisal,” and Schade-Poulsen’s explorations of not only what 
“people have done [to rai music, but]… what it does to people” have been for me 
                                                
24 See especially David Muggleton, Inside Subculture: The Postmodern Meaning of Style (New York: 
Oxford, 2000); David Muggleton and Rupert Weinzierl, eds., The Post-Subcultures Reader (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2004); Andy Bennett and Keth Kahn-Harris, eds., After Subculture: Critical 
Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
 





examples of inventive and curiosity-driven ways to invent terminology that gropes for the 
something else felt in cultural production.26  
The model that I propose in this research proposes paying particular attention to 
the ways in which performances produce affect. That is, I focus on how performances of 
Arabic rap affect bodies and the interactions between them and point to the generative 
“inbetween-ness” between bodies and consciousnesses that Spinoza considered emotion 
and affect to be capable of defining.27 Focusing on affect, on the ability to affect and be 
affected, is central in the philosophical recalibration of the subject as an open system. 
Beyond the capacities of a single body or the symbolic actions of a collective, 
considering affect encourages the recognition of the significance of a prescriptive grid or 
force-field within which a single body may be found. Massumi suggests “adding 
movement to stasis is about as easy as multiplying a number by zero and getting a 
positive product.”28 The likelihood, in other words, of cultural production to rouse 
audiences from apathetic slumber and direct them into political action is improbable. 
Locating the ability of Arabic rap to conduct political feeling instead asks how 
performance can be understood to be involved in the disintegration of this prescriptive 
grid, leaving bodies and relationships aware of each other in different ways. What would 
a youth politics that was not “resistance” look like in Palestine or in Lebanon? Can such a 
                                                
26 Tarek El-Ariss, Trials of Arab Modernity: Literary Affects and the New Political (New York: Fordham 
UP, 2013); Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics 
(New York: Columbia UP, 2006); Marc Schade-Poulsen, Men and Popular Music in Algeria: The Social 
Significance of Rai (Austin: U of Texas P, 1999), 13.  
 
27 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (Stillwell, KS: Digireads Publishing, 2008). 
 





thing be conceived of? And if not why? What might forcing the question do to a 
conceptualization of “politics” in the Arab world?  
Before moving on to elaborate further what these “politics” may look like, two 
general research questions further guide what I consider the significance of this affective 
approach to the research that follows. Moving into the next section of this Introduction, 
which considers an overview of politics in Arab cultural production, I elaborate how a 
theoretical emphasis on the recognition of emotion and feeling in live performances of 
Arabic rap and hip hop can be put to the service of understanding political production in 
this genre. I begin by asking: how is political feeling is located?  
This question underlines a very basic distinction. It points to the critical difference 
between studying the process of the appearance of a political feeling and studying 
political feeling tout court. This distinction is important in how I see the politics of my 
own research functioning. That “some” groups seem to possess greater or lesser degrees 
of emotion is a cultural conundrum that Sara Ahmed has addressed while emphasizing 
what emotion does. In the study that follows, I too am reflecting on the processes of 
sensing emotions, as opposed to the simpler admission or location of their presence.29 
This is important in a study of Arab youth culture where agents are already assumed to be 
more political or more emotional (susceptible to affect) than agents elsewhere.30 In 
chapter one I elaborate in further detail how histories of representing the “authentic” and 
                                                
29 Sara Ahmed, Cultural Politics of Emotion. 
 
30 In his recent study on “authenticity” in Syrian music, for example, Jonathan Shannon argues that a 
comprehension of Syrian modernity is incomplete without understanding the “Oriental spirit” and the 
enhanced emotionality it provides Syrian subjects: “Indeed, emotion if not emotionality is in many ways 
the centerpiece of the aesthetics and kinesthetics of musical and other modes of performance in Syria, and 
this accounts for the centrality of sentiment in what I am arguing are the outlines of a Syrian alternative 
modernity” (Shannon, Among the Jasmine Trees: Music and Modernity in Contemporary Syria 




the “exotic” play into interpretations of Arabic rap in the neoliberal global media and I 
explore how trajectories of Orientalism may apply to the relatively recent attribution of 
“political” and “resistant” as positive qualifiers to Arab youth. 
In asking how political affect is located, I can thus ask more specifically: what are 
the implicit presumptions when one declares, in positive terms, that Arab rappers 
“resist”? What is so immediately laudable about an Arab youth who raps, yet so easily 
dismissible (as commercialized, violent, misogynist, among others) about a black or 
Latin@ youth who engages in the same type of performance? These questions point to 
the need to understand what is happening when certain cultural agents are identified “as” 
political. What is the Arab rapper presumed to be resisting and how? Asking these 
questions leads me to wonder if the framework of laudable “resistance” applied to Arab 
artists has the potential to alter or even mollify pointed criticisms and productive affects 
they offer in their work. Further: how does it affect how one may read critical differences 
between performers? These questions stem from asking how political affect is located. 
The second general question that frames my approach to affective research is: 
how are politics recognized in specific cultural production? This is similar to but 
distinguishable from the first question in that while the former asks how politics come to 
be associated with specific players (in this case, Arab youth), the latter asks how politics 
are recognized in specific genres (namely rap and hip hop). I wonder, for example: why 
has electronic music in Beirut not garnered the political attention that rap has – despite 
being performed at many of the same venues, relying on the creativity of many of the 
same producers, and attracting similar audiences? Asking this question recognizes that 




strategies. It does not just exist, but is built, communicated, and shared through specific 
experiences.  
In this research, localizing Arabic rap aesthetically helps to address this question. 
I acknowledge that rap builds and borrows from other international as well as local art 
and music cultures and has expanded beyond the traditionally identified originators of hip 
hop’s beginnings in the Bronx. Electronic and experimental music, traditions of Arabic 
poetry, more “commercial” hip hop sounds form the corpus of influence of contemporary 
Arabic rap. I place particular emphasis on embodied practices during live performances 
and the shared and different qualitative affects in Arabic rap and its neighboring 
performance genres. I elaborate in particular the affective choreography of live rap 
performances. This is not an analysis of break dancing sometimes associated with hip hop 
culture, but rather an attempt to locate the gestures by which political feeling is made 
manifest. By paying attention to gestures and to a wide range of influences, I recalibrate a 
definition of hip hop or rap “culture”31 in each of the cities studied here. In so doing, I 
construct an alternative framework for understanding some contemporary Arabic rap as 
political activity, one that is particularly attune to corporeal practices and techniques and 
habits of reception.  
How is political feeling located? and how are politics affiliated with certain forms 
of expression? are questions to which I have returned over the course of this study, when 
attempting to shake out the particularities of the political feelings I describe. Having 
                                                
31 “Hip hop culture” refers to the intersecting energy made manifest in lyrical raps, beat boxing, graffiti, 
and break dancing. See, among others: Jeff Chang, Can’t Stop Won’t Stop: A History of the Hip-Hop 
Generation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2005); Murray Forman and Mark Anthony Neal, eds., That’s 
the Joint! The Hip Hop Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 2004); H. Samy Alim, Awad Ibrahim, 
Alastair Pennycook, eds. Global Linguistic Flows: Hip Hop Cultures, Youth Identities, and the Politics of 





elaborated an initial field of theory within which this study is situated, I now move to 
sketch another. The question of politics has been a regular concern of cultural theorists 
writing about the Arab world. In the next section I consider the different but connected 
Arab and Anglophone intellectual contexts which illustrate the stakes surrounding the 
near constant assessment of “politics” in Arab cultural studies. 
 
 
Part Two: Politics in Arab Cultural Studies 
 
Debates about modernity – how to enter it, how to re-invent it, and what it may 
mean in the Arab world – have been central currents in Arab thought since the Nahda.32 
Recent analysis has argued that this preoccupation with modernity is a product of – 
sometimes directly responding to, sometimes indirectly influenced by – global 
configurations of power in which the Arab world has frequently found itself at the 
contested center. Ibrahim Abu-Rabiʿ suggests “…[I]t is quite impossible and indeed 
unrealistic to grasp the social and intellectual dynamics of the modern Arab world in 
isolation from other world factors.”33 These factors have consisted of the struggles to 
overthrow imperial occupations; fights against continued colonial presences even after 
the evacuation of those imperial powers; contests over local control of resources in post-
colonial contexts; struggles against poverty, corruption, and weak states; or against 
nepotism, cronyism, and authoritarian states (frequently propped up by neocolonial 
                                                
32 Nahda, literally “awakening,” describes the cultural and intellectual renaissance that spread across the 
Arab world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
33 Ibrahim Abu- Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History 





presences).34 The debates over Arab modernity have been waged by political, cultural, 
sociological, economic, and religious players in intellectual, state, and popular 
discourses. Here I want to look at what debates over and about modernity in analyses of 
cultural production signal in the ways Arab intellectuals have located the political 
possibility in literature, theatre, music, and other cultural production. 
Tarik Sabry suggests the preoccupation with “modernity” among Arab 
intellectuals has effectively delimited interest in non-literary or more everyday cultural 
production.35 “Dominant discourses in contemporary Arab thought,” he argues “are more 
concerned with structuring and orchestrating narratives of becoming than with the kind of 
being they are anxious to deliver from wretchedness and ahistoricity.”36 In so doing, 
seemingly “non modern” practices and habits that do not fit this narrative are necessarily 
sidelined and ignored. At the same time, Arab scholars have found in the poetry of Nizar 
Qabbani and Adonis, tarab musical culture, turath folklore, and the politico-religious 
discourses of the Muslim Brotherhood, among others, the seeds or the tools for a 
homegrown resistance against a stronger, usually Western, increasingly USonian, 
opponent.37 In these analyses, Arab intellectuals have found essential traits of Arab 
                                                
34 For a more detailed overview, see Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in 
Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia UP, 2010), 2. 
 
35 Indeed, as Sinan Antoon, Boaz Shoshan, and others have suggested, the sidelining of an entire history of 
more popular literature for centuries can be understood in this light. See Antoon, The Poetics of the 
Obscene in Premodern Arabic Poetry: Ibn al-Hajjaj and Sukhf (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) and 
Boaz Shoshan, Popular Culture in Medieval Cairo (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993).  
 
36 Sabry, Cultural Encounters, 23-42. 
 
37 The configuration of power that asserts itself across the Arab world today is no doubt international. 
However, the central role and the uncontested power of the US, especially perhaps in the context of the US-
led invasion of Iraq, has led many scholars to identify US power and culture identify in particular as a 
hegemonic force. Ibrahim Abu-Rabi‘ summarizes, “Pax Americana seems to be a de facto system of 




culture and identity in particular forms or cultural products. As such, they are hailed as 
powerful tools with which to counter the cultural effects of globalization and 
neocolonialism.38 These studies quickly attain pointed and powerful political 
significance, specifically because they frequently adopt established political narratives. 
As Sabry explains:  
Due to the external threats from Western imperialism and Zionism, it was, 
and still is, much more fashionable for Arab intellectuals to contextualize 
their work on ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ within frames of nationalistic, pan-
Arab and pan-Islamist discourses… Attempts to de-essentialize Arab 
‘culture’ and ‘identity’ have also been equated with treason, abandonment 
of the Palestinian question and the pan-Arab project.39 
 
Often within the context of a debate about modernity, the contemporary analysis of Arab 
culture in Arabic has been frequently conceived of as a specific kind of political project: 
where culture is a tool with which to, or which reveals the means to, counter US-Western 
hegemony.40  
Despite a chasm that has long separated Arab and US/European intellectuals, and 
very different institutional structures,41 it is significant that scholars writing in other 
languages also identify “what modernity is” for the Arab subject as a major concern in 
                                                                                                                                            
economic/political critiques. (Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab 
Intellectual History, 5, see also note 21, 376). 
 
38 See Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History, 57; and 
Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique, 3. 
 
39 Sabry, Cultural Encounters, 48. 
 
40 To encourage the visibility of frequently sidelined, alternative approaches, Kassab devotes a volume’s 
worth of energy on what she calls the “growth of critique” (Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought, 2); Sabry 
outlines scholarly work he calls “anti-essentialist,” which champions the concept of “tajawuz – a 
philosophy promising to surpass the duality problematic between modernity and heritage,” led by the works 
of Abdelkabir Khatibi (Sabry, Cultural Encounters, 33); and Abu-Rabiʿ’s edited volume works to bring 
greater attention to the work of what he calls the much ignored scholars of “critical thought” (Abu-Rabiʿ, 
Contemporary Arab Thought, xiv). 
 
41 An intellectual quandary that both Kassab and Abu-Rabiʿ explicitly foreground and strive to address in 




sociological, literary, and other cultural analyses. Even when the author’s stakes are not 
countering or defeating US-Western power, dozens of texts in English make arguments 
for particular types, incarnations, or performances of Arab “modernity.” Many of these 
studies include assessments of various media – travel, the Internet, television, film, social 
media, music, etc.; in them, authors attempt to describe or redefine how Egyptians, 
Lebanese, Syrians, Algerians, and others relate to the contemporary world vis-à-vis the 
production and circulation of various media.  
Importantly, in defining “modernity” or hadatha, authors in both Arabic and 
English languages frequently juxtapose this concept with that of “tradition” [asala] or 
“heritage” [turath]. Even when authors argue for a hybrid approach to these concepts, 
combining new and old elements to create a particular “modernity” unique to a specific 
part of the Arab world in a particular moment, the emphasis on the rapprochement 
between two poles on a binary is clearly felt. In English, many of these analyses, 
alongside other postcolonial scholarship, have worked to expand the hegemonic 
perceptions of “the modern” associated with the so-called “Global North” to include 
certain kinds of being emanating from the so-called “Global South.” For example, 
Jonathan Shannon theorizes “alternative Syrian modernity” in his study of emotion and 
music.42 Studies of Arab media in particular have engaged questions of modernity in a 
globalized context since the 1990s.43 
In both languages, thus constituting a significant global understanding of Arab 
poets, musicians, and audiences, Arab culture is frequently understood to stage a contest 
                                                
42 Shannon, Among the Jasmine Trees. See note 30. 
 
43 Marwan Kraidy elaborates on this in his Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life 





between competing pulls of tradition and modernity.44 This overwhelmingly central 
polemic has profoundly affected the ways in which an Arab cultural product’s “politics” 
might be interpreted. Different nuances of the arguments not withstanding, political 
resonances have frequently been determined by the degree to which a culture or cultural 
practice incorporates or discards tradition or technology. Arguments about “resistance” 
are easily construed in myriad ways along this binary: youth “resist” conservative state 
practices via any number of hybrid music or leisure routines; simultaneously, 
conservative players may “resist” commercialization or commodification by reclaiming 
or reinforcing religious rites; etc. Debates about modernity and tradition thus structure 
one significant way “politics” have been interpreted in studies of cultural production in 
the Arab world. 
In Arab cultural studies in Arabic, it is significant to note that theorized studies of 
“subculture” and “popular” culture are extremely rare, the preoccupation being instead 
with culture of a more “respectable” (i.e., neither commercialized, or shaʿabi [popular]45) 
nature.46 While English language scholarship on Arab subjects has historically also 
favored assessments of “high” culture, a growing body of work on Arab “popular” and 
subcultures is emerging, which constitutes a significant development in the ways in 
                                                
44 Throughout Contemporary Arab Thought, Kassab does well to point out this cultural quandary and 
intellectual “obsession” is not unique to the Arab world. Similar interrogations are found in many “post-
colonial” contexts.  
 
45 I discuss the resonances of the Arabic “shaʿabi” in relationship to the English “popular” below. 
46 The noteworthy exception to this may be the work of Saudi Arabian scholar Abdullah al-Ghathami, who 
calls for a jump or qafzah from literary criticism to cultural criticism, which would include critical attention 
to “everyday” culture otherwise sidelined. An excerpt of his Cultural Criticism (Qiraaʾ fi annaqd a-thakafi 
[Casablanca: The Arab Cultural Center, 2000]), in which he makes this argument, is translated by 
Muhammad Ayish as “Cultural Criticism: Theory and Method” in Arab Cultural Studies: Mapping the 
field, ed. Tarik Sabry (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012], 255-274). Sabry elaborates on the significance of al-





which politics are assessed and understood in this scholarship. I will address this shift and 
the effect of intellectual models that have influenced the frameworks of many of those 
studies shortly. I want to point first to institutional developments that have allowed for 
Arab cultural studies in the US academe in particular.  
Institutionally, the course of studies of Arab culture in English over the past 
several decades has been significantly influenced by the development of “Area Studies” 
disciplines across the social sciences since the end of World War II.47 The financial 
resources devoted by the US government and US-based private foundations to fund 
international area studies before and during the Cold War has in large part made the 
growing cultural studies of today possible. 48 The thrust of this endeavor was initially to 
facilitate the knowledge of US scholars and institutions of numerous international 
“others,” in order to lessen the threats of the unknowns lurking between the US and the 
USSR.49 This is not to suggest that the political motives of the State Department in the 
                                                
47 Said points to some of these implications vis-à-vis the US and the Arab World in his Orientalism (New 
York: Penguin, 1977), 26. For more recent discussion, see among others: Rey Chow, Writing Diaspora: 
Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994); Vicente 
Rafael, “The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States,” Social Text 41 (1994): 91-111; Ella Shohat, 
“Area Studies, Transnationalism, and the Feminist Production of Knowledge,” Signs 26 (2001): 1269–
1272. 
 
48 While funding for US-based academics has come increasingly from the US government and private 
institutions, general trends in Europe also indicate that the mounting scarcity of traditional forms of 
academic funding have encouraged scholars to pursue more obviously politicized alternatives. For 
example, in the context of French scholarship on the Middle East, Gilbert Achcar suggests that drops in 
income among French academics in the post-1968 period have led them to seek complementary sources of 
income: “A feature (not common to all, of course, but extensive enough to be a key feature) – was to 
become a ‘consultant’ to foreign-affairs and defense institutions… the other way was through the mass 
media, whether in the form of direct honoraria for the scholars’ ‘expertise’ or as a means to increase the 
sale of their books – intensive mediatisation being the third distinctive feature of present-day researchers on 
Islam and the Arab world.” (Achcar, Marxism, Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism [New York: Verso, 2013], 
47.)  
 
49 See Robert Hall, Area Studies: With Special Reference to Their Implications for Research in the Social 
Sciences (New York: Committee on World Area Research Program, Social Science Research Council, 
1948). Vicente Rafael suggests, “The disciplined study of others ultimately works to maintain a national 




1940s have influenced or presided over all studies undertaken with these resources since, 
but to note the global political environment in which the opening of the US academe 
towards these parts of the world took place. Moreover, the overwhelming emphasis in the 
tradition of “area studies” has necessarily been on the particular “locality” of a given 
population, region, or demographic.50 Coinciding with the rise of post-colonial studies, 
area studies scholarship has largely worked to understand a given “Other” – but often by 
reifying that very Otherness.51 Indeed, the incorporation of specific area studies 
disciplines into the academy, despite the increased visibility of this material, has 
nevertheless ensured that cultural production from these regions (Africa, South and Latin 
America, the Middle East, Asia) or of other traditionally marginalized demographics 
(including Native Peoples, women, and LGBTQ populations) need not enter the 
normative cannon of traditional “literature” or “cultural studies” departments, nor effect 
the theories for analyzing the material “native” to those disciplines.52 It is in this context 
                                                                                                                                            
Americans skilled managers of foreign and domestic affairs.” (Rafael, “The Cultures of Area Studies,” 93-
97.) 
 
50 Rey Chow has demonstrated how Asian area studies have had the tendency to reproduce Orientalism 
(Chow, Writing Diaspora, 120-143). 
 
51 Rafael notes the double energy in area studies in the “proliferation and containment of Orientalisms and 
their critiques” (Rafael, “The Cultures of Area Studies,” 91). This is a central argument of Vivek Chibber’s 
Postcolonial Theory and the Spectre of Capital (New York: Verso, 2013). 
 
52 Ella Shohat’s discussion of feminism in transnational contexts develops this argument pointing out how 
“third world” feminism is rarely incorporated into US–based theory and critique (Shohat, “Area Studies, 
Transnationalism, and the Feminist Production of Knowledge”). Building off Shohat, Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty connects this directly to the institutionalization of area studies in the US academy. She suggests 
that courses on feminism in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere are “added on to the 
predominantly US-based curriculum as a way to ‘globalize’ the feminist knowledge base… [They] can be 
quite sophisticated and complex studies, but they are viewed as entirely separate from the intellectual 
project of US race and ethnic studies. The US is not seen as a part of ‘area studies.’” (Mohanty, “‘Under 
Western Eyes’ Revisited: Feminist Solidarity through Anticapitalist Struggles,” Signs 28 [2003], 520.) 
Gayatri Spivak suggests, “The Third World can enter the resistance program of an alliance politics directed 
against a ‘unified repression’ only when it is confined to the third-world groups that are directly accessible 




that enthusiasm about Arab culture as “political” or “resistant” in English language 
scholarship must be understood and critiqued. By this I mean: in the context of an 
institutional (which does not presume authorial intention) perpetuation of the exotic 
“Otherness” of the Arab (and other post-colonial) subject. In this context, the “political,” 
among other, qualities of Arab cultural production are necessarily seen in 
contradistinction to cultural production in other places, namely US/Europe.  
The common configuration of the study of Arab culture as “political” in English 
language scholarship is especially well-illustrated in the context of Palestinian cultural 
studies. A closer look at this subfield is informative for understanding the stakes of this 
attribution of political resonances to cultural production in the Arab world. Helga Tawil-
Souri suggests that in the context of both this burgeoning field of study53 and Zionist 
policy (which declares in the legacy of Golda Meir, that “Palestinians do not exist”) 
every study of Palestinian people and culture that shows that they do is necessarily 
political.54 The deplorable lived reality of the Palestinians and the international political 
environment in which these conditions are discussed outside the Arab world have thus 
led to the preconfiguration of politics in analyses of Palestinian cultural production.  
                                                                                                                                            
A Reader, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman [New York: Columbia UP, 1994], 84, original 
emphasis.) 
 
53 Rebecca Stein and Ted Swedenburg provide a history of the gradual opening of the US academy to 
different discussions about “the Palestine Question” since the late 1970s in their introduction to the edited 
volume Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture (Durham: Duke UP 2005), 4-7. 
 
54 Tawil-Souri actually makes this argument to counter critical expectations that Palestinian art practice 
should “only” or ideally depict Palestinian political reality. By suggesting that all artwork and cultural 
production (and its study/analysis) is political, she tries to alleviate pressure on creative expression that is 
trapped repeating tired symbols of political resistance (like the kaffiyeh, the red, green, and black of the 
Palestinian flag, and other easily identifiable symbolism). I appreciate and respect what she does with her 
argument with regard to the development of aesthetics under occupation. I am exploring here other effects 
of the pre-configuration of politics in cultural studies, specifically perhaps within the Anglophone academe 





I affirm the desire and the accompanying urgency to deliver and protect 
declarations about the existence of Palestinians, a reality the Israeli state consistently and 
violently attempts to erase. But I find problematic the wholesale celebration of 
Palestinian life as political, especially implied in contradistinction to, say, US, Belgian, or 
Kuwaiti life as not or less political. I hesitate first because of the growing contradictions 
engendered by the advance of neoliberal incursions in Palestine, a discussion I return to 
later in this dissertation. Put simply, I am skeptical that the celebration of all activity 
under occupation as “resistant” is able to advance radical politics – especially, perhaps, in 
the context of intense neoliberal urban growth.55  
But the wholesale celebration of Palestinian cultural practice as “political” is 
damaging for a second reason. The preconfiguration of politics engenders a dependent 
relationship between “resistance” and the study of Arab cultural production more 
generally. An implicit value judgment is appearing here: wherein subjects or cultures that 
are not demonstrably “resistant” are of lesser interest or critical import. Furthermore, the 
definition of what marks something as “resistant” is critically not neutral, as a generation 
of scholars critiquing methods of subcultural analysis in the UK and the US have 
                                                
55 Lisa Taraki, Joseph Massad, and Nasser Abourahme, among others have described how economic 
growth since the Oslo Accords (1993) has contributed to a “bantustanization” of Ramallah and its suburbs, 
where a consumer culture has created neoliberal conditions not unlike other cosmopolitan cities elsewhere 
in the region and around the world. I am not interested in denigrating that consumer culture as “not 
resistant” or “not political” enough (as if such a threshold exists), but in the pursuit of a radical critique. I 
return to these concerns in Chapter Three. (Lisa Taraki, “Urban Modernity on the Periphery: A New 
Middle Class Reinvents the Palestinian City,” Social Text 95 26 [2008]: 61-81; Joseph Massad, “Pinochet 
in Palestine,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online 819 [2006], accessed September 28, 2013, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/819/op2.htm; Nasser Abourahme, “The Bantustan Sublime: Reframing 





demonstrated since the late 1980s.56 Contemporary discussions in the Anglophone 
academe that affirm the necessity of “politics” in the analysis of Arab cultural production 
may stem from and frequently attempt to address the lacunae formed by political biases 
in the academe. But, as I will now explore, the intellectual framework they impose may 
nevertheless be limiting how politics can be understood and interpreted. They do this by 
shrinking political diversity to applications of a specific kind of “resistance.”  
Understanding how analyses of “politics” in cultural production have been 
reduced to locations of a specific kind of “resistance” requires a consideration of the 
methodological tendencies in and ideological influences upon much of this literature. It is 
not insignificant that critical consideration of an increased range of Arab cultural 
products as “resistant” comes concurrently with recent recognition in this scholarship of 
“popular” Arab culture and “everyday” practices as worthwhile subjects of study. Nor is 
it coincidental that this literature has been all but dominated by analysis in the tradition of 
the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham (CCCS). 
Indeed, the value attributed in this model to the capacity of cultural practice for political 
“resistance” against the mainstream has frequently been invoked to validate these new 
(popular, subcultural) subjects of study.57 Scholarship that focuses on everyday culture 
has slowly shifted understandings of agency and power in the Arab world as confined to 
ruling elites, and the intellectuals associated with those classes, to the political capacity 
(and implicitly the value) of marginalized segments of Egyptian, Algerian, Moroccan, 
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Lebanese, and Palestinian populations. However, at the same time, the sociological 
model of agency and “resistance” has tended to: privilege young, cosmopolitan, visibly 
“alternative” agents as active; emphasizes certain kinds of creative activity (music, dress, 
or other style elements) as (“the right kind of”) political; and/or recognizes specific 
collectivities (secular, extra-labor, non-gender normative) as empowering. To put it more 
explicitly, the emphasis on “symbolic violation” and “style,”58 so central in the 
Birmingham approach, has the tendency to reinforce particular, neoliberal values of 
individuals, their choices, and their relation to the collective that may actually hamper 
explorations of alternative meaning/politics engendered by cultural practice.59 I will 
argue in more depth in Chapter One that an analysis which distills divergent political 
experimentation in Arab cultural production into a simple symbolic “resistance” fails to 
assess the actual, sometimes contradictory political energy in these city streets. In the 
context of the Arab uprisings generally – or Tahrir Square, Pearl Roundabout, and other 
city sites specifically – to call creative choices “resistant” fails to add depth or 
particularity to an understanding of what cultural production may do or mean. At the 
same time, neither has it helped researchers, students, or critics to discern between 
                                                
58 Dick Hebdige’s work is of course central here: “The challenge to hegemony which subcultures represent 
is not issued directly by them. Rather it is expressed obliquely, in style. The objections are lodged, the 
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(Hebdige, Subculture and the Meaning of Style [Florence, KY: Routledge, 1979], 17, emphasis added.) 
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discourses, media representations, and capital accumulation), and intelligent (believing and deciding what 
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different emerging voices and aesthetics.60 For now, its should suffice to recognize that in 
much English language scholarship on Arab cultural production, studying politics by 
looking for “resistance” has limited the ways in which these politics can be understood. 
Without denying the real material realities that affect the lives of Palestinians, 
Lebanese, Egyptians, and others, what should an analysis of “politics” in Arab cultural 
production look like? Given the discursive contexts just outlined, is it possible to conduct 
an analysis of politics in cultural production without reinforcing the trajectories – that is, 
the conceptualizations of political possibility – suggested in these histories of 
scholarship? Asking as much clearly does not suggest stripping political analysis from 
Arab cultural studies. Nor does it argue against the observation that cultural production, 
as the work of living women and men in actual societies anywhere in the world, is 
always, necessarily political.61 On the contrary, being cognizant of the particular 
intellectual histories of locating “politics” within Arab cultural production notes the 
limiting patterns within which these politics have been understood, precisely in order to 
advance alternative political analysis.  
I am concerned throughout this dissertation that attributing “politics” to Arabic 
rap be done in such a way that reflects ongoing political discussions in these youth 
cultures. That is to say, in a way that complicates, dislocates, and disregards the binaries 
                                                
60 Shehab Fakhry Ismail has suggested this crisis extends to artists themselves: “Egyptian revolutionary 
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of East/West; traditional/modern; secular/religious; global/local; passive/active; and 
commercial/authentic. Instead, political energy in some Arabic rap struggles towards 
what Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi rappers called in a recent collaboration 
“khat thaleth” (literally, a “third rail”, or a “third option”). It is this productive unsettling 
of existing structures that I am interested in theorizing.62 A khat thaleth does not explode 
or erase existing binaries. Rather, a third rail, like Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s dismissal of 
scholarly pleas for “beyond,” encourages instead the formulation of an option that 
operates beside in order to unsettle and grow over the restricting pull of binary politics.63 
Such a formulation of what this might look like theoretically in Arab cultural 
studies might start with a reevaluation of the “popular” in popular culture. The meanings 
of the word “popular” in Arabic are notably distinct from those attributed to the word 
English. This consideration is not usually taken up by Anglophone cultural scholars 
working on the Arab world, however, in whose literature it is occasionally not at all clear 
what “popular” might mean in the local context. “Popular” is directly translated into 
Arabic as shaʿabi, an adjective derived from the word shaʿab, and meaning literally “of 
the people.” Unlike in English, the word in Arabic has connotations that associate it with 
modesty and humility, as opposed to success or riches (perhaps closer to “populist” than 
a celebrity’s “popularity”). A “popular” [shaʿabi] cinema or cafe is not so because it 
attracts the largest number of clientele, but because it is located in hay shaʿabi, or a 
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on a collaboration album released by Stronghold Sound on January 22, 2013, accessed January 10, 2014 
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“working class quarter and frequented by working class audiences.”64 Sabry suggests that 
in the Arabic context, “To be popular is to be one of the people.”65 Importantly, then, 
shaʿabi need not only refer to class identity. A rich politician or intellectual can be 
shaʿabi, if s/he can connect to and be embraced by the people. When I asked the 
Lebanese rapper Gaafar, for example, what “shaʿabi” meant to him, he said, “haqiqi” – 
or, literally, “real.”66  
Furthermore, the word “shaʿabi” has further political resonances in Arabic 
because of the way the noun shaʿab [people] is used in state discourse. Politicians invoke 
a-shaʿab [the people] to unify the electorate (something most politicians in the US would 
be abhor to do, lest they be accused of arousing “populist” sentiment). Similar to much 
nationalist sentiment all over the world, shaʿab can thus also be used to “mask the 
particularities of the very voices, heard or unheard, which make up Arab popular 
cultures.”67 In other words, the word meaning of the people can and is used to distort the 
diverse needs and desires of those very populations. Referring to “popular” culture in the 
Arab world thus has political intonations that are both charged with class and infused 
with state discourse. It may be that there is a consistent enough set of associations that 
link the Arabic “shaʿabi” to a specific kind of political “resistance.” But an 
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accompanying analysis of what this might be or imply for cultural practice and political 
possibility within it is, as of yet, unclear.68  
Furthermore, I think the enthusiasm to read “popular” [shaʿabi] as “resistant” has 
likely been encouraged (paradoxically perhaps) by the prominent use of the word sha‘ab 
in the Arabic slogans heard in 2010-2013 protests. But the consideration that the concept 
sha‘ab masks difference in a false unity is actually all the more relevant in the context of 
the widespread chants: “a-shaʿab yureed isqat a-nizam” [“the people want the fall of the 
regime”], as evidenced in what has been the devastating disintegration in more than one 
instance of protest movements into sectarian and other divisions in the wake of these 
uprisings. Considering notions of the collective invoked by shaʿab and shaʿabi may 
complicate understandings of symbolic resistance, belonging, and “politics” in Arab 
(pop)cultural studies. 
I refer to Arabic rap as “subcultural” not “popular” culture. Marking this out in 
part identifies the political histories of scholarship to which I see this work contributing. I 
refer to Arabic rap as “subcultural” production because my research suggests its market 
share is quite small relative to other musical production in the region and because of its 
frequently antagonistic relationship to “mainstream” music in both English and in Arabic. 
Furthermore, as I demonstrate in my case studies, rap in Arabic also capitalizes on an 
“experimental” or avant-garde cache that would make its qualification as “popular” in the 
US/European sense quite inaccurate. That said, while I do not consider Arabic rap 
“popular” in the English sense, I do pursue questions of its shaʿabi nature. Interlocutors’ 
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answers, like Gaafar’s above, indicate particularities about how they see the politics of 
the work functioning that are revealing. This pursuit of shaʿabi resonances within a 
subcultural study allows me to trouble some of the historical emphases in US/UK studies: 
subcultural models of responding to accusations of “degeneracy,” “non-normativity,” and 
social “marginalization” figure specific political resonances. Exploring the shaʿabi in 
subculture pushes on the terms “subculture,” “popular,” and the location of “politics” 
therein.  
In general, I am not trying to counter claims of degeneracy in a subculture of Arab 
youth by arguing that Arabic rap is political. Indeed, in contrast to a number of global 
musical subcultures from jazz to hip hop, politics has already been attributed to rap in 
Arabic. Since its fans and producers corroborate these claims, my aim is rather to develop 
a concept to theorize how Arabic rap functions politically. Towards this end, and quite 
differently from much cultural scholarship invested in political resonances, I am not 
interested in debating whether or not these agents have agency. I believe they do. Nor am 
I invested in discussing how agents’ activity (as opposed to passivity) defines them as 
political subjects.69 In my theoretical work in this subcultural study, I propose moving 
away from discussing agency and instead towards theorizing affectivity.  
I also begin from the assumption that Arabic rap is a hybrid genre – it has deep 
roots in many places: the US, the trans-Atlantic, the Arab world, and various diasporas. I 
am less interested in what is for me the fact of Arabic rap’s aesthetic and cultural 
hybridity than in its ability to communicate specific political feelings. In truth, sometimes 
it is hybrid aesthetics that help it do so, but it is not the simple presence of hybridity that 
                                                






communicates politics. The frequency and ubiquity of hybrid cultural production both 
within the Arab world and outside it suggests that the practice of cultural borrowing and 
appropriation is widespread. Fetishizing hybridity, contrary to frequently stated interests 
in assimilation, collaboration, and integration, has the tendency to reify difference, 
further delineating as distinct the different “Others” involved.70 This study does not work 
to establish where this cultural production comes from – historically or culturally – and 
use those findings to make a claim about agents’ resistance to various cultural and 
political factors. Rather it attempts to interrogate what this particular experimentation 
does to the people and environments with which it immediately interacts.  
Finally, for my analyses of politics and affect to resonate, I position these players 
within the material, urban contexts in which they produce their work. In other words, I 
pursue the generation of affect in the particular urban, neoliberal contexts in which it is 
found. Here I am building from recent theatre scholarship that connects the conditions of 
performance to manifestations of neoliberalism.71 Like these scholars and critics, I too 
find it increasingly disingenuous to discuss the political resonances of performances in 
Beirut, Ramallah, and Amman today without addressing the neoliberal configurations 
that in part determine how that content is produced, presented and consumed. The 
relationships between art institutions, real estate development, NGOs, and the state are 
different in each city, but the similarities in neoliberal structure cannot be ignored. It is in 
establishing and understanding these contexts that the affective resonances can actually 
                                                
70 I concur here with Simon Frith and Timothy D. Taylor’s observations. See Frith, “The Discourse of 
World Music,” 315-316; and Taylor, “Some Versions of Difference: Discourses of Hybridity in 
Transnational Musics,” in Beyond Exoticism.  
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be felt. My conceptualization of the intersection of affect and material reality is 
influenced here by Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick’s elaborations on “the whole issue of 
texture.” She argues: “The sense of touch makes nonsense out of any dualistic 
understanding of agency and passivity; to touch is always already to reach out, to fondle, 
to heft, to tap, or to enfold, and always also to understand other people or natural forces 
as having effectually done so before oneself…”72 I follow how Arab rappers and 
audiences reach for other political possibilities, knowing that in these interactions, they 
encounter the particular urban texture of neoliberal incursions.   
I develop more completely what I mean by neoliberalism and its incursions in 
Chapter One: Locating Politics, where I address the ongoing debate over the relevance of 
the term “neoliberal/ism” and especially its application to economic and political power 
in the Middle East and North Africa. Here, I point to the resonances in this dissertation 
with a growing body of scholarship that is now contextualizing the political events of the 
Arab Uprisings within a larger historical trajectory that dates back to the 1970s. Doing so 
furthers the discussion I elaborated in this section about the intellectual trajectories of 
locating politics in Arab cultural production generally by contextualizing the recent 
enthusiasm about Arabic hip hop and rap more specifically in the wake of the so-called 
“Arab Spring.” As should be clear, this is a tendency the present study acknowledges and 




                                                




Political enthusiasm and neoliberal critique 
 
Drawing on the irony of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s praise for 
Egyptian, Libyan, and Tunisian “sound economic policies and market reforms” weeks 
before the outbreaks of revolutions, Koenraad Bogaert argues that understanding recent 
events necessitates contextualization of the “pressing economic grievances and uneven 
development that are a result of more than thirty years of neoliberal policies” in those 
countries.73 Not doing so, he suggests, actually exacerbates miscomprehension of the 
region and its shifting politics.  
…In an attempt to explain political change and authoritarian persistence, 
many approaches to Arab political life mainly highlighted endogenous 
political legacies (e.g., corruption, clientilism, etc.), thereby constructing 
stereotypes of the ‘Arab regime’ that actually got in the way of 
understanding the complexity of the social forces and capitalist agency 
that are manifesting themselves in the current political orders of the 
region.74 
 
In other words, while the enthusiasm about these paradigmatic changing events is 
understandable, the onus is now upon criticism to pay attention to what is being 
constructed and elided by this excitement.  
In a similar vein, Alain Badiou coined the phrase the “phenomenon of Western 
inclusion” to describe the transformation of recent political resistance in the Arab world 
into a desire for “the West.”75 By this he refers to the narrative process wherein the 
unruly and anti-despotic ethos of the Arab crowd is translated by Western state 
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departments and the global mass media into a desire for “freedom.” This “freedom” is 
embodied politically in the trappings of liberal democracy and economically in the 
opening to/of “free” markets. Translated and transmitted in this way, an eruptive popular 
movement and populous moment “has every chance of ending in very modest 
constitutional reform” with the ushering into power of regimes that will come to “the 
general surprise of supporters of the riot.”76 (In other words, in results that do not address, 
on a structural level, corruption, gross inequities of wealth, the stripping of resources, or 
the refusal of IMF loans and their debilitating stipulations, and that neither include an 
increase in representation, self-determination, or any number of other demands vocally 
stated and physically embodied by ongoing protests.) “What would be a genuine change,” 
Badiou suggests, “would be an exit from the West, a ‘de-Westernization’, and it would 
take the form of an exclusion.”77  
This exclusion might embody a menace, in Homi Bhabha’s sense of the term, to 
the neoliberal and neocolonial order as it stands. Bhabha’s formulation of colonial 
mimicry – a mixture of “resemblance and menace” – points to the construction by the 
colonial subject of an identity or of desire that is “almost the same [as the colonists’] but 
not quite.”78 This menace is the same threat that Badiou locates in the mounting 
“anxiety” of “Cameron, Sarkozy, [and] Obama” in their assessments of the Arab 
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uprisings. Badiou says the uprisings “contain an Idea, as yet unformulated, which is 
highly displeasing" to the governments and those heads of state.79  
One of the hypotheses of my research is that a consideration of this “displeasing” 
“unformulated” exclusion –of a potential exit from neoliberal practice and policy, or the 
admission of a certain colonial menace – is being actively stripped or at least tangibly 
occluded from contemporary narratives. This is happening not only, as Bogaert, 
Armbrust, and others have suggested, in discourse about political developments in the 
region, but also in discussions about how “politics” or “resistance” appears in different 
kinds of cultural production. Hundreds of articles have been written about various aspects 
of youth culture in Egypt, Tunisia, and the Levant in recent years, including about Arabic 
rap. Virtually all champion its “resistant” qualities. But almost none discuss the actually 
alternative political possibilities that subcultural producers and audiences wade through. I 
develop affective models to discern precisely the development of these politics. Doing so 
also allows me to question and pursue the tenuous bonds of “solidarity” invoked by 
artists and activists in different cities.  
 
Part Three: Chapter Breakdowns 
 
 The dissertation that follows is structured in five chapters. The first two are 
theoretical in nature, not taking a specific geographic location as their focus. They are 
designed to build the affective and political model I began to contextualize in this 
                                                





introduction. I then implement this model in each of the three case study chapters that 
follow.  
“Chapter One: Locating Politics” takes issue with the discourses of resistance that 
I suggest all but categorically frame understandings of Arab rap. Building on specific 
examples of the presentation of Arab rappers and other performance artists in New York 
City, I suggest that neoliberal orientalism on international art stages, in academic 
literature, and in the neoliberal media depoliticizes Arab rappers. This plays on a 
racialized imagination, approximating Arab and Muslim subjects to African and African 
American history, culture, and musical expression, while stripping the politics from both 
Arab and black experiences. Having identified the depoliticizing work of discourses of 
resistance in specific examples, I propose a theoretical elaboration for understanding the 
political implications of the dominance of “resistance literature” in anthropological and 
cultural studies. Hannah Arendt’s concept of “political action” underpins my 
investigation. Her emphasis, which has been critiqued of late, on activity in the polis as 
indicative of agency grounds my critique of the approaches to resistance in both 
Subcultural Studies and Subaltern Studies, two fields of literature intimately connected to 
this project. 
Having exposed the limitations of frameworks of “resistance” for understanding 
politics in cultural production, “Chapter Two: Feeling Politics,” sets out to offer an 
alternative. In this chapter, I build the models of feeling politics and political feeling that 
I began to sketch in Part One of this Introduction. I elaborate my use of tarab as political 
feeling by proposing a framework for tracking its emergence specific to rap concerts. I 




previous chapter by suggesting a “spatizalized” approach to the materiality of concert 
venues. Leaning on the late Doreen Massey’s work, I propose that recognizing “the very 
fact of spacing” between audiences in specific concert venues in cities navigating 
cosmopolitan and neoliberal incursions deepens the political implications of the feeling 
conducted during rap concerts. This chapter also includes an outline of my methodology 
and outlines how I considered my scope and approach as researcher. 
“Chapter Three: Ramallah – The Second Wave of Palestinian Rap” contextualizes 
Palestinian rap production since the end of the Second Intifada (2006/7). My research in 
this chapter pushes back against the dominant understanding of Palestinian rap as an 
embodiment of the changing forms of youthful “intifada,” that is, as an enactment of 
resistance against the Occupation. My own findings did not corroborate this narrative. 
Instead, I argue Palestinian rap today largely does not engage or (re)produce an ethos of 
uprising, revolution, or resistance. In this chapter I explore how the material negotiations 
of concert makers and concert-goers continue to be political despite not being 
“resistance.” Importantly, exploring the political feeling in second wave rap concerts in 
Ramallah quickly became less about finding a subcultural answer to the Occupation in 
rap concerts and more about comprehending one of the myriad ways in which life 
continues under it. 
“Chapter Four: Amman – Resignation and Longing in an Emerging ‘Cultural 
Hotspot’” documents the recent emergence of the Jordanian capital as a regional cultural 
hub – in particular its development into something of a concert hub – together with an 
overwhelming, articulated desire of young people to leave Amman behind. I build from 




for cultural production, to explore a political feeling of resignation in reaction to a host of 
social and political situations produced in some Jordanian rap lyrics. This chapter 
engages notions of performed cosmopolitanism in addition to performer and audience 
testimony and thick description. 
In “Chapter Five: Beirut – Poetics of Disgust,” I propose understanding the 
dynamics held in tension in rap in Beirut as a product of affective disgust. Affectively 
different from the performed resignation I identified in some rap in Amman, it points to 
similar grasping for and working through both material and affective realities in Beirut. 
Disgust is the recognition that the city is being stolen from its inhabitants; the frustration 
with the status quo; the utter dissatisfaction with the government; resentment towards 
people who leave; and the identity crises that result upon return. As such, I consider that 
expressions of disgust are specific, active navigations of politics. By distancing 
themselves from dysfunction, corruption, neglect, and racism in a particular affective 
register, the speaker of disgust works around available political affiliation by refusing and 
circumventing in specific ways the trite, disappointing narratives of politicians, the 
humanitarian aid industry, and local as well as regional nostalgia. In this chapter, spitting 
disgust engages with performative analyses of political disgust like Sara Ahmed and 
Imogen Tyler’s, while diverging from these studies in ways contingent to my own 
context.80 
 In the study’s “Conclusion - Politics, Positions, Presence,” I offer a final 
reflection on the political use of a concept like political feeling at the time of the 
completion of this study – a context which is considerably different than the geopolitical 
                                                
80 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2004) and Imogen Tyler, 





situation that framed and encouraged the proposal of this research. From here I offer a 
critical engagement with the concept of “solidarity” as informed by both my 
interlocutors’ testimonies as well as their lyrical work. I close the study with a 
consideration of the technology via which this music is primarily consumed. 
 
* * * 
 
 In this Introduction, I have sought to provide an initial intellectual 
contextualization of the research that follows in terms of both studies of feeling (affect) 
and politics. The affective tension of “politics pulls at me” in the Ramallah 
Underground’s track succinctly frames the confluence of politics and feeling that I 
explore in this genre of subcultural production. I take the opportunity to conclude these 
initial thoughts on affectivity and politics in this research with a qualification about the 
relationship between affective processes – or the location and study of feeling – and the 
contemporary Arab demographic that is my focus.  
While my study takes as its subject specific subcultural production by and for 
young Arabs,81 I do not consider that the theoretical model I am building is salient 
because of an inherent political or cultural nature that these agents possess. Given the 
intellectual debates I hope this research will engage, the importance of this specification 
cannot be overstated.82 It is crucial to me that the discussion of affective dynamics in 
                                                
81 The demographic reach of this genre is growing and concerts and events analyzed in Chapter Three 
demonstrate the appeal of this work to a range of linguistic and cultural backgrounds. However, 
conversations with artists confirm the overwhelming audience consists of predominantly Arabic speakers. 
 
82 The lively debate around Vivek Chibber’s recent book Postcolonial Studies and the Spectre of Capital 




Arabic rap that I provide not be construed as validation for the Orientalist or “reverse-
Orientalist” claims83 that Arabs are simply more emotional, more susceptible to 
emotional arousal (and by extension, in this study, “more” political) than “Westerners”; 
or that musical practice in this part of the world is in essence less celebral, more illogical, 
or more interactive than “Western” musical practice. It is foolish to argue that cultural 
differences do not exist; they do. But it is equally ridiculous to impose onto cultural 
production cultural essences that are devoid of considerations of the material conditions 
in which they are found. Especially in a discussion of the “global” form of contemporary 
hip hop and the urban environments in which it is intervening with such vitality, such an 
interpretation of this research would be most out of sync with my intentions as an author. 
 
                                                
83 Sadik Jalal al-ʿAzm proposed the phrase “Orientalism in reverse” to describe a vein of scholarship that 
responds to critiques of Orientalism by suggesting unique (frequently “textual”) tools with which to assess 
the culture, religion, and political structure of “the East.” In doing so, he suggests, “‘Orientalism in 
Reverse’… simply imitates the great Orientalist masters – a poor imitation at that – when it seeks to 
unravel the secrets of the primordial Arab ‘mind,’ ‘psyche,’ or ‘character’… But the novel element is the 
conclusion of Orientalism in Reverse that comparative philological and linguistic studies prove the 
ontological superiority of the Oriental mind (the ‘Arab mind’ in this case) over the Occidental one.” (Al-
ʿAzm, “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse,” Khamsin 8 (1980), accessed January 31, 2014, 
http://libcom.org/library/orientalism-orientalism-reverse-sadik-jalal-al-’azm#footnoteref20_93ck6iy.) 
Indeed this simple reversal of a study of “essences” just to get the opposite result (“the East” is, in actuality 
superior, not inferior, to the “West”) is something Edward Said himself warned against (Said, Orientalism, 
322). Gilbert Achcar expands al-ʿAzm’s study of “reverse Orientalism” to French thought in Marxism, 
Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism, 40-56. I address this discursive intersection of Orientalism, affect, politics 













This chapter lays the first part of a theoretical foundation I will rely on in the 
subsequent case study chapters. It consists of a critique of a “discourse of resistance” 
which I identify exists in discussion and analysis of Arabic rap. In the first half of this 
chapter, I identify this phenomenon, which I acknowledge builds and diverges from 
“resistance literature” in the humanities. In order to establish the particular implications I 
see in these discussions of “resistance,” I explore how what I call neoliberal orientalism 
structures these representations of Arab cultural producers.  
Having established what the “discourse of resistance” is and what its implications 
are, in the second half of the chapter I aim to illustrate how it works. To do so, I turn to 
Hannah Arendt’s theory of political activity in the polis, and its critiques. I use Arendt’s 
theorization of political activity as indicative of political subjectivity to point to how the 
discourse of resistance pins agency into a representative framework where it is incumbent 
on spectacular displays of resistance. Critiques of Arendt’s model help to illustrate that 
this framework depends on the continued existence of individuals without agency, against 
whose background only some may be celebrated as active political subjects. I follow this 
theoretical exploration in two subfields of sociological and anthropological literature: 
subcultural study in the tradition of the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies and post-




The lengthy theoretical discussion in this chapter works to clear the space in order 
to be able to add something new to existing debates and analysis about rap in Arabic and 
the political behavior of its producers and consumers. This theoretical elaboration should 
allow my case studies, and the theoretical alternative to the discourse of resistance I 
propose in the next chapter, to work against the exoticizing of these agents that I find 





Part One: Discourse of Resistance and Neoliberal Orientalism 
 
   
 
 
On April 14, 2013, Columbia University in New York hosted an event entitled 
“Art as Resistance.” It was advertised as a panel discussion between two actors from the 
Freedom Theatre in Jenin, Palestine and a professor of theatre at the University of 
Connecticut. The email blasts and the website of the Center for Palestine Studies include 
short bios of the three panelists, wherein the first thing noted for both Palestinian actors 
are their ages. Faisal Abu Alhelja was 23; Ahmad Al-Rokh was 24. The age of Gary 
English, the third panelist, a Distinguished Professor of Theatre (and current director of 
the Freedom Theatre) was not listed. The advertising suggested that the “expertise” the 
first two panelists boasted was their Palestinian youth. The credentials of the third 




professional and scholar. “Resistance” only appeared in the event title. It was unclear 
from the promotional materials who or what these artists resisted, or how.1 
As pointed to in this dissertation’s introduction, critics and scholars have 
identified that the abstract framing of Palestinian artists and their work as “resistant” may 
be problematic. Helga Tawil-Souri has suggested that the expectation that Palestinian 
artists exclusively depict or address their political reality has limited the aesthetic 
possibilities available to them.2 Speaking of Arab artists more generally, Daanish Faruqi 
has suggested that even when Arab artists display works of high quality, their work may 
be neglected, even in their countries of origin, because it “fails to inform our political 
impulses.”3 In the wake of the political events since 2010 and the incredible attention to 
creative expression within the “Arab Spring,” Arab artists themselves have also begun to 
question and in some cases reject demands that they produce or perform “resistance” in 
galleries and concerts, and the presumption their work be framed as such.4 What is the 
                                                
1 Email blast reprinted in Phillip Weiss, “‘Art as Resistance’ – Two Actors and Artistic Director at Jenin 
Freedom Theater to Speak at Columbia Sunday,” Mondoweiss, April 12, 2013, accessed November 1, 
2014, http://mondoweiss.net/2013/04/resistance-artistic-columbia.  
 
2 Helga Tawil-Souri, “The Necessary Politics of Palestinian Cultural Studies,” in Arab Cultural Studies: 
Mapping the Field, ed. Tarik Sabry (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 138. See Introduction. 
 
3 As opposed to on an international art market. See Daanish Faruqi, “Art and the Arab Spring,” Al Jazeera 
English, January 10, 2012, accessed October 22, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/20121612493122450.html.  
 
4 Naira Antoon and Aimee Shalan, “After the Spring: Thoughts on Cultural Production and the Selling 
Power of Change,” Jadaliyya, November 15, 2011, accessed October 22, 2014, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3117/after-the-spring_thoughts-on-cultural-production-a; Andrew 
M. Goldstein, “New Museum Curator Natalie Bell on How to Understand Contemporary Arab Art,” 
ArtSpace, July 17, 2014, accessed October 22, 2014, 
http://www.artspace.com/magazine/interviews_features/natalie-bell-on-here-and-elsewhere-at-the-new-
museum; Shehab Fakhry Ismail, “Revolutionizing Art,” Mada Masr, October 25, 2013, accessed October 
22, 2014, http://www.madamasr.com/content/revolutionizing-art; Omar Kholeif, “The Social Impulse: 
Politics, Media, and Art after the Arab Uprisings,” Ibraaz, May 2, 2012, accessed October 22, 2014 
http://www.ibraaz.org/essays/34; Mona Gamil, Amira Chebli, et al. “Arab Dance Caravan,” (“Open 





proclivity towards “resistance” about? Why are critics and artists distancing themselves 
from it?  
If Arab artists and critics in general are bristling against expectations that they 
produce “political” artwork all the time, the case of rap and hip hop in Arabic provides an 
especially dense archive of this phenomenon. A discussion of rap in the Arab world in 
English or French that does not lay claim to its political or resistant nature, or its 
affiliation with political behavior, simply does not exist. The few analyses in Arabic that 
do not celebrate its imminent resistance tend to decry the genre for the same reasons 
others find it powerful (and political).5 This constant framework of representation is not 
the case with any number of Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian or other filmmakers, poets, 
theatre directors, or other musicians, who encounter expectations that their work is 
political or questions about how it is so, among other considerations.6 In the genre of 
Arabic rap in particular, I argue that we can see distilled the elements that drive the 
problematic political gesturing in other art and music arenas where Arabs are also 
involved. It is my argument that in Europe, in North America, and in the Middle East, the 
enthusiasm about this genre is inescapably bound up in a juxtaposition of African 
American influence, and progressive Arab “street” energy. These factors, taken singly or 
together, dominate the representative framework of these rap musicians and their work. 
The framework of political resistance attributed to Arab rappers is unique to this region 
among other studies of rap around the world. It may also be understood as a condensation 
                                                
5 Yazan Sa’dy, “Mostaqbal al-rap el ‘arabi ‘ala ‘Khat Thaleth,’” [“The Future of Arabic Rap after ‘The 
Third Rail’”], Ma3azef, February 19, 2013, accessed November 1, 2014, 
http://www.ma3azef.com/node/114. 
 
6 Many rappers who also perform in other genres, who act as producers, or who otherwise engage in art or 





of a larger neoliberal framework of representation of Arab youth in general.7 It is at the 
intersection of these spheres of influence of African American, Islamic, and Arab Spring 
energies that, for example, the Tunisian rapper El Général was named one of TIME 
magazines top 100 influential people of 2011, that press like CBS and the New York 
Times pontificated about the rap “soundtracks” of the 2011-2012 revolutions, and that the 
BBC and others wondered if “hip hop was driving the Arab Spring.”8 
 The converging spheres of influence in the body of the Arab rapper and his work 
are not arbitrary. They are driven by specific economic and imperial concerns and a 
particular racial ideology. Moreover, the “discourse of resistance” I identify builds from a 
trajectory of humanistic literature. I turn to that literature first, before elaborating that the 
discourse of resistance I am specifically concerned with is structured by neoliberal 
orientalism. With this phrase I attempt to define the “regime of power-knowledge-
pleasure” that structures the ways in which Arab rappers are celebrated for producing 
political music.9  
 
 
                                                
7 The study of “global” hip hop is frequently conducted through a frame of subcultural study and therefore 
is often celebrated for the agency of its subcultural subjects that it affirms. The deliberate association that 
rap in the Middle East is political is more unique to the region. See also Ted Swedenburg, “Imagined 
Youths,” Middle East Research and Information Project 245: 2007, accessed November 1, 2014, 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer245/imagined-youths.  
 
8 “The 2011 TIME 100,” TIME, accessed November 1, 2014, 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2066367_2066369_2066242,00.html; 
Sujatha Fernandes, “The Mixtape of the Revolution,” The New York Times, January 29, 2012, accessed 
November 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/opinion/the-mixtape-of-the-revolution.html?_r=0; 
Cordelia Hebblethwaite, “Is Hip Hop Driving the Arab Spring?,” BBC News, July 24, 2011, accessed 
November 1, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14146243.  
 
9 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 





Discourse of resistance 
 
Recent reactions by Arab artists and critics against the invitation that their work 
perform “resistance” should be understood within a larger discussion about the usefulness 
of the concept of resistance in analyzing the political effects of cultural production. That 
resistance may be celebrated in cultural production, and that this celebration may be 
problematic is not a new debate in humanistic literature. Donald Moore identified what 
he called a “boom industry” in “resistance studies” in the 1970s and 1980s.10 Moore was 
referring to the emergence of “ethnographies of resistance” and the proliferation of 
studies of “everyday forms of resistance.”11 In the 1990s, a slew of astute critiques 
reacted to this trend. Lila Abu-Lughod warned about “romanticizing resistance”; Douglas 
Kellner worried about its “fetishization”; Sherry Ortner remarked upon an “ethnographic 
thinness” in “resistance” literature; Roy D’Andrade bristled at the “moral model” 
anthropologies of resistance presented; and Michael Brown even suggested that, among 
anthropologists, “resistance” had become “theoretical hegemony.”12 Interest in the 
                                                
10 Donald S. Moore, “Subaltern Studies and the Politics of Place: Remapping Resistance in Zimbabwe’s 
Eastern Highlands,” Cultural Anthropology 13 (1998): 348.  
 
11 See for example Jean Comaroff, Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South 
African People (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1985); Richard G. Fox, Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the 
Making (Berkeley: U of California P, 1985); Aihwa Ong, Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: 
Factory Women In Malaysia (Albany, NY: State U of New York P, 1987); Ann Laura Stoler, Capitalism 
and Confrontation in Sumatra’s Plantation Belt, 1870-1979 (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1985); Michael A. 
Taussig, The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 
1980); Paul Willis, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1981); Forrest D. Colburn, ed., Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New York: Sharpe, 
Inc., 1989); James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, 
CT: Yale UP, 1985); James C. Scott and Benedict J. Kerkvliet, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in 
South-East Asia (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1986). 
12 Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through Bedouin 
Women,” American Ethnologist 17(1990): 41-55; Douglas Kellner, Media Culture: Cultural Studies, 




concept persisted despite these critiques, however, and the 1990s and 2000s have seen 
invigorating attempts to re-energize the ways in which resistance might be located and 
studied. For example, Scott’s emphasis on “indirect resistance,” what he calls “weapons 
of the weak,” borrows from Claude Levi-Strauss’ concept of “bricolage.” The 
construction of agents as bricoleurs, constantly negotiating forces of oppression in 
expressing resistance, attempts to explain what appear to be inconsistencies in the 
political behavior of participants. Studies like Scott’s both build on Dick Hebdige’s 
formulation of resistance as bricolage in Subculture and the Meaning of Style (1979) and 
foreshadow the most astute studies of resistance today, especially attention to apparent 
“ambivalence” in political behavior.13 
Within the realm of theatre and performance studies, “resistance” has also 
appeared with some regularity. It frequently appears in the framework for the study of 
non-US/European performance cultures.14 But it has also guided explorations of politics 
in especially avant-garde, community-based, and non-commercial theatre in the latter 
contexts as well. Marvin Carlson suggests that the rise in the study of the anthropology of 
performance has encouraged the development of alternative political analyses in 
                                                                                                                                            
Ortner, “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 
37 (1995): 173-193; Roy D’Andrade, “Moral Models in Anthropology,” Current Anthropology 36 (1995): 
399-408; and Michael F. Brown, “On Resisting Resistance,” American Anthropologist 98 (1996):729-749. 
 
13 I return to these considerations in the next chapter. See the special issue of History and Anthropology 
introduced by Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, “On De-Pathologizing Resistance,” History and Anthropology 
25 (2014): 415-430. Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London: Routledge, 1979).  
 
14 See for example, Glenn Odom, Yorùbá Performance, Theatre, and Politics: Staging Resistance 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Terence Chong, The Theatre and the State in Singapore: 
Orthodoxy and Resistance (Oxon: Routledge, 2011); Belinda Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of 
Apartheid (Columbus: Ohio UP, 2004); Jean Graham-Jones, “Rethinking Buenos Aires Theatre in the 
Wake of 2001 and Emerging Structures of Resistance and Resilience,” Theatre Journal 66(2014): 37-54. 
Of course, the prevalence of this tendency to understand “other” cultures as political or as demonstrating 
“resistance” is one of the theoretical concerns of this dissertation. (See Introduction.) This is not to detract 





conventional theatre study and practice. He tells us that especially Victor Turner’s work, 
on “the potential of liminoid activity to provide a site for social and cultural resistance 
and the exploration of alternative possibilities has naturally been of particular interest to 
theorists and practitioners of performance seeking a strategy of social engagement not 
offered by the more cultural-bound structures of the conventional theatre.”15 Dozens of 
compelling works of theatre and performance theory have been written in this vein: 
Randy Martin’s work on the performance as “political act,” Baz Kershaw on the “radical” 
in performance, Jill Dolan on the “utopic”; Alan Read on “the everyday” – to name only 
a few.16 A longer elaboration of politics as conceived in theatre practice is outside of my 
scope here. 
Instead, my focus here is on the trajectory of this debate about resistance in 
cultural production in the humanities. Looking at this history, we can glean that a 
discussion of the political aims and agency of the ethnographer, critic, or theorist have 
been a central part of studying “resistance.” Since the mid 1990s, these debates have 
considered, and indeed have been particularly charged, around the question of the 
relationship of political engagement to scholarly practice. For example, Nancy Scheper-
Hughes proposed a “barefoot anthropology” as “a more womanly-hearted” way of 
conducting ethnographic research where one is both scholar and companheira.17 Her 
                                                
15 Marvin Carlson, Performance, A Critical Introduction, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
19-20. 
 
16 Randy Martin, Performance as Political Act: The Embodied Self (New York: Bergin and Garvey 
Publishers, 1990); Jill Dolan, Utopia in Performance: Finding Hope at the Theater (Ann Arbor: U of 
Michigan P, 2005); Alan Read, Theatre and Everyday Life: an Ethics of Performance (Oxon: Routledge, 
1993); Baz Kershaw, The Radical in Performance: From Brecht to Baudrillard (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1999).  
 
17 Scheper-Hughes writes, “Witnessing, the anthropologist as companheira, is in the active voice, and it 




assertions that the anthropologists must “become alarmists and shock troopers… 
[producing] morally demanding texts”18 offended colleagues who considered the 
procedures of objective, scientific observation central to the sustenance of the integrity of 
the field.19 Hers is perhaps only the first in a string of calls for “militancy” in humanistic 
critique. Jeffrey Juris, for example, advocates a “militant ethnography” that merges 
practice and research.20 I will return to engage how these different articulations of 
scholarly endeavors inform my own positioning vis-à-vis political questions and 
engagement in the next chapter. I find them significant because they point to the often 
personal stakes that are involved in the choice of the researcher and theorist to engage the 
concept of “resistance.” For now, however, it will suffice to mark that the relationship of 
the social scientist’s political practice to the observation and theorization of resistance in 
the lives of her research subjects has been a significant part of the development of the 
recent debate around the concept of “resistance” and its use in the academy.  
What can we gather from this trajectory in humanistic literature? This history 
indicates the existence of a phenomenon we might call, following Michel Foucault, “the 
putting into discourse” of resistance.21 Significant for my own work, recognizing a 
                                                                                                                                            
one who will ‘take sides’ and make judgments, though this flies in the face of the anthropological 
nonengagement with either ethics or politics.” (Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “The Primacy of the Ethical: 
Propositions for a Militant Anthropology,” Current Anthropology 36[1995]: 419)  
 
18 Ibid., 417. 
 
19 See D’Andrade’s counter argument to Scheper-Hughes in the same issue of Current Anthropology: 
D’Andrade, “Moral Models in Anthropology.” 
 
20 Jeffrey S. Juris, “Practicing Militant Ethnography with the Movement for Global Resistance in 
Barcelona,” in Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigations, Collective Theorization, ed. Stevphen 
Shukaitis, et al. (Oakland: AK Press, 2007),164-178. 
 
21 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 12. Many have commented on a depoliticization of intellectual activity, 
despite claims to uncover “resistance,” “politics,” and “agency,” roughly since the late 1970s, a period 




discourse of resistance works to open up studies of politics in cultural production by 
insisting on exploring the relationship of this discursivity to power. By this I mean paying 
attention to what discussing resistance, representing it, celebrating it, does. Paying 
attention to a “discourse of resistance” is different from analyzing the political strategies 
of agents themselves. In my case study chapters, I get to individual cases and different 
political strategies. And in the next chapter, I explore different ways to access and 
understand those strategies. In this chapter, however, I am considering the representation 
of the activity of these agents as political content. I do this in order to clear the space for 
subsequent theoretical and political explorations. In addressing this discourse, I am, like 
Foucault, interested in “instances of discursive production (which also administer 
silences, to be sure), [instances] of the production of power… and [instances] of the 
propagation of knowledge (which often cause mistaken beliefs or systematic 
misconceptions to circulate).”22 
Identifying how acts of resistance are “put into discourse” is productive in that it 
moves the discussion past a deliberation of the truth or falsehood of the studies. I am 
largely not concerned with the question whether or not a musician’s work resists. As 
Foucault recommends, “the essential aim will not be to determine whether these 
discursive productions… lead one to formulate the truth… or on the contrary falsehoods 
                                                                                                                                            
witnessed, in all the bourgeois countries, the ascent to dominance of an entirely new kind of intellectual 
within a formation which continued to call itself a Left. The characteristic posture of this new intellectual 
was that he or she would gain legitimacy on the Left by constantly and fervently referring to the Third 
World, Cuba, national liberation, and so on, but would also be openly and contemptuously anti-communist; 
would often enough not affiliate even with that other tradition which had also descended from classical 
Marxism, namely social democracy, nor be affiliated in any degree with any labor movement whatsoever, 
but would invoke an anti-bourgeois stance in the name of manifestly reactionary anti-humanisms…” (Aijaz 
Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures [New York: Verso, 1992], 192.) 
 





designed to conceal the truth.”23 In other words, I am less concerned with whether or not 
the artists I will later discuss in detail are actually producing political strategies, than I am 
with the production of power and knowledge that accompanies the discourse about them 
and their work. The question at the moment is not the political or social efficacy of 
rappers lyrical and performative work; it is how representative frameworks limit how we 
understand that efficacy in the academy. 24 
 
Rap and resistance 
 
In March 2013, the Brooklyn Academy of Music hosted an event entitled “Mic 
Check: Hip Hop from North Africa and the Middle East.” The event literature described 
it as follows: 
From the recent revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East, rappers have 
emerged as torchbearers of the movement’s progressive energy and restless 
defiant spirit. For Mic Check: Hip-Hop from North Africa and the Middle East, 
BAM brings together a host of these intrepid anthem writers—Amkoullel (Mali), 
Deeb (Egypt), El Général (Tunisia), Shadia Mansour (Palestine/UK)—alongside 
more traditional musicians Brahim Fribgane and Yacouba for an evening of 
contemporary music born from radical social and political change.25 
 
The event and the artists’ roundtable that preceded it was a noteworthy showcase of Arab 
musicians on one of New York’s most prestigious stages. The curation by Zeyba Rahman 
brought rap in Arabic to an international stage as perhaps its live performance had not yet 
been. The innovative curation of this concert is both interesting and curious for a few 
                                                
23 Ibid., 11, emphasis added. 
 
24 I owe much here to Lila Abu-Lughod’s suggestion that we might better use resistance as a “diagnostic of 
power.” (Lila Abu-Lughod, “Romance of Resistance,” 42.) 
 






reasons. Looking at these closely sets the stage for a discussion of the neoliberal 
orientalism I see at play in the attributions of resistance to these artists.  
First, there were the dynamics in the opera house itself. For an event focused on 
“intrepid anthem writers” it is interesting that the lyrics of the anthems themselves were, 
for a majority of the gathered audience, impossible to follow.26 Even though BAM 
regularly hosts events in this venue with supertitles, the singers sang in their Arabic and 
African dialects without the assistance of simultaneous translation. Lyrics were printed in 
the program, but the house was not lit during the event. Audience members remained 
seated for the considerable majority of the evening. The “radical social and political 
change,” whose music had been discovered and showcased by BAM, was thus for the 
most part communicated through the addresses to the audience by the artists fluent 
enough in English to do so and the framework BAM provided. Deeb used call and 
response during his set. Shadia Mansour gave an impassioned and expansive address 
about Palestinian prisoners, and Amkoullel encouraged the audience to join him in 
dance.27 Ultimately, the political reach and meaning of these gestures was formed or 
limited by the general framework constructed to bring these artists together.  
In the artists’ roundtable two days before the concert, Mansour, Deeb, and Ben 
Amor (El Général) admitted they were not familiar with Amkoullel’s work before having 
been invited by BAM to New York. The inclusion of this musician from Mali on billing 
that reads “from North Africa and the Middle East” and implies direct connections with 
                                                
26 The musicians sang in different dialects without supertitles. Even if a majority of the audience – unclear 
from audience responses if a majority was Palestinian, Egyptian, Tunisian, or from Mali – understood one 
dialect, it is extremely unlikely that more than a handful of people could understand multiple performers, 
much less all of them, just by listening. 
 




the revolutions of 2010-2013 is decidedly curious. First, Mali is not typically included in 
the umbrella of “North Africa.” It has a different history, ethnic makeup, linguistic 
currents, and patterns of economic development than its northern neighbors. Claiming 
Amkoullel is North African because he is from Mali is at best unusual and at worst 
patently false – this is so regardless of the decidedly problematic racial and economic 
considerations that have accompanied the division (by the “West” or the UN) of the 
African continent into regions. Second, even though Mali is, approximately speaking, 
near Tunisia, a country which did witness quite radical “social and political change” 
recently, the unrest in Northern Mali in 2012-2013 cannot be said to even remotely 
resemble the revolutions of the “Arab Spring.” Of course, this would not matter if the 
event were billed as anything but a celebration of music “from the recent revolutions of 
North Africa and the Middle East.” Since the event was billed as such a celebration, 
however, and since the lyrical meanings of the artists’ music were obscured in 
performance, these curatorial choices are important. The umbrella provided by BAM had 
the effect of collapsing these important differences into one muddy, political soup. My 
point is that this is not accidental, even if it was not intentional, but ideological.  
The problematic reduction of the artists to a shared common background and 
politics can also be seen among the three Arab musicians. A practice of collaboration 
among rappers in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the Arab diaspora had by 
2011 become impossible for fans or critics following the genre to ignore.28 These 
collaborations allow artists to experiment with sounds and political expressions, reach 
                                                
28 A well-publicized example of this is the collaborative album Khat Thaleth, produced by Stronghold 






new audiences, and strengthen both aesthetic and political alliances. Even so, the Arab 
artists invited to perform in this event (Deeb, El Général, and Mansour) had never before 
collaborated. 29 There is a rich history of borrowing and exchange between Tunisian, 
Algerian, and Moroccan rappers. But their work has a notoriously limited reach in the 
Levant and Egypt. Mansour, a resident of the UK, has collaborated extensively with 
Eygptian and Palestinian crews, but not with Deeb. The artificial collaboration imposed 
by the curation on these artists by bringing them together under one umbrella of “music 
born of… change” has the effect of collapsing the very specific politics each musician 
addresses and the very different aesthetics in their work. Deeb, Mansour, and Ben Amor 
do not have similar histories in performing their music or in the subjects they address in 
their lyrics. The sense one gets from the curation is a little bit of tokenism, looking for 
wide representation: Deeb as a sort of liberal hipster, Mansour as a woman, and El 
Général as imprisoned rebel rapping against the machine. Moreover, the artists reacted to 
the reality of being thusly abstracted. 
For example Deeb closed his set with the following call and response, “When I 
say Egypt, you say Free! Egypt – ” and then the audience responded “Free!” He repeated 
it with Syria and Palestine (which received the heartiest response). This exchange is 
                                                
29 Journalists like Moe Ali Nayel and Mohammed Jabali and many of the musicians I interviewed have 
suggested to me that this historical lack of interaction and collaboration is due to the wide discrepancies in 
local dialects between the Eastern Mediterranean and the North African coast, something rappers within the 
Levant, or between the Levant and Egypt encounter to a much lesser extent. There is a considerable 
exchange between North African artists and French musicians of Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian 
descent. These artists share French in addition to local dialects. Interestingly, despite the persistence of 
French language education in some parts of Lebanon, and despite the diasporic experiences in France of 
some Lebanese musicians during the Lebanese Civil War (I am thinking primarily of El Rass and Rayess 
Bek), the collaborations between them and their North African colleagues in this genre is still negligible. I 
have yet to encounter a compelling explanation for this. My own hypothesis is that the differences are more 
aesthetic and economic than linguistic. Finally, it is worth noting that this may in fact have begun to change 
ever so slightly since the Tunisian Revolution, as those events sparked a renewed interest in pan-Arab 




recorded on the track and in recordings of other live events. At BAM, however, he 
rounded out the exchange with “the World –”/ “Free”; a choice that seemed to mute the 
powerful resonance of the refrain “Palestine/Free” that preceded it. But the most 
remarkable indication of the political washing out of the event came in Amkoullel’s 
closing set.  
Amkoullel’s most popular track is perhaps “SOS”: a piece which recounts the 
difficulty of fighting off violence and extremism in Northern Mali. This number, which 
he performed at BAM in the midst of the expedition of French troops to its former colony 
(in just another iteration of the world-wide “War on Terror”),30 basically asks for help. 
The chorus of the song is in French. The curatorial choice to conclude an evening born of 
the radical politics of the “Arab Spring” 31 with a SOS to French power was simply a 
remarkable appropriation of the local, radical energy of this period. The curation risked 
translating the radical critiques of corruption, nepotism, and racism in the preceding 
musicians tracks into a plea for Western aid. Allowing the chorus of “SOS” to conclude 
the evening was a specific – and very political – interpretation of the “radical and social 
change” sweeping “the region” between 2010 and 2013.32 In this way, the curatorial 
team, while pretending objectivity, imparted political meaning on the kind of change and 
the means of that change that the lot of presenting artists supposedly share.  
                                                
30 Adam Nossiter and Eric Schmitt, “France Battling Islamists in Mali,” New York Times, January 11, 2013, 
accessed November 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/world/africa/mali-islamist-rebels-
france.html.  
 
31 The Arab Spring was always the implied context of this event, if not declared outright. 
 
32 Anti-foreign intervention energy and mobilization was a significant part of political mobilization and 
rhetoric in every single Arab country (from Tunisia to Yemen) that experienced political and social 
upheaval in 2010-2013. The most contested of these of course has been in Libya, where Western powers 





Having sung “SOS,” Amkoullel changed the mood. Reminding the audience that 
“we musicians,” while sometimes engaging politics, also need to have fun, he proceeded 
to remove his traditional vest and began to dance, topless, asking the audience to shake 
their hips with his. He then sang his song “Farafina” a song with the message, 
underscored in call and response, that “We are all Africa.” Hisham Aidi calls this 
“blackwashing”: the attempt to tame political expressions with appeals to African 
American or trans-Atlantic African diasporic culture.33  
Indeed, what is significant about the curation of the BAM event is that it makes 
very obvious an imagined correlation between Arab politics and black bodies. More than 
this, the curation relies on this connection in order to produce a sense of cohesion 
between the artists. Here the confluence of black and Arab is enacted and performed by 
an art institution, but it exists in mainstream journalism, in efforts of the state department 
and their research and cultural programming, and in popular culture.34 This imagined 
correlation between black bodies and Arab politics draws together exoticized images of 
both black and Arab experiences. 
Moustafa Bayoumi writes about the emergence of “the African American” as 
“intermediary” with the Muslim World. Bayoumi suggests this correspondence between 
                                                
33 Hisham Aidi, “The X Factor,” Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim Youth Culture (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 2014), Kindle edition. 
 
34 Moustafa Bayoumi suggests that the black man (he doesn’t specify gender, but I am – because in his 
analysis it is obvious he means black men), because of his own lived history of oppression, has emerged as 
the figure capable of empathizing with Arabs today. Films like The Siege, The Kingdom, and The Traitor 
portray “blacks at the helm” of liberal American empire. (Bayoumi, “The Race is On: Muslims and Arabs 
in the American Imagination,” Middle East Research and Information Project, March 2010, accessed 





blackness and Arabness represents a significant shift in a US racial imagination.35 
Whereas a post-World War II US racial imagination frequently conflated Arabs and Jews 
in a sort of general anti-Semitism, and the 1980s saw ubiquitous images of Arabs as 
terrorists and oil sheikhs,36 in the post-9/11 period, Arabs have taken more of the 
spotlight as the denigrated racial “other” – leading to the popularized formulation “Arab 
is the new Black.”37 This latter phrase refers to a noticeable shift in surveillance and 
profiling – especially in heavily policed cities like New York City – from African 
American populations to Arab and Muslim ones. Most of the focus in literature that 
explores this new racism perhaps understandably emphasizes the effects on Arab and 
Muslim communities and the changing negative representations of Arabs.38 The 
transformation of the representations of African Americans however, in particular their 
emergence as iconically American, is just as significant. Bayoumi asks, “What could be 
more American today, after all, than the African American?”39 
                                                
35 I am aware of a certain fluidity in this section in my use of “Arab” and “Muslim.” They are obviously not 
the same thing. Many have taken pains to parse this, especially in order to counter an increasingly acrid 
Islamophobia in the public sphere of many European and American countries. The thread of this latter 
critique is that all “brown”—looking people, Asians, Latin@s, and of course Arabs, are being cast as 
dangerous “Muslims” in cities grappling with the effects of increased immigration. Since I am talking 
about this imagination that frequently collapses the two, I permit myself the same fluidity in order to 
address the scope and reach of the phenomenon. It should not be construed as an endorsement, however, of 
this problematic ignorance. (See Steven Salaita, Anti-Arab Racism in the USA: Where it Comes from and 
What it Means for Politics Today [London: Pluto Press, 2006], 10.) 
 
36 Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1981). 
 
37 Bayoumi, “The Race is On.” 
 
38 See for example, Moustafa Bayoumi, How Does it Feel to Be a Problem: Being Young and Arab in 
America (New York: Penguin HC, 2008). The book specifically uses a framework of African American 
experience and history (the title is taken from W.E.B. Du Bois’ The Souls of Black Folk [1903]) but only 
discusses the experiences of Arab youth in this transformation of racial prejudice. 
 





Despite the different histories of Arabic poetic expression that Arab rappers 
regularly invoke as influential, rap in Arabic has nevertheless provided an especially 
fertile soil for this racial imagination.40 It has already been exploited by the State 
Department. Hisham Aidi explores blackwashing in the context of the Rhythm Road 
Tours, a program developed by the State Department in partnership with Jazz at Lincoln 
Center. In 2004, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the tours revived a 
strategy of cultural diplomacy used during the Cold War. Then, jazz superstars stars like 
Dizzy Gillespie, Louis Armstrong, Benny Goodman, and Duke Ellington were dubbed 
“Jazz Ambassadors” and sent by the State Department to the Middle East, the former 
Soviet block, Africa, and southeast Asia to play their music and to spread what they 
hoped would be a political imagination uniquely tied to the US. Politicians and musicians 
alike concluded that this experimental program was “powerfully effective against Red 
propaganda.”41 Results of the Rhythm Road program have been more mixed. Originally 
featuring rap crews, the millennial incarnation of the Cold War strategy was sent to 
appeal to Arab and Muslim youth across North Africa, the Middle East, and the parts of 
Asia most susceptible to extremism, through the message of hip hop.  
The tool of hip hop seemed to appeal to these cultural policy makers for two 
reasons. First, for its aesthetic qualities of “speaking truth to power” or, in the words of 
the State Department, “promoting dissent.” And second for a perceived opportunity to 
                                                
40 Timothy Taylor writes that the dominance of American popular music, itself influenced heavily by 
African American sounds, from Jazz to Rock-and-Roll, leads to the effect that “African American sounds 
[are] taken to signal ‘western’ more generally.” (Timothy Taylor, Beyond Exoticism: Western Music and 
the World [Durham: Duke UP, 2007], Kindle edition, location 2909.) 
 
41 The quote is attributed to Gillespie. See Fred Kaplan, “When Ambassadors Had Rhythm,” New York 






connect with Muslim youth via hip hop’s history with Islam in the US. In fact, Aidi links 
the choices of the State Department to use hip hop and rap to reach out to Arab and 
Muslim youth directly to the transnational history and political legacy of Malcom X. The 
latter is frequently referred to in rap lyrics, and held in high esteem. Noting this, Aidi 
argues that the State Department sought to capitalize on aspects of Malcom’s thought and 
experience, while attempting to align his figure more closely with the interests of the US 
state.42 That is, they attempt to recast his political legacy: framing Malcom X as a hero of 
the post-Civil Rights Era, one celebrated by a “post-racial” US, presumably one that does 
not torture. Aidi points out that the Rhythm Road program recognized the long history of 
Islam in rap music as it developed in the United States and hoped to use this musical 
genre, home-grown in the US, as a tool against Islamic extremism abroad. Aidi connects 
this interest in “soft diplomacy” to the concurrent energies of different politico-religious 
partnerships that worked to secure funding and investment in schools of Islamic thought 
in the US that they found most amenable to US policies.43 
If the Jazz Ambassadors were sent to counter “Red propaganda” and defeat 
communism, the “hip hop envoys” (as participants in the Rhythm Road tours were called) 
were sent to stave off religious extremism. And if the free experimentation of jazz offered 
an imaginative escape from the rigid confines of Soviet communism, US hip hop was 
packaged to promote the “free expression,” “democracy,” and “dissent” that were at once 
denied by fundamentalist Islam, and which US policy makers hoped would undo it.44 
                                                









What is significant to me in this use of hip hop in the Arab world is the reworking of 
“dissent” as a tool of US imperial power. This fashioning of “dissent” was achieved 
through the imaginative blending of Arab and black experience. The Rhythm Roads 
Tours hoped to use elements of African American culture as a tool to seduce and appeal 
to Arab and Muslim youth, who, once won over by US culture, would presumably be less 
likely to dissent against capitalist exploitation and occupation by US forces.  
I refer to the BAM concert as an example of a discourse of resistance structured 
by neoliberalism in the context of a history of cultural programming like the Rhythm 
Road tours to suggest that this one concert was not an anomaly. Rather, its curation built 
off of energies and expectations generated through other cultural institutions, 
programming, and support. I have been using the example of the BAM concert to lay out 
the elements of neoliberal orientalism that structure the discourse of resistance in arts 
programming I wish to critique. These elements include: collapsing the background of 
different artists and different politics under one rubric of “radical change”; substituting a 
distinctly liberal political message (like the call for foreign intervention) for the ethos of 
otherwise untranslated political expression; and blackwashing – tapping into imagined 
African or African American experience in order to access Arab subjects.45 While 
Hisham Aidi’s work highlights how blackwashing works when the State Department 
used a sanitized perception of Malcom X in order to reach Arab audiences, the curation 
of the BAM concert as discussed here illustrates how blackwashing works by tapping 
into an imagination of African diasporic experience to frame for audiences the Arab 
performers in front of them.  
                                                





The curation of “Mic Check” built on the dynamics Aidi describes, but it added 
another dimension. BAM’s event, held in the predominantly (since the 1970s) African 
American and Puerto Rican and rapidly gentrifying neighborhood of Downtown 
Brooklyn, encouraged the imaginative confluence of Arab politics with black culture in 
the US via the medium of hip hop.46 But it also conjured a more global imagination, one 
tied with the aesthetics of “World Music,” wherein performances of tribal authenticity 
were melded with ideas of change, struggle, and politics in this region of the “Third 
World.” This Third World “otherness” was conjured by the “authenticity” and “tradition” 
performed by the two ʿoud musicians who played between the rap sets and had a visual 
counterpart in the costume choices of some of the artists. (Mansour wore an embroidered 
Palestinian gown, or thob and Amkoullel wore a wide brimmed straw hat and Malien vets 
and pants.47) These elements of “authenticity” were deliberately juxtaposed with the 
“modern” sounds of hip hop to create an aesthetic of “hybridity.” Hybridity, what 
Timothy Taylor has called the “new exotic” in the genre of world music, tends to feature 
blackness centrally and also feeds into narratives of resistance and change. Taylor notes 
that blackness has the tendency to fall out of narratives or analysis of resistance, even 
though its presence helps to conjure it.48 This would explain how Amkoullel could not 
                                                
46 Hillary Miller has explored how BAM has been at the heart of contests over what constitutes culture, 
funding, and public space in Downtown Brooklyn. She shows convincingly how the “revitalization” of 
Brooklyn since the late 1960s has always been conceptualized as a contest between and along class and 
race lines. See Hillary Miller, Drop Dead: Performance in Crisis, 1970s New York City (Evanston: 
Northwestern UP, forthcoming 2016). 
 
47 For discussions of “authenticity” in World Music, see Simon Frith, “The Discourse of World Music,” in 
Western Music and Its Others, ed. Georgina Born and David Hesmondhalgh (Berkeley: U of California P, 
2000), 305-322; and Taylor, “On Categories and Authenticity,” in Beyond Exoticism. 
 
48 Taylor writes: “Blackness represents a peculiar area in the hybridity discourses: sometimes it is so 
fetishized as a mode of affiliation and resistance that hybridity is constructed as the combination of 
blackness and something else; or blackness is subsumed into a larger category of ‘western’ or ‘modern,’ 




only fit into billing “From the Middle East and North Africa” and how his music could be 
understood as being borne of the struggles of the Arab Spring – it points to how he was 
centrally necessary for it. Noting that “blackwashing” exists in the discourse of resistance 
around Arabic rap maintains focus on the productivity of these racial imaginations.  
To be very clear, it is not that there is no similarity between Arab and Black 
struggles or no solidarity between these agents. It is that this solidarity desperately needs 
to be deliberated; it cannot be projected. There is good reason to be hopeful about these 
alliances,49 but there is also considerable reason not to project ideas of solidarity, as the 
alliances are very much not clear.50 Imposing a framework of solidarity, or of simple 
commonality, as BAM did, enacts a washed-out, liberal understanding of oppression, 
liberation, and change. In this vision of the world, these voices “from [North] Africa” are 
understood in terms of projects that “oppressed” people must need: like the right to 
education, to individual freedom, and above all to the freedom of expression. Within the 
curation proposed by BAM, even Shadia Mansour’s impassioned lecture about the 
condition of Palestinians in Israeli jails risked being understood as a problem of abstract 
censorship and oppression, completely severed from US influence or power.  
                                                                                                                                            
African American musics have influenced musicians around the world, but if the discussion in question is 
about ‘world music’ and is framed by questions of authenticity or hybridity, blackness frequently falls by 
the wayside.” (Taylor, Beyond Exoticism, Kindle locations 2838-2842).  
 
49 Consider for example the notable exchanges that have taken place between activists in Ferguson, 
Missouri and Palestine in the summer of 2014 that resulted in the mantra “From Ferguson to Palestine.” 
See, among others, Charlotte Alfred, “Protesters Say Ferguson Feels like Gaza, Palestinians Tweet Back 
Advice,” The Huffington Post, August 14, 2014, accessed November 11, 2014, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/14/ferguson-gaza_n_5679923.html.  
 
50 Arab activists and intellectuals have confronted considerable vitriol and accusations of racism from the 
African American community on the question of Obama’s imperialism in the Middle East. See for 
example, Rania Khalek, “Challenging the Discourse Around Anti-Blackness on Twitter,” June 5, 2014, 






In sum, the effect of the curation, which was facilitated by an appeal to 
overlapping racial imaginations, was to depolitcize both these musicians’ work and the 
struggles they claim they address. This happened despite, indeed through, a deliberate 
and overt framework of “radical and social change.” 51 Event literature deliberately 
invoked the “Arab Spring” while pitiful efforts were made to illuminate those political 
enjeux (and several were seemingly made to obscure them). The event, which overtly 
championed “progressive energy,” a “restless defiant spirit,” and “radical change” relied 
on a through-line of black culture and one literal black body, culminating in the refrain 
“we are all Africa.” This curatorial framework appeared to be invisible (read: neutral), 
benevolently encouraging the artists to “speak for themselves.” In fact, however, the 
framework directly structured how meaning could be made from these artists’ work. 
Through BAM’s curatorial frame, political change was best understood as a multicultural 
call for a “free world,” in which we all recognized our similarities (and our urge to dance) 
and grooved a little. Aidi called this phenomenon “blackwashing” and I locate it in the 
“discourse of resistance” I identify around rap in Arabic. The putting into discourse of 
cultural resistance – in this case, the literal putting on stage of these political artists – 
builds on specific racial imaginations. As I’ve begun to deliberate here, this imagination 
is informed by the specific, material conditions of the status-quo politics that maintain 
them.  
                                                
51 It deserves mention that the title of the event (“mic check”) further capitalized on a protest strategy 
during “Occupy Wall Street,” with which many New Yorkers may have been familiar with at the time. This 
further feeds the impression of protest politics that audiences were invited to explore during the concert. 
(See Edward D. Miller, “Authoring the Occupation: the Mic Check, the Human Microphone, and the 
Loudness of Listening,” in Media Authorship, ed. Cynthia Chris and David A. Gerstner [New York: 





Moreover, it is worth pointing to the general political milieu in which the 
“discourse of resistance” I’ve been discussing is found. Central to Michel Foucault’s 
deliberations on sexuality is his attention to an “endlessly proliferating economy on the 
discourse of sex.”52 Foucault suggests that this expansive discourse, the mandate to 
discuss sex, obscures the liberation such speech is meant to enact. We talk of sex to prove 
we are no longer repressed. But this insistence creates a loop wherein Western society 
(according to Foucault) continues to enact the same anxieties, but in the form of sexual 
liberation. Foucault’s focus is thus not on the existence or disappearance of repression but 
on the “mechanics of these incitements” to speak.53  
A proliferation of talk about “resistance,” about creative dissent, and about free 
speech in the face of censorship can be similarly understood. The discursivity around 
resistance and politics in cultural production has emerged at a time when the debate and 
consideration of actual political strategies has retreated from universities and intellectual 
life. Many have pointed out the depoliticizing effects of the so-called “cultural turn” over 
the past few decades. Nicky Gregson calls this “the evacuation of the social”; Donald 
Mitchell has argued that the cultural emphasis in “postmodern” approaches in humanistic 
literatures has rerouted research away from analysis of and intervention in sociopolitical 
struggle; and Vivek Chibber accuses strands of post-colonial studies in particular of 
refusing to actually engage in class or material analysis.54 Understanding that a 
                                                




54 Nicky Gregson, “Reclaiming the Social in Social and Cultural Geography,” in Handbook of Cultural 
Geography ed. Kay Anderson et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2003), 43-57; Donald Mitchell, Cultural 
Geography: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 3-34; Vivek Chibber, 





“discourse of resistance” exists derives its significance from acknowledging that its use 
enacts something. In the “appearance of a deliberate transgression,”55 the celebration of 
“resistance” reflects on the speaker. “We” talk of resistance everywhere in order to prove 
that we do not condone censorship or repression – in order to prove that our societies are 
free – unlike those from which the resistant artists hail – and in order to affirm our own 
tolerance.56 The celebration of “dissent” that has pervaded art programming in recent 
years is an especially rich archive of the confident anxiety around political alternatives 
where neoliberal power has taken hold. The concert at BAM and the talk at Columbia 
discussed above are both examples of events showcasing Arab politics, resistance, and 
dissent.57 As I have argued here, both depoliticize the artistic subjects they present. 
Which is to say, enthusiasm for narratives of “resistance” fills in where the debate of 
political alternatives has abated. The political and racial landscape in which the discourse 
of resistance is found now deserves further attention. “Neoliberal orientalism” makes 
specific a particular framework of representation of Arab youth in particular. 58 It is 
informed by the jockeying for power between players in the Global North and South, in 
                                                
55 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 6, emphasis added. 
 
56 Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton UP, 2006). 
 
57 Another example is the “Creative Dissent: Arts of the Arab World Uprisings” exhibit, curated by 
Christiane Gruber and Nama Khalil, on display at the Arab American National Museum (Dearborn, 
Michigan) November 8, 2013 through February 9, 2014. 
 
58 While working on edits to this chapter, I came across Sophia Ellman-Golman’s 2014 undergraduate 
thesis, “Deconstructing Discourse: Gender and Neoliberal Orientalism in the Egyptian Revolution” 
(undergraduate diss., Barnard College, 2014). Ellman-Golman uses the phrase to structure an understanding 
of how the January 25 Revolution was decried and denounced by “liberal” forces (including notably the 
Obama administration) for resulting in the election of Muslim Brotherhood representative Mohamed Morsi. 





which contest over control of resources in the Middle East has for some time been a 







What can be discerned about the intersecting efforts of the academe, art 
institutions, and the state department that sustain this “discourse of resistance”? What is 
the relationship between racial imagination and material dispossession? The discourse of 
resistance I am identifying around rap in Arabic relies on, indeed is managed by, the 
convergence of contemporary orientalism and contemporary global capitalism, or 
neoliberalism. Neoliberal orientalism imagines exoticized others by incorporating, 
augmenting, and adjusting racial imaginations. It does so as part of a political regime that 
is built on the expansion of capital between north and south, which expands its material 
power vis-à-vis dispossession and the dismantling of the services traditionally provided 
by the state. The discourse of resistance is one kind of knowledge production that 
sustains this phenomenon. 
In choosing the phrase “neoliberal orientalism” to describe what the discourse of 
resistance serves, I am admittedly slamming two concepts together: one which has been 
used to discern a contemporary iteration of late capitalism; and one which has been used 
to deconstruct a racist, colonial mentality projected onto the “East” by the “West.” To 
readers familiar with Said’s work on Orientalism, it will be clear why Foucault’s work on 




discourse to make his case for the existence of orientalism.59 At the same time, it may 
seem less clear how Foucault’s work on discourse and the production of knowledge will 
serve a critique of neoliberalism, especially considering the overtly Marxist vein that runs 
through what follows. My urge to combine the critique of a particular discourse with a 
material analysis and critique of neoliberalism into a single, productive phrase comes 
from frustration with both: Marxist critiques of late capitalism that leave little room for 
an analysis of racism alongside that of class,60 as well as post-colonial critiques of 
“colonized/colonial mentality” that hesitate to recognize the machinations of class and 
material, institutional power in the perpetuation of racism and discrimination. 61  
                                                
59 Said writes, “Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the 
Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, 
settling it, ruling over it […] I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault's notion of a discourse, 
as described by him in The Archaeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to identify 
Orientalism. My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly 
understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even 
produce—the Orient...” (Edward Said, Orientalism [New York: Penguin Books, 1977], 3.) Aijaz Ahmad 
thoroughly critiques what he sees as Said’s sloppy use of Foucault, a critique to which I will return to 
shortly. (Ahmad, In Theory, 166-167.) 
60 Vivek Chibber has suggested a common thread in this postcolonial literature centers on Marx’s notion of 
“abstract labor” which is seen as “a prime example of the deficiencies of universalizing theories.” (Chibber, 
Postcolonial Theory, 130. In this passage, he is in particular talking about Dipesh Chakrabarty’s 
Provincializing Europe [Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2000].) Scholars like Lisa Lowe and David Roediger 
have argued that Marx’s abstract analysis of social difference is incompatible with the reality of racial 
difference in the workplace. In other words, Marx’s theory doesn’t explain how racial discrimination 
effects capital. (Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics [Durham, NC: Duke UP, 
1996]; David R. Roediger, How Race Survived US History: From Settlement and Slavery to the Obama 
Phenomenon [London: Verso, 2008].) Cornell West has also analyzed a trajectory of African American 
socialist thinkers, whose early deficiencies, he points out, were that they confined their analyses of racism 
to the workplace. (See West, “Toward a Socialist Theory of Racism,” Chicago Democratic Socialists of 
America, accessed November 9, 2014, http://www.chicagodsa.org/CornelWest.html.)  
 
61 Said wrote, “[I]n the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in the imperial or colonial or racial 
sense, race takes precedence over both class and gender.” I do not share this belief of his. If orientalism as a 
concept or way of understanding the representation of Arab youth on global stages is to be useful, it must 
be qualified to bring an analysis of material reality – of class at least, though eventually this is 
indecipherable without also considering gender – on par with that of race. (Said, “Media, Margins, and 
Modernity: Raymond Williams and Edward Said,” ix; Raymond Williams, The Politics of Modernism: 
Against the New Conformists [London: Verso, 1989], 196-197.) Others have made this critique of Said (see 
Ahmad, In Theory, 197), most of which fall in line with the critiques of the “cultural turn” referred to 
earlier. For example Neil Smith has argued that basic social categories (such as gender, race, and class) 




In arguing for and recognizing neoliberal orientalism in the representation of 
artists, musicians, and performers who are also, predominantly, Arab youth, I attempt to 
describe the interconnected material and affective frameworks that continue to produce 
racist representations and unequal opportunities. I also attempt to bring together and 
respond to critiques of Marxist analyses which accuse the latter of “reducing everything 
to political economy” and critiques of post-colonial analysis which “blame everything on 
the West.” It is certain that a compelling analysis must address both race and class (or at 
least if not class, than material inequality). But how to do this? That is, without 
essentializing race or class, how can the intersections of material exclusion and racist 
discrimination be understood? Theorizing “neoliberal orientalism” is my attempt to do 
this. 
 
“Neoliberal – ” 
 
The debate over the relevance of the term “neoliberalism” in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA Region) has been a heated one. I want to clarify what I mean when 
I refer to the term in this study and why I find locating “neoliberalism” useful. I 
understand neoliberal power as characterized by three central features.  
First, it does not originate in one part of the globe. It builds its power and extends 
its flexibility because of a reciprocal relationship it embodies between “north” and 
“south.” In associating this fluidity with neoliberalism, I position myself in the current 
debate about the relevance of the term “neoliberalism” to studies of the contemporary 
                                                                                                                                            






Middle East. I am distancing myself from the argument that “neoliberalism” cannot be 
used to understand grievances or changes in this region because local particularities 
trump global trends. This argument, more prevalent in popular usage than in published 
work, has become considerably less popular since analyses of social movements during 
Arab Uprisings consistently pointed to shared economic grievances across the region – 
grievances protesters share with others across the Global South and in the slums and 
ghettos of the Global North.62 The argument against the relevance of neoliberalism in the 
MENA suggests that the region’s economic growth (different sites within it at varying 
degrees) is primarily being hampered by local corruption, religious conservatism, and 
autocracy innate to the culture of the region and not global trends in financial capitalism. 
As Koenraad Bogaert describes, in pre-2011 studies of ruling elites in the MENA region 
“a misleading subdivision is made and everything that falls under neoliberalism is 
situated within the realm of economics while the ‘regime’ is situated within the realm of 
politics.”63 Like Bogaert, I refuse the bifurcation of “politics” and “economics” – where 
the former is local, cultural, and historical and the latter informed primarily by the global 
present. The argument that a blanketing “neoliberalism” like a similarly encompassing 
“capitalism” should not and cannot be read onto the diverse and different cities of the 
Global South shares many features in common with post-colonial theory that seeks to 
establish that the reach of capitalism into Asia in particular in the twentieth and twenty-
                                                
62 But it was still current enough in 2013 to send academic roundtables into heated debate. “Neoliberal 
Urbanizations in the Arab World,” roundtable, organized by Alaaʿ Al-Hamarneh. (Middle East Studies 
Association Annual Conference, October 12, 2013, New Orleans, accessed February 18, 2016, Louisiana.) 
https://mesana.org/mymesa/meeting_program_session.php?sid=774d7fa6343cb7fd8e13091518e7d3c3. 
  
63 Bogaert, “What Do We Mean When We Talk about Neoliberal Urbanism in the Arab World?” paper 
presented at “Neoliberal Urbanizations in the Arab World,” 
https://mesana.org/mymesa/meeting_program_desc.php?pid=ba68cc2f3e303cfdb5f2e2979a8888a7, 




first century must be understood as wholly distinct from the development of capitalism in 
Western Europe and the Americas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.64 I want to 
distance myself from this argument. 
My own analysis follows the Marxist critiques coming out of Beirut, Cairo, 
Mumbai, and elsewhere that underscore a faulty essentialism in these refusals of capital 
as a framework for understanding power.65 I find problematic the idea that capitalism in 
the “Global South” is essentially different from that in the “Global North.” In particular, I 
reject the hesitancy to identify and analyze neoliberal incursions as such based on the 
belief that the Global South develops at a different pace than the Global North. Different 
regions develop differently; but it is in fact the exchange of capital, and indeed the 
negotiation of it between North and South, that defines the different experiences between 
neoliberal societies.  
Following Stephen Graham, I instead consider that neoliberal incursions in the so-
called Global South in fact inform how neoliberal power moves and operates in the 
Global North.66 Neoliberalism thus refers to a configuration (theoretical and practical) of 
late capitalism that cannot be relegated to the cities of Europe, Japan, or North America. 
                                                
64 For critiques of this tendency, see Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital; Benita 
Parry, Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique (London: Routledge, 2004); and Crystal Bartolovich 
and Neil Lazarus, eds., Marxism, Modernity, and Postcolonial Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004). 
 
65 Partha Chatterjee’s work is a good example of this trend. I will return to his work later in this chapter. 
See previous note. 
 
66 Graham writes that through “processes of imitation, explicitly colonial models of pacification, 
militarization and control, honed on the streets of the global South, are spread to the cities of capitalist 
heartlands in the North. This synergy, between foreign and homeland security operations, is [a] … key 
feature of the new military urbanism.” (Stephen Graham, Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism 





While Paul Amar has called this reciprocal relationship the “end of neoliberalism,”67 I 
consider this in fact a most powerful distinguishing feature of neoliberalism. Amar 
explores how strategies in urban securitization, for example, are tried out in the 
occupations of Baghdad and Ramallah, and in the favelas of Rio, and then imported to 
New York or the US-Mexico border.68 In fact, the traversing of the South/North division 
– the construction of “core” and “periphery” through the increased contact between the 
two – has been central to how neoliberal ideology and practice has functioned since the 
first experiments of the so-called Chicago Boys in Chile in the 1970s.69  
Secondly, I understand that neoliberal power is characterized by shrinking states 
and the non-governmental energies developed to fill in this deficit. This may be the result 
either of policies imposed on countries by creditors (as in the case of Lebanon); by 
military force (as in Iraq); or by elected representatives (as in Tunisia); or a combination 
of any of these (as in Egypt).70 That is, neoliberal orientalism appears in starkest relief 
when states and the services they provide are shrinking and the non-governmental 
                                                
67 Amar frames the “end of neoliberalism” as the rise of or increased concentration of facets of 
“international humanism,” to impose a “moralized” security on unruly publics, via the intersections of non-
governmental efforts (which he calls in a most useful formulation, parastatal formations). Focused on 
specific case studies of Egypt and Brazil, his are uniquely focused analyses of many processes that others 
have attributed directly to neoliberalism. My assessment is that Amar’s declaration of the “end of” 
neoliberalism stems from fatigue conjured by the debates around “neoliberalism” in political science and 
developmentalist circles as opposed to an interest in drawing finite distinctions between the modes of 
governmentality he discusses and those that are found “in” neoliberalism. (Paul Amar, The Security 
Archipelago: Human Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism [Durham: Duke UP, 
2013].) 
 
68 My examples here are informed by Amar’s work, which looks at patterns of securitization and 
surveillance in Brazil and Egypt (Amar, The Security Archipelago). See previous note. 
 
69 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Picador, 2008), 91-105. 
 
70 For a solid comparative study see, Nazih Ayubi, “Etatisme Versus Privatization: The Changing 
Economic Role of the State in Nine Arab Countries,” in Economic Transition in the Middle East: Global 






organizations (NGOs) that attempt to fill these gaps are proliferating.71 A critical 
consideration of debt at an individual and national level is a central part of understanding 
this aspect of neoliberalism. Moreover, at the same time that states are downsized at 
home, they attempt to expand their reach away from home, building a market for 
contractors, and NGOs.  
Stephen Gill has argued that neoliberalism “is an epoch-making order” manifest 
in part in the “quasi-legal restructuring of state and international political forms.” 72  My 
own study shares with his the understanding that neoliberal power is removed from 
central states and invested more directly into “quasi-constitutional regional 
arrangements,” the “multilateral regulatory framework of the new World Trade 
Organization,” and an economy of non-governmental organizations and contractors.73 
Aiwha Ong has called this effect of neoliberal state formation as “overlapping” or 
“graduated sovereignties.”74 Especially relevant to the exploration I am conducting of 
neoliberal discursive power is that the state may no longer be either the central conduit of 
this power or the primary generator of this discourse. Indeed, the wholesale shrinking of 
the state that many theorists have described in neoliberal economy should not signal the 
absence of centralized power or the elimination of elite hegemony.75 On the contrary, as 
                                                
71 See Koenraad Bogaert, “Contextualizing the Arab Revolts: The Politics Behind Three Decades of 
Neoliberalism,” Middle East Critique 2013: 17-19.  
 
72 Stephen Gill, “Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism,” Millennium: Journal 




74 Aiwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty (London: Duke UP, 
2006), 7. 
 
75 In her discussion of the transforming concept of “civil society” in relationship to NGO economies, Sibille 
Merz points out, “In development policy, the idea of civil society, mostly reduced to NGOs… is closely 




David Harvey has argued, this shrinking of the state has ostensibly only removed the 
workings of power from public accountability, without significantly restructuring it as 
more egalitarian.76 In much of the Arab world, the shriveling of the state under the 
context of “failed,” “besieged,” and “promised” states has led to the proliferation of 
NGOs upon which denizens now depend as heavily as they may have on proper social 
security and other services provided by a traditional nation-state. Neoliberalism in this 
study also means considering the discourses that an economy of NGOs constructs. 
The third and final defining characteristic of neoliberalism that I consider is 
colonial appropriation. This may be manifest either in outright military or police 
occupation, or alternatively as settler colonialism. Neoliberalism in the MENA region 
today is indecipherable from the contest between international and regional powers over 
the satellite control of resources and governance in the Arab world. The fact that I 
consider the structure of these colonial interventions to be inherently neoliberal does not 
pretend to negate the presence of different forms of racism, as I will elaborate in the 
discussion of “orientalism” below.  
Colonial appropriation then, as Timothy Mitchell, Gilbert Achcar, and others have 
argued, considers the significance of the contest over oil in this region and the continued 
colonial dimensions therein.77 Recognizing this is not reducing Arab culture or politics 
(or resistance!) to the ambitions of multinational oil companies or the imperial behavior 
                                                                                                                                            
liberalization.” (Sibille Merz, “‘Missionaries of the New Era’: Neoliberalism and NGOs in Palestine,” 
Race, Class 54 [2012]: 52.) 
 
76 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), 205. 
 
77 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New York: Verso, 2011); 
Gilbert Achcar, The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprisings, trans. G. M. Goshgarian 





of the states that facilitate this predatory behavior. Rather, this recognition underscores 
that the occupation of states like Iraq, resistance against it, and regional dynamics at play 
in large part around those interests has irreparably affected local dynamics across the 
Levant, and have done so for nearly a century. Oil has placed the peoples of the Middle 
East center stage in the post-Cold War theatre. And it has made the region a central pawn 
in negotiations between the US, China, and Russia as each of these powers jockey for 
international influence and power. As Achcar has put it, “One can deny that oil is the 
stake of Western powers’ intervention in the region only at the price of ignoring that 
stake’s immense economic and strategic importance.”78 Achcar, Adam Hanieh, and 
others even stipulate this is a major driving force behind the unequivocal support of the 
US for Israel.79 The investment in, development of, and conflicts over oil in the Middle 
East are both: the legacy of eighteenth and nineteenth-century colonialism; and the field 
in which the newest kinds of war and dispossession are tried out. This means that 
understanding “politics,” even in cultural production like rap concerts, must incorporate 
analysis of a legacy of orientalism that is both borne of the colonial period and adapting 
to neoliberal technologies and strategies.  
My insistence upon qualifying as “neoliberal” the way power operates in MENA 
cities also reflects a way of thinking about and historicizing global power and politics, 
since the “end” of the colonial period after the Second World War. That is, the shift from 
categories of “first” and “third” worlds for global “North” and “South” not only relates to 
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79 See Adam Hanieh, “Palestine in the Middle East: Opposing Neoliberalism and US Power, Parts One and 






globalizing economic and cultural strategies but also, significantly, relates to the political 
alliances structuring the post-Cold War landscape. Vijay Prashad recounts how following 
the Second World War and riding the wave of post-colonial independence struggles, the 
“Third World” emerged as a political pact and alliance between new states of former 
colonies. This pact joined to pressure Europe and the US for more representation in the 
new United Nations. The eventual dominance of terms like Global North/South mark the 
ultimate failure of the Third World pact to realize its political goals. It also marks the 
emergence of the UN as a devastatingly unequal representation of global interests.80  
These three characteristics structure what I mean by neoliberalism in this study: a 
reciprocal relationship of power between “north” and “south”; shrinking states and the 
non-governmental energies developed to fill this deficit; and dispossession.81 Running 
through these central features are many of the terms and buzzwords of neoliberal critique 
that have circulated in the last decade. I will discuss specific examples of financialization, 
privatization, debt and credit, securitization, gentrification, and “Lebanonization” in the 
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85-142. 
 
81 See for example, Judith Bulter and Athena Athanasiou, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). 
 






“ – Orientalism” 
 
Considering the framework of power, especially vis-à-vis state power which I 
have just described as neoliberal, is it at all accurate to continue to speak of orientalism? 
Since the relationship between the US and its allies and the Arab world today does not 
resemble, in a structural way, the imperial interventions of the French or British of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, or US imperial interests in the same period in the 
Far East, is Said’s understanding of orientalism as a way of managing colonized 
populations vis-à-vis “vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, [and] colonial 
bureaucracy and colonial styles” still relevant? 83 
I believe that it is, though the term requires adjusting. The adjustment I offer via 
the term “neoliberal orientalism” serves not only to account for the neoliberal structure of 
power that has replaced imperial bureaucracy but also to incorporate and accommodate 
the critiques that have built on and further developed Said’s observations in the years 
since its initial publication. At its essence, neoliberal orientalism adapts – and limits, 
actually84 – Said’s understanding of orientalist discourse to the ways in which I just 
described neoliberal power as operating.  
First, then, neoliberal orientalism acknowledges that the fabrication of denigrating 
and exoticized representations of “oriental” others is maintained, like neoliberalism’s 
reciprocity between “north” and “south,” vis-à-vis a reciprocal relationship between 
                                                
83 Said, Orientalism, 2.  
 
84 Aijaz Ahmad remarks that Said attaches “orientalism” both to imperial power and to a “European 
imagination” that reaches back to ancient Greece. I return to this discussion later in this chapter. (Ahmad, 





“east” and “west.” Neoliberal orientalism is not a product of the “west” alone. By 
referring to “neoliberal orientalism,” I want to recognize that Arabs themselves are 
playing a significant role in the perpetuation of orientalist representations, and that there 
are distinct class elements tied to the ability to “speak for” in this way. In considering this 
deepening of Said’s concept of orientalism, I recognize that many of the features of the 
“discourse of resistance” I highlighted during the “Mic Check” event in New York also 
appear in the presentation of artists in the Arab world. 
 In arguing for an understanding of orientalism as built reciprocally between “east” 
and “west” I am building on Lisa Lau’s concept of “re-orientalism.” Lau proposes this 
idea to describe a process she calls “Orientalism by Orientals,” which she associates most 
clearly with “diasporic Orientals.” Lau underscores and takes issue with these agents’ 
“speaking for and representing the Other,” “seizing voice and platform,” and thereby 
“consign[ing the Oriental] to subalternism.”85 I take from Lau the emphasis she puts on 
“orientals” producing orientalism.86 Departing from her work, however, I am again 
convinced this type of orientalizing energy has less to do with the location (diasporic 
nature) of these individuals as it does with their access to capital. In these Arab cities 
with which I am concerned, I find that re-orientalism is much more closely related to 
class than location of residence. Of course, there are considerable overlaps between the 
                                                
85 Lisa Lau, “Re-Orientalism: The Perpetration and Development of Orientalism by Orientals,” Modern 
Asia Studies 43 (2009): 571-572.  
 
86 Edward Said stated that it was never his intention with Orientalism to further reify “East” and “West.” 
That is, it was not his intention to mark that only Westerners can produce orientalist discourse. That kind of 
thinking, he writes, “adds to the sense of fixed identities battling across a permanent divide that my book 
quite specifically abjures.” (Said, Orientalism, 336.) His critics, even sympathetic ones, have remarked that 





two, but the tendency to “speak for” so central in Said’s articulation of orientalism87 is 
much more widespread within educated and monied classes, wherever they live, than it is 
among diasporic populations in general, which are comprised of a fantastic range of 
political ideas, access to capital, relation to their countrymen and women, and cities or 
countries of origin.88 As Hamid Dabashi has argued, “In an increasingly amorphous and 
boundary-less world, it no longer requires us to divide intellectuals along a fictitious 
center-periphery axis.”89 Considerations of exchanges of and access to capital are more 
relevant than location for understanding how both neoliberalism and orientalism operate.  
Building off this idea of fluidity between zones of “East” and “West,” the most 
important adjustment in my use of orientalism is that it is based on an understanding of 
exchange and interaction, not of encounter. Said’s understanding of orientalism depends 
on the notion that the “West” encountered the “East” and through this encounter, 
developed the discursive means to manage and produce the Orient. Said’s framework 
denies, as Tarek el-Ariss and Nabil Matar (among others) have powerfully demonstrated, 
a rich history of transfer and exchange from the other direction: that is, of Arabs 
                                                
87 In establishing what he meant by orientalist discourse, Said famously takes the example of Gustav 
Flaubert writing about the Egyptian courtesan Kuchuk Hanem. Said writes, “…she never spoke of herself, 
she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. He spoke for and represented her. He was foreign, 
comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him not only to 
possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell his readers in what way she was ‘typically 
Oriental.’” (Said, Orientalism, 6, original emphasis in italics, added emphasis underscored.) 
 
88 Lau’s formulation “diasporic Orientals” ignores the consideration of class. She refers to a few diasporic 
authors, highly educated individuals with access to various kinds of capital. Impecunious refugees in exile, 
to conjure only the most obvious counterpoint, frequently do not have the opportunity to perform the 
characteristics of “speaking for” she associates with the “diaspora” in general.  
 
89 In Brown Skin, White Masks, Hamid Dabashi refers to Joseph Massad’s writing on shifts in the 
Palestinian intelligentsia post 1967. Massad denounces those intellectuals in and out of Palestine, within or 
without 1948 or 1967 borders, or in the diaspora, who “traded in their national liberation goals for pro-
Western pragmatism.” Dabashi concludes his discussion of Massad’s history by writing, “the category [of 
this kind of intellectual] can become perfectly color-blind, because capital and its changing ideologies are 





“encountering” the West and the knowledge they produced.90 For an understanding of 
“orientalism” to be productive today, it requires allowing for what Steven Salaita has 
called the “interaction of Arabism and Americana”91 – that is, paying attention to how an 
Arab community in the US (or in France, Germany, Belgium or elsewhere) “facilitate[s, 
or] indeed, inspire[s]”92 representations of Arabs on a globalized stage.  
For orientalism to be useful it alsoneeds to be able to reflect a more complicated 
and interdependent set of racial dynamics than the ones Said accounts for. This is 
especially important in my own study because any discussion of hip hop and power, 
considering the genre’s history in the US, is already racially charged. Contextually, 
acknowledging the shift from Said’s colonial encounter to the neoliberal exchange means 
accounting for how realities of immigration have effected the shape of inner city life in 
Europe and the US and how these are actively informing perceptions about the Arab 
world.  
Moreover, I recognize that the existence and the treatment of increasing numbers 
of Arabs and Muslims in growing cities in the US and Europe over the past several 
decades accounts for changes in the styles and types of orientalist representation of 
Arabs. This interaction between “Arabism and Americana” influences the texture of 
orientalism today. Further, I am deciding to continue to speak of orientalism despite a 
clear trend in critical discussions of representations of Arabs in recent years to speak 
instead of either racism or Islamophobia. I opt to consider “neoliberal orientalism” and 
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not “neoliberal racism” or “neoliberal Islamophobia” primarily because of a positive as 
opposed to negative tone in much of the discourse I critique in this study. While 
Islamophobic discourse is almost always negative, orientalism – especially the neoliberal 
orientalism I am arguing structures the discourse of resistance I take issue with here – is 
more often than not couched in positive, enthusiastic, even celebratory language. If the 
ubiquitous celebration of Arab rap as “cultural resistance” is problematic, it is not so 
because the orientalizing speaker denigrates or intentionally degrades, but because she 
elevates and exoticizes. This formula, which Said also identified in orientalism, remains 
central in a discussion of neoliberal orientalism. Ultimately, while Islamophobia can raise 
its head in the discourse I suggest is structured by neoliberal orientalism, the history and 
context of its use are not particularly suited to the problems I am considering here.93 
                                                
93 One primary difficulty in adapting the discourse of Islamophobia to the discourse of resistance in cultural 
production in the cities of Ramallah, Amman, and Beirut is the fact that this term has developed in large 
part to address the experience of Middle Eastern and South Asian immigrants to Europe. Most of this 
discussion has centered on the experiences of Muslim immigrants (from south Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East) to England (in particular) and to varying degrees in France, Germany, Belgium, and northern Europe, 
in addition to the US. (See Salaita, “Beyond Orientalism.”) This history has produced a range of meanings 
for Islamophobia, from antipathy towards brown-skinned and Asian immigrants (regardless of religion); 
fear of religion in the public sphere; and anxiety about terrorism (see Fred Halliday, “‘Islamophobia’ 
Reconsidered,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22[1999]: 892-902). Tariq Modood has pointed out, 
“Islamophobia” may be closer to “cultural racism” than religious intolerance (Tariq Modood, 
“Introduction: the Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe,” in The Politics of Multiculturalism in 
the New Europe: Racism, Identity, and Community, P. Werbner and T. Modood, eds. [London: Zed Books, 
1997], 1-26). Vincent Greisser has productively suggested that Islamophobia may have less to do with 
Islam itself and may be more explicitly connected to an anxiety about the presence of religion in public, 
what he calls “religiophobia” (Greisser, La Nouvelle Islamophobie, [Paris: La Découverte, 2003], 12). 
These characteristics also describe some tendencies in NGO discourse. For example, Sibille Merz has 
discussed how, in the context of the post-Oslo West Bank, NGOs are encouraged by international funders 
to engage a language of peace and cooperation and to drop considerations of struggle, resistance or intifada 
[uprising, struggle] against the Israeli occupation (Merz, “Missionaries of the New Era,” 56). This has 
resulted in, among other things, the proliferation of a discourse that completely eschews, if it does not deny 
outright, local religious considerations. The refusal, in a post-Intifada landscape, to engage the major, 
grassroots, and Muslim players may in part be understood as trepidation about Islam in politics. The 
elements of this fear are the perceived connection of Islam with terrorism and of Muslims with violence, 
especially in the wake of the suicide bombings and other violence associated with Palestinians during the 
Second Intifada. Elements of Islamophobia do circulate in NGO discourse that I refer to in neoliberal 





I am interested, as Said was, in recognizing a systemic way of representing the 
Arab world that makes Arabs objects of desire and the places they call home exotic 
spaces of experimentation. My adjustment comes from acknowledging that this 
imagination today comes from a more complex dynamic of overlapping racisms and of 
intercultural exchange. This means in part considering, as Mustafa Bayoumi has 
identified, a certain slippage between mainstream perceptions about marginalized 
communities, especially between African American and Arab American ones. It also 
means considering, as Hisham Aidi has established, how institutions and the US State 
have deliberately used perceptions about African American experiences in order to reach 
Arab youth. This adjustment to orientalism I propose provides the space to consider, for 
example, how blackwashing functions within a framework of representing and 
understanding the Arab world. 
The third adjustment I propose stems from considering theoretical reproaches of 
Said’s construction of the concept of Orientalism. One of the most compelling critiques 
Aijaz Ahmad offers of Said is what he calls “the form of Foucault’s resurfacing in Said’s 
thought.”94 In this, Ahmad pushes the literary scholar on his use of “discourse,” 
questioning where orientalism comes from, or what kind of ideology we should 
understand it is attached to. Ahmad points out that Said ties his concept of “orientalism” 
to post-Enlightenment Europe, where “Orientalism appears to be an ideological corollary 
of colonialism.”95 At the same time, Ahmad notes, Said locates the origins of Western 
ideas about the Orient – what Said calls “the European imagination” – in ancient 
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Greece.96 Said uses this thousand-plus-year gap to argue that the strength of “the codes of 
Orientalist orthodoxy” is derived from their development over hundreds, not tens, of 
years. Said writes, “To say simply that orientalism was a rationalization of colonial rule is 
to ignore the extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather 
than after the fact.”97 Ahmad takes reasoned issue with Said’s insinuation that a single 
through-line runs through “Western” imagination from Aeschylus to Flaubert, pointing to 
a discourse that has only intensified and condensed over time. Ahmad rightly denounces 
this as Said’s clumsy use of Foucault. Ahmad writes, “The idea that there could be a 
discourse – that is to say, an epistemic construction – traversing the whole breadth of 
‘Western’ history and textualities, spanning not only the modern capitalist period but all 
the preceding pre-capitalist periods as well, is not only an un-Marxist but also a radically 
un-Foucauldian idea.”98 
 The implications of this critique on the usefulness of Said’s notion of Orientalism 
need to be considered, all the more so because I have positioned the usefulness of a 
“discourse” (of resistance, that is fueled by neoliberal orientalism) centrally in my 
elaborations here. In using the phrase “neoliberal orientalism” I do not envision a further 
intensification of the racial imagination Said invokes. There is no single racial 
imagination in the “West” distinct from that in an “East” that can be traced from the 
defeat of Xerxes through to the occupation of Baghdad by US-led forces. I concur with 
Ahmad that this is a soundly essentialist notion that has little use in a material analysis of 
                                                
96 Said, Orientalism, 56. 
 
97 Ibid., 39. 
 





forces of oppression in the Middle East today. Neoliberal orientalism is not meant to 
indicate an intensification of colonial orientalism.99  
 It is meant to address how the shape of neoliberalism structures the contours of 
orientalist representations of the Arab world and its subjects. The world is much too fluid 
today to productively be split into sealed zones of “east” and “west. ” That is, like Hamid 
Dabashi and Gayatri Spivak, I also am concerned with the tendency in Said’s articulation 
of orientalism to conjure “victims” and “oppressors” based on their location in the world 
or their ethnic identity.100 Neoliberal orientalism, as I structure it in this study, also 
considers the orientalising work within the Arab world by Arabs themselves as they try to 
enter globalized markets and international opportunities. The imperial context of the 
nineteenth century has changed considerably and as such, neoliberal orientalism as I’ve 
articulated here accounts for active reciprocity between “core” and “periphery,” 
challenging the validity of these concepts. By qualifying this orientalism as neoliberal, I 
also point to shifts from colonial bureaucracy to economies built on a coordination of for-
profit interests and the NGO sector. Finally, I consider orientalism in this study to build 
on overlapping racial imaginations that rely on a neoliberal economy of exchange as 
opposed to a colonial logic of encounter. 
                                                
99 Said writes, “… as one surveys Orientalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the overriding 
impression is of Orientalism’s insensitive schematization of the entire Orient. How early this 
schematization began is clear from the examples I have given of Western representations of the Orient in 
classical Greece. How strongly articulated were later representations building on the earlier ones, how 
inordinately careful their schematization, how dramatically effective their place in Western imaginative 
geography…” (Said, Orientalism, 68). 
 
100 Dabashi is concerned in particular with the problem of oriental agency in light of Said’s construction of 
orientalism as the west always “speaking for” the East. (Dabashi, Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power 





 The final critique of orientalism I must address revolves around the question of 
agency. Many astute critiques of Said accuse him of writing off “Oriental” populations as 
forever oppressed, without agency. Said attempted to respond to this accusation with 
what was in many ways a sequel to Orientalism, his Culture and Imperialism.101 
Understanding my hesitations about the question of agency, looking for it, finding it, and 




Part Two: Resistance and Politics 
 
 
 If the “discourse of resistance” is different from whatever political strategies 
individuals or communities employ, it is also not necessarily confined to instances where 
the word “resistance” itself is invoked. I have chosen the term “resistance” because of the 
frequency of its use, as pointed to above, and to which I return shortly. As I identified in 
the BAM example, the “discourse of resistance” is a way of pointing to a phenomenon I 
see at play when a number of words and concepts – “political,” “revolt,” “revolution,” 
“change,” “defiant,” “radical,” “rebel,” among others – are invoked. That being said, it is 
important to qualify that the “discourse of resistance” I identify is not the same as a 
history of ideas and debates about how to challenge power, many of which have been 
conceptualized as revolution, rebellion, and radical politics. The productivity of the 
                                                




“discourse of resistance” is directly attached to neoliberalism, and has emerged primarily 
since the latter has taken hold as a political and economic ideology.  
 In different centuries, and from every corner of the globe, theorizations of 
rebellion and revolution have addressed when and how uprisings should take place, under 
what conditions they are sanctioned, who is permitted to carry them out, and the possible 
effects of these changes, should they effectively be enacted. My ultimate concern with 
the “discourse of resistance” that I identify, and the reason I spend so much time in this 
chapter locating it, is because I fear it distances the subjects and contexts in which it is 
found from those radical theorizations. In my case studies, I explore how musicians and 
their audiences invert and deconstruct ideas of thawra [revolution], mouqawameh 
[resistance], ijtihad [reasoned struggle], tamarod [rebellion], sabr [patience], sumoud 
[resilience], wataniyya [nationalism], and others. But before turning to these, I first want 
to explore how the neoliberal “discourse of resistance” I am identifying works. How does 
the depoliticization I identify happen? This theoretical exploration will help to guide my 
exploration of the concepts just mentioned in subsequent chapters, so as to not repeat the 
same mistakes that I identify as intrinsic to the “discourse of resistance.” I spend the rest 
of this chapter arguing that the discourse of resistance works by relying on a limited 
framework of recognizing and representing political action. These actions are in turn tied 
to a specific theorization of subjectivity, and with it, agency; a theorization which is 









“Wherever you go, you will be a polis.” ~ Ancient Greek saying102  
 
In The Human Condition (1958), Hannah Arendt relegates politics to a space she 
calls the polis. She describes the polis as “the space of appearance.”103 Her 
conceptualization of political activity in the polis is the seed both of Arendt’s original 
contribution to political thought and the source of the most compelling critiques of it.104 
In exploring Arendt’s definition of political activity in this section, I am not endorsing all 
the possible implications of her theory. I am, however, suggesting that Arendt’s 
theorizations of politics (political activity in the polis) can be used to illuminate the 
tendency to speak of “resistance” as representative of agency, if not incumbent on it.  
 The Greek word polis means city, or city-state. Arendt uses it as Aristotle and 
Plato did, to elaborate an ideal political community. She writes, “The polis, properly 
speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people 
as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people 
living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be.”105 As both Plato and 
Aristotle, despite their differences, considered the members of the polis as removed from 
more worldly considerations, so too does Arendt separate the realm of politics from other 
human activity. That is, the first claim Arendt makes about political activity is that it is 
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removed and different from the other spheres of human behavior.  
 Arendt’s theorization of political activity is thus based in her differentiation and 
separation of fields of human experience. Three categories – labor, work, and action – 
divide the activities of human beings by their function. Labor is the activity required to 
maintain life. Work is the activity that produces products for trade or sale – what enter 
human beings into worldliness. And political action is what happens in the polis – it is 
speech and action seen and heard by others. Political action performs the plurality 
intrinsic to the human condition. 
 Most critiques of Arendt take issue with her definition of the polis as a sphere 
removed from other aspects of human life. For example, in recognizing activity in the 
polis as distinct from that which is required to sustain life, Jacques Rancière accuses 
Arendt of expressing “the will to preserve the realm of pure politics.”106 He is concerned 
that Arendt perpetuates as apolitical, as incapable of politics, those whose lives are 
consumed with the labor of living, whose efforts are largely consumed by the sphere of 
activity she defines as labor.107 For Rancière, these categories of behavior endorse 
unequal categorization of political actors. Indeed, Rancière’s critique will prove salient in 
the next subsection, when I follow Arendt’s idea of activity to its corollary, agency.  
 Arendt’s separation of work, labor, and action is rooted in a critique and a 
proposition. The critique she makes is of the rise of the significance in “modern” political 
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philosophy108 of “labor” as the intrinsically human activity.109 That is, she takes issue 
with the dominance of homo faber – or, the idea that what makes human beings human is 
that they can produce things, in political thought. Arendt critiques this notion and in its 
place she proposes something else. For Arendt, what makes human beings unique (what 
defines the human condition) is not their ability to labor nor to work, but their ability to 
carry out action. It is political activity that defines human beings as human beings. This is 
so because political activity affirms the plurality of the human experience – the condition 
of being among others. Through political activity, individuals recognize similarity among 
fellow men and women and distinguish themselves as individuals. This recognition and 
this distinction reflect the human condition of plurality, and they are enacted in the polis. 
Arendt suggests that the essential thing to understand about the human condition is not 
that the human being labors, nor that she works, but that her life is lived in the plural, 
among others. 
 The significance of this idea to my own study, and my elaborations in this chapter 
of how a discourse of resistance operates, lies in in the way in which Arendt ties plurality 
to an idea of politics. Her attention to plurality in the polis, via actions that are seen and 
heard by others, constructs a representative schema for politics. This is a useful tool for 
understanding how the discourse of resistance limits “resistant” subjects and the theorist 
who takes them on. To understand how Arendt’s work can help illuminate this, I consider 
more carefully Arendt’s distinctions of the three fields of human activity.  
 Arendt comes to the conclusion that it is action that defines the human condition 
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after deliberating the difference between work and labor; a distinction she says has been 
ignored by modern philosophy.110 Labor is the energy required to sustain life: what Locke 
called the “labor of the body.” This is in contradistinction to the “work of our hands.”111 
That there is a difference between the two, Arendt suggests, can be proven in the contrast 
between different words delineating ideas of work and labor.112 Arendt suggests that this 
difference has been interpreted in the development of the distinction between productive 
and unproductive labor; between skilled and unskilled labor; and even between 
intellectual and manual labor.113 The development of the distinction between productive 
and unproductive labor in particular contains the “fundamental division between work 
and labor.”114 This distinction is found in the fact that the former consists of the 
fabrication of products, and the latter leaves nothing behind. The efforts of labor are 
completely consumed by living, while the efforts of work may be brought to market, 
bought and sold, or abandoned to decay. While the unique nature of laboring led Marx to 
conclude (according to Arendt) that human beings are essentially animal laborans;115 it 
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111 John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chapter 5, Section 27. Qtd. in Arendt, The Human 
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115 Marx thought that labor produced a productivity of its own, a surplus value he calls labor power, namely 
the production of life. Arendt summarizes, “Unlike the productivity of work, which adds new objects to the 
human artifice, the productivity of labor power produces objects only incidentally and is primarily 
concerned with the means of its own production; since its power is not exhausted when its own 
reproduction has been secured, it can be used for more than one life process, but it never “produces” 
anything but life.” (Ibid., 88.) In his own words, Marx writes, “Given the individual, the production of 
labor-power consists in his reproduction of himself or his maintenance. For his maintenance he requires a 
given quantity of the means of subsistence. Therefore the labor-time requisite for the production of labor-




was the unique nature of work that led others to propose homo faber, or the fact that our 
species can produce objects, as our quintessential essence.  
 Arendt looks at both of these frameworks and remarks that the tools and products 
of both these activities dissipate. The tools upon which human beings labor in order to 
sustain life – their own bodies – as well as the products human beings produce through 
work – the carpenter’s chair, or the farmer’s crops – all are ultimately negatively affected 
by our use of them. They wear out through consumption. But this is not so, Arendt 
suggests, for the “human artifice” itself. The sphere of action, what takes place in the 
polis, has a unique kind of durability. Speech and action are not consumed, even if they 
are affected by generation upon generation of human activity. As long as speech and 
action take place in the polis, they endure. This is the distinction between the spheres of 
labor and work and the sphere of action. Human actions recognized in the polis have a 
kind of durability not seen in the other spheres of human activity. Here it is worth quoting 
Arendt at length: 
Distinguished from both consumer goods and use objects, there are finally 
the ‘products’ of action and speech, which together constitute the fabric of 
human relationships and affairs. Left to themselves, they lack not only the 
tangibility of other things, but are even less durable and more futile than 
what we produce for consumption. Their reality depends entirely upon 
human plurality, upon the constant presence of others who can see and 
                                                                                                                                            
value of labor-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the laborer. 
(Karl Marx, “The Buying and Selling of Labor-Power,” Capital, Volume One: A Critique of Political 
Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes [New York: Penguin Books, 1977], 272.)  
 The critique Arendt makes of Marx lies in her assertion that in his conceptualization of labor 
power, Marx conflated labor with work. Throughout Marx’s thought, Arendt suggests that “labor is 
endowed… with certain faculties which only work possesses.” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 102). She 
suggests that Marx conceived of labor as a process that has a productivity of its own, “no matter how 
furtive and non-durable its products may be.” (Ibid., 88.) The problem Arendt saw with this model is that 
Marx’s revolution proposed not emancipating the laboring classes but emancipating man from labor. This 
creates a paradox for Arendt. “The fact remains that in all states of [Marx’s] work, he defines man as an 
animal laborans and then leads him into a society in which this greatest and most human power is no 
longer necessary. We are left with the rather distressing alternative between productive slavery and 





hear and therefore testify to their existence…They themselves [action and 
speech] do not ‘produce,’ bring forth anything, they are as futile as life 
itself. In order to become worldly things, that is, deeds and facts and 
events and patters of thoughts or ideas, they must first be seen, heard, and 
remembered and then transformed, reified as it were, into things – into 
sayings of poetry, the written page or the printed book, into paintings or 
sculpture, into all sorts of records, documents, or monuments.116 
  
Herein lies the essence of the schema of representation that can be found in Arendt’s 
conceptualization of politics. What distinguishes speech and action from labor and work 
is the sustenance that is maintained by their representation.117 Arendt does not argue that 
the intentions of political agents are sustained through actions once initiated or that the 
fallout of speech once uttered can necessarily be predicted or prescribed. What she does 
argue, what she insists upon actually, is that the significance of speech and action lies in 
the fact that others perceive and recognize them.118 To exist at all, political activity must 
be seen and heard by others. This is essentially an understanding of a representative 
schema of politics. Certain behaviors indicate the presence of politics and of political 
agents. Significantly, these behaviors don’t produce politics; they signal the arrival of 
political subjects to others. Through speech and action, political subjects emerge, and the 
“space of appearance” of the polis is the stage on which they do so.  
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117 Arendt does not broach the issue of Austinian performativity. That is, she does not seem concerned with 
what saying things does (She says, “They themselves [action and speech] do not ‘produce,’ bring forth 
anything, they are as futile” [ibid.]). Though in another sense, she does clearly recognize that speech and 
action are performative when she says they [speech and action] “signal a second birth,” as in: they bring 
into being political life, even if she does not define them as such. Her emphasis again is more on the 
reception and recognition of speech and action, what others do with them, in turn. It is important to 
remember that throughout this discussion, Arendt is making a case for plurality as the “human condition.” 
That is, being with others in the polis is what is essentially human and what makes politics possible: 
because others recognize, reify, and transform speech and action.  
 
118 Again, this recognition implies that this speech and action will be remembered, and ultimately 
transformed. Arendt is keen to underscore that agents do not have control over the reverberations of their 




 I want to suggest that Arendt’s theory of the polis can be used to deconstruct how 
attributing “resistance” to marginalized actors functions. That is, it is a useful way to 
understand how looking for and finding resistance attributes agency to certain individuals 
while implicitly denying it to others. The discourse of resistance essentially consists of 
building a polis around given subjects, creating an audience that is able to see and hear 
their actions. The discourse of resistance recognizes and interprets political activities and 
in so doing attributes agency to given subjects. Some examples will illustrate how the 
narrating process of “resistance’ builds a polis around specific political actors. The 
examples I use here are referred to widely in the literature on both politics and cultural 
production in the Arab world. 
 
Example: the Birmingham School and “symbolic resistance” in subcultural study119 
 
 Subjects of subcultural study (a significant subgenre of the boom in “resistance 
studies” referred to above) have traditionally been populations seen to be manifestly 
unproductive. Indeed the location of the “sub” in subcultural populations is necessarily 
tied to an idea that the subjects involved are removed, or somehow “below” normative 
society. In his historical overview of subcultural studies from the eighteenth century 
through the twentieth, Ken Gelder begins by defining what a “subculture” is. He suggests 
that, “Subcultures are always in some way non-conforming or dissenting,” and then 
                                                
119 A good historicization of how the Birmingham school effected Arab cultural studies, especially vis-à-vis 
Palestinian cultural studies can be found in Rebecca Stein and Ted Swedenburg’s introduction to the 
volume they edited Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture (Stein and Swedenburg, “Popular 
Culture, Transnationality, and Radical History,” in Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture 





suggests six key ways “in which subcultures have been generally understood.”120 The 
first of these identifying characteristics is the “negative relation [of its members] to 
work.”121 He points to Henry Mayhew’s Those Who Will Not Work as a foundational text 
in the field.122 Gelder is concerned to point out that a primary, shared characteristic of 
subcultures is that they are perceived to be “‘idle’, ‘parasitical,’ hedonistic, criminal, 
etc.”123  
 For Gelder, this negative relationship to the mainstream is what initially defines a 
subculture. The perceived distance from “productive labor” in the qualification of 
“delinquency” or “degeneracy” in subcultures is most significant in the sense of a 
perception of social alienation. This can be seen in the other characteristics of subcultures 
that Gelder identifies, such as an “ambivalent relationship to class” and “movement away 
from home into non-domestic forms of belonging.”124 That is, what defines a subculture 
is not primarily unemployment but alien forms of sociality – different ways that 
individuals identify with and distinguish themselves from others. 
 We might see this social alienation as an alienation from the sphere of action. 
“Delinquents” do not perform activities fit to be seen and heard by others. Their 
“degenerate” behavior, in dark alleys, and at odd hours, only proves their unfit nature for 
engaging with others in the polis. Significantly, subcultural studies, even before the 
Birmingham School, to which specific case I am arriving, almost uniformly seek to recast 
                                                




122 Henry Mayhew, et al., London Labor and the London Poor: A Cyclopaedia of the Condition and 
Earnings of Those Who Will Not Work (London: Griffin, Bohn, and Company, 1862).  
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the subjects of their study in brighter light. That is, the outside perception of the subjects 
of study as in one way or another “delinquent” or “degenerate” is frequently cast as a foil 
in this literature, which the researcher proceeds to counter. When researchers take 
communities that are perceived to be “idle” or “parasitic” as their subject, their concern – 
almost categorically – is to recast their behavior in a positive light. It is to reinterpret this 
behavior as productive, social, and meaningful.  
Gelder suggests that subcultures are a “matter of narration.”125 And he also 
suggests that understanding subcultures consists of understanding how each of these 
social groupings “creates its own geography,” that is, how individuals imagine “a set of 
places or sites… through which [they] gain cohesion and identity.” Applying Arendt’s 
political theory as a way to deconstruct this gesture, we might say that this process in 
subcultural study consists of building a polis around subcultural agents. That is, the 
researcher attends to an audience that sees or hears the actions of these marginalized 
individuals. In this way, significance and meaning is restored to behavior the subcultural 
theorist suggests is misunderstood.  
In recent decades under the profound influence of cultural studies theorists like 
Stuart Hall and Dick Hebdige, the trend has been to attribute significance or meaning by 
framing subcultural activity even more explicitly as “resistance.” In the tradition of some 
theory coming out of Centre of Contemporary Cultural Studies at the university of 
Birmingham (CSSS), the work of the sociologist is frequently then one of a decoder that 
translates the seemingly unproductive into active choices that are symbolically resistant. 
For example, “style,” especially in Dick Hebdige’s work, became a way in which 
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political activity is enacted by subcultural participants. Sartorial choices, hairstyles, 
piercings, and tattoos transform working-class youth into individuals rallying against late 
twentieth century capitalism, nostalgic for the working-class communitas of his parents’ 
and grandparents’ generation.126 In Tony Jefferson and Stuart Hall’s work, activity that 
articulates a powerful “symbolic resistance,” permits these youth a political life otherwise 
ignored by parents, teachers, and the upwardly mobile middle classes.127 Whether or not a 
specific critique or sentiment of resistance existed before the stylistic choices appear is 
not something these theorists explored. Nonetheless, the ready presence of “resistance” is 
readily attested to, whether the subjects of study were mods, teddy-boys, punks, or in 
later studies influenced by this approach, hip hop heads, ravers, or world music fans.128 
Indeed, Stanley Cohen has argued that the “constant impulse [in sociological studies 
following the Birmingham tradition] is to decode the style in terms only of opposition 
and resistance.”129 It is the relegation of “resistance” to the appearance of recognizable 
activity that signals to me a representative schema of politics.  
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127 Stanley Cohen, in his Symbols of Trouble (1980) catalogs the proliferation of terms used to invoke this 
“symbolic resistance.” He writes, critiquing this approach: “Whether the objects for decoding are Teddy 
Boys, Mods and Rockers, Skinheads or Punks, two dominant themes are suggested: first that style—
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whatever is the problem… Sociologically more opaque than this notion of resistance is the reciprocal idea 
that this process (whether conceived as defense, re-working, re-assertion or whatever) is somehow a 
symbolic one. Again it is instructive to list the actual words used to convey this meaning: ritualistic; 
imaginary; mythical; fantastic; metaphorical; magical; allegorical; ideological…” (Stanley Cohen, 
“Symbols of Trouble,” reprinted in The Subcultures Reader, eds. Ken Gelder and Sarah Thornton [London: 
Routledge, 1997], 161.) 
 
128 See for example, Sarah Thornton, Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1995) and Rupa Huq, Beyond Subculture: Pop, Youth and Identity in a Postcolonial World (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2006). 
  




The deliberations, hesitations, and feelings that lead a teenager to shave her head 
are ignored for the spectacular action itself. These are the deliberations I am interested in, 
but these cannot appear in this kind of discussion of resistance. In the search for 
“symbolic resistance,” spectacular activity is the primary evidence. Gang fights; spiked 
hair; even the seemingly banal is nevertheless still spectacular in its distinction from 
normative behavior. The best example of the latter is perhaps sociologist Paul Corrigan’s 
essay “Doing Nothing.” In this essay, he explores the “intense activity which is found” in 
Sunderland street-corner culture.130 Corrigan argues that activity that is seen by parents 
and teachers as a waste of time is actually teaming with activity. Readers of Corrigan’s 
study learn that the major elements of “doing nothing” are in fact talking and fighting – 
or, Arendt’s markers of political activity par excellence! Corrigan looked for and found 
speech and action. Through that speech and action, he narrates a significance he calls 
“resistance.”  
 That this gesture, in Corrigan’s study, of recasting the behavior of these young 
men is a (re)narration of specific activities should be clear. Corrigan takes street-corner 
loitering and turns it into working-class resistance. This is a good example of the 
narrating that Gelder attests is central to subcultural literature. We could also see it as a 
good example of the “remembering and transformation” Arendt suggests is intrinsic to 
political action in the polis. That is, by recognizing the activities of working-class 
Sunderland youth, Corrigan constructs a polis around them, an audience that sees and 
hears these agents. He narrates and commemorates their actions as political subjects, 
giving those activities new meaning. 
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 Pointing to the construction of a polis is another way of referring to the erected 
context within which agents are found. But it is more than that. The contours of the polis 
literally dictate what agency looks like. In a qualification about what constitutes the polis, 
Arendt quotes an ancient Greek saying: “Wherever you go, you will be a polis.” She 
suggests that this “watchword of Greek colonization” reflects the Greek belief that the 
relationship between citizens in the polis could be created anywhere. This Ancient Greek 
truism is an assertion of the perceived universality of the human condition of plurality. 
However, as a colonial ideology imposes itself onto a people, so does the search for a 
polis – in my case, the search for resistance – structure knowledge about marginalized 
populations. It is not that a more astute perception, looking more closely, will allow one 
to see more real and more radical “resistance.” What I want to argue that as long as one 
looks for resistance, one recreates this imposition of the polis. 
This is because the theoretical gesture I am discussing – wherein the polis 
functions as a “space of appearance” confines an analysis of politics to the appearance of 
political subjects. The appearance of resistance restricts the discussion to the 
recognizable activities of individuals. It consists of, as Arendt suggests, attributing glory 
to heroic actors. In subcultural literature, the attribution of “resistance” to subcultural 
actors is an assertion about the presence of agency within a given community. As I will 
explore shortly, a similar gesture is at play in so-called subaltern studies. At best, this 
gesture has the power to expand the polis. This could mean extending the possibility of 
enacting political activity to greater numbers of people. This is significant. Ultimately 
however, I find the political reach of this gesture limited. The ways in which this agency 




explore this further we need to return to Arendt and to the relationship between political 






“Action without a name, a ‘who’ attached to it, is meaningless.”131  
 
 
 In order to further understand how political activity resonates, Arendt’s definition 
of politics requires interrogating the relationship between political activity and the 
subjects capable of executing it. For Arendt, it is not political activity alone that has 
political meaning. “Action without a name, a ‘who’ attached to it,” she suggests, “is 
meaningless.”132 This is a crucial point in her definition of politics. When an individual 
performs a recognizable action, she proves that she has agency – the ability to act. Arendt 
suggests that enacting political activity performs a “second birth,” that of the political 
subject.133 Speech and action that is seen and heard by others have an “agent-revealing 
capacity.”134 When we speak of agency, in other words, we have attached the dimension 
of a subject to (political) activity. This relationship is presupposed by the human 
condition of plurality. The collectivity of the polis is significant because it is required for 
the recognition and narration of subjects who perform political actions. 
 Here we must consider the critical assessments of Arendt that I pointed to in the 
beginning of this discussion of her work and to which I promised I would return. The un-
                                                
131 Arendt, The Human Condition, 180. 
 
132 Ibid., 180-181. 
 
133 Ibid., 176. 
 





ignorable critique of Arendt is that her formulation of politics perpetuates a sort of elitist 
view of political subjectivity. Because she separates work from labor and action from 
both of these, she is accused of denying agency to those whose lives are consumed with 
laboring or with work. This recognition of the cleavage Arendt proposes between 
activities, and with it subjects – some of which (and whom) are political, and some of 
which (whom) are not – informs the critique I am working to provide of how the 
discourse of resistance problematically projects passivity and assumes silence on the part 
of the subjects for which it attempts to speak.  
 Writing in the early 2000s, almost fifty years after the publication of The Human 
Condition, Jacques Rancière questions the separation Arendt proposed between public, 
political space, and private, unpoliticized space. Rancière was writing in the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of humanitarian intervention in the name of 
human rights. The discussion of “human rights” and how they are being used in 
international politics leads him to a discussion of the rights of the “citizen” versus the 
rights of “man.”135 I am interested in Rancière’s attempt to “reset the question of the 
subject of the Rights of Man,” and with it resetting the subject of politics.136 
 Rancière suggests that Arendt’s political theory is useful in understanding the 
problematic dynamics in a period expected to be “a peaceful posthistorical world” that 
has nevertheless seen an unprecedented proliferation of violence on a global stage.137 The 
problem for Rancière is that violations of “human rights” have become the excuse by 
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which colonial and imperial intervention have continued. Rancière suggests it is through 
a conceptualization of human rights as “the rights of the victims,” rights which must be 
defended by others.138 Human rights are the ones invoked by the plight of those who have 
no state or other body to whom they can appeal. Rancière follows Arendt’s argument that 
the “rights of man” are not the “rights of the citizen”; a citizen can appeal to her state for 
redress of grievances. In contrast to the citizen, the refugee and the exile have no body 
from which to claim or to which to petition her rights. Hers are the rights of “man.” 
Rancière suggests that these rights are held up and defended by others, through which 
maudlin exercise “humanitarian interference” is invoked as essentially the right to 
invade.139 Rancière accuses Arendt of providing the theoretical basis through which this 
cleavage – this separation of “man” from “citizen” is possible. He suggests that Arendt 
envisioned “the public sphere [ie the polis] as a separate sphere, removed from the realm 
of necessity.”140 In the latter, life is trapped in “idiocy” or brute necessity and is incapable 
of public action.141 Outside the polis, neither actions nor life are political. 
 I am not sure the perpetuation of a “realm of pure politics” was Arendt’s intent – 
her emphasis on collectivity in action and the plurality of the human condition speaks to a 
wider conceptualization of shared humanity than that which Rancière gives her credit for. 
It is nonetheless unavoidable that the construction of a sphere called a polis, where 
actions can be recognized, implies that there is necessarily a space separated from the 
polis, perhaps surrounding it in a kind of vast abyss, where actions are apolitical, where 
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activity if it happens at all, is not recognized, and where actual people live an 
unpoliticized existence. This must be the case because otherwise the polis would not be 
recognized as a distinct sphere of human interaction. Its defining feature would not be a 
“space of appearance”; and its central content would not consist of the spectacular 
recognition and distinction of individuals. If all individuals were political agents, the 
“second birth” marking the arrival of political subjectivity would not be necessary. 
Indeed, if the polis represented all human activity – it would not exist at all. Its very 
definition is built on selection and distinction: the emergence of individual political 
subjects from an apolitical, indecipherable mass.  
 The polis and political activity within it requires the continued existence of a 
space that is not the polis, where human beings are not political subjects. In this light, 
sociological or anthropological studies that circle around the question of agency are 
curious indeed, especially when they essentially consist of claiming agency for 
marginalized or oppressed populations. What I mean is, the theoretical gesture that raises 
“marginalization” or “oppression” as a foil, which is then countered by narratives of 
resistance that attest to the presence of agency among marginalized communities, is 
curious in that it intrinsically relies on the idea that spectacular actors emerge from a 
great mass of subjects without agency.  
 I just considered how subcultural studies reclaimed delinquent behavior as 
symbolic resistance. Subcultural theorists like Dick Hebdige, Tony Jefferson, and Paul 
Corrigan recast marginalized youth populations presumed to be a drain on society’s 
resources as active bricoleurs, making meaning and building symbolic resistance. In so 




to turn to explore another trend in how agency is located and constructed among another 
kind of marginalized community. I turn to studies concerned with “resistance,” but this 
time in the field of so-called “subaltern” studies. As I will show, this literature is also 
concerned with populations considered to be marginalized or, as is more frequently 
invoked in this literature, oppressed. These are post-colonial populations, at the 
“periphery” of global power; often peasant or working class; occasionally women, or 
other social categories removed from the center of power. I mentioned in the previous 
discussion that subcultural researchers frequently invoke the perception of delinquency 
and unproductivity as a foil that they then counter with claims about the meaningfulness 
of intense activity among their interlocutors.  
 In subaltern literature, the claim is first that oppressed subaltern populations 
“resist” in robust ways: that is, that they have agency. Secondly, the claim is that this 
agency is wholly different from “Western” agency, and thus requires new tools to discern 
it. Subaltern “resistance,” these authors claim, is different. Without conflating the plight 
of Bengali jute workers with the leisure activities of English mods and tods, I intend to 
use Arendt’s model of political activity as a tool in order to argue that the search for 
resistance which these literatures share poses problems for actually different 
conceptualizations of politics and political subjects.  
 
Example: Subaltern agency 
 
One of the most influential schools of thought in the late twentieth and early 




Heavily influenced by Edward Said’s provocations about imperialism in Orientalism, and 
headed by the so-called “Subaltern Group,”142 Subaltern Studies has succeeded in 
bringing unprecedented study of the non-European/US world into the European and US 
academe. At the forefront of efforts to “decolonize” theory and academic practice, this 
theory and research has consistently insisted first that “Western” historiography has 
repeatedly sidelined the “subaltern” subject. They critique the fact that the subaltern 
subject has only ever been a sidekick to the march of European history. Second, these 
efforts to decolonize theory and academic practice insist that the subaltern subject has 
been ignored because “Western” models are inadequate for the study of African, Asian, 
and aboriginal or indigenous cultures. Using different approaches, subaltern theorists 
have argued that understanding the “subaltern agency” unique to Indian peasants, Bengali 
jute workers, and other marginalized communities requires attention to the different 
forms of belonging, community, and spirituality in the non-European world, and the 
effects of these particularities upon the history of capitalistic development in these places. 
To pay attention to these aspects, subalternists argue, a process of writing history that is 
different from those used for Western subjects is required. Indeed, so they make the case, 
subaltern history is incomprehensible if analyzed through the perspective of Western 
experience.143 Historically, much literature concerning Arab politics has also occasionally 
embraced this model of championing local difference at the expense of global 
comparison and contextualization. Especially with regards to the study of “Arabs,” 
                                                
142 The “Subaltern Studies Group” refers to a cluster of authors whose work largely focused on Indian and 
South East Asian history and anthropology and who prioritized “decolonizing” history and theory as a 
central focus. Initial works were gathered and edited by Ranajit Guha in five volumes. Influential members 
include Ranajit Guha, Pratha Chatterjee, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Gayatri Spivak, among others.  
 






music, and emotion, this championing of essential cultural difference is widespread.144 (I 
return to these considerations in the next chapter.) Here, I recognize how this theoretical 
gesture of inverting Western bias, despite the intentions of its authors, can have 
depoliticizing effects. 
Ranajit Guha’s Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, a 
foundational text in the subaltern canon, provides an example of how the reliance on 
spectacular activity as indicative of agency in this literature is problematic.145 Guha uses 
an archive of instances of insurgency and rebellion, which he interprets to reveal a 
different kind of political agency, unique to the peasant in colonial India. Guha’s 
methodology for doing so initially allows him to argue that a certain kind of political 
subject has been ignored by both colonial and nationalist historiography.146 Elementary 
Aspects asserts that the Indian peasant is worthy of having her own history written, and 
not as a subset of some other history – like that “of the Raj, or of Indian nationalism, or 
of socialism.”147 
The second intention of Guha’s text is to confirm the value of this first venture by 
suggesting it is impossible to understand the history of the Indian peasant using the tools 
                                                
144 A primary example is Rouget’s study, which Ali Jihad Racy critiques at length (Gilbert Rouget, Music 
and Trance: A Theory of the Relations Between Music and Possession, trans. Brunhilde Biebuyck 
(Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1985); and Ali Jihad Racy, Making Music in the Arab World: The Culture and 
Artistry of Tarab (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004). See also Jonathan Shannon, Among the Jasmine 
Trees: Music and Modernity in Contemporary Syria (Middleton, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2006). 
 
145 Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 
1999). 
 
146 In the introduction, Guha claims that responsibility of “exclude[ing] the insurgent as the subject of his 
[sic] own history” should be “shared equally by all schools and parties.” He then proceeds to with the 
following declaration, “To acknowledge the peasant as the maker of his own rebellion is to attribute, as we 
have done in this work, a consciousness to him.” (Guha, Elementary Aspects, 4.)  
 





of Western historiography. Guha is thus concerned to trace a different kind of political 
subjectivity. In Elementary Aspects, he does not trace individuals, political affiliations, or 
particular locales. Rather, he traces something he calls “peasant consciousness.” This is 
Guha’s attempt to recast the political subjectivity of the subaltern subjects he studies. 
Guha argues that the Indian peasant cannot and should not be understood vis-à-vis 
“Western” identity groupings like political party, class, gender, et al.148 Rather, peasant 
history should be understood through social and cultural specificities unique to the Indian 
context: things like, “negation, ambiguity, modality, solidarity, transmission, and 
territoriality.”149  
Importantly, for Guha, these elements of peasant consciousness can be seen to 
appear in moments of insurgency and agitation. Indeed, Guha repeatedly insists that 
moments of insurgency reveal the political or rebellious consciousness of the Indian 
peasant, and it is therein that this consciousness appears. His emphasis on the appearance 
of political consciousness and its revelation through spectacular acts is an excellent 
example for the argument I’ve been developing here about how an understanding of 
spectacular acts that reveal political subjects is problematic.150 It is so because it is never 
                                                
148 Others, like Vivek Chibber, have taken issue with Guha’s assertion that “class” is a Western category 
that cannot be projected onto the Indian subcontinent. Chibber suggests that Guha’s replacement of class 
struggle with an identity of negation against landlords and moneylenders is a sloppy use of Gramsci. 
(“Sloppy” in the sense that it borrows Gramsci’s terminology without considering the political critique – 
that of class – which Gramsci was making when he used that terminology.) Other elements of Guha’s 
“peasant consciousness,” argues Chibber, like ambiguity, territoriality, and solidarity are similarly found in 
other parts of the world and other moments in history, including in Europe. This critique suggests that as he 
asserts the uniqueness of the Indian peasant, Guha is exoticizing, if not orientalizing, aspects of this society. 
 
149 Each of these is a chapter heading in Guha’s text.  
 
150 Fellow subalternist Partha Chatterjee wrote that in Elementary Aspects, Guha had created “a 
methodological procedure by which one obtained an access into peasant consciousness.” (Partha 
Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories [Princeton, NJ: Princeton 





quite clear to whom these subjects are “appearing” or to whom they are revealing 
themselves.  
Indeed, what’s fascinating about Guha’s study in relation to the discussion of the 
recognizability of political activity and the putting into discourse of “resistance” that I 
have been elaborating is precisely the archive to which Guha turns. Guha writes that, 
unlike crime, “rebellions are necessarily and invariably public and communal events.”151 
Further, he states that peasant consciousness is “expressed through its resistance at the 
point of insurgency,” when it appears as “an antagonistic force” in the historical records 
of the dominant classes. In other words, not only did rebellion or resistance only appear 
to exist when others noticed it, but specifically when it appeared in the historical register 
of the colonizer! In actual fact, Guha builds his whole notion of subaltern consciousness 
(their unique political subjectivity) on records he himself identifies as “elitist in origin” – 
on “police reports, army dispatches, administrative accounts, minutes and resolutions of 
governmental departments, and so on.”152 If Guha is interested in recasting subaltern 
agency (which he claims he is), then this is methodology is problematic at best. More 
specifically, I find it limited: limited in the sense of how it is ultimately unable to break 
out of the framework of oppression it reportedly attempts to deconstruct, one where elites 
oppress, narrate, and control the means of representation of the subaltern.  
One might call Elementary Aspects, a re-narration of Indian history. I call this a re 
narration because the author relies on the identification of the same spectacular acts 
considered to be criminal or unprincipled by previous visitors to the archive. Guha’s 
                                                
151 Guha, Elementary Aspects, 79. 
 





work in Elementary Aspects is an example of how subaltern literature, like Corrigan’s 
subcultural study above, functions as a reformation of the polis in order to extract 
different meaning from human activity. Where the British colonizer found these 
spectacular events evidence of treason, and the nationalist historian found them proof of 
the “pre-political” (that is, not ideologically informed) nature of peasant frustration, Guha 
finds these events indicative of a unique peasant consciousness. In all cases, political 
subjectivity is located via the recognition by the colonial police (among others) of speech 
and action.  
I would suggest that we do not have in this methodology a radical formulation of 
“politics.” In these formulations we are still very clearly narrating the birth of political 
subjects vis-à-vis the recognition by a chosen elite of some spectacular activity. The 
appearance of the robust consciousness to which Guha attests lies in its distinction from a 
mass of apolitical, unconscious, behavior that presumably, nobody bothered to write 
about. Some agents demonstrate consciousness. Which ones? The ones the police and the 
colonial governor saw fit to enumerate in the ledger. As some critics of Guha have 
pointed out, this is indeed a peculiar way to reclaim the agency of the subaltern, 
especially perhaps, the one arguably sidelined by “Western” historiography.153  
A discussion of formulations of subaltern agency and their limitations here would 
not be complete without considering the major damage the tendency to reverse-
                                                
153 Chibber, Postcolonial Theory, 155. Critics of Guha’s work have furthered this critique by connecting it 
to one of the central aspects of peasant consciousness that Guha identifies, “negation.” Negation in Guha’s 
text, heavily influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s work, refers to a set of negative relationships with people in 
power, like land owners and money lenders. For instance, Walter Hauser worries that framing Indian 
peasant consciousness exclusively or primarily through negation risks oversimplifying the peasant as an 
object of oppression. That is, in making a case for the unique agency of the Indian peasant (defined through 
negation), Hauser argues that Guha is reinscribing the power dynamics that cast her as subaltern in the first 
place. (Walter Hauser, “Review: Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India by Ranajit 





orientalism has done to the search for alternative kinds of agency. This also draws out the 
question of to whom politics and agency appear when spectacular acts take place. I 
suggested above that the first major concern of subaltern studies has been to claim that 
the subaltern has agency, and that the second has been to assert that this agency looks 
different than “Western” agency. According to this literature, subaltern agency is unique; 
and it requires its own tools of analysis. 
 For example, in The Nation and Its Fragments, Partha Chatterjee argues that 
community plays a much more prominent role in rural Bengal society than in the 
individualistic, European societies from which capitalism comes and in which the 
struggles against it initially took place.154 Chatterjee urges us to “grant that peasant 
consciousness has its own paradigmatic form, which is not only different from 
[European] bourgeois consciousness but in fact its very other.”155 
It is undoubtedly one of the greatest paradoxes of the legacies of Said’s 
Orientalism that in establishing a considerable history of racism that the “West” projected 
on the “East,” and encouraging its further recognition and analysis, the compelling 
framework of orientalism was nevertheless not able to discourage many authors from 
composing explicitly reverse-orientalist analyses while invoking the very terms of anti-
orientalist critiques and analysis.156 That is, the claims to unique subaltern community, 
                                                
154 While Chatterjee’s work is perhaps the most prominent example, Chibber explains that, “Postcolonial 
theorists [in general] commonly take the stance that political psychology is culturally constructed, all the 
way down. Even more to the point, they take one form of consciousness to be peculiar to the West – the 
capacity to separate one’s own identity and interest from those of the social group to which one belongs” 
(Chibber, Postcolonial Theory, 176).  
 
155 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments, 164, emphasis added. 
 
156 Ahmad traces this to weaknesses in Said’s text (Ahmad, In Theory, 159-220); Chibber traces this to 
weakness in the subaltern/postcolonial project writ large (Chibber, Postcolonial Theory 152-176). I am less 




consciousness, and resistance more often than not end up spinning “Western” stereotypes 
about “Eastern” subjects as positive cultural aspects. Negative tropes about the religious, 
tribal, or irrational nature of the subaltern are flipped into essentialized claims about 
unique subaltern “community,” “spirituality,” and “consciousness.” Critics of this 
tendency in subaltern theory have explicitly taken issue with this: that in theorizing a 
uniquely “subaltern” consciousness, the school has first ended up reinforcing Orientalist 
perceptions of southeast Asia (in particular) and second, this reverse Orientalism 
ultimately and necessarily circles back to bourgeois humanism and the birth of the 
rational political subject, vis-a-vis recognizable political activity. 
Which is to say, the “unique” resistance and indigenous political consciousness 
found among subaltern subjects has frequently either mirrored the political subjectivity of 
Western subjects, or reiterated the prejudices of nineteenth-century Orientalism. The 
point for me here is not that subaltern theorists potentially fail at their own project (as 
Rosalind O’Hanlon argues157) but that this dependence on the emergence of behavior of 
activity to indicate politics is quite clearly tied to normative understandings of 
subjectivity. That is, my interest is not in insisting that a different political consciousness 
                                                
157 Rosalind O’Hanlon takes pains to establish the continued exclusivity of “the virile figure of the subject-
agent” in this literature and questions why subaltern studies, in their very critique of the same, have 
nevertheless not been able to shake the indomitable influence of the Enlightenment project in re-producing 
this rational human subject. She writes: 
 
At the very moment of this assault upon western historicism, the classic figure of western 
humanism – the self-originating, self-determining individual, who is at once a subject in his 
possession of a sovereign consciousness whose defining quality is reason, and an agent in his 
power of freedom – is readmitted through the back door in the figure of the subaltern himself, as 
he is restored to history in the reconstructions of the Subaltern project. The consequence of this is 
to limit and distort the conceptualization of the contributors' own chosen themes of domination 
and resistance.  
 
(O’Hanlon, “Recovering the Subject Subaltern Studies and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia,” 






actually exists among subaltern populations but has been misunderstood by postcolonial 
theorists. Rather my argument is that even this literature, with its pretentions to radical 
critique and its widespread influence in the academe as such, also relies on the same basic 
understanding of political subjects being born through spectacular acts of resistance. This 
understanding, as I’ve been arguing, requires the perpetuation of life, behavior, and 
individuals whose existence is ignorable, and apolitical. Most importantly, it is an 
understanding quite at odds with the (radical) notion, articulated throughout this 
literature, that oppressed and marginalized populations have the capacity to “resist,” 
“have agency,” or live politicized existences, despite not appearing in normative 
histories, archives, or ledgers.  
The parallels that I see between what signals indigenous “resistance” and 
subaltern agency within postcolonial critique and what in cultural studies marks 
“symbolic resistance” and subcultural agency lie in how individuals are understood as 
performing political activity, or enacting agency. I do not intend to conflate the political 
impact of a jute workers’ strike with that of the sartorial choices of suburban punks. But I 
have wanted to look at the theoretical mechanism that allows both to be seen as markers 
of an “Other” agency. “Alternative” agency that ultimately mirrors normative political 
engagement and subjectivity illustrates the limitations of the theoretical feedback loop 










I have spent a great deal of time in the second half of this chapter critiquing two 
very important fields of cultural study. I hope to have established that they share certain 
expectations of political activity. We might say the framework they share begins from a 
zero-state of no agency. Marginalized populations start as non-descript groups of people, 
understood as devoid of the potential for political activity, which are then scripted by the 
theorist as entering and performing on a political stage. The researcher interprets the 
recognizable activity that renders the demographic in question active, that is, political. 
Despite the widespread championing in these literatures of the power and capacity of 
marginalized societies, they begin, much like the hegemonic framework they bemoan, 
with the supposition that youth agents and the colonized/post-colonized are 
disempowered by their very subject positions. This is overcome by the performance of 
specific and recognizable actions that render them political subjects. The problem as I see 
it is that these conceptualizations of agency, contingent upon certain kinds of action, 
promise to continue producing ignorable subjects. 
 If I have traced political activity and a discourse of resistance in two otherwise 
unrelated traditions of academic practice, my attention to these two specific literatures in 
particular is directly informed by my subject matter in this study. Rap and hip hop 
concerts in the Arab world and the political resonances therein beg to be addressed most 
immediately by the frameworks developed either in subcultural or in subaltern literature 
(or both). My sustained attention in this chapter to dominant frameworks in these fields 




rap music in these three Arab cities will diverge from these.  
In sum, I have tried to draw attention to how an emphasis on recognizable activity 
has created a representative schema of “resistance” – which frames and limits the ways in 
the North American (and British) academe are able to recognize political energy. My 
understanding of what politics may be generated in Arabic rap concerts thus started with 
a critical understanding of how recognizing agency as incumbent on spectacular activity 
necessitates the perpetuation of agents without agency and apolitical behavior. Having 








In the previous chapter, I suggested that an emphasis on locating “resistance” has 
limited the study of politics in subcultural and subaltern studies to the location of 
spectacular activity. I argued that the theoretical gesture which frequently attributes 
significance to this activity comes in the construction by the researcher of a polis around 
certain actors: a political space within which the significance of a given activity is 
affirmed. I suggested that this framework necessitates the perpetuation of apolitical or 
non-spectacular behavior – against whose background only some subjects can emerge as 
having agency. I argued that this is a troubling way to conceive of radical politics among 
a certain group of actors or within a specific genre of cultural production. 
 In this chapter, and in order to get out of the theoretical cul-de-sac, which I 
suggested limits our understanding of the political possibility of cultural production, I 
propose applying elements from both the spatial and affective turns in critical theory. I 
propose a broadening and deepening of a potential polis in Arabic rap and hip hop by 
considering a spatial analysis of concert culture. Then, I propose a critical consideration 
of feeling to produce a similar complication of subjectivity. This serves, I hope, to open 
up a conceptualization of subjects and agency within this rap and hip hop culture in these 
cities.  
In the first part of this chapter, I propose an ethnographic methodology rooted in 




geography through which performers and audiences travel, as well as an awareness of the 
construction of intimacy between performers and audiences. It is my intention that this 
material reading of the spaces within which concerts take place can reset a sociological 
imagination of the “polis.” That is, this spatial methodology may help dissuade from 
focusing on a group of agents in isolation. Following this, the second part of this chapter 
makes a case for the construction of what Dorreen Massey has called a “spatialized 
subjectivity” by inserting an analysis of feeling in rap concerts. That is, I add a 
consideration of subjectivity (via felt processes) to my conceptualization of political 
“space.” Specifically, I propose discerning feeling through a re-invigoration of the 
ethnomusicological concept of tarab, traditionally applied to classical forms of Arabic 
music. In doing so, I propose tracing the building of tarab in rap concerts as a technique 
to recognize ways of being with others that are politically potent. 
Bringing together the theoretical arguments allows me to propose a model for a 
political ethnography of subcultural production: what I call feeling politics. This 
procedure – considering both space and feeling, or feeling through space – is my 
alternative to the discourse of resistance and the theoretically limiting tendencies of 
recognizing spectacular political activity that I identified in Chapter One. I conclude this 
chapter with reflections on my role as researcher and my personal navigations of both 





Part One: Deepening Space 
 
Heterogeneous audiences  
 
 In Harlem, the MC took the mic between opening acts. She called out to 
the audience, scattered throughout the concert space, in a mix of Arabic 
and English, ‘Who here is falasteeni [Palestinian]? Who here is from 
falasteen [Palestine]?’ A few enthusiastic shouts of solidarity and hands 
shot up from the crowd. I spotted Palestinian flags, noticed some familiar 
faces from the Arab American community. She repeated the question to a 
slightly more enthusiastic response. Then she continued, ‘Who here is 
from masr [Egypt])?’ You could tell she was preparing to run through a 
short list of countries, and the performance space and the bar quieted 
slightly waiting to hear who would be called on next.  
 
 In the pause, from the bar, a middle-aged African-American man, seated 
with a friend hollered back in response, “Harlem! From Harlem!” When 
she ignored the outburst, his friend continued “Yea, from Harlem! Speak 
English!” The interaction effectively ended that tactic of community 
building which the rapper Shadia Mansour, when she took the stage, 
seconds later, quickly countered with an Arabic language reference pulling 
her audience to her and encouraging them to ignore/forget the outburst.1  
 
The incident above happened at the Shrine, a world music venue in Harlem, New 
York, at 113th Street and Amsterdam. Over the past decade, it has built a reputation as a 
world music venue and bar in the heart of a neighborhood that has, in the past thirty 
years, gone from perhaps the most notorious ghetto on the East coast to an increasingly 
hip haven of valuable real estate.2 In November 2011, the UK/Palestinian MC Shadia 
                                                
1 Author’s field notes, November 19th, 2011. Parts of this analysis and fieldwork will appear in “Resisting 
‘Resistance’: On Political Feeling in Arabic Rap Concerts” forthcoming in Arab Subcultures: 
Transformations in Theory and Practice, Tarik Sabry and Layal Ftouni, eds. (London: IB Tauris, 2016) and 
different parts will appear in “Call and Response, Radical Belonging, and Arabic Hip Hop in ‘the West’” 
forthcoming in American Studies Encounters the Middle East, Alex Lubin and Marwan Kraidy, eds. 
(Chapel Hill, NC: U of North Carolina P, 2016). 
 
2 Property values in Harlem were on a steady climb before the 2008 financial crash. Developers and 




Mansour performed there with DAM, a group of Palestinian rappers based in Lyd, Israel. 
The concert was part of a promotional tour in several US cities for the documentary film 
Hip Hop Is Bigger than the Occupation, filmed and produced by the non-profit group 
Existence is Resistance.3 The MC warming the crowd, who goes by the name Harrabic 
Tubman, did so after a young rapper had already taken the mic as an opening act, but 
before Shadia Mansour and DAM took the stage. 4 How to understand this exchange? To 
me, it is irrelevant whether or not the older men seated at the bar identified, understood, 
or sympathized with the political struggle around Palestine and its occupation by Israel 
that the artists and the event were endeavoring to make visible. Furthermore, it is 
similarly perhaps tangential if they identified the rap music being performed as a legacy 
of African American musicians that were first formulated by rappers a few miles away 
and decades before.  
Considering the hostility with which it was laced, the inclination to clump the 
African American men at the bar in with the things the rapping Palestinians “resist” is 
politically dangerous: pitting minorities against each other in the midst of gentrifying 
Harlem plays into both racism and essentialism. Neither does it advance the Palestinian 
struggle. But it no way did the men’s vocal rejection of the concert’s content actually 
                                                                                                                                            
for units in a single building on 5th Avenue and 120th Street, for example, leapt from $10,000 to $953,000 in 
one year, 2012). These changes in property values have significant effects on the demographics of the 
neighborhood, making it increasingly inaccessible to the city’s poor, who feel less welcome. Joseph Berger, 
“As Tastes Change in Harlem, Old-Look Liquor Store Stirs a Fight,” New York Times, December 1, 2001, 
accessed August 10, 2014, http://www. nytimes. com/2011/12/02/nyregion/in-reborn-harlem-liquor-store-
draws-complaints. html? _r=3&ref=nyregion; Julie Satow, “After a Short Nap, Harlem is Back,” New York 
Times, March 22, 2012, accessed August 10, 2014, http://www. nytimes. 
com/2012/03/25/realestate/harlem-back-after-a-short-nap. html? pagewanted=all&_r=0.)  
 
3 Accessed August 10, 2014, www. existenceisresistance. org.  
 
4 “Harrabic Tubman” is the stage name of Nancy Mansour. Note the obvious play on words invoking an 




empower Arab or diasporic listeners, nor did it further the Palestinian cause writ large, or 
the musicians’ performances in particular. More pertinent to a material understanding of 
what is political about this subcultural event – and what in my opinion is more likely – is 
that the men from the neighborhood were responding to an influx of much younger, white 
and Arab incomers with different cultural capital in a quickly gentrifying neighborhood. 
That this audience’s arrival in the neighborhood was couched in a presentation of “hip 
hop culture,” but rendered alien via the language in which it was spoken, was likely also 
significant.  
The framework of the event at the Shrine – fundraising for an NGO called 
“Existence is Resistance” – should easily recall the problematic politics of the discourse 
of resistance elaborated in the previous chapter. One can imagine an analysis of this 
concert that applauds Palestinian resistance against the Occupation; that celebrates the 
power of music to transcend borders (after all the film being promoted is entitled Hip 
Hop Is Bigger than the Occupation); and that, considering the concert’s location, 
similarly celebrates the intersectionality of African American and Arab/Palestinian 
struggles. “Harrabic Tubman”’s stage name also invokes this intersectionality.5 
Strangely, perhaps, all of these narratives necessitate that we ignore the exchange 
between the MC and the bar, relying instead on the positive responses from audience 
members that huddled close to the stage. 
Towards an alternative, I want to suggest this exchange at the Shrine can 
productively illustrate the limitations of the dynamics of the “polis” I described in the 
                                                
5 Her naming choice has been critiqued online for what has been interpreted as an unbecoming 
appropriation of African American culture and history. See M’bwebe Aja Ishangi, “The Power in a Name 





previous chapter. There, I argued that Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of the polis as 
the “space of appearance,” or the sphere where political activity happens, was a useful 
framework for understanding how a persistent discourse of resistance functions in 
academic literature. I identified that a discourse of resistance operates vis-à-vis a 
methodological gesture of recasting a group of people around certain actors. Within this 
constructed polis, given activities can be understood as significant – as empowering, as 
“resistant”, etc. I argued that what was troubling about this construction of the polis was 
the necessary continuation of apolitical behavior outside of it, against which only some 
activity can be interpreted as political.  
An important part of the construction or location of a polis lies in the presumption 
of some kind of homogeneity within this political sphere. I mentioned that Arendt writes 
that the polis is “the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking 
together.”6 In subcultural literature concerned with style, for example, “resistance” is 
attributed to those haircuts and sartorial choices that peers (who approve) or teachers and 
parents (who don’t) recognize. Similarly, I noted that the actions of subalterns are 
registered as threatening by the colonizer (recorded in colonial police legers). In these 
accounts of “resistance,” the polis is made up of supporters – those who recognize 
empowerment in selected actions; and foes – those who recognize a threat or other 
negative implications in the same actions. But what to make of the others who witness 
activity but accord it neither of these valences? At the Shrine, what to make of the men at 
the bar? How to document politics in motion while acknowledging the heterogeneity of 
audiences even as they gather in the same concert venue?  
                                                




So the significance of the incident at the Shrine lies in its ability to underscore the 
dynamic heterogeneity of urban concert audiences. It illustrates the feebleness of only 
considering the fans huddled close up to the stage – the inadequacy of constructing a 
specific audience, through which political significance can be attributed. Secondly, the 
incident clearly highlights the tensions in urban venues when the marketing of the live 
music is effected by or playing into the discourses of resistance I identified in the 
previous chapter. Concert frameworks investing in a kind of “urban chique” all too 
frequently position events at the frontlines of gentrification in whatever city they are 
found. The response to the MC’s efforts to warm the crowd from the bar’s local clientele 
rejects this momentum in a memorable way, while at the same time putting into relief the 
vibrant intersection of trajectories alive in the concert space and ignited by the concert 
itself. How can a political ethnography of subcultural production account for these urban 
dynamics and these political exchanges? How can an analysis of the political texture in 
concerts like this one level the boundaries of the polis so that other actors – who don’t fit 
the binary of resistor/resistee – can also be recognized and their political activity (their 
existence) accounted for?  
In other words, can we build a model for understanding politics in subcultural 
production that accounts for the multiple trajectories present at once? Can there be a 
model for understanding politics in performance that accounts for what Doreen Massey 
calls the “simultaneity of stories-so-far”– that is, the heterogeneity in a given venue at a 
given time?7 How can politics be extracted or attributed to the processes of encounter, 
collaboration, and co-consumption in city spaces that are themselves actively contested? 
                                                




The first part of this chapter attempts to deepen the polis, and in doing so moves towards 
a more spatial understanding of the hetergoneity of audiences and venues.  
I am hardly the first to recognize that intrinsic to the idea of the polis are practices 
of exclusion. In the previous chapter, I pointed to Jacques Rancière’s critiques of Arendt. 
For centuries, the liberal idea of the cosmopolis has emerged in political theory as the 
open, welcoming counterpoint to the closed, exclusive polis. Against the idea of a finite 
and bound city-state, increasingly manifest in modernist claims to the political 
community and identity of the state, theorists have theorized the cosmopolis. As R. B. J. 
Walker explains, after Hobbes, many philosophers have come to the conclusion that “the 
modern polis can no longer be our political home, at least our only political home.”8 
Moreover, over the past two decades, there has been a resurgence of theorizations of the 
cosmopolitan, deepening and complicating the term, searching for a “cosmopolitics.”9 As 
David Harvey has quipped, “cosmopolitanism is back.”10 
This more recent resurgence in theorizing the cosmopolitan comes in part as a 
response against critiques of utopian cosmopolitanism that emerged in the wake of the 
Cold War, perhaps most easily perceptible in the work of Martha Nussbaum.11 Her critics 
found much at fault with the celebration of the open and global reach of capital, and with 
                                                
8 R. B. J. Walker, “Polis, Cosmopolis, Politics,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 28(2003): 268. 
 
9 See, as perhaps two bookends with plenty of variation in between: Bruce Robbins and Pheng Cheah, 
Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1998) and David 
Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (New York: Columbia UP, 2009). 
 
10 David Harvey, “Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils,” accessed October 4, 2015, 
http://www.davidharvey.org/media/cosmopol.pdf. 
 
11 Martha Nussbaum, For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996) 




the positive aspects of globalization in her work.12 The complete range of formulations 
developed to recover the cosmopolitan project in response to these criticism – what 
Harvey calls “counter-cosmopolitanisms” – are outside the scope of my discussion here.13 
These debates have in various ways tried to root or locate cosmopolitanism in a specific 
geographic place or among a specific set of identities. Thereby, they address the darker 
sides of the transnational expanse of capital, paying attention to the irregularity of 
privilege and movement across the globe, looking for “actually existing 
cosmopolitanism.”14 Can the idea of a rooted cosmopolis – a diverse, tolerant, and open 
political community, that is nonetheless effected by shifts in global capital, transform the 
political expectations I suggested were attached to the more traditional polis? Can 
thinking of urban audiences consuming avant-garde music as cosmopolitan shift the 
processes of recognition of political activity away from locating “resistance”? Is the 
cosmopolis a satisfying alternative to the polis? 
A certain degree of cosmopolitanism in Arabic rap and its consumption is easily 
recognizable. Some rap lyrics articulate anti-sectarian and anti-nationalist sentiment. 
More significantly, the structure of live rap consumption in Ramallah, Amman, and 
Beirut is markedly cosmopolitan. Most live rap concerts are primarily geared towards a 
mobile, and upwardly mobile cosmopolitan audience – whether that means foreigners, 
locals who travel or have lived abroad, or simply locals with mobility in each city. That 
Arabic rap concerts almost exclusively rely on this framework while Arabic rap lyrics 
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frequently bemoan structures of power and speak in local idiom to the street, need not be 
terribly surprising. It would indeed be remarkable if an iteration of what is at least 
occasionally a “global” culture – hip hop – did not have at least some cosmopolitan 
qualities. What is worth underscoring, however, are the class considerations that mark its 
live (cosmopolitan) consumption. It is here that what Doreen Massey terms “the local 
production of the neocapitalist global” may be interesting in terms of Arabic rap and 
concert culture.15 This is something I return to in each case study. 
Indeed Massey’s “local production of the neocapitalist global” may point to the 
different ways in which gentrification is manifest in Ramallah, Amman, and Beirut. It is 
here that the limits of understanding the political implications of rap production as 
cosmopolitan can be found. The cosmopolitan economy I just described, while trading in 
anti-sectarian, anti-religious, and “universal” values and aesthetics simultaneously 
engages in processes of exclusion based on class, ethnicity, and religion (especially as 
publicly displayed). The cosmopolis – globalized (sections of each) city, open and 
connected to (sections of) other cities – necessitates for its existence vast stretches of 
rural or urban backwardness from whose restrictive confines and familial doldrums 
young people are understood to flock. As I detail in my all three of my case studies 
however, audiences frequently refuse this narrative, in some cases violently. The most 
“cosmopolitan” centers of Ramallah, Amman, and Beirut are also, for some audiences, 
the least tolerant, the most exclusive, the most difficult to access. On Hamra Street in 
Beirut, a young veiled woman from Hermel (in the Bekaaʿ Valley) asks to stand next to 
me as she awaits her ride after a rap concert at the theatre Metro al-Madina. She is afraid, 
                                                





standing alone on this hipster-ized thoroughfare, that people will make fun of her for 
wearing the veil. In Ramallah, youths from the neighboring refugee camp throw bottles 
over the wall into the lush garden of La Vie café, where rappers and electronic musicians 
have performed, and which prides itself on trading in local, organic products and 
implements the boycott of Israeli goods. Café ownership considers erecting mesh netting 
over the garden to protect from the projectiles. In Amman, young boys flock to stare at 
the stream of well-dressed men and women queuing to enter the Roman amphitheatre for 
the Al Balad Music Festival. They throw stones from the concrete plaza outside, into the 
theatre, to which they (and anyone without a ticket) are barred entry during concerts. The 
festival’s director understands this expression of frustration as stemming from the fact 
that during the festival, this public space is (in his words) “stolen from them.”16 Like the 
incident I described during the concert at the Shrine, these examples of audience 
interactions, expectations, and resentment point to very real difference and heterogeneity 
within and around cultural spaces. I want to suggest these spaces are not adequately 
understood either as cosmopolitan, or as a cohesive political community constructing a 
polis within the bounds of which the significance of political activity can be located. 
These examples, and the others which I detail in the chapters that follow, have led 
me to question the limits of the open tolerance of the cosmopolis. Even when (especially 
when) this cosmopolitanism is couched in globalized modernity, when it actively 
counters restrictive religious social mores, and when it supposedly encourages free and 
alternative creative expression, it consistently implements a class project which allows 
for the middle and upper-middle class consumption of forms of globalized culture while 
                                                





it actively excludes working class audiences (frequently in the name of security concerns, 
or in the name of profit).17 I review in more detail, and, I hope, complicate these 
dynamics in each case study chapter. 
For now, I want to note that these testimonies have led me to interrogate the 
structure of the cosmopolis in relation to the polis. In other words, considering the 
practices of exclusion upon which both depend, are the polis and the cosmopolis actually 
opposed?18 Walker suggests:  
It is a great mistake to assume that our futures lie either with the polis or 
with the cosmopolis. We confront, rather, ongoing struggles to resituate 
and politicize sites of political authority. We already know that the old 
distinctions between local and global or urban and rural or north, south, 
east and west are being renegotiated very rapidly. These negotiations 
imply the need to renegotiate our understandings of both the polis and the 
cosmopolis.19 
 
In fact, the polis and the cosmopolis are co-constituted, each based on a similar 
understanding of a modern subject, its limits, and construction. While the polis sees the 
necessity of a community of individuals, constituted as subjects, through which to 
distribute democracy; the cosmopolis affirms the status of the individual subject while 
recognizing the need to tolerate difference (embodied in different, individual, subjects). 
In other words, my search for a different sort of political space in which to read the 
political significance of rap concerts does not find much traction in the cosmopolis as 
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Bourgeoisie?] (Beirut: Dar Al-Farabi, 1974). 
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nationalism rather than opposed to it.” (Robbins, “Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism,” 2.) 
 





alternative to the polis. This is so even though the aesthetics of many Arabic rap concerts 
frequently trade in global, cosmopolitan, trends. 
 The phenomenon of “that metropolitan-academic preoccupation: cities” (of which 
this study is in some ways a part) provides another avenue of inquiry.20 The metropolis is, 
of course, a conceptualization of space within which much politics (and “resistance” 
incidentally) has been located in recent scholarship. From “everyday” resistance to the 
“right to the city,” the urban metropolis has emerged as the terrain upon which political 
significance is readily discernable.21  
 Since Lefebvre located the unspoken assumption in Marx and Engels (namely that 
the struggle over the means of production is essentially an urban struggle), the political 
potency of activity in the city has taken on new meaning.22 US cultural studies in this 
vein are especially prone to these discourses of resistance, which, as Kristin Ross 
explains, 
  …take capitalism for granted as a kind of force field or switchboard that 
processes meanings; the Salvadoran or Guatemalan selling oranges on the 
freeways of Los Angeles becomes a figure of ‘resistance’ - someone who 
has appropriated urban space and used it to his own devices, someone 
thumbing his nose at the ‘master planners.’23 
 
But, Ross asks productively, “resistance to what?”24 Here, similar to the hesitation I 
articulated in the previous chapter, Ross critiques the washing out of “resistance” within 
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1984); Henri Lefebvre, Le Droit à la Ville, Third Edition (Paris: Editions Anthropo, 2009). 
 
22 Henri Lefebvre, La Pensée Marxiste et la Ville, Third Edition (Brussels: Casterman, 1978), 27-69.  
 






the specific confines of urban studies, where the “metropolitan” becomes place holder for 
struggle. For her part, Doreen Massey explains that: “What Ross is really worrying about 
here is the lack of coherence in this resistance, and the lack of a singular focus (tactics 
‘are not made to refer back to capital nor to offer any means of understanding the system 
as a whole.’)”25 And she continues: 
Against ‘the city as system’, the implacable presence of stabilized 
legibility, is romanticized a mobile ‘resistance’ of tactics, the everyday, 
the little people… This central power is understood as removed from ‘the 
everyday’ … It is an imagination which has taken a strong hold in urban 
literature, with its own elaborations… of this street as ‘the margins.’26 
 
I have articulated so far in this chapter that I seek a deeper conceptualization of political 
space than the one available in either the polis or the cosmopolis. It should be clear 
however, that to consider the whole physical city – or metropolis – with its ghettos, 
refugee camps, and gentrifying neighborhoods together, as the political space par 
excellence, is also limiting and problematic. If the polis – as a political community built 
on the recognition of specific activity – is built on the continuity of apolitical behavior 
outside it, and the cosmopolitan neighborhoods of each city actively exclude in order to 
build an ethos of tolerance; than the metropolis flattens all urban conflict or confrontation 
into a single amorphous struggle, the political goals of which are not clear. How then to 




                                                







A Different methodological gesture 
 
 In her book For Space, the late Doreen Massey makes a compelling case for 
philosophical and political attention to the concept of “space.” She argues for an 
understanding of space as something more than a simple “expanse we travel across” and 
proposes instead to understand it as “the product of interrelations, as constituted through 
interactions.”27 That is, she proposes an understanding of physical space that is not just 
“there,” bounded and unbounded by different political and ecological boundaries, but that 
is constantly constructed through the material interactions it hosts. In this way, her 
conceptualization of space is voluminous: it is three-dimensional. Hers is not an 
understanding of space as area, as flat expanse. This sense of depth in her formulations 
about space adds a living dimension to physical location; Massey’s argumentation “for 
space” is about understanding how we interact in it and through it: as the “sphere of 
possibility of the existence of multiplicity in the sense of contemporaneous plurality.”28 
This “contemporaneous plurality” responds to trends in post-colonial and subaltern 
literature, and to the anthropologization of the “Other” that consistently figures “the 
field” as frozen in time and research subjects and their locales as existing in a 
romanticized “tradition” that is always in the past. 
In Massey’s theorizations, I find a sharp theoretical model for reformulating the 
political space within which rap and hip hop concerts are found. Massey urges us to 
rethink space. And she does so from political convictions about contemporary 
                                                







globalization – our understanding of which she sees as philosophically confined by the 
traditional binary between space and time – that are similar to the political concerns I 
have attempted to unravel over the course of this dissertation’s introduction and the 
previous chapter. Massey’s work allows me to discard notions of a polis, momentarily set 
aside considerations of the cosmopolis (and cosmopolitan aesthetics or consumption), 
and to really interrogate the shape of the metropolis – the city itself – by thinking instead 
about the constantly-being-constructed, three-dimensional space through which 
performers and their audiences move to arrive at the concert venue and which they 
construct together through their interactions over the course of the performance event.  
Massey’s provocations provide fertile ground to begin to understand the 
intersecting trajectories manifest in the concert at the Shrine in Harlem, at Metro al-
Madina in Beirut, La Vie in Ramallah, and during the Al Balad Festival in Amman. In 
other words, “space” is a way of understanding the venue and cultural event that is 
pregnant with possibility, without eroticizing the alternative or transgressive nature of 
cultural production or the seemingly alternative venues – themselves often at the heart of 
contestation over the right to the city. 
Considering rap concerts spatially means recognizing that ongoing urban change 
is part of the politics of these events. In some cases these urban changes look like 
gentrification, in others dispossession, and in others systemic privatization. Audiences 
and performers live and understand these urban processes in different ways, and they 
move through the physical manifestations of these changes in order to meet in specific 
venues. For me this is not only a question contextualizing a rap concert within the history 




patterns of listening and audience behavior spatially will deepen understanding 
audience/performer interactions by pointing to politics in process. Massey writes that 
recognizing space is a “recognition of the fact of spacing.”29 It is precisely the dimension 
of space as distance and proximity felt in the performance venue that I argue is political, 
that points to political processes.  
A subcultural ethnography built on this recognition is less prone to romanticizing 
the political or populist reach of a certain musical genre. Understood spatially, concerts 
are moments when relations are enacted, brought into relief. Moreover, these relations, 
because they are situated in space, are always in motion. Massey tells us that relations are 
“are necessarily embedded material practices which have to be carried out.”30 The 
political impact in such an understanding lies in acknowledging that collective feeling, 
community building, shared experiences, or political expression in rap concerts may not 
be already formed, as in some hypothetical, succinct subculture. Rather, the processes of 
interacting in space may be the political developments to pay attention to. As Sara 
Ahmed has offered: “Collectivities are formed through the very work that has to be done 
in order to get closer to other others.”31 In other words, rather than the already formed 
and outwardly performed identities, styles, politics often taken as evidence of 
“resistance,” politics may equally be productively discerned in processes of interacting. 
This has deep implications for the capacity of live cultural production – like rap concerts 
– to shape politics and determine political constitutions. Moreover, if the concept of 
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space is able to dissolve the boundaries the polis, allowing us to dissect and consider 
patterns of inclusion and exclusion, the conceptualization of feeling I elaborate in the next 
section multiplies subjectivity and moves the discussion away from both identity and 
agency. This is to pick up where Massey stops, to offer a theorization of what Massey 
calls a “spatialized subjectivity.”32  
 
 




I feel you. That’s the most important thing: I feel you. The 
first line of rap I ever wrote is maybe the most important 
one I will ever write. It says “ana hases feek katheb [I feel 
you, liar].” The line does two things. First, it shows the 
listener that the politician “on high” doesn’t feel him at all. 
And in the track, I’m describing the pain [that comes from 
this]. And second thing, at the same time, I’m telling the 
listener that I’m with you: I’m in the same place. I am in 
pain in the same way. 
~Bu Kolthoum33 
 
 Massey’s proposition to spatialize subjectivity comes from her recognition of the 
“inseparability of individuality and sociability.”34 In her efforts to dislodge the primacy 
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33 Syrian rapper Bu Kolthoum. Interview with the author, March 31, 2015, Amman. All subsequent 
quotations from Bu Kolthoum are taken from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own. The 
quoted line of rap is from the track, “Oum Wselna” [“Get up, we’re there”]. See: “Bu Kolthoum ‘Oum 
Wselna’ official video – qoum weselna – bu kolthoum,” YouTube video, 2:52, posted by “Bu Kolthoum,” 
August 11, 2014, accessed May 22, 2016, 
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of temporality as framework for narrating the subject, she writes, “Experience is not an 
internalized succession of sensations (pure temporality) but a multiplicity of things and 
relations.”35 Subjectivity in other words, she suggests, is not built chronologically, but is 
constantly constituted in the multiple relations held simultaneously. Similarly, Moira 
Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd have argued that the emotions and passions that build an 
individual are not constituted separately and succinctly, but can be held simultaneously, 
effecting both memory and imagination. Leaning on Spinoza, they write: “To understand 
the operation of the passions in individual life is at the same time to understand the 
relations of collaboration and antagonism which bind human beings together in 
society.”36  
This way of understanding the individual complicates subject readings that are 
based on a variety of identities (class, gender, nationality, et al.). It does so by pushing 
past the immediate alternative, discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, to assert, 
in post-modern times, the presence of hybrid identities. Instead, the line of inquiry 
Massey, Gatens, and Lloyd pursue places the body at the center of the interrogation of the 
individual. Importantly, this body is always recognized in relation to other bodies in lived 
space. So, Gatens and Lloyd write, “It is only as a finite individual among other finite 
individuals – made vulnerable but also sustained by their collective power – that the 
individual exists.”37 This individual in relation to others is significant not because of the 
different identities it can carry, but because of the capacity of the body to affect and be 
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affected by other bodies. “To be an individual at all is to be exposed to the external force 
of other bodies – to the powers, whether congenial or antagonistic – of other 
individuals.”38 This focus on the body as a force that acts upon and is acted upon opens 
up interesting ways to consider the politics in live cultural production, and in particular to 
evaluate audience interactions in contested city spaces, like rap concerts. 
 In particular, this line of inquiry allows for a way of interpreting interactions 
without drawing a tight circle (a polis) around chosen performers and their audiences, 
excluding subjects around them. That is, by acknowledging that audiences “are not just 
passively moved by external forces, [t]hey have their own momentum,” we are able to to 
consider audience movement – not just in the concert space, but towards it and away 
from it. This spatializes the individual listener – putting the focus on her in relation to 
others, but not necessarily as opposed to or removed from others. In other words, that 
audiences bring affect into concert venues and simultaneously are affected by fellow 
audiences and the performer is central to the processual politics in rap concerts. Listeners, 
in Gatens and Lloyd’s terms, “act and [are] acted upon in a multiplicity of ways.”39 
 Like Massey and Gatens and Lloyd, I also lean on Spinoza’s conceptualization of 
sensation and subjectivity. It is in particular his formulations that our sense of self is our 
sense of our body in relation to other bodies that is most productive here. That is, 
subjectivity is built vis-à-vis what is felt in the body and sensed in relation to other 
bodies. His idea of subjectivity is something simultaneously felt internally and in relation 
to others. New avenues to imagine politics in process open when the feeling body is 
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repositioned as central in how to conceive of subjectivity and collectivity. It is not the 
shape or color of bodies (ie identity) that is my primary interest, but their ability to hold 
energy, absorb energy, sense other bodies.40 This emphasis on sensation is central to my 
proposal of “feeling” as central to the politics in rap concerts.  
 I use “feeling” in the meaning of sensation. That is, I mean feeling as the process 
of sensation, not as specific emotions. What is important to hold on to here is the spatial 
relationships sensed between self and others. Consider the expressions, “You feel far”; “I 
feel close to you”; “I feel you”; “I don’t feel it.” The point is to notice the difference 
between these statements and phrases like “I feel sad/happy/angry.” Importantly, while 
the latter are internally focused (even if the cause or catalyst of the feeling is external), 
the former communicates sensation of the body in relation to others. It is easy to imagine 
a range of emotions attached to each phrase: “You annoy me. I wish you would leave. 
You do. You feel far. I am happy.” Alternatively, when used in this context: “I miss you. 
You feel far,” the same phrase can carry different affect. The sensation of distance or 
proximity can arise from different emotional registers, or even multiple emotions at once. 
Consider this example: “Come back. I am angry at you because you feel far.” Here, one 
can imagine both longing and anger together as the affective registers. It is not the 
emotional qualities in and of themselves that concern me in my elaboration of feeling in 
rap concerts in the following – except perhaps in so far as registering that emotions 
(plural) may be held simultaneously. (I will return to the emotional blending in the 
discussion of tarab, below.) What I am concerned to trace, rather, is the feeling of others 
– whether as proximity, distance, or co-presence.  
                                                




 Feeling featured as a central part of my conversations with interlocutors over the 
course of this research. Considering the internet-based media through which Arabic rap is 
primarily disseminated and the real obstacles to hosting live events (especially in 
Ramallah and Amman), the reasons artists give for bothering to attempt and continuing to 
host live events were always an important part of our discussions. Tangentially, the focus 
I brought on the live concert often came as a something of a surprise to my interlocutors, 
who are used to a slate of questions from journalists and researchers about politics, 
resistance, protest (vis-à-vis the Arab Spring, intifada, or whatever other street protests 
are underway),41 or their relationship with US hip hop culture. It was nonetheless 
exploring the live aspect of their work that led me to the line of inquiry that I elaborate 
here. Their answers as to why they consider concerts important are almost categorically 
wrapped up in the opportunity “to feel” their audience or, as listeners, to feel the music. 
DJ Sotusura locates an inciting moment in his personal history about the relevance of the 
live rap concert in an experience listening to American rap: 
 
There was a festival in LA. I went because Wu Tang were the headliners. 
Right before Wu Tang, Mos Def took the stage. It was 1999. Mos Def’s 
first album had been out for like six months, and I hadn’t really listened to 
it. I had heard one or two tracks but I hadn’t really listened to the whole 
album. Mos Def took the stage and did his set. I was totally stunned. I’m 
telling you, he gave me goose bumps. Any song he did, the whole crowd 
was with him. This was the first concert where I felt the power of an MC. I 
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can listen to Mos Def at home, and like the album, but the effect he has on 
stage is much greater than anything else.  
 
When I came back [to Amman] in 2004 we did concerts with Ramallah 
Underground. And when they went to London I went on stage with them. 
And [there] I felt like the crowd was being touched the same way I felt 
when I saw Mos Def. The guys [of Ramallah Underground] just had to 
hold the mic right and you could feel their energy: rage. Like, they were 
just going to explode. This feeling, I know the audiences felt it. Arab or 
British, it didn’t matter — there were people who came up to them after 
and were like, ‘Man I don’t know what you’re talking about, but I can feel 
it.’42 
 
Sotusura’s testimony points to the involuntary, felt sensations (goose bumps) that 
transpired when listening to a powerful performance and to the centrality of the 
experience of feeling or being moved by the music in the consumption of live rap that I 
want to focus on in the remaining part of this chapter. Audiences and listeners alike 
affirm the importance of the opportunity to discern these feelings. The Ramallah-based 
rapper, producer, and DJ Boikutt (himself one third of the now disbanded Ramallah 
Underground) elaborates from his perspective: 
 I can put music online, and people can hear it, like it or not like it, 
whatever. But live, there’s a connection in the moment. You can know 
right in the instant what the response is of anyone listening, how they 
receive what’s coming out of me, what I’ve been working on for years. I 
can see in the instant how people react. In people’s faces. In their eyes. I 
can feel the energy, I can feel the vibe, khalas [that’s it]. And at the same 
time, it’s a connection. At the end, music for me isn’t one sided. There is 
call and response.43 
 
Building a theoretical model based on these testimonies and those of their peers, 
the alternative I propose to reading resistance in rap concerts lies in paying attention to 
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these powerful sensations – of feeling the performer – or feeling the audience. Simply, 
these experiences on stage can act as validation for performers. They also, I think, point 
to politics in motion: as performers experiment with expression, audiences are exposed to 
articulations to which they may not be otherwise. When this happens in semi-public 
spaces, both the articulation and the reactions of listeners are felt multiply, from different 
directions. This call and response of receiving and giving affect are the political 
exchanges in these live musical events at the same time that they are absolutely central to 
the aesthetics of the genre and different performers within it. Having established a spatial 
understanding of concerts, and the centrality of feeling in order to discern the self in 
relation to others, I now want to propose tracing the building of tarab in rap concerts as a 




Music is the way to the soul. You get people into trances, 
basically. If you have an audible algorithm, you can make 
them feel certain stuff. Basically, that’s lovely, it’s 
beautiful. 
~Al Nather44  
 
In this dissertation’s introduction, I referred to seemingly uncontrollable 
emotional reactions (tears, shouts, etc.) in response to powerful performances of Arabic 
rap. I suggested these felt reactions of mine have in part driven a curiosity to explore 
other less tangible forms of political engagement in this genre of subcultural production. 
                                                
44 Mohammed Masroujy, the Palestinian DJ and rapper who goes by Al-Nather. Interview with the author, 
March 30, 2015, Amman. All subsequent quotations from Al-Nather are taken from this interview. 






Similar to but distinct from the Spanish duende and the Persian hal, Albanian wedding 
singing, the Tunisian stambeli, and the Moroccan gnawa, explored by other scholars of 
music, poetry, and performance, tarab is a term that describes both a traditional genre of 
Arabic music production and the audience-performer interactions and the affective 
condition evoked by the exceptional performance of live music, often associated with the 
genre.45 Ethnomusicologist Ali Jihad Racy’s foundational study on tarab culture provides 
the basic understanding for the term that I assume and then depart from here.46  
 Pointing to the centuries-old use of the term in Arabic philosophy on art, Racy 
tells us that reference to tarab appears frequently in medieval Arabic literature.47 Of 
these, especially Majd al-Din al-Ghazzali’s work on proper modes of listening in music 
and in prayer was long the most developed work on the subject.48 Racy builds on these 
and other ethnomusicological literature in order to develop his own understandings of 
tarab as a state of rapture, an emotional blending that is transformative for subjects, 
                                                
45 Michael Anthony Sells, Early Islamic Mysticisms: Sufi, Qur’an, Mi’raj, Poetic and Theological Writings 
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulis Press, 1996); Lorca, Frederico García Lorca, “Theory and Play of the Duende,” trans. 
A.S. Kline, accessed January 10, 2014, http://www.poetryintranslation.com/klineaslorcaduende.htm; Jane 
Sugarman, Engendering Song: Singing and Subjectivity at Prespa Albanian Weddings (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1997); Richard C. Jankowsky, Stambeli: Music, Trance, and Alterity in Tunisia (Chicago: The 
U of Chicago P, 2010); Deborah Kapchan, Travelling Spirit Masters: Moroccan Gnawa Trance and Music 
in the Global Marketplace (Wesleyan, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2007). 
 
46 Ali Jihad Racy, Making Music in the Arab World: The Culture and Artistry of Tarab (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge UP, 2004). 
 
47 While pointing to these sources, Racy also takes care to critique Glibert Rouget’s dependence, in the 
latter’s seminal study on trance, on these medieval sources in trying to establish understanding of 
contemporary music. While acknowledging the history of the term dating back to the medieval period, 
Racy is keen to define and analyze a contemporary musical practice corresponding to some characteristics 
associated with the term for centuries (Racy, Making Music, 197). See also Gilbert Rouget, Music and 
Trance: A Theory of the Relations between Music and Possession, trans. Brunhilde Biebuyck (Chicago: U 
of Chicago P, 1985). 
 
48 Excerpted in James Robson, Tracts on Listening to Music (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1938). Also 
translated by Duncan MacDonald, “Emotional religion in Islam as Affected by Music and Singing. Being a 
Translation of a book of the Ihya ʿUlum ad-Din of Al-Ghazzali with Analysis, Annotation, and 




and/or an overtly expressed longing invoked by a particularly powerful piece of music or 
poetry, and a desired state of spectatorship. Racy focuses his study in the twentieth 
century, in the urban centers of Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, and to some extent Aleppo, 
where tarab dominated a type of specialized, urban musical production, associated with 
particular patterns of listening. Most readily located in the careers and popularity of Umm 
Kulthoum, Mohammed Abd el-Wahab, and others of their generation, tarab music 
reached its peek during their lifetimes, and has since steadily declined in popularity.49 
This tarab music is associated with songs written in specific modes, where the subject is 
almost always love, and is nearly completely dominated by an affective mode of longing.  
Tarab music is called such because of the tarab condition it has been associated 
with producing. Distinct from trance though it shares some of its characteristics, the tarab 
condition is an affective state induced by the processes of careful listening and exchange 
with engaged performers.50 In Arabic, it is often invoked in relation to saltanah, or 
ecstasy, and wajd, religious ecstasy or trance (especially in the Sufi tradition), but is 
                                                
49 See also Virginia Danielson, The Voice of Egypt: Umm Kulthum, Arabic Song, and Egyptian Society in 
the Twentieth Century (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1997); and Jonathan Shannon, Among the Jasmine Trees: 
Music and Modernity in Contemporary Syria (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2006). 
 
50 Charles Hirschkind calls tarab “enchantment” that is “produced by the affective synthesis of listener and 
performer.” He also refers to it as “harmony” and “an intersubjective form enabling an exchange of feeling 
or an affective melding.” (Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic 





nonetheless distinct from both.51 Tarab need not have a spiritual connotation; nor is it 
solitary, nor inwardly focused (like the experiences of saltanah and ecstasy).52  
 Considering my focus in this study is not the music of Umm Kulthoum or others, 
but with Arabic rap, I am here less concerned with the twentieth-century classic music 
genre usually associated with the word tarab than with the affective condition frequently 
associated with it.53 My interlocutors are nonetheless intimately familiar with the style of 
popular music, often referred to as tarab elʿarabi [tarab music]. They consistently testify 
to its presence in their narratives of musical exposure as children and teenagers. Further, 
this music has been consistently sampled across the wide range of Arabic rap developed 
over the past thirty years (I return to this below). The style and form of tarab music is 
                                                
51 Saltanah is frequently related as an element of tarab. Saltanah is the ecstasy an individual can go into as a 
result of (mostly) playing music. Tarab more readily invokes the dynamic of elation or ecstasy invoked by 
exchange between performer and listener, what Racy calls the “transformative experience.” One can 
yusaltan (go into ecstasy) listening or playing alone. The same is not typically true for tarab. (See Racy, 
Making Music, 120-146.)  
 
52 Rouget tries to make a firm distinction between ecstasy and trance. The former he confines to the 
religious experiences (the likes of those documented by the nun Teresa de Avila), which are solitary, quiet, 
and which the subject remembers clearly afterwards. By contrast, trance is the stuff of shamanistic rituals, 
and may be manifest in trembling, shaking, foaming at the mouth, swooning, etc., and is induced by music, 
drumming, or other noise, the experience of which few subjects are able to recall after the fact. His 
definitions are not always compatible with the translated terms he refers to, for example, other translators 
use the same words (which in Rouget’s study have completely opposite meanings) to describe different 
aspects of different terms. Neither am I convinced that there cannot be elements of what Rouget describes 
as ecstasy in trance. I return to Racy’s problematizing of Rouget’s work on tarab specifically with reference 
to its Arab subject matter later in this section. (See Rouget, Music and Trance, 3-11.) 
 
53 On Oum Kulthoum and tarab see Virginia Danielson, “The Voice of Egypt: Umm Kulthum, Arabic Song, 
and Egyptian Society in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1997), 139, among others. For 
distinction between singers in this genre and their ability (or not) to produce tarab, especially for the 
interesting contrast he draws between between tarab and sentimentality, see Martin Stokes, “Abd al-
Halim’s Microphone,” in Music and the Play of Power in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, 
edited by Laudan Nooshin (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 55-74. Furthermore, the relationship of tarab to 
spiritual practices, especially certain Sufi rituals, points to its presence of tarab outside this musical genre. 
See for example, Michael Frishkopf, “Tarab in the Mystic Sufi Chant of Egypt,” in Colors of Enchantment: 






also sung (not sampled) in the work of the Hermel-based rapper Gaafar al Touffar, who is 
known for singing mawwal between verses or as the hook in his tracks.54  
What I am primarily interested in here is not tarab el arabi but tarab el jumhur 
[tarab of the audience]. That is, not the genre of music, but the reactions of the jumhur 
[audience]. Rather than dissecting the style of music in use, whether sampled or recorded, 
I want to propose tarab as a way of approaching audience dynamics in rap concerts and as 
a way to re-center the processes of listening to rap as significant.55 Racy’s observations 
continue to be useful here. A performer of tarab music himself, Racy tells us that that 
tarab concerts [haflat] rely on a specialized listening audience, on which the singer 
depends for responses that may include clapping, exclamations [aiwah! (right on!), 
Allaah! (Heavens!), et al.] rocking, swaying, etc. These reactions facilitate the 
performer’s own ecstasy and encourage him/her to yitrabou [go into tarab]. Moreover, 
Racy tells us the emergence of tarab depends in significant part on specialized listeners or 
samiʿah, who were trained, either through formal or informal instruction, how to 
appreciate the series of improvisations performed by vocalists and instrumentalists, 
themselves possessed by the trance-like condition of tarab.  
On the heels of a small concert under spring rain in Amman, I asked Boikutt 
about what he discerned from the gathered audience’s reactions. His description is 
                                                
54 In classical tarab, mawwal is a sung piece of music before the formal song begins. Sung in dialect as 
opposed to standardized fusha, the mawwal allows the singer to demonstrate his/her ability to improvise a 
non-metrical melody. 
 
55 Al-Ghazzali emphasized the significance of listening as meaning making. He writes, “There is no way of 
extracting… hidden things save by the flint and steels of listening to music and singing, and there is no 
entry into the heart save by the antechamber of the ears.” (Al-Ghazzali, translated and printed in Duncan B. 
MacDonald, “Emotional Religion in Islam as Affected by Music and Singing being a Translation of a book 
of the Ihya ʿUlum ad-Din of Al-Ghazzali with analysis, annotation and Appendices,” Journal of the Royal 





illuminating in unpacking tarab exchanges in rap concerts – in order to understand those 
interactions between audience and performer that establish whether or not the music is 
felt: 
I found two people who were interested. I could tell from their faces. 
There was a guy up front, and there was a very open connection between 
us, he was exchanging with me a lot. I don’t mean to imply some deep 
analysis of his personality, but he was very clear and open with me. And 
there was another woman, she was standing in the back and she was 
giving me a lot of feedback on the flow. I’m not even sure if she spoke 
Arabic, but she was giving me feedback on the music. So there, I had two 
points in the audience. One guy is giving me feedback on the lyrics, and 
one is giving me feedback on the technicality, on the musicality. This was 
the perfect balance for me. At a complicated lyrical place I’d check in with 
this guy, for the flow I’d check in with the woman in the back; both cases 
I could see if it was good or not. Of course I was also checking in with 
other people who were there, but I would always return to these two 
points. I need this energy. 
 
In this case, the “dialectical …intercommunication with others who ‘felt’ the music” 
seems predominantly to takes the shape of eye contact and slight movements of the 
head.56 Other performers at different events describe it in more obvious displays like  
shouts, clapping, raising both hands to the temples or forehead in an expression of shock 
or relief. The intensity of the exchanges can build and release over the course of a 
concert. In rap concerts, as in the traditional contexts Racy describes, the tarab state can 
suggest “loss of control” – jumping, shouting, or other releases of energy that may 
otherwise not be typical and at the same time be “physically empowering.”57 Regardless 
of the form it takes however, of central importance is that it is an exchange. Like the 
                                                
56 Racy, Making Music, 9. 
 





rapper and DJ Dakn explains, “It’s question and answer, it keeps going. We’re in a circle 
and we all go into a trance together.”58  
Performers thus refer to exchanges that rely on some of the traditional performer-
audience interactions in hip hop concerts – like, for example, call and response. H. Samy 
Alim has suggested that call and response in contemporary US hip hop and rap music 
developed from similar interactions in funk music performances, like this basic one: 
“[Rapper] Say ‘Hoooo!’ [Audience] ‘Hoooooooo!’ [Rapper] Say ‘Ho! Ho!’ [Audience] 
‘Ho!’ ‘Ho!’”; etc.59 Literature on call and response, sometimes called antiphonal 
exchange or communication, in hip hop studies, anthropological accounts of African 
musical forms, studies of preaching styles in African American churches, as well as 
assessments of protest strategies in Occupy Wall Street, all suggest that these responsive 
utterances are additionally significant in that they are able to create community during the 
performance event.60 Robert Farris Thompson describes call and response as “perfected 
social interaction” for its ability to bring individuals together to act as one body.61 Daniel 
and Smitherman concur adding, “call and response seeks to synthesize ‘speakers’ and 
                                                
58 Interview with the author, March 30, 2015, Amman, Jordan. All subsequent quotations from Dakn are 
taken from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own. 
 
59 H. Samy Alim, Roc the Mic Right: The Language of Hip Hop Culture (New York: Routledge, 2006), 79-
80. 
 
60 See for example: Jack L. Daniel and Geneva Smitherman, “How I Got Over: Communication Dynamics 
in the Black Community,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 62 (1976): 26-39; Maggie Sale, “Call and Response 
as Critical Method: African American Oral Traditions in Beloved,” African American Review 26 (1992): 
41-50; Oliver Jackson, “Preface,” in Kuntu Drama, ed. Paul Harrison (New York: Grove, 1974), ix-xiii; 
Geneva Smitherman, Talkin’ and Testifyin’: The Language of Black America (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 
1977); Robert Farris Thompson, African Art in Motion: Icon and Act (Los Angeles: U of California P, 
1974); Edward D. Miller, “Authoring the Occupation: the Mic Check, the Human Microphone, and the 
Loudness of Listening,” in Media Authorship, ed. Cynthia Chris and David A. Gerstner, (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 180-193; and H. Samy Alim, Roc the Mic Right, 54-56. 
 





‘listeners’ in a unified movement.”62 Arab rappers and MCs, like their counterparts that 
perform rap in other languages around the world, also use antiphonal strategies to connect 
with and activate their audiences. 
However, MCs and listeners I spoke with readily discern between what they call 
“hype” and what they call a listening experience that “biʿabi el rass” [fills the head]. The 
difference as manifest between two prominent Palestinian crews with pronouncedly 
different aesthetics will be some of the focus of a subsequent chapter. At the moment, I 
want to note that what my interlocutors call “hype,” or the excitement that comes from 
traditional call-and-response, where a performer is able to charge the crowd and excite 
them, is not always the kind of tarab I want to pay attention to here. The ability of the 
music to fill the head, is, however. This tarab can be much harder to notice visually, 
because it is not predicated on spectacular behavior (jumping, yelling, etc.); the feeling, 
however, can be much more powerful. Recall Sotusura’s recollections of the Ramallah 
Underground show in London. The performers were not very active or hyped up. There 
was little call and response. Sotusura says “all they had to do was hold the mic properly” 
and the communication of feeling was powerful enough that even non-Arab speakers 
were moved enough to tell the musicians afterwards they could “feel it.” The Lebanese 
rapper El Rass’s distinctions between a concert that hypes and one that does something 
else make this distinction very clear. He started by explaining to me how he notices the 
presence of tarab in his concerts: 
For example, when they shout, when they cry. There are a lot of nuances, 
when you see a hall of three hundred people and you’re spitting your shit 
and no one is moving a thing. They're staring and you can see that they 
                                                





really want to get every word you’re saying, you can feel that, compared 
to a public for example that only reacts when you say something 
provocative or very catchy. You can see the difference between the 
different kinds of reactions. And it’s not only a question of different kinds 
of publics, sometimes it’s your responsibility too to take the public to this 
kind of place. As opposed to keeping them in the “shout out” place, in the 
“hype” thing. A lot of people would see a successful show as a super hype 
thing. For me this is not an ideal show. 
 
Super hype — when they’re dancing? 
 
Or like you know when it gets shouting and people going crazy and put 
your hands up and whatever. For me this is not the ideal show. For me the 
ideal show is when people individually and internally are most affected by 
what I am proposing to them. And not on a simplistic, basic, bond of 
punchline-reaction, insult-reaction. 
 
Filling the head, what El Rass calls “when people are most affected” – as opposed 
to hype – requires a more focused, active listening. Racy’s emphasis on the importance of 
what he calls “creative listening” points to the centrality of the audience in this form of 
performance analysis.63 Racy suggests this “creative listening” can be led by a 
specialized section of the audience, what Racy calls the samiʿah, or “listeners.” These are 
the dedicated fans who fuel the performer with attuned reactions to delivery, rhythm, tone 
of expression.64 In other words, tarab is not manifest in just any response, but in a 
specific kind of delivery within the framework of the performer-listener call and 
response. Racy tells us “proper listening requires the display of reactions that are both 
genuine and idiomatically correct.”65 In other words, the communication of “feeling” the 
                                                
63 Racy, Making Music, 131. 
 
64 Elsewhere, I have elaborated how samiʿah may facilitate multilingual call and response in performances 
of “Long Live Palestine: Part Two” performed by DARG Team in Geneva. (See El Zein, “Call and 
Response and Arabic Hip Hop in ‘the West.’”) 
 





music in the reactions of samiʿah is nuanced. 66 This active listening communicates to the 
performer what is working – what “is felt” and to what extent, as in Boikutt’s 
recollections about the concert at Jadal, above.  
Sprinkled throughout the jumhur, or general audience, the specialized listener 
helps in part to shape the appropriate reactions and who deliver the most useful feedback 
to performers.67 The samiʿah may include musicians (other rappers and DJs for example 
in my context), but usually they are just dedicated fans. Racy says that the “samiʿah can 
be viewed as an in-group.”68 These audience dynamics also appeared in the rap concerts I 
am concerned with here. Asked if he noticed characteristics particular to rap audiences, 
the owner of a music venue in Ramallah responded thusly: 
A rap audience is different, specific. [They are] more of a community. 
People come in a group, like maybe ten of them and they know each other 
well. Audiences of other bands are more spread out. [In a rap concert], 
there will always be the first two rows, full of loyal listeners. They’ll 
always be there, and you’ll see them in all the rap concerts. And then the 
rest of the audience… they’re varied.69 
 
In these recollections, the owner recognizes the presence of a specialized listening 
crowd within the general public at rap concerts. Importantly, he offers that the 
presence of the samiʿah is unique to rap concerts among the other genres of music 
(rock, jazz, DJ parties) that he hosts in his venue. 
                                                
66 Racy adds: “the ability of the samiʿah to listen and feel is manifested in a culturally established 
vocabulary of gestures, facial expressions, body language, and verbal exclamations, that all 
express their genuinely felt tarab sensations…[their behavior]…forms basis for meaningful 
performer-listener interactions.” (Ibid., 41.) 
 
67 Racy writes that the samiʿah “may either cluster together as a substantial constituency in a small musical 
gathering or may be ‘sprinkled’ as individuals or small ‘pockets’ of individuals within large audiences as 




69 Sami Said, co-owner of Beit Aneeseh, now Radio. Interview with the author, December 7, 2014, 





Racy argues that tarab induced by this listening is impermanent; tarab lasts a few 
moments or, at most, a portion of an evening: it is transient, fleeting. The effects of tarab 
may include disruption of the perception of time: seemingly speeding up or slowing 
down its passing. Predominant among the sensations aroused by tarab is the sense of 
empowerment it induces –physically, musically, emotionally, causing reactions, 
performances, or expressions that may not otherwise be typical. Significantly these felt 
sensations connect audiences to each other. As Racy, leaning on the qanun player Amin 
Fahmi expands, “listeners experience an elative sense of surrender, a feeling of 
communitas that… binds them together as citizens of the tarab nation.”70 Indeed, this 
phenomenon – where an individual, subjective sensation encourages the “imaginative 
awareness of others” evokes the spatialized subjectivity proposed by Massey and Gatens 
and Lloyd, with which I opened this chapter. What are we to make of the proposition of a 
“tarab nation”?  
Perhaps most compelling to me in the characteristics Racy ascribes to tarab is its 
conceptual elusiveness – that is, tarab is not partial to a particular ideological expression 
or belief. It is surely tied to the lyrical expression involved, but it need not depend on the 
articulation of a particular political project. Racy suggests that tarab is “an ethos that is 
felt rather than something that is merely conceived or visualized.”71 Further, neither is the 
emergence of tarab tied to a specific emotion or affect. Racy takes great care to 
emphasize the distinction of tarab from emotion-specific descriptions of sentiments or 
                                                
70 “Tarab nation” is Racy’s phrase, extrapolated from the following quotation from Amin Fahmi: “When I 
used to listen to the Shaykh [Zakariyya Ahmad] as he sang and acquired saltanah in his singing, I always 
imagined that he was an uncrowned king…he took control of his listeners and captured their senses… They 
would look up to him with exaltation and reverence, as if they were the subjects of a nation whose name is 
tarab” (qtd. in Racy, Making Music, 124). 
 





feelings.72 Instead, echoing statements from his own interlocutors, he asserts “al fann 
ihsas” or, “art [music in this case] is feeling.” Differentiating it from both sentiment and 
emotion, Racy explains that this feeling “is best interpreted as something resembling… 
the concept of ihsas… [which] stands for “feeling” (rather than ‘feelings’ in the plural) 
and is not committed to any particular emotional or sentimental profile.”73 Ihsas as he 
identifies it, and as it means in Arabic, means something closer to a physical sensation, a 
feeling. And it is this meaning that I also want to invoke when I propose the phrase 
“feeling politics” as a methodology for the political ethnography of subcultural 
production. But before moving on to address this proposal, I want to return to the 
subjective yet interrelational aspects underscored in the presence of tarab as active 
listening, to the ideas of communitas that may be engendered by the emergence of tarab. I 
will do this via a detour, however, to address the some cultural assumptions invoked by 
this framework. 
Racy notes that Arab audiences’ emotional responses to live musical 
performances captivated the interest of eighteenth and nineteenth century Western 
observers of the Arab world. He points to the orientalism that allowed observers like 
Guillaume Andre Villoteau to comment on Egyptians’ “bizarre display of passion.” 74 
Racy argues that it is orientalism that allowed these authors to postulate about the 
emotional, hysterical, or childish essence of Arabs based on behavior that, in comparison 
to British, French, and German norms in concert etiquette, seemed quite alien. In 
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deepening an understanding of tarab from the perspective of both scholar and performer 
of the genre and the affective condition associated with it, Racy takes great pains to 
distance himself from even twentieth century ethnomusicological studies. He deplores 
claims like Rouget’s, for instance, that the Arab listener 
is encouraged by his upbringing to cultivate this emotion, sharpen it, 
exacerbate it as it were, and not only give it free expression but make it 
explode, and express this explosion in the most spectacular way.75 
 
Racy is right to point out that this type of analysis, despite being frequently fronted by 
explanations that seem to deny cultural essentialism, nonetheless perpetuates it. Rouget’s 
efforts preceding this passage only shake a bias about an “innate Arab temperament” to 
place it instead on an Arab “sociocultural phenomenon”: 
It is indeed hyperesthesia that is involved, it seems, at least relative to 
what we late-twentieth-century Europeans see as the norm. But to what 
should be attribute it? I trust everyone will agree we cannot see it as some 
natural and innate quality of the Arab temperament. We are clearly dealing 
with a sociocultural phenomenon (even though one could just as easily 
interpret our relative indifference to music as resulting from a veritable 
form of anesthesia of our musical sensibility; in which case this would 
then be our culturally specific characteristic).76 
 
Whether the “sociocultural phenomenon” is “ours” or “theirs” makes no difference, the 
essentializing function remains.77  
 It would be a great shame if my proposal to apply an interpretation of tarab to 
audience dynamics in Arabic rap were interpreted as an invitation to understand these 
audiences or these performers, the politics that seem to be in process, their lyrical 
expression, or their behavior otherwise as particularly “emotional.” My proposals in this 
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chapter of “feeling politics” and recognizing tarab in order to do so are not an attempt to 
orientalize my interlocutors or to understand their politics as either hysterical or innately 
emotional. I should think that the concept of tarab in music and in audience behavior – as 
a way of understanding feeling aroused by performance and as analyzing how music is 
felt – could be a productive tool of analysis in a number of cultures and performance 
styles. I see no reason why it cannot be applied to some forms of hip hop elsewhere, 
especially hip hop resembling the early political roots of US hip hop (see for example, 
Sotusura’s recollections, above). As should be clear in my differentiation of “hype” and 
music that “fills the head” neither is this proposal of tarab as performance analysis an 
invitation to haphazardly apply it to every instance in which one discerns 
audience/performer call and response. Rather, if I am successful, my attempts here to 
unseat the phenomenon of tarab from the genre with which it has recently been associated 
in ethnomusicological literature should be a productive theoretical and methodological 
move for the study of other types of performance. The framework of tarab seems to me 
more attached to the nature of some live performance than any cultural essence. My 
intention in using the term is to attempt to adapt – and to introduce into English discourse 
no less – a concept of Arabic musical theory and listening analysis to the discussion of 
contemporary live performance. Tarab is just as valid a framework of performance 
analysis for these live events as any number of other models of spectatorship touted in 
recent years.  
 The analysis of political space I elaborated in the first section of this chapter 
culminated in the proposal to “spatialize subjectivity.” By this I meant recognizing the 




felt sensation of the body and its proximity or distance to other bodies. I pointed to theory 
building on Spinoza’s work that suggests that it is only through the felt body that we 
imagine others. Rap concerts are rife with these processes of feeling. As performances of 
live music, they are ideal events within which to elaborate further this conceptualization 
of self and other through the analysis of performance. On the philosophical importance of 
recognizing the felt experiences of listening to music, Judith Becker writes: 
 [W]e experience music with our skins, with our pulse rates, and with our 
body temperature. To subscribe to a theory of musical cognition which 
cannot deal with the embodiment of music, of the involvement of the 
senses, the visceral system, and the emotions is to maintain a Cartesian 
approach of mind/body dualism.78 
 
Building from this, I suggest that offering an analysis of Arabic rap that does not consider 
the felt experience of listening to it, is to relegate its analysis to the traditional study of 
music as text (whether lyrics or beats), and to confine a study of the politics therein to the 
rational workings of logic (the mind), as opposed to the materially felt experience of 
interacting with others in space (the body). It is indeed to continue to perpetuate this 
dualism. 
 How the music is felt is important. All the more so because, as I have been 
working to elaborate, the processes of an individual feeling the music herself are 
intimately intertwined with her processes of perception of the communities within which 
she can imagine herself. Earlier, I referred to Fahmi’s invocation of a “tarab nation” – or 
an imagined, ephemeral community in the presence of tarab during live concerts. This 
concept points to something that is felt internally, communicated or shared with others, 
fleeting, and empowering. I also referred to literature on call and response which 
                                                




similarly can bring into being a feeling of community with its enactment. Central to the 
political significance that may be attributed to rap concerts as a result of the presence of 
tarab during them may lie in the sense of self in relation to other that it evokes.  
 Importantly this fleeting, empowering felt self in relation to felt others is unique 
from the models of audience rapport and communitas largely based on visual (as opposed 
to aural) stimulation offered of late by scholars of theatre and performance. Erika 
Fischer-Lichte’s autopoetic feedback loop for example, describes exchanges between 
performers and spectators in avant-garde performance practices since the 1970s.79 This 
concept applies to various performatic arrangements wherein the roles between spectators 
and performers are reversed (spectators act, performers watch or listen), community is 
generated, and intimacy and distance in the performance space is actively negotiated. 
Performances Fischer-Lichte considers do not represent community generation or 
intimacy, rather, “…they actually create instances of these processes. The spectators 
become actors and in so doing having an important effect on the course of the 
performance itself.”80 
 Significantly for my study, and especially for the analysis I offered in the previous 
chapter, all of Fischer-Lichte’s examples require quite spectacular behavior on behalf of 
the spectators in order to confirm their “transformation” into actors. Audiences of Marina 
Abramovic’s Lips of Thomas moved to stop the performance itself, covering the artist 
with their coats as she lay crucified upon blocks of ice. Similarly, some of those who 
attended Joseph Beuys’ action in 1964 at the University of Technology in Aachen, 
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stormed the stage and punched the artist until he bled from the nose. Taking an example 
from music, attendees to David Tudor’s 4’33” audibly and vociferously voiced their 
disapproval, shouting and throwing things onto the stage when the pianist sat in silence, 
refusing to play a single note. The feedback loop Fischer-Lichte indicates as 
transformative is, in the examples she presents, categorically manifest in quite 
spectacular behavior on behalf of those audiences supposed to be passive. The passive 
spectator becomes active through the manifestation of spectacular behavior. This is 
precisely the problematic theoretical cul-de-sac I identified in the previous chapter. When 
we locate political activity in the behavior of individuals who act out, we are perpetuating 
the need for apolitical, passive activity, from which only a few gestures can emerge as 
politically significant. While this celebrates some individual choices, it actually 
necessitates the continuation of “apolitical” behavior, against whose background some 
gestures appear transformative. 
 The interactions I am talking about when tarab emerges in rap concerts also point 
to the reality that live performance is co-conceived, or at least dependent on a live 
audience. However, the reactions that rappers are going for are not the spectacular 
transformations from passive actors into active spectators, which Fischer-Lichte talks 
about. As the DJ Dakn told me, “It’s energy going back and forth, you play with it, it’s 
like soccer.” Or as the Syrian rapper Bu Kolthoum put it,  
At the base it’s about energy. I grab a stone of energy and throw it at them 
[the audience], and I’m waiting for a response. I throw a spark, like they 
say. The response they give me allows me to respond again with 
something stronger. It gets me higher, higher, higher, and this lets them 
come with me on this trip. If I get to a very high spirit, I know 100% that 





Contrary to some theatrical presumptions about the passivity of the spectator, rappers 
assume their listeners are already active, it is about bringing them “on the trip,” in order 
to feel the music. Audience reactions are about communication, presence, and feeling, not 
the transfer or transformation of subject positions. Dakn again: 
Sometimes when I’m spitting verses, I close my eyes. But within the first 
four lines you can notice what’s happening in front of you. And from there 
it becomes clear if the listeners are political, or if they’re not into arts, or 
into whatever… from their feedback I can tell if they know what’s going 
on. I can also tell if they understood me but it wasn’t satisfying enough for 
them [in that case] that means I need to work on myself. You also have to 
build from one concert to the next.  
 
The importance on feeling (as opposed to vision) is made so clear in these remarks, 
where Dakn admits in four lines he can tell what’s happening with his eyes closed. The 
goal is feeling this proximity or distance, and the satisfaction or dissatisfaction from it, 
not the agitation or provocation into a certain type of action, or any spectacular behavior. 
In fact, the emphasis on correct forms of listening, implied in all these interlocutors’ 
reflections, suggests that the radical transformations of the position of listener/performer 
would not be welcome. As evidenced in these recollections, audience reactions not only 
let him know his weaknesses, but if the audience even “knows what’s going on.” Dakn is 
referring here to a definitely understood framework of behavior, within which 
comprehension and communication can also not be faked.81 Within this understanding of 
audience-performer interactions, the goal is in fact not to be spectacular or to produce 
spectacular behavior outside the understood framework, but to recognize and feel the 
presence of those present. This points to an understanding of the act of listening as 
                                                
81 Judith Becker elaborates at length about negotiations of “believability” in trance (Becker, Deep Listeners, 
30-32); and Racy discusses the sincerity of audience reactions in depth in the context of tarab listening 




always already active; one needn’t catalyze a spectacular gesture in order to overcome an 
inherent passivity. 
 When asked if tarab exists in rap concerts, most performers confirm its presence. 
The great majority of the MCs I interviewed positively related the presence of tarab – or 
particularly charged exchanges with their audiences – in concerts as a central part of the 
value of the live concert itself. In cases where musicians and audiences affirm powerful 
exchanges of feeling but hesitate about whether or not to call it tarab, the value placed on 
tarab-like exchanges is still high, pointing to the primary machine of pleasure in rap 
concerts, for both performers and listeners. The hesitation about whether or not to call 
these sensations tarab in rap concerts may come from the discomfort with what seems 
like an anachronism, applying a classical term to contemporary performance. Other 
times, it may come from the reality that many listeners of Arabic rap also listen to and 
enjoy the classical tarab. The patterns of listening to the latter (and frequently the 
company within which one finds oneself when doing so) are markedly different from the 
patterns of listening to the former. Most notably because classical tarab concerts are now 
somewhat rare in these cities, listening to this music will likely be confined to the home 
or the home of a friend, playing or replaying familiar recordings, the extent and depth of 
whose satisfaction is largely familiar. In most ways these jalsat [gatherings] will be quite 
different from the rap concerts I describe below: in terms of audience, in terms of affect, 
and in terms of energy. For some, I think that makes also describing the interactions in 
rap concerts as tarab difficult to accept. 
 My goal is to make a convincing case for why tarab can be applicable to rap 




between listeners and performers. For a moment, however, I want to indulge a brief 
digression into content, in order to explore the political potency of these feelings and 
sensations. While I have been using standard translations of tarab as ecstasy, trance-like, 
and so on, at a very basic level, tarab means “agitation” or “movement.” To be affected 
by tarab in a musical context like the ones I discuss here, means to be moved by the 
music. Al-Ghazzali tells us that the subject of the medieval songs that moved listeners in 
his time was the love of God. It is for that reason that al-Ghazzali’s treatises are on the 
proper forms of listening: how to be moved (and how not to be moved) by the love of 
God. In twentieth-century tarab, Racy suggests the subject of most tarab music was 
heterosexual love: sweet hearts, forbidden love, slighted love, betrayal, alienation. He 
offers that the development of some lyrics about camaraderie, friendship, and drinking 
can be traced back and occasionally conflated with love of God. Regardless, we can 
imagine al-Ghazzali’s shock (can we not?) at the secular, profane, and perhaps much 
more explicitly erotic nature of the lyrical longing in twentieth century tarab in 
comparison to that of the twelfth century, in which he wrote.  
A great number of contemporary rap lyrics also deal with longing – not for a 
sweetheart, for God, nor (explicitly) for camaraderie and drink – but rather for any 
number of things taken, lost, missing, or otherwise non existent. While not taking a lover 
as the subject, many, many Arabic rap lyrics articulate sentiments of betrayal, of 
spurning, or deceit. Most powerful pieces articulate some form of alienation – from self, 
from immediate community, from international understanding — that may be the result 




are not articulated in an affective register we associate with love-lust or despair, much of 
it, I think clearly fits a mode of longing.  
It is perhaps for this reason that twentieth-century tarab sampling works so well in 
contemporary Arabic rap. Consider a track I will discuss at length in the Ramallah 
chapter: Ramallah Underground’s “Khaleeni ʿAyeesh” [“Let Me Live”]. The track opens 
with a sample of Oum Kulthoum singing a line from her piece “Amal Hayati” [“Hope of 
my Life”]. Oum Kulthoum’s piece is about a love affair that is ending – khaleeni ʿayeesh 
is a plea to be allowed one more day in the company of her beloved. Her refrain takes on 
a very different meaning sampled under Boikutt’s verses. The phrase “khaleeni ʿayeesh” 
sung between verses about the impossibility of resistance (and the hypocrisy of the 
diaspora) still literally means ‘let me live’ but here it is directed at the forces of the 
Occupation as well as political discourse about what one should and shouldn’t do under 
Occupation. The lyrics I excerpted in this dissertation’s introduction “I try to forget but 
politics pulls at me/ I tell her let go, I’m not interested/She tells me I’m a part of your life 
you won’t be able to resist me,” also by the Ramallah Underground, similarly position 
political struggle as a tiff between lovers (not least of which is evident in the 
anthropomorphism of “politics” as a woman). There are dozens and dozens of examples 
of this politicized longing and frustration in the work of the musicians I deal with here. 
This affective articulation of desire, betrayal, or slighting in an overtly political 
context (Occupation, corruption, diaspora, etc.) should not be confused with pieces in 
which rappers directly address the subject of love or romantic partnership, a growing 
subgenre. This subject, which is a favorite suggestion among journalists, enthusiasts, or 




interest and growth. But this is not what I am referring to.82 I do not want to associate the 
powerful tarab I think can exist in rap performance with individual songs that discuss 
love. I am rather talking about an affective mode of longing when the topic is not overtly 
romance.  
It seems to me that the jump from longing for a lover to the longing for some 
political alternative, the end of Occupation or colonialism, or another becoming, not yet 
arrived, is not that dissimilar from the jump in subject matter from the love of God in the 
twelfth century to the love of a lover that dominated tarab listening in the twentieth. If 
tarab can be equally found in lyrics addressing both of these subjects, it may surely 
structure the longing for neither a specific, omnipotent power, nor a specific, unattainable 
lover. Tarab can also be manifest in the longing for something politically evasive and as 
of yet unattained. Similarly, someone else expressing that longing can relieve the 
pressure felt on the individual listener. 
For example, Rouget takes from al-Ghazzali the example of a woman taken by 
her husband far from her homeland. One day when she is off to gather water, she hears 
someone singing about their own homesickness. The woman is so moved by the music 
she faints and dies. This is an (rather extreme) example of being moved by the music, or 
feeling tarab. This anecdote highlights how the feeling of homesickness was already 
present in the woman, but the surprise of hearing someone else articulate it, and set to 
music, brought that feeling out and moved her to (in this case a rather dire) ecstatic 
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climax. Nonetheless, this tarab still relieved her (one might say) of the painful feeling of 
being far from home.  
Listeners of Arabic rap similarly point to a release when they listen to specific 
pieces. If we were to follow the framework of resistance we are so eagerly told should 
exist in this genre, it seems at the very least the anger articulated by performers in their 
lyrics (rage, I was told more than once) should translate to the audience, inspiring them to 
pick up rocks, and make revolution – or whatever artistic “resistance” is meant to 
catalyze. On the contrary, however, most listeners affirm they feel relieved or relaxed 
after having attended a rap concert. DJ Sotusura offers his reflections having watched 
audiences for over a decade: 
This guy on stage relieved them. He said everything that was on their 
minds so they relax. They don’t come out of the concert, “let’s break 
shit!” I think rather they come out of it feeling like, “wow this was good 
for my soul to hear someone say what I can’t say.” 
 
This points to the pleasure in tarab listening during rap just like during classical tarab or 
the medieval example. Similarly, audiences of Oum Kulthoum did not exit her concerts 
heartbroken and weeping. Rather, even if there is heartbreak at play within the individual 
drama – indeed especially if this is the case – the musician pulls out and relieves the 
longing via the emergence of tarab. My suggestion is that the same can be true whether 
the subject of longing is the singular God, a specific lover, or an abstract politics. This is 
why I think it valid, for political analysis no less, to engage with an analysis of tarab in 
rap concerts. This relief felt together in the presence of the MC’s articulated expression is 




At the same time, this is not the same effect Augusto Boal writes of when laying 
out the politics of Aristotelian catharsis.83 When Boal writes about how Aristotle’s 
“coercive system of tragedy” functions, he argues that disruptive politics are purged from 
the body politic via their representation on the stage in this kind of play-making. The 
audience leaves the theatre less likely to confront the fates because Oedipus has done so. 
The protagonist’s indulging his own hubris leads the spectator not to want to do the same. 
This is not the same kind of catharsis I identify.84 The feeling of tarab I am talking about 
can be empowering, and thus politically potent, while it provides relief. As I mentioned, 
this feeling stems from the felt sense of self in relation to others. This relief is not 
catharsis in a lesson received from the performer or his or her message. It is a felt 
confirmation of not being alone, of feeling self in relation to others, of feeling longing 
with others. To understand this relief, its tarab-ness as it were, is to acknowledge longing 
and relief simultaneously – this is the impact of the “emotional blending” I will address 
shortly. 
 There is a final note about emotion as reflected in longing and with regards to the 
Arab context to be mentioned here before moving on to see how this model differs from 
other discussions of politics in Arabic music and rap. I affirmed above that Arabs are not 
more emotional than other groups of people, neither is “their” political articulation more 
hysterical, hot-headed or otherwise prone to feeling than that found elsewhere. In specific 
ways, however, the political history of the Arab world today is marked by loss, and this 
loss is outwardly recognized as such in ways that the political defeat of progressive forces 
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elsewhere on the planet is not. The continued presence of the Israeli Occupation, the still 
felt defeats of the wars with Israel of the previous century, the failure of pan-Arabism, 
and in the past ten years the devastating counterrevolutions in Libya and Egypt, the rise 
of fundamentalism and ISIS, and the recent occupations and divisions of Syria and Iraq 
mark Arab political reality today with an inescapable sense of loss. This loss is much 
different, both affectively and to the extent to which it is felt and accepted, than the felt 
decline of “the Left” in Western Europe and North America, or the millenial “malaise” 
we are constantly being told is disturbing the youth in the US. It is not that Arab politics 
are inherently emotional or that Arabs are inherently political, it is that political history at 
this moment in this region is – I think it is safe to say – and perhaps especially among this 
generation of 18-35 year olds, felt to be full of failure and defeat. The anger and longing 
that emerges in some tracks of Arabic rap is tied to this material, political reality.  
 
Revolutionary song in the Arab world 
 
 The conceptualization of feeling in rap concerts I am elaborating here allows for 
an analysis that other studies of the political valences of Arabic music have not be able to 
access. Political study of Arabic music – whether or not they revolve theoretically around 
a notion of resistance – has most typically been conducted in an analysis of song as 
political vehicle. While genres and particular singers are recognized for their proximity to 
politics or their manipulation to political ends85 and genres are recognized as part of 
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political and cultural life, musicological readings, in depth lyrical analyses, and 
discussion of politics in music have regularly been analyzed through individual, iconic 
songs.86 This attention has produced a veritable repertoire of Arab political song in the 
twentieth century, where the influence of cultural forms like the dabkeh, political 
movements like Nasser’s state-led socialism, and general changes like the advance of the 
video-clip influenced the development of music within which individual songs became 
prominent classics.87 Recent work on politics in Arabic rap music has continued in this 
vein, highlighting particularly popular tracks as new anthems for the rising generation.88 
It is worth noting that this critical attention on political song has perhaps 
disproportionately focused on Palestinian artists or Palestinian subject matter, considering 
the centrality of the Palestinian question in regional Arab politics. (Or, at least, the 
centrality of the Palestinian question in Arab politics as perceived by an international 
audience. Local political questions have always outweighed the regional ones, in the 
Arab world as elsewhere – to the great expense of the Palestinians, no less.) My emphasis 
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on tarab in performance rather shifts the focus away from the song as political vehicle 
and into deliberations of the political experiences of interacting during concerts.  
 This approach I am proposing, based in the recognition of the slow building of 
tarab, is also considerably different from most studies of the politics in “global hip hop.” 
Unlike much contemporary discourse about hip hop and rap in the US, rap outside of the 
US is much more readily associated with the early political roots of US hip hop and is 
almost always digested with an understanding of its political, if not “resistant”, potential. 
These political valences are often located within the social structure of rap production 
and consumption, in “empowering youth communities,”89 often associated with if not 
directly dependent on local economies of aid, NGO markets and cultural production, and 
international recognition thereof. Alternatively, politics may be located in the formation 
or expression of local, hybrid, or conflicting identity.90 These are different strains within 
the trend of postulations about rap as “resistance,” from which I hope my proposals here 
will allow my study to diverge.  
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Haflet rap  
 
 Like a piece of theatre, a religious ritual, a sporting event, or a government 
ceremony, haflet rap [a rap concert] is marked by social expectations that change for the 
different phases of the event, each understood by the participants.91 The features of this 
performance event and the behavior of its participants are similar enough in the three case 
study cities of this dissertation to be recognized, and yet unique enough to be set apart 
from the concerts of other genres of music and other performance events. In many ways 
the features of the rap concert are similar to those in rap concerts in venues with 
comparable numbers elsewhere in the world. Similar to Racy’s assessment of the tarab 
music event, which leans heavily on Victor Turner’s classification of the phases of a 
performance/ritual, I characterize the haflet rap here as having four phases.92 Breaking 
down the performance event as such is a way to systematically pay attention to the 
formation of tarab, and thereby to notice the motion and interaction between audiences 
and between performers and audiences in the concert space. In my case studies, my 
excerpts from field notes provide thick description that typically hone in on one particular 
phase within the concert itself. The observations that opened this chapter, during the 
concert at the Shrine, for example, focused on the “warming up” period, as explicated 
below. Breaking down the rap concert in this way allows for a more systematic tracing of 
the emergence of tarab. Alongside my descriptions, which are formed from participant 
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observation and informal conversations with anonymous audience members, are specific, 
recorded recollections from musicians. 
 Build up. The concert announcement happens online between two and ten days 
before the event takes place. It consists of circulation of a poster designed specially for 
the event online (usually on Facebook, either by the venue itself or by the individual 
performers).93 The poster displays a title for the event – usually not simply the musicians’ 
names, but a title for the event – an album name, or another conceptualization of the 
reason for this concert, ticket price if applicable, start time, venue, and the performers. 
This announcement is part and parcel of word-of-mouth communication. Not all 
attendees hear of the event through Facebook or social media. Audience and performer 
interactions begin in this phase, with audience’s enthusiastic assertions that they will 
attend, regrets that they cannot make it, questions about whether there is new material, 
and performer responses, including encouragements “not to miss it” and assertions about 
the one of a kind nature of the event. 
 Opening of the house. The time listed on the announcement is anywhere between 
one and two hours before the moment when the musicians first take the stage. Between 
the time listed on the event announcement and the emergence of the musician on stage, 
there is little or no music in the venue; house lights may be on, or lighting may still be in 
process; and the house is empty save the bartenders and other arriving guests (technicians 
may also be present). If the sound check has not happened, it may be in progress. The 
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musician may occasionally be visible passing through the venue (he or she may also be 
acting as technician). However, MCs are typically not there just “hanging out.” Boikutt 
explains: 
I like to be by myself before the show. That’s why I don’t like shows 
where there isn’t a backstage. I get uncomfortable. I end up outside in 
front of the crowd, and if I find myself talking to somebody I know for a 
while, then I get nervous. Because I end up not in my own energy, you 
know? My inner peace is distracted because that someone else will be 
talking to me about something else that doesn’t have anything to do with 
the show. I’ll be thinking about the first track and the second track. I need 
to sit and be thinking like this. So I like to be by myself. It doesn’t always 
work out. So I go to the bathroom a lot to be by myself. Sometimes I’ll do 
a little exercise in there if I can. If the bathroom is big enough I’ll do 
pushups, if it’s smaller I’ll do some stretches, so that my muscles can 
relax.  
 
While musicians prepare, audiences socialize. They may smoke, drink, or order 
food. They may even leave the venue to do so. Many are coming en route from 
somewhere else; almost all attendees come accompanied by or meet friends and 
acquaintances in the venue. Audiences do not know everyone present, but even if they do 
not come in a group, they are sure to meet people they know once there. Audiences greet 
each other from across the venue, move through the venue to meet each other, introduce 
each other to others, etc. The significance of this phase of the performance lies in its 
establishment of the social milieu in which the musical performance will take place. 
Significantly, happenings outside the venue frequently flow into the space during this 
time. This may include recent political events, or neighborhood drama, from the large to 
the minute. This phase allows the space in the venue to calibrate – expanding or 
retracting as necessary, in order to absorb the different navigations through the city which 




other before getting introduced to the performers. Performers also speak of it as a 
significant time in their own preparation to perform. 
 Warming the crowd. The first performer, MC, or set of musicians to take the stage 
are usually younger (in experience, and usually age) than the MC of primary billing. 
Their stage presence is less developed, appearing nervous, jittery, or overly confident. 
Usually an MC who is not performing (or who may perform a single number later in the 
evening) will introduce them, encourage them, and direct the audience’s attention to the 
stage. This attention may not be very focused at first. Audiences will largely still be 
socializing and arriving, paying attention sporadically, or at the culmination of a 
particularly compelling track or refrain. Even during this period, however, committed 
fans or listeners in the audience – they may be friends, family, or just followers – of the 
less experienced MC will be listening astutely and will facilitate directing audience 
attention to the stage. This may take the shape of cheering “aiwa!” [right on!] and 
clapping after significant passages or at the end of tracks. Hearing these cheers, 
especially in the middle of a piece, encourages audience members who may be unfamiliar 
with the young MC, or engaged in socializing to direct their attention to the stage. Not 
everything is encouraged uncritically. Passages that are poorly delivered or poorly written 
will be politely ignored, as audiences turn back to conversation and refreshment, 
applauding more or less when cued by the hosting MC. This phase, while its energy 
doesn’t compare to the following phase, is important for several reasons. First, it gives 
younger performers the valuable stage experience they need while introducing them to a 
largely still unfamiliar fan base. Second, it facilitates a transition from the energy of the 




This is the most experimental of the phases of the performance event, where less 
experienced performers try out themselves and their work, and where audiences feel out 
the kind of evening coming up. There is generally a progression of performers, leading to 
the most prominent name(s), again introduced by a well-known MC. This MC also works 
to focus audience attention, starting a sort of question-response. Joking is usually at a 
pleasant minimum, though the MC may show his or her charm, often exhibited in a kind 
of big-sibling mode, in anecdotes about the performers, for example. Venues may also 
play with the lights during this phase, gradually darkening the house further and lighting 
the stage more. Digital projections may begin intermittently; foot lights or spotlights may 
be introduced.  
 The heat. The boundary between this phase and the previous one can vary but one 
can be sure it has arrived when the overwhelming focus of energy in the venue is between 
the stage and the first two or three rows of people, standing, crowded up against the 
stage. It is frequently initiated by the request of an MC known to the audience to “come 
closer.” Where requests like “I need your energy,” “Where are you?” “What are you 
sitting for?” “You want me to sing and dance for you?” are not uncommon. These 
sarcastic jibes at the audience by the performing MC point to an understanding that the 
work of the performance is shared, and that without the focus and presence of the 
audience, the MC will not be able to perform. Boikutt explains: 
For me to be on stage, holding the mic, and people are seated, far from 
me, where I can’t get the body language from them: that’s very difficult. I 
don’t have fun in the show and I don’t feel like I’m connecting with the 
audience. 
 
This phase also builds gradually, usually from this request to come closer to a 




complex, as well as most succinct and powerful political expressions, that also happen to 
be the best known by the audience. This is not to suggest that these are refrains familiar 
to all the audience, but that they are better known than others. Talented MCs are able to 
play with surprise in this phase because there is something to contrast with – that is, a 
new verse, refrain, or other introduction or substitution may appear new in contrast to 
what the audience already is familiar with: something that is difficult with newer 
material. Syrian rapper Bu Kolthoum notices the presence of this phase in a particular set 
of gestures: 
The reactions I see are always [from listeners in] the first and second row, 
after that I’m kind of blind to the rest because of the light. I see their lips 
moving with the track. And I feel it when I deliver [islekh] a punch line 
and everybody’s like oohhhh! [he puts his hands on his temples].94 This 
body language by itself has a big effect. This is satisfying to me. It means 
they understand what I’m saying. It means they understand the work 
musically because they love the music, and at the same time they 
understand the issue, they understand what I mean by this punch line 
(because we don’t speak in a very direct way [shekl mubashar] in Arabic 
hip hop).95 I know they understand because the sound from the audience 
feels like the place is going to explode.  
 
It is in this phase and interactions like these that the tarab present in the performance is 
most obvious. Performers speak of temporarily losing consciousness, of a feeling of 
being high (that is not drug-induced), riding the energy in the performance space, 
becoming something else, and arriving at a more complete realization of the work. 96 
                                                
94 Islekh means “slaughter” or “butcher.” Bu Kolthoum is using slang to descriptively relate how he is 
“killing it” or how he powerfully delivers a punch line. “Deliver” here as a translation is woefully 
inadequate, but “slaughtering” or “butchering” a punch line in English would convey messing it up, not 
“killing it.” Hence, I settle for this rather tame translation with the Arabic in parentheses. 
 
95 He means he is content when his listeners understand the metaphors in his lyrics. When he says 
expression in Arabic hip hop is “not direct” he is underscoring its poetic value, the importance of playing 
with words, imagery, and symbolism, and relating ideas in a nuanced way. 
  
96 Few of the performers I spoke with admitted to using drugs while or before performing. As for alcohol, 




Audiences may exhibit elements of trance behavior: the ceaseless flowing of the body or 
of the head in rhythm with the music, seemingly involuntary exclamations, or other 
exhibits of elation. During this phase of the performance the venue almost without 
exception becomes unbearably warm, regardless of the season outside. If smoking is 
permitted inside (and often even if it isn’t), the smoke in the room becomes thick. If there 
is a dominant mood conjured by the music or the musician, or by the effect of both on the 
audience, be it enthusiasm, aggression, distaste, confrontation, or otherwise, it becomes 
pronounced in this period. When I speak of a political feeling in rap performances, I am 
talking about the energy sustained in some events during this phase. During this phase, 
the multivaried elements of the performance, performer and audience, are flowing into a 
more cohesive energy. It is this that I refer to as tarab in these performance events. 
 Cooling. Concerts frequently culminate with a finale or series of them. Return for 
a formal “encore,” popular in other genres of musical performance in these cities, is 
usually skipped in rap concerts, or else it is nodded to by a symbolic gesture. When the 
performers have finished, the concert is definitively over and the performance space 
usually empties quickly. This is often mandated by the heat in the room; “cooling” 
frequently takes place outside the performance venue, or at least away from the stage, 
                                                                                                                                            
playing music also appears in the testimonies of my interlocutors. Most artists I spoke with talk of needing 
heightened concentration in order to perform well, despite having experimented with alcohol or marijuana 
in performance contexts. Even if artists do imbibe alcohol while performing, none credit it for the feeling of 
elation during performance. On the other hand, some musicians prefer performing in venues that sell 
alcohol. They consider that the presence of alcohol among the audience sometimes allows for more of a 
release of audience energy and reactions the performers seek. As Al-Nather puts it “it’s way more difficult 
to get people into our music if they’re not sincere. If there is peer pressure. Any kind of social pressure. It’s 
difficult because we’re not socially accepted. I think we can easily get people ‘tarab-ed’ if they’re 
completely honest with themselves. Alcohol helps with this.” Boikutt concurs: “It’s not that I prefer [there 
to be alcohol], it’s that I prefer that people be relaxed and comfortable and giving real responses. If they 
can do that without alcohol, great, but up to this point I don’t really see that happening without alcohol. So 






where audiences and performers can smoke, wait for rides, and otherwise dissipate into 
the evening. This phase, which may differ in length for individual participants releases 
the energy accumulated between the stage and house in the previous phase. It returns 
participants to the secular social mode with which the event began, coming down from 
the transformative tarab or elation which marked the previous phase. Rapper Bu 
Kolthoum describes his feelings after a concert:  
When I come off the stage afterwards, I’ll be trembling. I don’t know why. 
I come out of the event the feeling mkhaddar, zero, energy at zero, I mean 
no anxiety, no energy to try anything else. Zero thoughts. In my brain 
there will be nothing. I’ll be exhausted, but super relaxed. I come off the 
stage like a guy who’s let everything out [fashesh khilqho w khalas]. I 
come out of the stage like… like someone who’s been imprisoning 
something and just let it out. I come out like someone who was thirsty and 
has drank [ʿatshan w shereb]. I’m very “relaxed,” calm [rayeq], “calm.”97 
 
Likewise the Palestinian rapper Haykal recounts coming down from tarab after a free-
styling session, or open jam: 
I am not really always focused on what I’m saying [when free-styling], 
sometimes it will be the beginning of an idea, and sometimes it’s like 
when [the prophet] Muhammad said biyji el wahi [inspiration comes to 
him] or like when TuPac says “I feel his hands on my brain, when I write 
rhymes I go blind and let the Lord do his thing.” You understand what I 
mean? Not literally. And it depends. But it happens especially when I’m 
free-styling. I lose it, I start talking, talking, talking. Most of the time I 
stop by just leaving. I go somewhere else, or I go for a walk, or I smoke a 
cigarette. Sometimes I laugh, sometimes I cry, I don’t care. It’s only about 
doing the energy. 
 
These testimonies point to a particular emotional release for the performer. Racy 
proposes the emotional “blending” to understand the affective exchanges in tarab 
dynamics.98 His attention to emotional blending in his construction of this feeling, 
                                                
97 Words in quotation marks originally spoken in English. 
 





something felt between joy and sorrow, between longing and satisfaction, between 
empowerment and submission, between anger and relief, pushes concepts of affect and 
feeling in a productive direction. Racy argues tarab consists of “transformative blending, 
or “the creation of new blends that are no longer identifiable in terms of their inner, 
mostly emotional, ingredients, or no longer emotional in the familiar sense.”99 In other 
words, tarab consists of emotional blending that is both individual and shared. It is 
subjective, but it requires certain conditions.100 Furthermore, considering its affective 
nature – the emotional blending Racy suggests is intrinsic to it – the presence of tarab 
points to the kind of simultaneous heterogeneity that I suggest is also a necessary 
characteristic of audiences themselves – a collection of “bodies with [different] 
momentums.” 
 
Feeling through space 
 
In this chapter, I have proposed paying attention to how tarab is built is a 
productive way to trace the development of feeling in rap concerts. I suggested attention 
to feeling and sensation as a way to consider the “multiplicity of things and relations” in a 
concert space. Specifically, I find this productive because it allows me to discern 
emotions not in succession to one another but simultaneously (anger and relief; elation 
and discomfort; etc.). The intrinsic “blending” in tarab points to the powerful political 
experience of complicated attachments to self and community, while its outward 
                                                
99 Ibid., 203. 
 
100 Racy offers: “The emotional impact of tarab renditions is subject to the listeners’ own interpretations, 




manifestations allow for a way to consider and analyze audience behavior and performer-
audience dynamics. 
This is the feeling part. The discussion of “through space” that follows combines 
this analysis inside the concert venue with an appreciation of the physical, urban space 
which audiences traverse in order to arrive at concert venues. I alluded to this 
conceptualization of political space in the first section of this chapter. I am now putting 
these two sections together: feeling through space is a two-part process, both are 
spatialized. First, I want to consider a spatial understanding of the live concert event: the 
venue, the neighborhood, from where audiences arrive and how they leave. Then, I want 
to consider the spatialized dynamics felt within the concert space – how the music is felt, 
how performers and musicians communicate, and the feelings that emerge in the space 
when they do. This is what I call feeling through space, and what I elaborate as feeling 
politics. 
In the case studies that follow, I document examples of feeling suspended 
between audiences and performer and/or other individuals in and around the performance 
space. I use performer and audience interviews to build an understanding of how tarab is 
built in different venues, at different moments, and with different audiences. Thus, I trace 
the development of tarab and its affective texture in different concerts and in the 
experiences of different musicians and fans. Importantly, my study and my use of tarab 
differs from traditional studies of tarab – I propose a qualitative documentation of its 
affective texture. This means I do not assume the same quality of tarab in all concerts, 
even while it is based on similar structure of expression (seemingly involuntary call and 




casual fans, and rapport with the performer). I am introducing a qualified study of tarab 
as audience-performer relation; suggesting that the affective blending sustained within 
the framework of tarab interactions points to processes of politics in motion.  
The ability to arouse tarab does not point to established political positions voiced 
with force, but to a combination of manner of expression, awareness, and feeling that is 
able to access the listener’s own politics in process. Its political potency lies in this 
combination of lyrical and affective delivery, which is primarily accessible in live 
performance, and the success of which performers gauge in their audiences’ responses to 
them. This potency is indecipherable, however, without an equally attentive appreciation 
of the materiality of concerts within urban space. So, my documentation of tarab feeling 
in rap concerts comes alongside a documentation of the changing urban space within 
which participants live and across which they traverse. 
Feeling politics means combining sensation of the individual body in relation to 
other bodies with an analysis of the material volume of space. This points to the 
heterogeneity of stories-so-far and a recognition, like Susan Leigh-Foster emphasizes, 
that bodies do not go through space the same way.101 I suggest this to be a framework for 
a political ethnography of subcultural production. With regards to the particular case 
studies examined here, I have proposed that this may be achieved by following the 
emergence of tarab in concert venues situated within changing city neighborhoods.  
Critically, the experiences during rap concerts need not necessarily lead to more 
egalitarian, less misogynistic societies, neither must they portend greater capacity for 
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communities to respond to or retaliate against oppressive power structures. They may 
occasionally be a part of larger, progressive social transformations. But they need not be 
in order to find significance in this study. This allows me to offer research that dissects 
city spaces and relations within them as they are lived: without projecting resistance on 
them before hand, or attributing radical significance to them afterwards. I see little reason 
to attribute to rap concerts a single, radical affect, or a single political experience. But, I 
do see plenty of reason to see these events as rich societal cross-sections, rife with 
politics in motion, the eventual state of whose outcome is far from clear.  
 
 
Imagining the researcher: Or, my body and I (also) move through space 
 
 
“Mind is the idea of body.”102  
 
In bringing this chapter to a close and as an opening towards the case studies that 
follow, the perhaps obvious fact that as a researcher I also had feelings and also moved 
through space deserves some attention here. In a way, the academic articulation of my 
location as a researcher is perhaps as much a formalized response to the constant probing 
of identity and trajectory that were asked of me by strangers, acquaintances, and 
interlocutors over the course of this research, as it is now an ethical requirement in the 
writing up of my findings. In my own mind, this probing of identity and place is only the 
latest chapter in a lifetime of negotiating space (and my “place”) between the US and the 
Arab world.  
                                                





I am an Arab-American woman who speaks Arabic with an accent that is not 
quite place-able: outside of Lebanon, the accent is presumed Lebanese; inside Lebanon it 
is decidedly not. It is Palestinian, Lebanese, and American. Above all it is broken, based 
on a phonetic understanding of the spoken language (ʿammiyeh). The Arabic I speak is 
prone to mistakes and mispronunciations not typical among literate adults, based as it is 
on aural exposure to the language since I was a child and very little formal instruction. At 
the same time, my relative ease with language offers me access I would not have 
otherwise. My familial identity (my name), my familiarity with local dialect, with 
patterns of joking and understanding, with social expectation, and with political 
expression initially open the doors to intimacy and trust with my interlocutors that I 
would have had difficulty opening under different circumstances given my own 
personality (increasingly introverted) and the emotional journey that accompanied this 
research. That said, I look more like my northern-European grandmother than the 
imagination of “Arab” by either Western or Arab interlocutors. And perhaps more 
pronounced than my physical features or the structure of my speaking, I grew up in the 
US. Living “abroad” has forced the recognition that I carry myself in a culturally specific 
way: the way I walk, the way I dress (in terms of style, not exposure of skin), how I hold 
my body, the eye contact I maintain or dislike, all mark me as “foreigner” whenever I 
travel in the Arab world.103 
The combination of these factors – the fact that I am quite obviously not “Arab” 
and quite obviously “Arab” at the same time – creates, I have been forced to notice, a 
kind of weird effect. Neighbors, police, salespeople, receptionists, waiters, busboys, 
                                                




bouncers, bartenders, baristas, and strangers consistently remark with surprise “that I do 
not look Arab” in the middle of conversation. Meanwhile, friends of friends are often 
eager to discern my “identity package” with tests of language or attempted readings of 
the way I pronounce certain words. These kinds of tests are not unique to my person (I 
witnessed them tried out on others constantly) and most frequently come in attempts to 
(quickly) understand where one is coming from, and (quickly) decide whether to 
establish or dispense with trust.  
I bother to mention all of this in an attempt to acknowledge perhaps some 
underlying exoticism that I carry with me unintentionally as a researcher, which is the 
product of hybrid upbringing. Asked to reflect on my position “in the field” (which is at 
the same time my only permanent home [in the case of Beirut], and where I “come from” 
[in the case of Palestine]), I have come to recognize that I frequently perform familiarity 
and difference at the same time. This can generate enthusiasm and curiosity that brings its 
own set of challenges and advantages as a researcher. 
In Palestine for example, in the middle of the 2014 Gaza war and its aftermath, I 
was overwhelmed by the amount of sharing – of intimate details, of personal histories – 
to which I was warmly (urgently?) made privy in Ramallah, within weeks (sometimes 
within minutes) of meeting people. I came to recognize that politics were often projected 
upon me: as a “Westerner,” I was frequently assumed to be tolerant, open-minded, not 
religious, but also that I probably did not yet understand the difficulties, complicities, and 
betrayals of NGOs nor the specificities of local politics. At the same time, without 
making too much out of it, my company may have seemed to feel comfortable and 




The significance of language in my own mind was highlighted by my frequent 
recognition in social interactions with friends in Ramallah, Amman, and Beirut, of shifts 
of trust and limitations on sharing when the conversation was entirely in Arabic versus 
when, in the presence of non-native speakers, it turned to English or French. (This is the 
case even though my interviews were conducted in all three languages.) That this 
research was conducted for the most part during a particularly violent period of the “War 
on Terror” should not be sidelined. Without exaggerating its significance (and quite 
understandably, no less, considering the disastrous fall-out of the huge influx of NGO 
workers and other expats), I frequently perceived a tangible distrust of foreign observers 
in the different Arab communities which I wove in and out of. The difficulty of the 
Arabic language – and the fact that still relatively few non-Arabs communicate 
effectively in local dialect – makes of the language both a security blanket within which 
speakers can feel at ease, and an easy barrier to stave off strangers, or at the very least 
with which to invert the conceived power dynamic between “the West” and the Arab 
world. 
The projection of familiarity upon my person through language or otherwise 
nevertheless in some cases profoundly unsettled me, in many cases because I had much 
less reason to feel either comfortable or familiar. One set of revelations about physical 
abuse in a romantic partnership in particular pushed me to the point of doubting the 
contours of what I was actually doing and forced me to reevaluate what it was I was 
hoping to theorize, or where I hoped my impact would be. Of course many researchers 




That I am a young woman who appears “unattached,” entering into what has been 
in my experience a predominantly male “scene,” has also been a significant part of my 
positioning within this research. My experience of it as such comes from several factors. 
Concert culture in the Arab world, as elsewhere, is first and foremost a social exercise. 
However, unlike New York for example, where a culture of music consumption and 
amateur listening is particularly cosmopolitan (indeed, where dilettante consumption of 
music is almost professionalized!), going to concerts alone in either Beirut, Ramallah, or 
Amman – as was absolutely necessary in my case upon arrival in each city – is a rather 
alien act, upon which, it should be noted, not terribly interesting or pleasant expectations 
attend. (This is not only a question of gender. A most welcome conversation near the end 
of my research with a rapper revealed his own experiences of hostility and confusion 
when he attends concerts alone, as work – whether it is to scope out a venue, or observe a 
colleague, etc.) My experience nonetheless of the scene as predominantly male, or as 
particularly charged with testosterone, comes from interfacing almost exclusively with 
men at concerts, most of the time not of my own volition, more often than not fraught 
with expectation and feigned confusion (“why so sad,” “why don’t you dance,” or if 
slighted, for example, “what, are you CIA?”), and all too frequently accompanied by 
intrusions into personal space brought on by the need to hear despite the sound system, 
and so on. There are of course women who consume this subculture, and as my stay in 
each city progressed, I met and, in all three cases, built or became part of friend groups of 
mixed gender where we exchanged and shared reflections, in the process of which 




my presence at a concert was obviously no longer solitary, and as such my being there as 
an observer or researcher was less noticeable – indeed it was probably invisible.  
The majority of musicians I interviewed were also male. Of course there are 
exceptions and of course I made an effort to include them in this study. That this music 
production is generally dominated by men should not be surprising, however. (I find 
attempts to declare otherwise problematic: the search for token female performers is often 
informed by the discourses of resistance I discussed in the previous chapter). Moreover, 
in this gendered context, this researcher’s desire for an “in” occasionally presented some 
confusing choices. It is perhaps not at all evident what “a PhD about rap concerts” could 
possibly mean outside of an academic context (see last remarks in this section), and I 
think it is fair to assume that in many cases I was initially presumed to be a naïve, eager 
fan, with the attending expectations about sexuality that this social grouping is frequently 
presumed to embody. I felt this in the way the girlfriends of musicians occasionally 
reacted to me, in the complete (or deliberate) lack of attention to social norms some 
invitations to meet up conveyed, and in the near constant appreciation for the 
professionalism and seriousness with which I was treating the work in question – often 
articulated with respect or surprise in the middle of or upon conclusion of an interview.  
While many anthropological or ethnographic researchers struggle with access to 
their interlocutors, in my case I was for a long time preoccupied – perhaps more than was 
necessary, though it did not feel so at the time – with structuring that access in order that 
I did not find myself in a position that would damage the reputation of the study. That 
said, I can assert (without surprise), that all of my in-person interactions with 




explain my study and as I built a reputation for myself over the years. The impact of 
words of respect from one musician to his colleagues cannot be underestimated 
(vouching for me, as it were), and as my study progressed I found it less and less 
necessary to find ways to iterate my seriousness (it was assumed) or (interestingly) to 
assert or articulate my identity, which I believe somehow became less relevant. 
My access to funds also clearly influenced my position in this research, in the 
most obvious way by getting me out of New York. At different times, I carried university 
funding, departmental support, NGO affiliation, or was part of a US government-
affiliated program. I eagerly sought all these types of funding for years and uncritically 
accepted all kinds of support when my applications were finally successful. Without 
them, the breadth (and certainly length) of this research would not have been possible. 
Funders variously did put stipulations on research projects and potential interlocutors. In 
my case, however, at no point did a funder’s delimitations effect whom I spoke with or 
where I saw music performed.  
However, to stop the consideration of how funding effects research positionality 
there would be to disregard how affiliation nevertheless marks a researcher. As I explore 
in the following chapters, the affiliation with NGOs or with the US government in my 
sites almost always carried with it a set of associations that were far from neutral. The 
words and names that conjure respect and prestige in some places can inspire very 
different associations in others. Knowing this, I nevertheless made it a point to try not to 
obscure the sources of my funding in conversation with my interlocutors (the publication 
online of my research affiliations I exercised more discretion over, for different reasons). 




politics that I came to understand were in some cases attached with them. In the best 
cases, being forthright about affiliation (unexpectedly, and pleasantly) became a way to 
further conversation about opportunity, strategy, and access, deliberations many of these 
musicians also share. I adapted my presentation of where and how I was coming to a 
given interview depending on with whom I was speaking.  
What most affected the locality of my research, however, and most relevant 
perhaps to the theoretical explorations in this chapter, was my material mobility as 
researcher through, around, and outside of each city. With the exception of the studios of 
Katibeh 5 in the camps of Bourj el Barajneh outside of Beirut, I confined my research 
(and myself as researcher) to the cosmopolitan centers of each city. That is, I have 
restrained my research to the districts where gentrification is most obvious, where the 
great majority of concerts are held. The most significant way in which the study is limited 
is thus in terms of class as it is reflected in the geography in each city. I spoke with 
musicians and audiences from across the economic spectrum. However, the physical 
space in question in this study is decidedly not the refugee camps around any of the three 
cities, nor the working-class neighborhoods of Dahiyeh (Beirut) or East Amman; it is 
rather the suburban sprawl of Masyoun (Ramallah), the bars and festivals of West 
Amman, and the pubs, clubs, and cafes of Hamra Street, Mar Mkhayel, Gemmayzeh, and 
Monot (Beirut).  
I am of course aware that rap concerts have taken place in refugee camps around 
all three cities. Unfortunately, none of these took place during periods while I happened 
to be in any of these cities. These concerts appear in the reflections of musicians and fans, 




hesitated to the point of abstention to postulate about the audience-performer dynamics in 
such events. Moreover, and this is as much a question of methodology as the study’s 
limits, I deliberately did not insist, as far as my capacity as a researcher was involved, on 
access outside the cosmopolitan centers of each city. Where I was invited, I humbly tried 
to follow, and learned much (as is the case with Katibeh 5). My interviewees come from 
and live in a variety of neighborhoods and represent the spectrum of economic class. 
Whenever possible, I tried to leave interview location categorically at the interviewee’s 
discretion. But where I was not invited or did not have established pretext via which I 
could enter spaces outside the center of the city (an introduction, an interview, or a 
concert), I did not – in my capacity as data-gatherer or recording observer – try to enter.  
This was a conscious decision based on my interpretation of what was appropriate 
considering the features of the performance of gender and identity just elaborated (how I 
am most frequently read by strangers), and what I set for myself to be the ethical limits of 
a project such as this one. I considered that attending concerts alone in West Amman, 
Masyoun, or Gemmayzeh to observe, to meet and talk with strangers, and to make 
connections to be a necessary part of my research. Trolling refugee camps to meet people 
or make connections I considered something else entirely. I considered it so despite 
knowing, thanks to the recollections of my interlocutors, that I may find other consumers 
and different frameworks for the consumption of rap in other neighborhoods. This 
decision for me was as much about ethics as it was about focusing research energy. The 
intrusion by “Western” researchers into the most downtrodden sections of each city, and 
the penetration of the most vulnerable populations by well-meaning cultural observers is 




interlocutors – and to which I had no wish to contribute. To put it another way, this 
choice of mine is marked by a refusal of trends in urban literature, what Massey calls 
“another form of eroticized colonization of the city…getting laddish thrills (one 
presumes) from rushing about dark passages.”104 Entering a refugee camp a handful of 
times would neither have given me the impetus to speak about the place or value of rap 
across the whole society (as so frequently happens in English language assessment of the 
genre!) or to pontificate about these neighborhoods in particular. I could have focused my 
project entirely on rap in a particular camp in each city, but doing so would mean I ignore 
most all live rap and hip hop, period, most of which depends on the cosmopolitan 
frameworks of the gentrifying city-centers. 
Thus, part of my research choices in this regard is an emphatic refusal to fetishize 
the most vulnerable populations as the most authentic. Part of this is to acknowledge the 
very limited populism in concert culture, so often assumed in the discourses of resistance 
discussed earlier, in this genre of cultural production. And part of this is to appreciate 
both the foreignness (to me) and density of each of these three cities, despite the months I 
spent in each, and the need to limit and focus my scope. If it is not already evident, 
however, narrowing the geographical scope of my research, even if it is in some ways 
marked by class as reflected in the topography of the city, does not mean that class drops 
out of the considerations I pursue in each chapter. Over the course of the remaining 
chapters, the class dynamics attached to a certain kind of cosmopolitan consumption 
should become obvious.  
                                                




A final consideration about my positioning as researcher may be a consideration 
of my belonging inside/outside hip hop culture itself. I do not consider myself a “hip hop 
head.” Style-wise I do not think I can be read this way, and I do not pretend to boast this 
cultural expertise, as much as I have tried to catch myself up in my research since 
beginning this project. My interest in el rap el ʿarabi was at first concerned with the 
performance of what was to me fascinating and extremely personal political expression in 
the wake of the most exciting political developments since 1968. My own history of 
exposure to hip hop (in any significant degree) is very recent, and almost entirely 
attached to trying to understand the development of the genre in Arabic. My practice of 
participant observation was/is never styled, consciously or otherwise, as a part of b-boy 
culture, or the other attending stylistic or expressive elements of global hip hop. Out of 
respect for the musicians whose work I appreciate, I never attempted my own raps or 
beats. I expect there will be readers who will find fault with the lack of “inside-ness” I 
could thus hope to boast as a researcher and consumer of the genre. But I have decidedly 
tried to “keep it (more) real” by not making pretensions about own “hip”-ness, or “hip 
hop”-ness, as it were – with my interlocutors and readers, both. 
The media fascination with performers of this genre has, for the most part, not 
been conducive to musicians taking writing about them seriously, or as serious work, or 
as stemming from serious interest or thorough study. It is my hope that I am able in the 
case studies that follow to respond to these musicians’ creativity and seriousness with the 






Chapter Three: Ramallah1 




My first aim in this chapter is to draw attention to patterns that have distinguished 
rap production in Ramallah over the past ten years from rap production in occupied 
Palestine in the decade that preceded it. This encourages me to recognize the emergence 
of a different mode of production and consumption of rap music since roughly 2006-
2007, what I propose to call a “second wave” of Palestinian rap. My second aim in this 
chapter is to explain how the production and consumption of the second wave functions 
politically. Following the theoretical elaborations I offered in the first and second 
chapters of this dissertation, I do this by tracing the emergence of tarab during second 
wave concerts. Having located the particular political feelings produced by this tarab, I 
then situate these dynamics in concert venues within the larger context of the city of 
Ramallah. This allows me to include a consideration of who is included and who is 
excluded in the production of this particular political feeling.  
 With few exceptions, most existing academic literature on Palestinian rap and hip 
hop understands Palestinian rap as an embodiment of the changing forms of youthful 
“initifada” and as an enactment of resistance against the Occupation. My research 
findings largely do not corroborate this narrative. I found that Palestinian rap today 
                                                
1 Research for this chapter was made possible by a June Bennett Larsen Alumni Research Grant, the 
Wenner Gren Foundation, and the Palestinian American Research Center (PARC). Thanks in particular to 





largely does not engage or (re)produce an ethos of intifada, uprising, revolution, or 
resistance. In the pages that follow, I explore how the material negotiations of concert 
makers and concert-goers continue to be political despite not being intifada or 
“resistance.”  
Exploring the political feeling in second wave rap concerts in Ramallah in my 
research quickly became less about finding a subcultural answer to the Occupation in rap 
concerts and more about comprehending one of the myriad ways in which life continues 
under it.2 The second wave of Palestinian rap can best be understood as an avant-garde 
musical subgenre whose consumers and producers are largely part of an “alternative” 
middle class in Ramallah. Initially, the politics of the second wave can be found in the 
ways in which they interrogate Palestinian politics by refusing the romanticism of 
traditional political narratives. Second wave rappers push on the contours of Palestinian 
struggle by refusing the politics of sumud [steadfastness], questioning the intentions and 
existence of international solidarity and the cohesiveness of the diaspora, and 
interrogating, sometimes irreverently, notions of authenticity or heritage [turath] and 
resistance [mouqawameh].  
In Chapter One, I pointed to the “putting into discourse” of resistance. There, I 
considered what calling cultural production “resistant” or “resistance” does. I asserted my 
interest in the production of power and knowledge that accompanies how artists are 
discussed. And I argued that the putting into discourse of cultural production as resistance 
                                                
2 I spent approximately five and a half months between July and December 2014 based in Ramallah. The 
period, marked as it was by the kidnapping and burning alive of Palestinian teenager Mohammed Abu 
Khdeir and the Israeli Defense Force’s bombardment of the Gaza Strip in “Operation Protective Edge,” was 
undeniably a very tense one across the West Bank and throughout Israel. These political events had 
important effects on my research in ways I could not anticipate. For example, there was much less live 





builds on specific racial imaginations. In this chapter, in addition to exploring briefly 
some of this racial imagination in existing literature on Palestinian rap in particular, I will 
explore how traditional narratives of Palestinian struggle build on specifically classed 
imaginations. I am concerned to pay attention to how second wave rappers represent the 
political and economic contradictions they observe and to how they refuse dominant 
political representations of Palestinian identity and struggle.  
As mentioned, much existing literature on Palestinian rap is keen to underscore 
the capacity of this cultural production for resistance. To do so, authors have framed 
these artists and their fans as part of an international youth “movement.” This latter is 
frequently understood as being virtually able to pull artists out of the Occupation.3 Others 
have framed Palestinian rappers as part and parcel of ongoing local activism,4 whose 
lyrics are envisioned as tools of physical struggle.5  
My hesitancy in this chapter to call these artists or the cultural content they 
produce “resistance” is encouraged by Ted Swedenburg’s ambivalence about the ubiquity 
of “the struggle paradigm” in Palestinian rap.6 More specifically, my concern is not only 
                                                
3 Sunaina Maira, “‘We Ain’t Missing’: Palestinian Hip Hop – A Transnational Youth Movement,” The New 
Centennial Review 8 (2008): 161-192; Caroline Rooney, “Activism and Authenticity: Palestinian and 
Related Hip-Hop in an International Frame,” in The Arab Avant-Garde: Music Politics Modernity, ed. 
Thomas Burkhalter et al. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2013) 209-228; Randa Safieh, “Identity, 
Diaspora, and Resistance in Palestinian hip hop,” and Janne Louise Andersen, “Transgressing Borders with 
Palestinian Hip Hop,” both in Palestinian Music and Song: Expression and Resistance since 1900, ed. 
Moslih Kanaaneh et al., (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2013): 69-81 and 82-96, respectively.  
 
4 Sunaina Maira, Jil Oslo:Palestinian Hip Hop, Youth Culture, and the Youth Movement (Washington, DC: 
Tadween Publishing, 2013). 
 
5 David McDonald, “‘Carrying Words like Weapons’: DAM Brings Hip-Hop to the West Bank,” in ibid., 
My Voice is My Weapon: Music, Nationalism, and the Poetics of Palestinian Resistance (Durham: Duke 
UP, 2013), 262-282. 
 
6 Ted Swedenburg, “Palestinian Rap: Against the Struggle Paradigm,” Popular Culture in the Middle East 
and North Africa: A Postcolonial Outlook, ed. Walid El-Hamamsy and Mounira Solimon (New York: 




that the location of “resistance” in second wave rap may be inaccurate – it directly 
contradicts the testimonies of my interlocutors – but also that this narrative of locating 
resistance makes it impossible to discern and evaluate the political deliberations and 
interactions that do exist and that are taking place. Asserting that Palestinian rappers 
enact resistance against the Occupation may obscure an analysis of the politics of rap 
production and consumption under it. In addition, I argue that the reach of this essentially 
avant-garde musical experimentation in live performance is very limited. The limits of 
populism in this concert culture needn’t be reason for its dismissal. After all, hundreds of 
studies have focused on contemporary and historical avant-garde art movements. In this 
chapter I want to testify to the aesthetic innovation and political experimentation in this 
genre while also acknowledging the exclusivity of its concert culture. This should only 
prove contradictory if we assume certain romance about political struggle or creative 
expression in the Palestinian context.  
My analysis of the deliberations and contradictions in my interlocutors’ 
testimonies has been markedly animated by Sherene Seikaly’s very recent book, Men of 
Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine.7 While dealing with a different 
time period than mine here, Seikaly compellingly lays out how the historiography of 
Palestinian choices since 1948 has almost exclusively been narrated in the academe 
against the backdrop of Zionist victories (I expand on my use of Zionism in this chapter, 
below). She argues this has led to characterizations of the middle class as consisting of 
                                                






either loyal nationalists or colluding capitalists.8 Moreover, the historical failure of 
Palestinian capital to defend its national interests (I explore neoliberalism in the context 
of the Occupied Palestinian territories, below) – today combined, I would argue, with the 
acceptance among the middle classes of more globalized forms of culture – has 
“embarrassed scholars” and pushed researchers away from studies with Palestinian 
middle class protagonists.9 This has not only led to what Keith Watenpaugh calls a 
“paucity of work” on the Arab middle classes, generally; in the case of Palestine 
specifically, Seikaly argues convincingly that this has closed off avenues to understand 
politics and strategies in formation.10 Viewing Palestinian capital – like that middle-class 
cultural and economic capital invested in alternative leisure like rap concerts – as 
necessarily either of the revolutionary vanguard that can lead the struggle against the 
Zionist Occupation, or part of a “comprador” class that colludes with it leaves very little 
room for understanding the complexity of Palestinian social fabric.  
I attempt in this chapter to illustrate some of the complexity of that social fabric. 
Moreover, to do so I lean on the theoretical discussion elaborated in Chapter Two. 
                                                
8 When narrating the middle class, Seikaly suggests that “Historians have used the divides between the 
comprador and authentic economic nationalist to explain late capitalism and the failure of the national 




10 Keith David Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and 
the Arab Middle Class (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2006), 18; qtd. in Seikaly, Men of Capital, 12. Christa 
Salamandra’s work has also countered this tendency to ignore upwardly mobile and “elite” Arab 
protagonists as worthwhile subjects of ethnographic research. In the conclusion of her work on new 
consumptive practices of upper classes in Damascus, she writes, “Elite social statuses are being redefined 
through new consumptive practices, as ways of life are transformed into lifestyles of the modern sort. Such 
processes are rarely discussed in literature on the Middle East, where it is assumed, despite evidence of 
rapid and profound social transformation, that the old urban notables still know who they are—and are 
known by everyone else—and have nothing to prove.” My research leans on her attention to classes with 
economic and political power in a different Arab, urban context. (Christa Salamandra, A New Old 





Spatializing an analysis of subjectivity under Occupation allows for a material and 
affective analysis of what these “avant-garde,” “middle class” political negotiations feel 
like. This is not to argue for their efficacy. It is to testify to their sensation. In my 
discussion of what I consider analysis-worthy politics in Palestinian rap today, I do not 
propose that my interlocutors invent and then embrace a radical, new politics. My 
proposed conceptualization of politics in Palestinian rap alludes to politics in process by 
considering the material, discursive, and affective navigations these artists and their fans 
undertake. 
 
Part One: The Ramallah Bubble 
 
 
A bourgeoisie doesn’t make a state 
 
 
Am I going to come and tell you that there are [neo]liberals in Ramallah? I 
can’t say that. There is a monopoly, and there is monopolizing. There is a 
bourgeoisie, and there is a bourgeois class. These bourgeois are open to 
global culture, and they live like the world is a playground built just for 
them. And if and when anything happens, they pack themselves up and 
leave. There is a bourgeoisie; and a bourgeoisie doesn’t make a state. 
~Sheʿrab11 
 
These comments by Sheʿrab (which means poetry-rap) came during the first 
interview I conducted in Ramallah. I didn’t realize at the time how aptly the poet-rapper 
crystallized a complex phenomenon that I would spend many months afterwards trying to 
parse. His words came in my response to my question to him of what, if anything, 
neoliberalism meant to him. His answer, which in half a dozen lines points to the 
                                                
11 Sheʿrab, interview with the author, August 26, 2014, Ramallah, all subsequent quotations from Sheʿrab 





relationship between capital, Palestinian sovereignty, and the Israeli Occupation needs to 
be understood within the context of economic and political changes in Ramallah and the 
occupied Palestinian territories since the 1991 Oslo Accords, and within the context of 
the sixty-odd years of Israeli Occupation of historical Palestine. I begin this discussion of 
the emergence of a second wave of Palestinian rap with an elaboration of the context in 
which it is found. I open with Sheʿrab’s comments, to which I will return. 
As the military, economic, social, and political history of the creation of the state 
of Israel has been thoroughly documented elsewhere, I have relieved myself of 
reproducing it here.12 However, given the scope of this literature it is worth being clear 
about a few definitions I will use throughout this chapter in reference to the Occupation 
of the Palestinian Territories by Israeli forces. I refer to the presence of Israeli forces in 
the West Bank and the Gaza strip as an “occupation.”13 In doing so, I position the politics 
of this study and myself as researcher within an extensive and expanding literature– 
academic and otherwise – that assumes the illegality of Israeli presence in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip since 1967, recognizes the complicated system of settler-colonialism 
which structures its jurisdiction there, bemoans the brutality of its military, and critiques 
the system of separation, or “apartheid,” that have made of Palestinians and “Arab-
Israelis” second-class citizens in their own homeland. When I refer to the “Occupation,” I 
mean Israel’s integrated apparatus of embodied military force, disembodied surveillance, 
                                                
12 For an overview, see for example, James Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of 
War, Third Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014) or Ilan Pappé, A History of Modern Palestine: One 
Land, Two Peoples, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006).  
 
13 In his study examining the historical discourses of Palestinian-Israeli relations, Sean McMahon 
acknowledges that the “Occupation” and the “Occupied Palestinian territories” [oPt] are terms that 
“represent the overwhelming international consensus on the status of the[se] spaces.” (Sean McMahon, The 






an extensive permit system, and a legal code that is applied to Palestinian and Israeli 
subjects differently, and which is intended both to separate Israelis from Palestinians and 
to appropriate resources for the State of Israel and its (Jewish) citizens. 
To differentiate my positioning now within literature that is critical of Israel and 
its policies, it is important to me to underscore that I understand this Occupation to be 
driven by the specific political project of Zionism. Zionism is one of the most significant 
political ideologies of the modern period, developed in Europe in the nineteenth century. 
This political project for an exclusively Jewish state is the basis of Israeli institutions and 
foundations and drives the Occupation of the Palestinian Territories. Zionism is separate 
from Judaism, a religion, and from Jews, an international community of individuals who 
adhere to this faith. Moreover, I identify Zionism as the driving ideology of Occupation 
and Israeli state policy while recognizing that one Zionist strategy is settler colonialism. 
This is to assert that I consider that racism and colonial practices are mobilized in the 
name of a specific ideological political project. In a similar way, the politicized religious 
zeal that drives contemporary Zionism enables Israel to enforce a system of apartheid. In 
the Occupied Territories and Israel today, both settler colonialism and a system of 
apartheid are tools of Zionism. This should serve to position my use of terminology vis-à-
vis current literature on Israeli settler colonialism and apartheid.14  
                                                
14 The contemporary trend in critical literature on Israel/Palestine is to use models of either settler 
colonialism or apartheid to understand the Occupation. These gestures have garnered the Palestinian cause 
considerable attention through international lines of solidarity and comparison – with other indigenous 
struggles, and with the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. I insist on expressly identifying Zionism 
as the driving political and ideological force that mobilizes both settler colonial and apartheid strategies as 
tools. I consider this to be the best way to deflect the most powerful Zionist defense in use today: that 
critics of Israel are anti-Semitic. Recognizing Zionism as a political project quite distinct from Judaism is a 
less frequently articulated piece of pro-Palestinian critical discourse today, the attention much more 
frequently going to settler-colonialism and apartheid. (On settler colonialism and apartheid see: Maya 
Mikdashi, “What is Settler-Colonialism?” Jadaliyya, July 17, 2012, accessed November 3, 2015, 




The Zionist Israeli Occupation effects mobility, economic growth, and access to 
resources like water within the West Bank as it affects Palestinian access to places and 
resources outside these territories. As the manager of La Wain club told me:  
The Occupation affects everything, generally. Specifically it affects the 
cost of alcohol and the ability of those coming from Jerusalem, 
Bethlehem, Jenin, and wherever to get here. When there are four 
checkpoints to cross at night, [your potential audience] will tell you, 
“Why do I want to go out? No, man. I’ll stay home.”15 
 
Alongside the images of young men and women throwing stones at tanks, the idea of 
young poets spitting words like weapons in an expression of non-violent, empowering 
creativity in face of this occupation has proven especially sellable. My point is that 
understanding how these concerts work politically requires understanding them not as 
images or ideas cast against the Occupation, but as sites of production and consumption 
within a material economy structured by it.16 As my interviews with interlocutors 
illustrate, it is impossible to talk about the challenges facing the production and 
consumption of a second wave of Palestinian rap in Ramallah today without – in addition 
to the Occupation – also considering the shortcomings of the bureaucracy of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA; in Arabic simply as-sulta [the Authority]) as well as the 
economic realities of living in the West Bank. As the following interaction between co-
                                                                                                                                            
Colonialism: A Comparative View of Diluted Colonialism in Asia and Africa,” South Atlantic Quarterly 
107 [2008]: 611-633; Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation [London: Verso, 
2007]; Lorenzo Veracini, The Settler Colonial Present [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015].) 
 
15 Bakar, manager of La Wain club. Interview with the author, December 2, 2014, Ramallah. Subsequent 
quotations from La Wain management (with Ramzi Hazboun) are taken from this interview. Translations 
from the Arabic are my own. 
 
16 For a discussion of the emphasis on “real”-ness in hip hop culture see H. Samy Alim, Roc the Mic Right: 





managers of La Wain pub, which followed the earlier statement quoted above about the 
Occupation, illustrate: 
 
Bakar: We want to install a new sound system and expand. That’s the 
plan. Inshallah [God willing], you never know, tomorrow they can come 
and occupy us. 
 
Ramzi Hazboun: Who can? 
 
Bakar: The Authority.17 
 
Testimonies like this one need to be understood within the context of the PA as sustained 
by the Oslo Accords (1991).18  
Oslo I, Oslo II, and the Paris Accords directly tied a promised Palestinian state to 
the development of a specific Palestinian economy. This economy was not an abstract 
horizon but a particular program of “good governance,” aid packages, and investment 
opportunities structured by the IMF, the World Bank, and the so-called Washington 
consensus, over which Israel ultimately held the veto. Importantly for the political effect 
it produced, this particular economic program was called a “free” economy.19 However, 
this “free” economy was never actually free, nor nominally even “open” to free trade. 
                                                
17 See note 15. 
 
18 Oslo I (1993), the Protocol on Economic Relations (also called the Paris Protocol, 1994), and Oslo II 
(1995) are the signed agreements referred to generally as the “Oslo Accords.” Signed between 1993 and 
1995, their term was not meant to extend a period of five years, approximately 1999. 
 
19 The Oslo Accords were able to essentially dictate the shape and pace of the development of the 
Palestinian economy by establishing a preliminary structure for a Palestinian government and by setting the 
boundaries within which this government could operate. Article 21 of the Basic Laws, drafted by the 
Legislative Council for the Palestinian Authority (PA), addresses the structure of the Palestinian economy. 
It begins, “The economic system in Palestine shall be based on the principle of free market economy.” 
(Palestinian Basic Law, Article 21, March 18, 2003, accessed March 5, 2015, 
http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/basic-law/2003-amended-basic-law.) Tariq Dana notes, “paradoxically, 
even the United States, the global driver of free market capitalism, has a constitution that is flexible enough 
to allow for different responses to specific economic circumstances.” (Tariq Dana, “The Palestinian 






Sara Roy has underscored not only the crippling reliance of Palestinian trade on Israeli 
markets, but also the deliberate and systemic Israeli attempts to thwart any substantial, 
independent Palestinian economic growth or development, because of the preludes to a 
state that such growth would provide. She calls this “de-development.”20 Amal Ahmad 
calls it Israel’s policy of “containment.”21 Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir point out 
that the Paris Protocol structured an Israeli “customs envelope” around Palestine, wherein 
even foreign aid donated to Palestinians was required to pass through, and be taxed by, 
Israeli customs.22 It is common, frustrating knowledge to most of my interlocutors, all 
Palestinians under 35, that Oslo I and II and the Paris Accords amount to an economic 
and security prison imposed on Palestinians and enforced by Palestinian security forces 
and the PA: a prison where, for example, the construction of tanks to collect rainwater, 
the manufacturing of school uniforms – and literally hundreds of other basic activities – 
are prohibited by Peace Accords that promised a Palestinian state. 23  
This is all to point to an important relationship between Zionism and 
neoliberalism. The development of an independent Palestinian state and an independent 
                                                
20 Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development (Beirut: Institute for Palestine 
Studies, 1995). 
 
21 Amal Ahmad, “The Customs Union and Israel’s No-State Solution,” Al-Shabaka, November 26, 2014, 
accessed July 4, 2015, https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/the-customs-union-and-israels-no-state-solution/.  
 
22 Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir, “Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail: Donor Aid in Occupied 
Palestine in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings,” Mediterranean Politics 19(2014): 435. 
 
23 See also Sahar Taghdisi-Rad, “The Economic Strategies of Occupation: Confining Development and 
Buying-off Peace,” in Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy, ed. Mandy Turner and Omar Shweiki 
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014), 13-31; and Raja Khalidi, “Under-the-Radar Palestinian 






Palestinian economy is overseen and limited by Occupation forces.24 This is to point not 
only to the failure of the Accords in helping to establish Palestinian sovereignty, 
something all my interlocutors readily acknowledge, but to the very complicated role of 
investment of capital in Palestine today, considering the necessary collusion that 
investment requires with the existing forces of Zionist Occupation.25 Moreover, it is 
within this context that the disdain for recent Palestinian economic growth that Sheʿrab 
expressed in the quote that opened this section can be understood. When he says that the 
bourgeoisie “doesn’t make a state” he is referring to the hollowness of economic 
development in this context.  
 
* * * 
 
This foray into the politics of Palestinian development under Occupation is 
relevant to my study here because the recent growth in the rap scene in Ramallah is part 
of economic and cultural development attached to the specific growth of the city. In my 
research, this neoliberal economic growth emerged as a central factor in the city’s ability 
to host a “second wave” of Palestinian rap. The political status of the city as Palestine’s 
“de facto” capital in the “post-Oslo” period reflects an influx of Palestinian and other 
                                                
24 This is within a larger regional context driven by the material interests of the US, as world power. See 
Tawfiq Haddad, “Political Economy of Neoliberal Approaches to Conflict Resolution and State Building in 
the OPT, 1993-2013” (PhD diss., The School of Oriental and Asian Studies, University of London, 2015).  
25 For a critique of this relationship as a critique of “capitalist peace,” see Tariq Dana, “The Symbiosis 
between Palestinian ‘Fayyadism’ and Israeli ‘Economic Peace’: the Political Economy of Capitalist Peace 
in the Context of Colonization,” Conflict, Security, and Development 15(2015): 455-477. It has been 
important for me over the course of this research to discover, assert, and re-assert how Zionism and 
neoliberalism work together, at the same time, and when and how they diverge from each other. I 
understand that the Occupation is underpinned by Zionism at the same time that it structures neoliberalism 
in Palestine. Conversations with Lisa Bunghalia, Falastine Dwikat, Yasmine Hemmayel, and Tawfiq 





Arab capital that operates in close coordination with the Zionist Occupation.26 In this 
context, and as I’ve begun to allude to here, the lines of anti-capitalist struggle, anti-
Zionist struggle, and Palestinian liberation (which ultimately needs both) become very 
hard to follow. The need for Palestinian growth and the development of its economy are 
not addressed by anti-capitalist critiques of recent Palestinian neoliberalism. In the 
context of the Accords that require this development for Palestinian liberation, it is not at 
all clear how an anti-capitalist sovereignty could be achieved. At the same time, 
considering Zionist control over this capital and its use, it is equally unclear how the 
development of the Palestinian “state” or “its” economy could ever be achieved via this 
kind of capitalist investment. 
Tawfiq Haddad calls the recent growth of Ramallah a “second phase” of 
neoliberalism in the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt).27 This was heralded by then 
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in the promotion of policies since dubbed “Fayyadism” – 
significant accelerations of the neoliberal program imposed by Oslo, coming on the heels 
of the Second Intifada (2000-2005/6). A US-educated, former minister of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to Palestine, Fayyad’s “institution-building” program 
received consistently positive reviews from supporters like Tony Blair and George W. 
Bush. 28 Robert Danin has called it “a third and highly pragmatic form of Palestinian 
                                                
26 For a historical trajectory of the growth of Ramallah and its middle class leading up to the Oslo Accords, 
see Lisa Taraki, “Enclave Micropolis: The Paradoxical Case of Ramallah/Al-Bireh,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 37 (2008): 9-14. 
 
27 Haddad, “Political Economy of Neoliberal Approaches.” 
 
28 Khalid Farraj, Camille Mansour, and Salim Tamari, “A Palestinian State in Two Years: Interview with 





nationalism.”29 But the accelerated neoliberal approach increasingly gathered criticism, 
despite touted figures of an increased GDP.30  
Fayyad’s critics have offered more cautious analyses of this program’s potential.31 
Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour suggest that “[Fayyad’s] statehood program encourages 
the idea that citizens may have to acquiesce [to the] Occupation but will not be denied the 
benefits of smoother running traffic, a liberal education curriculum, investor-friendly 
institutions, efficient public service delivery, and, for the middle class, access to luxury 
hotel chains and touring theatre performances.”32 Kareem Rabie argues that the investor-
friendly environment proposed and worked towards by Fayyad created the much-
remarked upon “Ramallah bubble.”33 This bubble refers to both a credit cycle that looked 
unstable and to a new culture of consumption, “luxury,” and entertainment that catered to 
a lively expat community and the Palestinian middle class. Within the “bubble” one could 
almost forget the continued presence of the Occupation, encouraged by an atmosphere of 
consumption. Moreover, the extension of consumer credit helped in part to provide an 
                                                
29 Robert M. Danin, “A Third Way to Palestine: Fayyadism and Its Discontents,” Foreign Affairs 90 
(2011): 94.  
 
30 Critics point out that by severing Gaza from the West Bank, figures of GDP growth misrepresent 
Palestinian reality. (See Jeremy Wildeman, “Delusions of a Palestinian Economic Miracle,” ThinkIR, June 
25, 2011, accessed March 22, 2015, http://www.thinkir.co.uk/delusions-of-a-palestinian-economic-
miracle/.)  
 
31 See among others, Alaa Tartir, “Securitized Development and Palestinian Authoritarianism under 
Fayyadism,” Conflict, Security, and Development 15(2015): 479-502. 
 
32 Khalidi and Samour, “Neoliberalism and Liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the 
Palestinian National Movement,” Journal of Palestine Studies 60 (2011): 16.  
 






audience, which had time, interest, and spendable capital for a spectrum of leisure and 
entertainment, including “alternative” musical production like rap concerts.34 
The emergence of this bubble was marked in my interviews with interlocutors 
with a mix of surprise, excitement, and disdain, as is clear in these recollections of Sami 
Said, the owner of a prominent restaurant-bar cum music venue: 
I remember this period of like one month when maybe ten or fifteen 
broadcasts came out, and they all did the same report on the same theme, 
and that was: “Nightlife in Ramallah.” The first and the second one, we 
were pleased, whatever. But then we started to feel like something wrong 
was happening. [It’s like people were surprised that], even though there’s 
an Occupation, people are still living. What does this mean, people are 
still living? Like, what are we supposed to do, die? And then all of a 
sudden we stopped hearing from these journalists. [And we were like,] 
what was that, you finished? Everything is fine because people go out at 
night? Look: it’s our right to go out. And, we want to go out. And we still 
have problems. It doesn’t mean that everything is ok, that people are living 
normally.35 
 
Indeed, the existence and development of the “Ramallah bubble” is one of the primary 
concerns the second wave of Palestinian rappers in Ramallah are eager to discuss.36 The 
growth that has made of Ramallah a hub for an international audience consuming 
                                                
34 Sam Bahour, “Palestine’s Economic Hallucination,” This Week in Palestine 165(2012), accessed March 
22, 2015, http://archive.thisweekinpalestine.com/details.php?id=3596&ed=202&edid=202. 
 
35 Sami Said, interview with the author, December 7, 2014, Ramallah. All subsequent quotations from Said 
are taken from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own. Taraki notes that an orientalist 
“wonderment that Palestinians are capable of intelligent lives pervades these journalistic writings [on the 
Ramallah Bubble, by ‘Western and Israeli journalists’].” (Taraki, “Enclave Micropolis,” 11-12.) 
 
36 To be sure, these concerns are not limited to the genre of hip hop and rap, and are addressed in musical 
lyrics across a number of genres. (See, for example the indie rock band Bil3ax’s piece, “Ramallah”: 
“Ramallah-Bil3ax,” YouTube video, 3:32, posted by “Faressho,” November 12, 2013, accessed April 23, 
2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=61nTMkSCEm0&ab_channel=Faressho.) Neither are these 
concerns about Ramallah’s changes and the culture of detachment and aloofness “under” the bubble limited 
to the genre of musical production. In July of 2014, Ashtar Theatre produced Yasmin Shlalda’s play 
entitled, Ramallah Bubble Lounge and Coffee House. The play, which premiered during the 2014 Israeli 
assault on Gaza, is a series of vignettes, each of which characterizes different, well-recognizable parts of 
Palestinian society as they pass through one café. It is a critique of precisely this culture of detachment 





alternative cultural production is the basis of its (very recent, and relatively limited) 
claims to cosmopolitanism, acting as a precarious node in circuits of exchange between 
Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Amman, and to a lesser extent, Beirut and Dubai. Understanding the 
limits of this cosmopolitanism requires a closer look at how audience makeup and youth 
demographics reflect persistent class stratification in the oPt (I return to this in the third 
section of this chapter). Finally, the fact that the oPt receive of the highest levels of per 
capita foreign aid in the world must effect how we understand its “free” economy.37 
Understanding how the “Ramallah Bubble” is built requires considering not just the 
neoliberal imperatives for a “free” economy and the push for private investment. It also 
requires a consideration of how the economy has been “developed” by a booming NGO 
sector in the absence of a state. 
 
Locating the “Second Wave” 
 
The concerts that I document and focus on in this chapter all took place within the 
“Ramallah Bubble,” the cosmopolitan phenomenon acerbically critiqued by academics 
and Leftist commentators as neoliberal while they are simultaneously celebrated by the 
Western press as proof of a growing Palestinian economy. Importantly, despite the 
increasing critiques Ramallah’s growth in cultural production and consumption is 
receiving, audiences, musicians, and bar owners are all enthused by the progressive 
implications of the presence of alternative leisure in Ramallah. None of my interlocutors 
– musicians, fans, curators, journalists, or venue owners – see the increase in privately 
                                                






owned leisure spaces, more opportunities for concerts as provided by them, or the 
alternative sociality built in these venues as part of the negative effects of neoliberal 
development in Ramallah. They certainly do not consider that these events or this cultural 
production encourage or facilitate the Occupation. While most of my interlocutors readily 
recognize effects of gentrification in increasing real estate prices, the changing 
demographic of Ramallah, the presence of expats and aid workers, increased 
securitization (by both the IDF and the PA), all in a culture of encouraged consumer debt 
– they categorically do not connect their concerts to this trend. On the contrary, 
musicians, audiences, venue owners, are all enthused by the prospect of its growth. 
Consuming this culture is, more often than otherwise, seen as exciting, if not liberating.38 
Understanding this seeming paradox requires stepping back to assess the kind of 
opportunities available for artists and fans to interact. What distinguishes the second 
wave rap concert is both how it differs from previous concert trends and how it refuses 
opportunities from the NGO sector. 
 Rap concerts during the Second Intifada and immediately after were often held in 
basically public venues (like the Qasaba theatre) or as part of festivals hosted outside. 
Private venues could accommodate small audiences only (like Pianos, a bar/lounge). The 
owners of Beit Aneeseh (now called Radio) explain that before they opened in 2008, 
concert culture was limited: 
 
                                                
38 Lisa Taraki suggests that Ramallah’s middle class actively “recasts” narratives of Palestinian resistance 
to accommodate these new patterns of consumption. She suggests that, “a new conception of resilience has 
been taking root, one that is not based on an ascetic denial of frivolity, joy, or entertainment, but rather 
renders the very pursuit of happiness a manifestation of resilience and of resistance at the same time.” 
(Taraki, “Enclave Micropolis,” 17.) This is not my argument. That is, I am not interested, as has been the 
trend in subcultural studies for some time (see Chapter One) to invest the “everyday” with an ethos of 
resistance. I return to how second wave rap and their concerts engage with narratives of Palestinian struggle 




[There used to be concerts], but, excuse the expression, [they] used to 
happen in a dull [ghabi] way. Like for example, Qasaba would bring a 
band, and you’d go, and sit in your chair, and listen to Arabic soft rock, or 
hip hop or whatever, from your chair. There were no drinks, you couldn’t 
smoke, there was no interaction. [Concerts] used to be like this: in a 
proper, official, cultural venue; or in the street, during a festival, for 
example. But still there were no drinks. In between these two options [the 
formal concert venue and the street festival] – a bar where 200 people 
could drink and see the musician and talk to them before or after the show 
– this didn’t exist [before we opened]. Beit Aneeseh was the first place 
like this. 
 
Since the second phase of neoliberalism in the oPt we can see a consolidation of a general 
trend in the performance and consumption of a certain kind of rap in private venues. Hip 
hop concert culture, advertised via social media, taking place after dark, in private venues 
that post cover charges and employ bouncers, is a development since the end of the 
second intifada and coincides with the growth of the Ramallah Bubble. It does not mean 
that there were not rap concerts in bars during the period of the Second Intifada or that 
one cannot find rap in more public spaces or as part of festivals today.39 I want to 
recognize a general trend towards a specific kind of consumption tied to the aesthetic and 
political development of this music.  
This trend is partly driven by a refusal of the influence of non-governmental 
organizations in cultural production. Musicians and other artists I spoke with are hesitant 
to engage with, if not fiercely critical of, the not-for-profit and/or non-governmental 
institutions (NGOs) which sponsored, encouraged, and showcased the first forays into the 
genre of Palestinian hip hop in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and which continue to host 
                                                
39 For example, Boikutt recounts having been invited to perform in Qalandiya refugee camp, alongside 
MCs from the camp. They performed on the bed of a truck in a main street. Boikutt recalls it as one of the 





projects, events, workshops around hip hop and rap across the West Bank.40 As 
filmmaker and then co-manager of La Wain pub Ramzi Hazboun told me: 
NGOs … have Western politics. Whatever work you do with them 
contributes to those politics – it doesn’t matter what the work is 
specifically. Like in our field for example, are the NGOs in music and 
culture or [are they] in politics? In the end, it’s always politics. They 
might bring you a brilliant band from wherever, but to work with them 
they always put it in your face [in a contract where you have to state] that 
you’re against “terrorism” – without anybody clarifying what “terrorist” 
means, and how it’s meaning is changing, actually. [Their structure] is 
colonized, regardless if they bring a band whose beats we appreciate. We 
try to avoid working with anyone that’s imposing a politics on us. Not just 
in the bar, but in all aspects of daily life. 
 
Musicians’ desire not to participate in this NGO economy is frequently propelling them 
into the arms of private businesses, in the form of privately owned bars and clubs. To be 
sure, they also have complaints about the general managing structure that shapes these 
opportunities, including financial negotiations with owners, or the hassles of putting up 
capital to rent a space on their own. By and large, however, they prefer these 
arrangements because they feel they have more control over the transmitted meaning of 
their work.  
 None of my interlocutors admitted to collaborating with an international NGO for 
the purposes of showcasing their own, original work. Anecdotally, many revealed having 
attended or agreeing to a gig and then resigning or stepping out at a later time.41 Some 
artists and producers of the second wave may have worked with NGOs in the past, 
thereby deterring them from future collaborations; others have come of age in a period 
                                                
40 Maira discusses several examples of these (Maira, Jil Oslo, 42-43). 
 
41 Almost all my interlocutors, venue owners and musicians, hold down other jobs in addition to making 






when they could consume a range of cultural production, within which they were able to 
discern important political differences. In this way, “second wave” points not only to the 
emergence of new voices on the Palestinian rap scene, but also to evolution among artists 
as they learn from experiences and establish political positions.42  
For example, when I arrived in Ramallah in July 2014, Stormtrap/Asifeh (rapper 
and producer, formerly one third of the crew Ramallah Underground) and Asma Ghanem 
(an experimental musician going by the name Shams Asma43), then a couple in addition 
to occasional musical team, were debating participation in a musical festival and 
workshop sponsored by the US State Department called “One Beat.” They had received 
an invitation to participate in the weeklong series of concerts and workshops in the 
Southwest US from the US embassy and had preliminarily agreed. Some time later, they 
discovered it was sponsored by the US State Department and when I met them, they were 
in the process of deciding what to do. 
In our discussions, Asifeh was sure their participation (or his at least) had to be 
terminated. He had no interest in being affiliated with the State Department (How can I 
decry others’ complicity with the Occupation if I take this gig?, he asked). Ghanem was 
less sure. There were no other Palestinians on the billing, and no Israeli musicians either. 
                                                
42 My observation of this political position vis-à-vis NGOs during interviews with musicians, venue 
owners, and audiences is in marked contrast to some recent literature that has asked Palestinian cultural 
producers and consumers what they think about (mostly Western) NGOs. Sunaina Maira writes that, “in the 
focus group interviews [she] did with youth in the West Bank, none of them spoke about foreign NGOs as 
a factor in the “Westernization” of Palestinian culture or the entry of globalized cultural forms.” She writes 
about an “absence of [a] direct critique of… the process of NGOization of the cultural sphere.” (Maira, Jil 
Oslo, 42-43.) Needless to say, these findings are in direct contradiction to my own, as evidenced in 
Hazboun’s quote above. It may be that the five to ten year difference between her fieldwork and mine has 
allowed for the growth of this critique, as it is surely true that frustration with NGOs is growing. Of course 
other literature on cultural production and cultural producers in this period also found antipathy towards 
NGOs. (See for example Maurya Wickstrom, Performance in the Blockades of Neoliberalism: Thinking the 
Political Anew [New York: Palgrave, 2012].) 
 





Ghanem argued that cultural exchange was necessary and that furthermore, the 
opportunity to make a statement always existed. As an artist, she suggested, one should 
always be able to make an intervention. She argued that by refusing the invitation they 
were giving up the opportunity to expose people to different politics. By way of example 
of how they may be able to subvert the political meaning via their participation, she 
recounted her experience participating in a workshop in Graz, Austria, run by an Occupy 
Wall Street activist and sponsored by a public Austrian university.44  
During a workshop, the artist-participants were tasked with making protest 
signs which they could later choose to hold in the day’s performance: a 
staged protest in a public square. The participants were furnished with 
markers and poster board and told to use images only to construct either a 
statement (concluded with an exclamation point) or a question (concluded 
with a question mark). Ghanem recounts that much of the talk at the time 
was about gay marriage and homosexuality and many of the participants 
chose this subject as the subject of their posters. An organizer assured 
Ghanem that her poster could be about anything she desired, however. 
Assured, Ghanem took a marker and a poster board and drew the Israeli 
flag, then the equals sign, then a swastika, and concluded with a question 
mark.  
 
Before she finished, seven or eight people crowded around her and took 
the poster and the marker from her. They asked her what she thought she 
was doing and demanded that she removed, covered, or blotted out the 
swastika. When Ghanem refused in the name of artistic license, the 
organizer blotted it out with a marker for her. Word of the incident spread 
quickly. For Ghanem, this was a successful intervention — in that it 
exposed the limits of Austrian “freedom” and generosity towards artistic 
expression that the workshop was clearly invested in showcasing. In that it 
forced a tiny but very literal enactment of the censorship [on the subject of 
Zionist policy] in the society lived daily.45 
 
                                                
44 Asifeh spent many childhood years in Vienna with his family. He speaks German and holds Austrian 
citizenship. He cites collaborations with his neighbors and friendships in Vienna as an important part of his 
artistic development. (Interviews with the author July 19, August 27, and September 5, 2014, Ramallah.) 
 
45 Field notes excerpt, July 2014; discussions, and recorded interview with the author July 19, August 27, 





I include this anecdote as an example of the experiences which artists return to in 
debating their participation in internationally funded opportunities. Interestingly, Ghanem 
was using this experience as reason to participate in the US State Department venture. 
The discussions Ghanem and Asifeh had with me and the arguments they rehashed in my 
presence also illustrate how social relationships are guiding the political development of 
the second wave. Asifeh, a performing musician across two decades, was much more sure 
of his position than was Ghanem, who has been performing her own work since roughly 
2009. Asifeh’s experience undoubtedly helped to shape Ghanem’s position – and this 
needn’t reflect on the nature of their personal relationship, only. Aesthetic as well as 
political influence is easily perceptible in the friendships between second wave rappers in 
Ramallah, and navigating opportunities is a primary forum in which these experiences are 
rehashed and reviewed. Ultimately, the pair declined the invitation, pulling out of the 
workshop.46 
 In addition to suspicion of European and US NGOs and sponsored festivals, 
some musicians and venue owners also relate an antipathy between them and local non-
profit cultural organizations. They accuse the latter of being secretive or selective about 
opportunities, and of generally unambitious programming – either with regards to more 
                                                
46 During my conversations with both Ghanem and Asifeh in July, we talked at length about the 
frameworks of “resistance” which are available to, and indeed asked of, them as musicians when they 
represent Palestine in international festivals. My own research is part of this industry of cultural production 
and exchange. When Ghanem and Asifeh were debating their participation in One Beat, both asked for my 
opinion. I was forced then (and continue to) reflect on the stipulations placed on the researcher by the 
different funding opportunities which I accepted and which facilitated this research, and the underlying 
ideological systems of which they are a part. In accepting PARC funding, I uncritically signed a contract 
which included a clause stating I would not collaborate with “terrorists,” the same kind of clause Ramzi 
Hazboun acerbically critiqued in our interview (quoted above). The complications of affiliation while on an 
IIE Fulbright research fellowship, affiliated as it is with the US State Department, and which facilitated my 
research in Amman, would become clear at a later time. It has been impossible for me to engage sincerely 
with the questions these musicians navigate without simultaneously reflecting critically on my own role as 




mainstream aesthetics or the relative paucity of events organized. Several musicians also 
related resentment about an attitude of dependency, which they felt was expected of them 
by local cultural institutions, and which they simultaneously perceive in the relationship 
between these institutions and international organizations or artists. These musicians feel 
that on the one hand, local cultural institutions want to be the ones setting the pace and 
determining the horizon of cultural expression; at the same time, they feel these 
institutions depend too much on international support and validation. As with the 
international NGOs, it frequently seems to musicians that the priorities are not in the right 
place. Indeed, I often felt from my interlocutors a more pronounced astringency and a 
more ready disgust towards NGOs – foreign and domestic – than that even towards the 
Occupation. While the abuses of the latter are well-documented, the problematic politics 
of “development” via NGOs and donor aid are still less current in analysis and discussion 
of cultural production and politics within it. Similarly, while the negative effects of the 
Occupation were often assumed in our conversations, my interlocutors frequently 
expressed what seemed to me a desire to correct a positive image of NGO work, with 
testimony to the political contradictions they impose on them. 
 It is against this political and economic backdrop that I argue that we can notice 
the emergence of a “second wave of Palestinian rap.” The second wave is set apart by 
patterns of social collaboration, by the kinds of concerts they pursue and perform in, and 
the musical, lyrical, and performatic experimentation therein.47 Sunaina Maira has 
proposed jil Oslo, or the “Oslo Generation” as a category useful for understanding the 
                                                
47 I use performatic as Diana Taylor does, as a term to describe something relating to live performance. 
Taylor suggests the term as an alternative to distinguish from J. L. Austin’s discursive notion of the 





politics of Palestinian hip hop. She describes this youth demographic as coming of age in 
the years after the Oslo Accords.48 This category effectively encompasses, I think it’s 
safe to say, most all Palestinian rap, and definitely all Palestinian rap in Arabic.49 While 
there is at maximum a ten or so year gap between some musicians I mention here, my 
proposition that there is a “second wave” of Palestinian rap speaks less to a generational 
distinction between the musicians in question than it does to aesthetic currents, patterns 
of collaboration, histories of exposure, concert culture, as well as the political feeling 
generated within them. My discussions with musicians and fans, my experience at 
concerts, perusing online footage, and listening to the music encourages me to mark the 
development of different aesthetic and political energies within a single generation. 
Haykal, Dakn, al-Nather, Shua, Julmud, Faragh, Riyadiyat, and Boikutt/Muqataʿa 
form a loose collective they call saleb wahed or, “minus one”: “-1.”50 This is the most 
tangible, physical manifestation of the energies I identify as belonging to the second 
wave. To this named collective, I add Sheʿrab and Stormtrap/Asifeh to the category of 
                                                
48 Maira, Jil Oslo, 34-73. 
 
49 Many Palestinian rappers began writing poetry or rap in English before writing in Arabic. For example, 
Boikutt recalls rapping in a crew called Two Man Army with friend John Naʿmeh in English before 
Ramallah Underground formed. Tamer Nafar of DAM began his career rapping in English and Hebrew 
before switching to Arabic (see Ted Swedenburg, “Against the Struggle Paradigm,” in Popular Culture in 
the Middle East and North Africa: A Postcolonial Outlook, Mounira Solimon and Wael El Hamamsy, eds. 
[New York: Routledge, 2013],17-32.)  
 
50 Haykal’s Sound Cloud page, accessed October 23, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/haykalonol; Dakn’s 
Sound Cloud page, accessed October 23, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/dakn-1; Shua’s Sound Cloud 
page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/shu-a-1; Julmud’s Sound Cloud page, accessed 
April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/julmud-1; Faragh’s Sound Cloud page, accessed April 19, 2015, 
https://Sound Cloud.com/faragh1; Riyadiyat’s Sound Cloud page, accessed October 23, 2015, https://Sound 
Cloud.com/riyadiyat-1; Boikutt’s Sound Cloud page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound 
Cloud.com/boikutt: Boikutt was one third of Ramallah Underground and is a part of the visual/sound 






the second wave.51 Together, this near dozen musicians and producers participate in a 
robust network of exchange and collaboration with Lebanese, Syrian, and Jordanian 
rappers, producers, and other musicians. They collaborate extensively among themselves 
and with Edd Abbass (of Fareeq al-Atrash, based in Beirut), DJ Sotosura (Amman), 
Osloob (of Katibeh 5, Paris), Bu Kolthoum (Syrian, residing in Amman), El Rass 
(Beirut), Sayyed Darwish (Beirut), Psychaleppo (Beirut), El Far3i (London). These 
collaborations form a dynamic, inter-urban exchange not present in the rap scene in 
Palestine or in the region before 2007/2008.52 In addition, all of the “-1” artists DJ 
recorded sets in addition to performing and recording their own raps. The production 
work of Al-Nather (who raps less than the others) is helping to connect a dozen or more 
MCs across the Arab Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, the influence of Boikutt – as a 
producer as well as a musician – among this group of musicians and their fans is palpable 
and undeniable. The second wave of Palestinian rap is thus distinguished by a certain 
cohesion among a group of artists and their social patterns of collaboration.53  
                                                
51 Another important player is al-Had, who shares a history socially and musically with the “-1” group 
(especially Haykal and Dakn) but who is now based in Chicago. Sheʿrab’s Sound Cloud page, accessed 
April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/she3rap. Stormtrap made up one third of the Ramallah 
Underground. Stormtrap/Asifeh‘s Sound Cloud page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound 
Cloud.com/stormtrap.. 
 
52 Bu Kolthoum’s Sound Cloud page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/bu-kolthoum; El 
Far3i’s Sound Cloud page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/el-far3i; Satti’s Sound Cloud 
page, accessed April 19, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/ay-satti.  
 
53 Others have explored how collaboration online or for the infrequent concert organized by an international 
festival or NGO fosters a liberating sociality by creating a virtual mobility not available to Palestinian 
musicians under Occupation otherwise. In my research, I recognize that the collaborative patterns of a wide 
range of musicians across the Levant is a powerful social as well as aesthetic network. However, I do not 
make arguments here testifying to the political potential of this networking. For one, the bigger the scene 
gets, the more fractious it actually becomes. In Beirut, for example, the city where the most collaboration 
could and does take place, the rift between different groups of rappers and hip hop heads has become so 
deep as to prevent collaborations and interactions between musicians. In Amman, the politics of 
international concert organizing created resentment where “foreign” artists were paid while “local” artists 
weren’t (they were all Arab rappers). Secondly and more importantly perhaps, suggesting that a specific 




Unsurprisingly since they share such strong social connections, similarities in 
musical exposure form another defining characteristic of these musicians. Asked about 
the first rap they really took to or to which they remember being exposed, many of the  
“-1” point to different artists than those referred to by Arab rappers performing in the 
early 2000s. This makes sense considering teenage years lived in the latter half of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century.  
A particularly memorable scene in Jackie Salloum’s Slingshot Hip Hop (2008) 
features Tamer Nafar of DAM holding Public Enemy’s album Fear of a Black Planet. (I 
identify DAM as part of the “first wave.”) Nafar points to the CD and says, “There, they 
have a fear of a Black Planet… Here, we have fear of an Arabic nation.” The sound bite 
opens the trailer to the film, so well does it frame an easily-digestible understanding of 
Arabic rap in relation to its African-American predecessors: Palestinian Arabs under 
Occupation identify with the struggles of African Americans in US East Coast ghettos, 
and so are attracted to imitate their modes of expression.54 Indeed, many of my own 
interviews with first wave rappers trace their exposure to rap to a certain generation of 
African American musicians. Mos Def, Gangstar, Public Enemy, Wu Tang, Nass, the 
                                                                                                                                            
for specific nationalities is a real obstacle – I think ultimately hinges on romanticizing international 
collaboration. This privileges the musicians’ identity over any other aspect of their participation, a gesture 
most musicians I spoke with resent (as I explore later in this chapter). Generally, I consider these networks 
of collaboration positive, but I am hesitant to project upon them certain politics: the crippling immobility 
imposed upon Palestinian – and recently Syrian – musicians by geo-political forces, not withstanding. (For 
arguments about the liberating potential of international and transnational collaboration, see Sunaina Maira, 
“‘We Ain’t Missing’” and Janne Louise Andersen, “Transgressing Borders,” among others.) 
 
54 “Slingshot Hip Hip official trailer,” YouTube video, 1:55, posted by “Fresh Booza,” May 17, 2012, 






Fugees, Talib Kweli, and others appear in the recollections of Boikutt, Asifeh, Rami GB, 
Sotusura, and other rappers present on the scene by 2004-2005.55  
It has been popular among leftist circles for some time to connect African 
American struggles against racism, poverty, and ghettoization in the US to the Palestinian 
struggle against Occupation. Some of this work highlights the productive exchanges 
between black and Arab organizers and experimenters with political strategy in attempts 
to connect important struggles.56 Other examples do important work connecting the 
strategies of empire.57 Sometimes, however, and especially in the case of Palestinian hip 
hop today, understanding the Occupation as an iteration of urban suffocation and intra-
communal strife in the Bronx can perhaps offer only a facile understanding of either 
experiences of oppression. In analyzing the political processes of listening and making 
meaning in second wave rap, I want to caution against this kind of connection-making 
and political theorizing.58 
                                                
55 Rami GB’s Sound Cloud page, accessed October 23, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/ramigb; 
MWR’s YouTube channel, accessed April 19, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/user/MWRHipHop?spfreload=10?&ab_channel=MWR-PalestinianHipHop. 
 
56 See for example, Alex Lubin, Geographies of Liberation: The Making of an Afro-Arab Political 
Imaginary (Chapel Hill, NC: U of North Carolina P, 2014).  
 
57 See for example, Keith P. Feldman, A Shadow over Palestine: The Imperial Life of Race in America 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2015). 
 
58 In Chapter One of this dissertation, I pointed to blackwashing as part of the phenomenon of neoliberal 
orientalism that drives the discourses of resistance I deemed problematic in representations of Arab rappers. 
There, I suggested that simplified understandings of Arab politics are created using (equally simplified) 
references to expression and struggles by African Americans. In Chapter Two, I pointed to examples of 
how framing of Palestinian hip hop concerts in Harlem appropriates terms of African American struggle 
while participating in the gentrifying energies of traditionally African American neighborhoods. Of course 
blackwashing is very different from the very real work of intersecting African American struggles and 
Palestinian ones (like some promising strides made in 2014 during #BlackLivesMatter organizing 
following violence in Fergusson, Missouri, and protests against the Israeli bombardment of Gaza). This 
latter in my opinion needs more than the hopeful projection of one struggle upon the other. Indeed, much 
real black-Arab antipathy suggests that these lines of solidarity desperately need to be rediscovered and 
redrawn. Contestation over the terms of solidarity was really obvious, for example on social media 




I suggest this caution is necessary because, in our interviews, second wave 
rappers readily offer that the experience of the US ghetto that grounded much early US 
hip hop was altogether too strange to have proved directly influential in their own music 
making, lyricism, or political awareness. Some of these musicians pointed to the 
incomprehensibility of the slang used in this hip hop, not used in other forms of popular 
culture available to them at the time, rendering lyrical expression hard to follow.59 Others 
pointed to the availability, during their own teenage years, of other kinds of rap on outlets 
like MTV and others in Palestine. And others still pointed to their own relationship to the 
streets and clubs of their own neighborhoods in Ramallah. For example, Haykal offers 
that a conservative upbringing kept him from socializing with kids in his neighborhood 
from a young age. In his case, and in his analysis, this prevented a strong sense of 
identification with the kinds of urban sociality referenced in early US hip hop. 
Rather than identifying with African American life in the US ghetto as expressed 
in early hip hop lyrics, most all the second wave rappers I spoke with remember that 
Eminem was their first significant exposure to rap music. The political assumption of 
shared black and Arab experience in the attraction to rap as a medium requires serious 
reconsideration when the Palestinian rapper offers that his initial attempts at lyric writing 
were driven by the desire to reproduce the multi-syllables in Eminem’s work, or that 
looking back, he finds in his early lyrics teenage angst against his mother (a frequent 
                                                                                                                                            
college students in North Carolina in the fall of 2014. And plain racism can be seen in the hip hop scenes in 
the Arab world themselves. The much touted “first Arab rap battle” held in Mar Mkhayel in Beirut in 2014 
between Edd Abbas and Dizaster is one example. Abbas is half Ivorian. Dizaster’s raps returned more than 
once to his opponent’s skin color and the corresponding worth he should be accorded in Lebanese society. 
(“The Arena – Dizaster vs. Edd Abbas (First Official Rap Arabic Battle) #MobaRap,” YouTube video, 
13:29, posted by “The Arena ME,” July 10, 2015, accessed November 8, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DPQ-PC5HfS0&ab_channel=TheArenaME.) 
 
59 By contrast, Boikutt and Sotusura, for example, who also reference the importance of Public Enemy, 




theme of Eminem’s), as opposed to rage or frustration against racism and systemic 
oppression. This of course is not to deny the relevance of first wave rappers’ testimony. It 
is rather to point to important shifts and changes among rappers and their audiences.  
To be sure, the second wave’s aesthetic and lyrical choices – more in line with 
trends in electronic music than with traditionally understood hip hop sounds – have also 
garnered criticism from some of the veterans on the scene, who express frustration with 
the more brazenly experimental forays of these artists. In our interviews, older musicians 
frequently shook their heads in reference to some of this younger work. Commentary like 
“it’s not hip hop,” “something’s been lost in translation,” or “I don’t even understand 
what this guy is saying here” frequently appeared in these testimonies. 
Regardless of how much one appreciates the new sounds or not, the recognition of 
different influences by musicians is an important shift that very much deserves attention. 
Moreover, all of these musicians expanded their range of musical exposure in the process 
of becoming musicians, and now relate to and digest much more than their teenage idols. 
If a distinguishing feature of the second wave is the kind of rap they remember being 
initially exposed to and compelled by, a second defining characteristic, also rooted in 
performer histories, comes from the shared recognition of different approaches to rap in 
Arabic. Second wave rappers, unlike the first wave, were not the first to rap in Arabic. 
This means they had the opportunity to discern aesthetically between musical and lyrical 
approaches to rap in Arabic, something musicians several years their senior would not 
have had the opportunity to do. Moreover, the second wave shares ideas about the kind of 
rap after which they are interested to model their own work. Referencing the kind of 




they like, and/or the kind of rap they aim to produce, Haykal, Dakn, al-Nather, Sotusura, 
Boikutt and others used the phrase “biʿabi el rass,” Arabic for “fills the head.”  
In his work on tarab, ethnomusicologist A.J. Racy writes that the “the ineffability 
of the tarab state is illustrated by the prevalent use of metaphors that explain how the 
music is ‘felt,’ as in such expressions as ‘filling the head.’”60 Interlocutors’ testimonies 
lead me to suggest that second wave rap is premised on feeling the music in a certain 
way. Asked to explain what this feeling consists of, my interlocutors contrasted the thing 
they seek (music that fills the head) with music that “hypes.” In Chapter Two of this 
dissertation, I referred to the uniqueness of tarab as a performatic phenomenon: that while 
it may employ call and response, it cannot be reduced to it. The specificity of second 
wave rappers’ articulations of the kind of music they seek to create and that which they 
seek to avoid precisely plays on this distinction.  
Asked to elaborate, the distinction between “hype” and “filling the head” was 
frequently illustrated by my interlocutors by distinguishing between two bands. The 
Ramallah Underground and DAM made up a big part of the rap scene that existed in 
Palestine during the Second Intifada (so they make up a majority of rap that makes up the 
“first wave”).61 While DAM is still together and producing rap music, Ramallah 
Underground has since broken up. Interestingly considering the relative lack of critical 
attention they have received, my interlocutors credit the Ramallah Underground with a 
continuing influence. Haykal told me: 
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61 DAM’s Sound Cloud page, accessed October 23, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/damrap; Ramallah 






[The name] “-1” isn’t really different from the phrase “Ramallah 
Underground.” It’s almost the continuation of RU. We are -1 from 
Ramallah. It’s the Underground of Ramallah. We became a kind of a 
continuation of what the Ramallah Underground was. 
 
Observers agree. The DJ Sotusura, who never raps himself, explained to me that, 
“Ramallah Underground is a school when it comes to Arabic hip hop. DAM is a school 
and Ramallah Underground is a different school.”62 This observation points to a 
significant aesthetic and political spectrum in Palestinian hip hop.  
Most second wave rappers and producers were barely teens when Ramallah 
Underground and DAM performed in Ramallah what were, for many of them, the first 
live concerts of the kind.63 Al-Nather was twelve when he first saw Ramallah 
Underground perform, a concert he and childhood friend Dakn, remember vividly. 
Al-Nather: Of course I remember [the first rap concert I heard]. It was 
[Ramallah Underground] at Pianos. It was revolutionary for everyone who 
was there. We didn’t have anybody doing this kind of thing in Ramallah. 
It was the first time ever - It was like who are these guys? What are they 
doing? Are they really one of us? From here?  
 
Dakn: Yes. Yes, that’s exactly how it was. […] They saw things 
differently, and this perspective filled my head [biʿabi rasi]. You know 
what I mean?64 
 
In these remarks, the two second wave rappers identify a political process of listening in 
which they aligned themselves with one aesthetic over another. Continuing, Dakn 
recounts the following about a concert of both DAM and the Ramallah Underground at 
the Qasaba theatre in the middle of the Second Intifada: 
                                                
62 Interview with the author September 11, 2015, Amman. Subsequent quotations from Sotusura are taken 
from this interview. Translations from the Arabic are my own.  
 
63 For thick description and analysis of DAM’s concerts and their performance styles see McDonald, My 
Voice is My Weapon. 
 
64 Interview with the author, March 30, 2015. Subsequent quotations from Dakn and Al-Nather are taken 





I came with the local neighborhood club [nadi] where we had been 
playing basketball. The majority of people there were from the club, kids. 
I was very young and most of the crowd was my age. I’d heard of DAM, I 
knew some of their tracks. But I hadn’t heard Ramallah Underground 
before. DAM took the stage and everybody got on their feet and started 
dancing, and I did too. Their track “Meen Irhabi?” [Who’s the Terrorist?] 
in the middle of the intifada really captured people’s imaginations [ktir 
bitaʿqed kanat ], every line was like what we wanted to hear. But then I 
heard the track “Khaleeni ʿAyeesh” [“Let me live,” by Ramallah 
Underground]. And that was like, wow [wa kanat yaʿni aha]. It was from 
the street. It was different: a different approach to the people.  
 
It is important to note here how the two pieces performed live are juxtaposed in Dakn’s 
memory. While Dakn and Al-Nather both admit they were excited by DAM’s piece in 
performance, it was Ramallah Underground’s track that really touched them. This points 
to the song’s effect as one of both lyrics (something I’ll return to in the next section) as 
well as delivery. The distinctions between the two help to parse the difference between 
“hype” and “filling the head” as reflected in audience dynamics in Arabic rap. 
Haykal remembers DAM’s stage presence as “more like comic,” and 
nationalistic.65 Al-Nather called it “acting.” Elaborating on this difference between the 
two bands’ performance styles, Sotusura explains,  
DAM are good performers, they’re good on stage, capturing the crowd, 
and communicating with the crowd. I think in this part of it they’re 
stronger than the others. They’re the first crew that did live shows and had 
a proper interaction with the crowd and had a proper live show. 
 
Haykal describes it like this: 
DAM have, like, signatures. Like “Rrrrrrramallah!” all the time. They 
want to keep people hyped, in a fun way. “Yalla! [let’s go!] Let’s have 
fun!” “Yalla heyyyy! [he claps].”  
 
                                                
65 He offered “more like comic” in English. I return to the question of performing Palestinian national 
identity below. (Interview with the author, August 16, 2015, Amman. All subsequent quotations from 




This, Haykal, Dakn, and Al-Nather confirm, is in marked distinction to the 
performance style of the Ramallah Underground. Haykal told me:  
The way [that Boikutt] delivers, it’s not his concern if people like him or 
not. He’s informing. There is informative behavior in both of them [Asifeh 
and Boikutt]. They like for the effect on people to come from… the words 
themselves, how they control the sound, and how they use hip hop for 
what it is, as music. DAM do it up more like a show.  
 
The differences Haykal and Sotusura point to are similar to the differentiation I described 
in Chapter Two between the emergence of tarab in audience-performer interaction based 
on specialized listening and the excitement or hype produced by more generic call-and-
response. There, I argued that tarab is a kind of call-and-response, but should not be 
reduced to it. Second wave rappers offer that the ability of a piece of Arabic rap to “fill 
the head” depends in part on an articulation of politics that lets the listener think or feel 
beyond the immediate excitement of the live performance, the latter always more or less 
always charged with some kind of energy. Explaining how this works lyrically requires 
another contextualization, this time in terms of political discourse.  
 
* * * 
 
 In this section, I have sought to contextualize the emergence of what I call a 
second wave of Palestinian rap within the context of recent neoliberal economic growth 
in the Occupied West Bank. I have identified a concentration of rap and hip hop 
production that finds its home within the cosmopolitan growth of Palestine’s “de facto 
capital” following the Oslo Accords. In recognizing the emergence of the second wave, I 




influences and exposure to rap in English and Arabic. In so doing, I underscore the 
influence of the Ramallah Underground, a “first wave” band (made up of Asifeh, Boikutt, 
and Aswat) that has since broken up. Importantly for understanding the musical and 
lyrical influences and of the second wave, I include Asifeh and Boikutt’s recent work in 
the category “second wave.” Unlike DAM, a first wave hip hop crew that are still 
together and which figure in every study of Palestinian rap and hip hop, the influence 
aesthetically and politically of the Ramallah Underground has been critically 
understudied. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I maintain a focus on the 
influence of the Ramallah Underground and especially the work and mentorship of 
Boikutt in understanding the aesthetic and political experimentation in the second wave 
as well as the social collaboration patterns evident in this network.  
Finally, I have suggested that the driving thread of the second wave is the search 
for and the making of music that “fills the head.” I suggested this is different from rap 
music that “hypes” and pointed to some initial differences in performatic styles to which 
my interlocutors testify. These testimonies about the differences between the Ramallah 
Underground and DAM are integral to my argument about the emergence and 
particularity of a second wave of Palestinian rap. To understand further how second wave 
lyrics discursively “fill the head,” I now turn to a contextualization of these lyrics within 







Part Two: Political Discourse 
 
Second wave rappers offer that the ability of a piece of Arabic rap to “fill the 
head” depends in part on an articulation of politics that lets the listener think or feel 
beyond the immediate excitement of the live performance. In our interviews, second 
wave musicians and fans relate the effects of listening as a political process, where the 
lyrics, delivered in a certain way, have the capacity to produce a powerful political 
feeling. As the observations that concluded the preceding section alluded, this capacity 
for rap music to “fill the head” depends on particular qualities of the live delivery as well 
as the form and content of the lyrics themselves. I return to the musical components of 
sound and the ability of these sonic elements to produce affect in the concert space in the 
third and final section of this chapter. Here, I want to explore how the intellectual 
engagement in second wave lyrics lies in diversion from and inversion of representations 
in existing narratives of Palestinian struggle.  
My argument is that historical discourses of Palestinian political struggle are 
classed in specific ways. Ways of framing Palestinian-ness and the struggle for national 
liberation since before 1948 are built on a classed imagination of Palestinian fighters and 
their society. The material political and economic developments in the oPt means that 
these political imaginations conjure figures that no longer reflect the material reality of 
Ramallah. In this context, second wave lyrics paint a different class picture of Palestinian 
society. Their commentary on Ramallah’s growth, their cynicism about the uses of sabr 
[patience], sumud [resilience], their refusal of performances of turath [heritage], and their 




theorization of certain kinds of political action, these reflections are closer to 
observations and analysis than calls to arms or rallying for struggle. At the same time, 
they have real affective power. I argue this kind of lyrical work, most noticeable when it 
actively inverts mainstream, historical, and romanticized narratives of Palestinian 
struggle, is central to the ability of second wave rap to “fill the head.” That is, this lyrical 
expression helps to produce the tarab that distinguishes the political feeling in these 
concerts. 
 
Sabr and sumud 
 
Discourses of struggle against the Occupation – as well as the political, legal, and 
military discourses that sustain it – have frequently assumed its temporary nature. During 
the Second Arab-Israeli war in 1967, when Israel seized the Gaza Strip from Egypt, all of 
the West Bank up to the Jordan River (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, and the 
Golan Heights from Syria, its territory tripled in a matter of days. However, the “new” 
territories were never annexed; they remained contested territories.66 This, Neve Gordon, 
Eyal Weizman, and others have argued, allowed Israel to sidestep the Geneva 
Conventions concerning the responsibilities of an occupying power.67 Less tangibly, it 
also helped produce a certain fluidity regarding the hard reality of the Occupation and 
                                                
66 Also called the “Six-Day” or “Yom Kippur” war. For a history of the buildup to the 1967 war, see 
Cleveland and Burton, A History of the Modern Middle East, Fourth Edition (Philadelphia: Westview 
Press, 2009), 322-344. 
 
67 Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley: U of California P, 2008), 26; Eyal Weizman, Hollow 





how to contest it. Gordon suggests that following Israel’s defeat of the Arab armies, 
“Temporariness was… used to prevent opposition and to thwart Palestinian resistance.”68  
A similar application of “temporariness” was achieved during the Oslo Accords. 
The first of the Oslo agreements, the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements,” illustrates the central feature of all of the following 
agreements: namely, they were built on the premise of an interim agreement until the 
establishment, after the interim period, of a sovereign Palestinian state.69 The status of 
Jerusalem, the question of refugees, the geography of international borders, and relations 
with neighboring countries were all left unelaborated and unsettled, to be returned to at 
the end of the interim period.70 Moreover, the veritable maze of barriers, checkpoints, 
roadblocks, gates, dikes, trenches, and ‘flying’ checkpoints – what Eyal Weizman calls 
                                                
68 Gordon, Israel’s Occupation, 25. 
 
69 The Declaration of Principles reads: “The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current 
Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government 
Authority, the elected Council (the “Council”) for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the 
whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.” (“Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements,” September 13, 1993, accessed March 22, 2015, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles.aspx.) 
 
70 Sean McMahon identifies this dependence on temporariness in the Accords as evidence of the non-
radical nature of the Oslo Peace Process, and the continuation of business-as-usual in Palestine. He argues 
that it is indicative of the continuity, despite fanfare to the contrary, of Israel’s Zionist political intentions 
not to relinquish territory to Palestinians nor to recognize any Palestinian state – and of the complicity of 
the Palestinian leadership with Israel (McMahon, The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations, 5). The 
Oslo Accords have in effect encouraged the further entrenchment of the Occupation, as they enshrined in 
agreement the presence of Israeli bureaucracy and its military on the Palestinian territories. Despite the 
positive press, Israeli military control and surveillance after Oslo expanded via further division of 
Palestinian territory. Oslo II split the oPt into three “kinds” of areas: Areas A, B, and C. Critically the 
Accords also stipulated emphatically that the Palestinian National Authority must “establish a strong police 
force” responsible for “maintaining internal security and public order” even as it authorized the 
redeployment of Israeli military along the terms of the divisions between areas (“The Israeli-Palestinian 
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” (Oslo II), Article XIV, and Annex I Article IV, 







“structured chaos” – was made possible by the Oslo Accords. Effectively designed to 
maintain the difference between these territories, it thereby deepened and extended the 
Occupation Israel administered since 1967.71 If indeed the Oslo Accords succeeded in a 
further entrenchment of the Israeli Occupation of Palestinian Territories, they have done 
so in part by reaffirming the manner in which the Occupation was talked about and 
conceived. Central here has been a sense of impermanence – that the Occupation will not 
last.  
Historically and into the present day, this sense of impermanence has thus had 
profound effects on the ways in which Palestinians articulate and develop tools of 
struggle against Zionist dispossession. The state of limbo – the sense of the Occupation’s 
imminent dissipation, despite much historical and material evidence to the contrary – 
persists in Palestine today. While the terms used to describe or invoke struggle against 
the Occupation have changed over the decades, two widespread discourses in particular 
speak to the idea of the need to hold out for a limited time. The discourses of sabr 
[patience] and sumud [steadfastness, resilience] date back to before Israel’s defeat of the 
Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967, preceding the formal military 
occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the period between the nakba– the 
violence and expulsion that accompanied the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, 
and the 1967 war, strategies for dealing with what was then understood to be a temporary 
                                                
71 Weizman, Hollow Land, 5. Weizman’s observations expanding on this notion are worth quoting at 
length: “…[T]he very military, political, and economic logic of the Oslo process [was] one that sought to 
replace direct occupation and management of the occupied Palestinians, and thus direct responsibility for 
them, with the creation of a Palestinian Authority – a prosthetic political system propped up by the 
international community – and the delegation of local functions to it. According to this logic of governance, 
Israel remained in control of the Palestinians by regulating their movement through space, without resorting 
to managing their lives within the separate enclaves it sealed around their towns and villages. In assuming 
the duties of the day-to-day governance within the enclaves under its control, the Palestinian Authority has 





condition were first developed as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
organized abroad. Discourses around both sabr and sumud developed during this period 
and imagined the condition of estrangement from Palestine, via exile or occupation, to be 
temporary. Both were developed in order to strengthen Palestinian communities during a 
period understood to be interim.  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Palestinians and Arabs worldwide reeled from 
the defeat of Arab armies and the blow to Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s Pan-Arabism that this 
defeat had dealt. Salim Tamari suggests that an official iteration of sumud [steadfastness, 
resilience] began during this period “as a form of passive resistance.” According to 
Tamari, the application of sumud grew out of a “survivalist ideology,” which envisioned 
the economic dependency on and dispossession by Israel to be finite. In this iteration of 
Palestinian struggle, Palestinians needed “survival programs that would make life 
tolerable and leave the fabric of community life intact.”72 Sumud was a way of 
encouraging patience, resilience, and the setting aside of personal difference or personal 
gain for the sake of the larger struggle. This iteration of political strategy was based on 
the notion that “all Palestinians suffer equally under the yoke of occupation.”73 It was 
intended both to unite a populace that was disjointed – with populations living the misery 
of exile and occupation in different ways; and to connect a leadership, itself in exile, with 
its people.74 The discourse around sumud was also specifically connected to the 
                                                
72 Salim Tamari, “The Palestinian Movement in Transition: Historical Reversals and the Uprising,” Journal 
of Palestine Studies 20 (1991): 58-59. 
 
73 Tamari, “The Palestinian Movement,” 61. 
 
74 The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964. From 1967 to 1970, the PLO 
coordinated operations outside Palestine, from Jordan and Syria. Following the events of Black September 




commemoration of the sacrifices of the Palestinians living directly under occupation. In 
this way, leaders abroad could invoke solidarity with their countrymen, a-samdeen [the 
steadfast ones] under occupation. During the first intifada, discourses of sumud were 
additionally invoked to help sustain an “ascetic culture of resistance.”75 
Many of my interlocutors – musicians, fans, or bar owners, express skepticism 
and impatience about the proposition of patience, resilience, or asceticism accompanied 
with the expectation the Occupation will not last. They are extremely cynical about 
strategies or invocations of sabr [patience].76 For example, consider these lyrics, dripping 
with sarcasm, in a track released in the immediate aftermath of the 2014 Israeli 
bombardment of the Gaza Strip:  
zay el jahsh lazem intah enta w ana/ 
zay el hamameh ʿal beit dalak sabr enta w ana 
 
[You and me, like beasts, we keep goring/ 
You and me, like the pigeons on the roof, got to be patient]77 
 
                                                                                                                                            
PLO relocated to Tunis where they remained until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. (See for 
example, Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict [Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994].) 
 
75 Taraki, “Enclave Micropolis,” 17. 
 
76 In specific, political terminology, this probably reflects the fact that the idea of a one-state solution is 
becoming much more prevalent and accepted in the West Bank since the end of the Second Intifada (Near 
Eastern Consulting, “Survey: Seventy Percent of Palestinians Support One State Solution,” February 24, 
2007, accessed December 9, 2015, https://electronicintifada.net/content/survey-70-percent-palestinians-
support-one-state-solution/6773). I want to focus my discussion here on the affect produced by specific 
political discourses, however, not on explicit political answers, on which my data in any case is insufficient 
to be conclusive. The point for me continues to be that these politics are in formation. This being the case, I 
have not pursued definitive answers about the percentage of musicians or fans that support a one or two 
state solution. Nonetheless I do not find it inaccurate to interpret some general inclinations affected in the 
ways in which lyricists refuse strategies of sabr and sumud. 
 
77 “Quboor el Qarn” [Graves of the Century]: “Shua - Quboor Al Qarn (produced by Boikutt),” Sound 






A good example of the dark sense of humor in much second wave rap, in this track Shua 
spins a trope about staying patient with dignity into a caricature of the pathetic position of 
senseless repetition and stagnation. Pigeons’ inability to imagine anything but sitting on 
the roof of his house and the beast’s stubborn charge are juxtaposed with the mode of 
sabr or patience. In the wake of Israel’s 2014 attack on Gaza, the lyrics are a fresh (if 
extremely cynical) take on discourses of “holding on.” Needless to say, there is also a 
quite pronounced sting in them – which may be alternatively alienating, refreshing, or 
incomprehensible depending on the listener. 
 Less dark but equally frustrated, the lyrics in Stormtrap’s “Zey ma sar mbareh” 
[“What Happened Yesterday”] also refuse the narrative of patient waiting.78 
Significantly, Stormtrap refuses sabr while connecting it to being bought: pointing to 
negative uses of sabr in the context of Palestinian politics: 
 Linno el waqt ʿam yisbaq 
 Biqillak jay el salam bas asbar 
Bidak tistana? Hay el hitat biʿamorha ma bazbot 
Biydfaʿlak qad ma biddak ʿashan tiskot 
 
[Because time is racing 
He keeps telling you peace is coming just be patient 
You want to wait? These plans never succeed 
He’ll pay you as much as you want to keep quiet.]79 
 
As Tamari duly notes, the usage of sumud by the PLO and its foreign sponsors eventually 
lost its revolutionary meaning. In 1978, Arab State leaders gathered in Baghdad decided 
                                                
78 “Stormtrap – Zey ma sar mbare7,” YouTube video, 3:21, posted by “Ramallahunderground,” June 10, 
2010, accessed December 9, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZAXczID4q4s&ab_channel=Ramallahunderground. Translation of the 
title provided by the author. 
 
79 Arabic lyrics and their translation provided by the artist and published in Rayya El Zein, ed., “Exploring 






to aid the “sumud” of the oPt with cash in the amount of $150 million annually. In doing 
so, Tamari suggests that the phrase, “daʿm sumud ahluna fi al-dakhil [in support of the 
steadfastness of our people inside] became the official Arab ‘guilt money’ for abandoning 
the confrontation with Israel.”80 Tamari argues that via this appropriation, the discourse 
of sumud was transformed, from passive resistance to “aggressive nonresistance.”81 In 
this way, the uses of sumud by the PLO and its foreign partners came to be described 
with cynicism. That is, the transformation of struggle in discourses of sabr and sumud 
into something that can be bought showed itself to be completely evacuated from both 
revolutionary ethos and liberatory praxis. Tamari writes: 
The word sumud became a term of cynical self-denigration often used as a 
mocking reference to the nouveau-riche recipients of patronage money. 
Only to the external observer did it retain any positive content of 
glorification thus enhancing its irony.82 
 
In his lyrics reflecting the post-Oslo reality of the West Bank, above, Stormtrap points to 
similar connotations of corruption and buying off within the discourses of sabr and 
patience.  
Tamari also points out that, concerned as they have been with Palestinians staying 
on the land, discourses sabr and sumud have also been tied to a particular agricultural 
                                                




82 Ibid, 63. To be sure, as the First Intifada in many ways rebelled against the nepotism and elitism that 
characterized these years of the PLO and its foreign donors, the valences of sumud changed again. It was 
during this period that the revolutionary socialist arm of the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) actively reinvented an application of sumud in order to reflect changing political 
dynamics. They invoked sumud as an official, broad-based strategy for confronting the Israeli Occupation. 
Specifically combatting the problem of the efficacy of Israeli torture techniques on Palestinian prisoners in 
Israeli detention, sumud became, under the leadership of the PFLP, a set of strategies through which 
prisoners refused to confess under torture or threat of torture. Prisoners shared torture techniques and 
strategies to resist them. Demonstrating sumud by not confessing became a badge of honor whose public 
recognition the PFLP actively promoted. (See Lena Meari, “Sumud: A Palestinian Philosophy of 
Confrontation in Colonial Prisons,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 113[2014]: 547-578. I am indebted to 




imagination. Sabr, which is also the Arabic word for a species of cactus, conjures the 
patient determination with which Palestinians remain on their land.83 The olive tree – an 
obvious visual placeholder for Palestine – as well as the cactus, wheat, dates, and citrus 
have all been mobilized at different times to evoke Palestinian land and Palestinian 
struggle.84 Given this agricultural imagination, the human figure associated with sabr, the 
Palestinian fellah [peasant; fellaheen, pl., fellaha, feminine] and the traditions associated 
with rural Palestinian society, like embroidery, handicrafts, cuisine, the dance of the 
dabkeh, among others have similarly come to represent Palestinian struggle. 
Contemporary invocations of the figures of sabr, especially as found in the search 
for “authentic” expression, can be found encouraged in contemporary art scenes in 
Palestine and internationally where Palestinians artists are featured, especially where 
female artists are concerned. These may be manifest in the production of traditional 
embroidery or in wearing traditional clothing. For instance, Palestinian-UK hip hop artist 
Shadia Mansour’s decision to perform in the traditional Palestinian robe or thob, can be 
seen as an example of this kind of manifestation of sabr and the imagery of the resilience 
of traditional Palestinian society that it evokes. 
 
 
                                                
83 Ted Swedenburg describes the practical use of the sabr in identifying Palestinian homesteads well: 
“When Palestinians sight cactus plants (sabr) on the Israeli landscape, they know immediately that an Arab 
village formerly stood on that spot. Arab farmers planted the cacti to fence off their property… Palestinians 
claim that the Israeli authorities, despite unceasing efforts, cannot eradicate sabr. Even when burned to the 
ground, the plant always springs back to life. Cactus has thus become a folk metaphor for the indelible 
Arab character of the land. Since sabr means “patience,” it equally connotes persistent Arab steadfastness 
on Palestinian territory.” (Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the 
Palestinian National Past [Fayetteville: U of Arkansas P, 2003], 62.) 
 





Figure 3.1: “Shadia Mansour in thob.” Shadia Mansour often performs in a thob or traditional 




Tamari rightly points out that the uses of both sabr and sumud, relying as they do on a 
romantic notion of the land and on traditional Palestinian society, have often been quite 
socially conservative in their application.85 Tamari writes:  
 
  In the West Bank, sumud also evolved as a form of asserting the 
traditional virtues of rural society (attachment to the land, the fecundity of 
Palestinian women, and self-sufficiency). In effect, there was something 
very retrogressive in this attitude. Attachment to the land took the form of 
an idealistic glorification of peasant society that never existed in reality.86  
 
For her part, Sherene Seikaly has fascinatingly documented how in the 1930s, Palestinian 
middle classes and elites actively excised laborers and peasants from national narratives 
of what constituted an upstanding Palestinian and who contributed to Palestinian society. 
She shows how it is only in the 1940s,  
                                                
85 The fact that public opinion in Ramallah is increasingly conservative came up frequently in my 
conversations with interlocutors, especially venue owners. The dominant political discourses, which I 
suggest second wave rappers refuse and invert, have real material implications – especially on the privately 
managed venues in which second wave concerts are increasingly held. For example, in April 2014, the 
municipality closed, to considerable media fanfare, a popular restaurant-bar called “Beit Aneeseh” (it 
reopened as “Radio” in January 2015). When I arrived in July it had been closed for nearly three months 
and was still a regular subject of conversation. The managers of Beit Aneeseh referenced social 
conservatism and political infighting as responsible for the (unexplained) closure. They explain that when 
public opinion pressures as-sulta, the Authority responds by occasionally closing bars and restaurants. 
When this plays out in the environment of the political divide between Fatah and Hamas, the two main 
Palestinian political parties, that political rivalry can and has been literally played out on the backs of 
Ramallah’s leisure scene. As Sami Said of Beit Aneeseh explained, 
 
Aneeseh became like a hanger. Everybody could hang his own problems on it. Say 
Hamas has a problem with Fatah or the PA. So Hamas starts writing on its websites that 
the PA is responsible for the opening of places like Beit Aneeseh, and that therefore the 
PA encourages licentiousness, things that are haram [forbidden] and so on.  
 
In other words, the existence of the bar became the terrain through which local political parties vociferously 
articulated their politics. When the municipality closes a drinking establishment to prove it does not 
succumb to vice, it is engaging ideas about the proper forms of politics informed by traditional ideas of 
“Arab Palestinian culture” (which is here implicitly Muslim, it should be noted). The prevalence of this 
conservatism, or at least this conservative reiteration of identity and culture is not that different from the 
conservative turns in other Arab and Muslim countries/politics (see Tarik Sabry, Cultural Encounters in the 
Arab World: On Media, the Modern, and Everyday Life [London: IB Tauris, 2010], 48). 
 






[i]n the face of both wartime constraints and the rapid erosion of political 
possibilities [that] men of capital expanded their understanding of the 
middle class to include what they called the authentic Bedouin and fellah 
[peasant], who they feverishly and belatedly sought to represent.87 
 
These considerations of the discourse of sumud and the incorporation of what are today 
the idyllic images of Palestinian struggle lead me to the observation that the discourses of 
Palestinian struggle are socialized in specific ways. Specifically, I suggest that they are 
“classed” in specific ways. When I say “classed,” I mean a specific socio-economic idea 
of Palestine and its caretakers are mobilized to serve a specific political imagination.  
In Chapter One, I suggested that the neoliberal orientalism of the mainstream 
press and US state department cultural programming racializes representations of Arab 
rappers on world stages. That is, by blackwashing, neoliberal orientalism mobilizes ideas 
of “black”ness in order to understand and incorporate Arab politics. Here, I suggest a 
political imagination that imagines and idealizes the Palestinian peasant class is at work 
in much discourse about Palestinian struggle. Discourses of sabr and sumud, especially 
through representations of turath [heritage] illustrate this classed imagination vis-à-vis the 
fellaheen [peasantry]. The problem with this political imagination, especially the 
declarations and performance of specific ideas of “Palestinian-ness” – in addition to the 
conservative overtures that Tamari identifies, is that the romance of these ideas persist 
despite the changing shape of Palestinian politics, continued land dispossession, and 
economic realities.  
This is especially significant when we recognize that the once widespread 
experience of the fellah tending his plot of land within an extended family/kin network is 
                                                




no longer the reality for a majority of Palestinians, an increasing number of whom are 
urban, laboring poor. The reality of Palestinian dispossession means that most 
Palestinians today are not farmers but laborers, who sell their labor to Zionist (or 
predatory Palestinian, Arab, and other transnational) capital to survive. It is in this 
context that the refusal of second wave rappers to reproduce the discourse of sabr and 
sumud as attached to images of turath has the capacity to be politically powerful.88 
By observing that second wave rappers also largely avoid performances or 
associations of turath, I mean that they avoid performing widely-recognizable Palestinian 
identity. Almost always dressed in t-shirts, hoodie sweatshirts, and jeans (rarely sporting 
even a kaffiyeh) second wave rappers are largely not interested in being identified first as 
Palestinian. On the contrary, they speak of a constant negotiation with international 
curators, with the press, and with fans in which they insist on being recognized as 
musicians first, not Palestinians. Similarly, their recollections of the kind of music they 
like reflect this political choice. This explains for example, the refusal of the “comic 
                                                
88 This is not to suggest that these aesthetic choices disavow the insistence for the land, the oldest and most 
fundamental of Palestinian political demands. I am suggesting that there are ways in which romantic 
posturing about the land and its caretakers has distanced political discussion and strategy from the reality of 
the existing relationship between the historical class of the Palestinian fellaheen and the land. That is, there 
are ways of celebrating the farmer that mask the contemporary challenges she faces. Some second wave 
lyrical work rejects this distance between the romance in political discourse and the material reality.  
I have been asked here to expand on how this critique of romanticism applies to the demand of 
“return” for Palestinian refugees. I maintain that similarly, any consideration of Palestinian return needs to 
acknowledge the material and economic changes over the last sixty years. Without a serious restructuring 
of capitalism in Palestine (and elsewhere), the influx of both capital and unskilled labor when return is 
achieved will be very trying on the existing population, one that has already suffered considerably under 
occupation. This material analysis should also apply to the contexts from which refugees will return. Of 
course, the political discourses of resilience and return have also been used, in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and 
the Gulf States as excuses not to integrate Palestinians into the local economy and society. This doesn’t 
mean that “return” should cease to be a central demand. But, alongside the narratives I’m outlining here, 
the goal of return is frequently romanticized, a romance which is achieved by not considering the material 
realities of the Palestinian economy and its political geography. The hard-hitting lyrics in Ramallah 
Underground’s “Khaleeni ʿAyeesh” (discussed in Chapter Two) excoriate the political posturing of the 






nationalism” some listeners located in DAM’s work. Haykal explains his reluctance to 
embrace bands of the “first wave” of Palestinian rap, MCs like Rami GB and DAM as 
follows: 
[This music had] a very strong Palestinian character [tabaʿa] that was 
very close to the general taste, or the taste of weddings, etc. As part of the 
middle class, my taste was closer to pop and Western music. I wasn’t 
accepting wedding music, to me that was trash, even though I grew up in 
Al-Bireh [outside of Ramallah]. Rami GB and DAM were close to this 
Palestinian character that I didn’t use to like. 
 
Here, Haykal admits he felt more at home in more globalized cultural contexts “closer to 
pop and Western music” – and was less interested in the outward, recognizable 
representations of “Palestinian” identity in some popular culture and music. His statement 
“to me that was trash” could be understood as an anti-populist bias (one not that 
dissimilar from the refusal of “pop” culture elsewhere).89 But it could also be interpreted 
as a refusal of the stereotyped image of “Palestine” and “Palestinian-ness” which have 
long framed both Palestinian cultural production and politics, and which Haykal 
distinctly felt did not represent him.90  
The distancing from traditional celebratory discourses of sabr, turath and the 
fellah, need not necessarily trigger an aloof, “comprador” middle class image for Haykal 
and his peers.91 Nor should it necessarily attribute to them an anti-peasant political 
position. On the contrary, their refusal of the traditional political narratives attached to 
the land and the agricultural imagination may more compassionately reflect the continued 
                                                
89 Simon Frith, Performing Rites: On the Value of Popular Music (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1996), 3-
20. 
 
90 Helga Tawil-Souri has made this argument. I discuss her work in the Introduction to the dissertation. 
 





dispossession and re-entrenched distance between young Palestinians today and the land 
itself. So when Shua raps cynically in the middle of the 2014 bombardment of Gaza in 
the lyrics reproduced above, he is specifically lambasting a political imagination that 
exalts agricultural imagery and staying steadfast on the land as the stalwart Palestinian 
ideal. He turns it inside out, stripping the humanity from sabr, rendering it dumb, 
repetitive, self-destructive. 
To be very clear here, I do not consider that the musicians of the second wave of 
Palestinian rap deny their Palestinian identity. These rappers and their fans identify as 
Palestinian. They just don’t feel the need to perform this identity outwardly. Musicians 
feel that when they do, it closes off the possibility of being understood as a musician first 
and foremost. Additionally, it pressures them to articulate politics and identity in specific 
ways: this they eschew – not their actual identity or the real struggle against the 
continued dispossession of their land by the Occupation or Zionist settlers. My point is 
the dominant political discourses around reclaiming the land in Palestine are increasingly 
out of touch with the material reality under neoliberal occupation. They continue to rely 
on historical tropes that do not today represent the majority of Palestinians.92 Otherwise 
well-researched, left-leaning Palestinian policy papers regularly advocate a return to 
“sustenance farming” with very little acknowledgement of the fact that this is literally 
                                                
92 Moreover, the exoticization of Palestinian land and its caretaker the fellah, in discourses and 
deliberations of Palestinian struggle have often come at the expense of the experience of both the refugee 
and the exile. Besides their sometimes radical potential, these discourses often envisioned a framework for 
ideal Palestinian being that is completely untenable to most Palestinians, be they internally displaced, or 
refugees in other countries. The continuing prevalence of the idea of the fellah as the Palestinian mode of 
resistance par excellence creates an idea of Palestinian struggle inaccessible for both the refugee and the 
exile. That is, if the Palestinian struggle is imagined as being fought by the peasant on the land, what room 
does this leave for political engagement for people not on the land? The answer historically has been 
sumud: just hold out until you get on land and can resist like the fellah. My argument is that today, all the 






impossible for the vast majority of Palestinians in the economic and material landscape of 
the West Bank post-Oslo, and perhaps only partially possible for some parts of an urban 
upper-middle class. 93 When these rappers treat representations of turath and Palestinian 
identity with some disdain, I think they are reflecting the urban reality of Palestinian 
dispossession today, not disrespecting the historical peasantry.  
Furthermore, considering the history of discursively incorporating, holding up, 
and excluding the peasantry that Seikaly has laid out, we can see how the second wave’s 
refusal of these discourses is part of a longer history of the Palestinian middle classes 
incorporating or leaving out the peasantry. In other words in both cases (the period 
Seikaly addresses in the 1930s and 1940s and mine 2004-2014), this incorporation or 
exclusion is not actually about the peasantry, but about what works as a political symbol 
for Palestinian struggle. The rappers are saying that the romanticized construction of the 
fellah and his [sic] society – what frequently, even today, constitutes “Palestinianness” – 
does not represent them. This doesn’t have to be disingenuous or politically deplorable. 
In fact considering the extent to which this romancitized fellah continues to be held up in 
Palestinian political discourse, refusing that figure and the imagined trappings of this 
society could actually be politically productive: demanding alternatives in its stead that 




                                                
93 I explore this more in Rayya El Zein, “Re-evaluating Capital and Labor in a ‘Resistance Economy’ in the 








 In addition to discourses of sabr, sumud, and turath, discourses of mouqawameh 
[resistance] in Palestine are also classed, though differently. If sabr and sumud invoke an 
imagined peasantry, mouqawameh similarly relies on a classed imagination, but here 
more closely attached to the urban, working class, than to the peasantry. This classed 
imagination of more valiant resistance existing in poverty allows West Bank residents 
generally to readily identify (and romanticize, actually) citizens of Gaza as the real agents 
of resistance. It is the same imagination that encourages the Ramallah middle classes to 
locate more authentic resistance in the stone-throwing youth of the refugee camps. Both 
citizens of Gaza and denizens of refugee camps, in contradistinction to the middle classes 
of Ramallah, regularly bear the brunt of Israel’s security operations, are less upwardly 
mobile financially, and at the same time occasionally defend themselves physically.  
All my interlocutors refused the notion that their work may be resistance or 
should be referred to as such. Haykal referenced the distance between Arabic rap and the 
Palestinian “street” when he told me, 
I never wrote about myself “I am resisting” or “I am resistant” 
[mouqawem]. The looks you will get from the street here will be like: Who 
are you kidding, man? [inta esh tithabal?] It’s impossible for someone to 
come down [and rap] “I am resisting” if the street rejects you [tafef 
ʿaleyk].94 
 
                                                
94 Testimonies like this one are the primary reason I do not find more recent assessments of pleasure or 
consumption “as resistance” under Occupation in the context of the growing middle class in Ramallah to be 
a compelling alternative to the asceticism of sumud. That is, my interlocutors were much more ready to 
disavow the existence of resistance at all in their work than they were to claim the presence of resistance in 





His testimony reflected sentiments articulated by most of my interlocutors. This 
disavowal, I perceive, is part a deferral of respect, part an assertion of cynicism. In the 
summer and fall of 2014, “mouqawameh” most immediately evoked throwing stones and 
firing rockets, i.e., physical resistance. I heard many iterations of, my music “isn’t 
resistance like throwing stones is”; or hosting or attending a concert is “hardly launching 
a rocket.”  
The second wave refusal of discourses of mouqawameh may also reflect their 
recognition of the romanticization of urban poverty as resistance. Consider Boikutt’s 
lyrics off his most recent album in the closing track “Akher Kilmeh” [Last Word]:95 
Biysawrou abyad w aswad dakhl ras “Old School” 
ʿarfeen ino el kuffiyeh ʿarabiyeh bas wallah el mukhayam mish “cool” 
 
[They film in black and white, pretending to be “old school” 
we know that the kuffiyeh is Arab, but I swear the camp is not “cool”]. 
 
In these lines, Boikutt directly juxtaposes trappings of resistance (the kuffiyeh) with its 
current romanticized location (the refugee camp) while critiquing those who seek to 
appropriate political struggle or political reality for their own benefit. The camp is “not 
cool” means they are not there to be appropriated as cultural capital – political or 
aesthetic.  
The lyrics and performatic elements in second wave rap disavow discourses of 
resistance and refuse to embody traditional representations of “Palestinian-ness” that are 
classed in certain ways. If this is the case, what are the implicit or built class positions 
assembled through these refusals and disavowals? As I will explore in the next and last 
                                                
95 “Akher Kilmeh,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 3:28, posted by “Muqataʿa boikutt,” accessed November 
14, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/boikutt/wtc64ttewvtm. (The track is off the Haiwan Nateq album, 





section, second wave concert culture is middle class, urban, globalized, and relatively 
elite cultural production. That said, I see no reason to assume that the appeal of its lyrical 
content should be confined to this demographic. Especially since, as I hinted to in the 
beginning of this section, evidence of politics in formation is most obvious in second 
wave lyrical work when it describes the political and economic contradictions of life in 
Ramallah. 
Consider Boikutt’s description in “Risaleh min Muqataʿa” [Letter from 
Boikutt].96 
I’m reading in the paper 
About roads newly paved 
Speed bumps removed, a lot of other useful stuff! 
Certain individuals benefit 
Funding from here and there 
Organizations are plentiful, but freedom is far-fetched 
… 
Let them wait for foreign aid until they die 
Spinning in circles within the apartheid wall 
Into unlimited mazes, taking up unlimited space 
That are renewed to fit settlement expansion 
Violation, occupation 
But not for everyone 
There are people here in Palestine living “the good life” 
I don’t know what they’re think 
Seems like they don’t know one day we’ll be gone 
And all these shops will close.97 
 
In this piece that he regularly performs, Boikutt paints a quotidian picture of Ramallah (“I 
sit reading the paper…”) wherein the inequality and corruption in the city’s political 
reality are almost banal, so regular are they in his perception of the current landscape. 
                                                
96 “Boikutt – Risaleh Min Muqataa,” YouTube video, 1:40, posted by “arabhop,” November 26, 2011, 
accessed December 8, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RVMMq-lcBw0&ab_channel=arabhop.  
 






Disdain and criticism of money, shopping, and the commercialization of Ramallah 
frequently appear in second wave lyrics, as do characterizations of the city as fertile 
ground for corruption, coldness, and anonymity. The hypocrisy of the former is 
frequently put into relief by juxtaposing these neoliberal elements with the role of 
Ramallah as “de facto” capital – as supposed seat of resistance since it houses the 
administrative offices of the Palestinian National Authority. For example, Hakyal offers 
in his track “Haqqan” [Truthfully]: 
Sigara bara: lefet hawa 
ʿImara qarabat tetsawa 
Guevara wallah ma biddho yatsawq 
Ramallah sharnaqah ili batbawaʿ el saytara el wiskha 
Khush nsban fawran el saytara btskha 
 
A cigarette outside: a change of air 
Another building about to be leveled 
I swear [Che] Guevara doesn’t want to be taken to market 
Ramallah is a cocoon that cradles corrupt control. 
Hide behind a monument, and control stains immediately.98 
 
Here, Haykal takes us with him as he goes out for a cigarette break. In front of him, 
another building is about to be leveled to make way for a shopping complex. Revolution 
does not want to go shopping, though, he offers. And then the “Ramallah Bubble” 
emerges in his recollections as a cocoon holding corruption in. How does listening to 
lyrics like these function? The words themselves point to politics in formation: not quite 
calls to action, articulating shared observations about changes and developments in the 
city can nonetheless have powerful political effect.  
                                                
98 “Haqqan (Prod. Boikutt),” Sound Cloud audio recording, 2:16, posted by “Haykal,” accessed December 
9, 2015, https://Sound Cloud.com/haykalonol/haqqan-prod-boikutt. Arabic lyrics posted by the author at 




In Chapter Two I proposed tracing the emergence of tarab as a way to re-center 
the processes of listening to rap as significant. In our interview, second wave rapper 
Haykal specifically noted that listening is a political process that can yield different 
results. For example, Haykal offered that listening to DAM’s lyrics was a political 
process with limited potential. He explained: 
DAM have this lyric, “Why are children free everywhere else, but I don’t 
have freedom?” I used to repeat this line for like six months after I heard 
it. But then I thought about it some more and it occurred to me that the 
children of the world aren’t free and actually this phrase is really 
dangerous. Your capacity [istʿabak] for resistance itself really disappears 
here. You erased the idea that there are children that are much more 
oppressed than the Palestinians, and you’ve made it so that the Palestinian 
deserves more respect than the rest. Now you’ve become like everybody 
else. You didn’t take me anywhere. You’re repeating the same thing, like 
Najwah Karam.99 You didn’t do anything with brain. You just repeated 
what everyone says, and got me to repeat it. 
 
His description of listening to this first wave band hinges on the lyrics not opening new 
ways to consider his place within the larger horizon of political struggle. On the other 
hand, Haykal’s description of the political process of listening to the Ramallah 
Underground (the first wave band that much of the second wave looks up to) is very 
different. Boikutt’s lyrics were for him much more stimulating, intellectually, and as a 
result, stronger politically.  
When Boikutt says this line, “aktar moustahlekeen lil bidaʿa/ fa 
tarakoulna el hayat” [we’re the biggest consumers, that’s why they keep 
us alive], he solves a lot of personal problems for me. I couldn’t 
understand before […] But when he gives me the idea of economics: [he 
tells me] basically ‘don’t think that you’ve performed some great 
resilience [ino samadet]. Don’t think that you are strong.’  
 
                                                





Haykal’s reflections on the political processes of listening locate the appeal of the 
Ramallah Underground in their ability to articulate lyrics (and Palestinian politics) in a 
way that opened avenues for further exploration, not repetition. This band offered a kind 
of expression that encouraged questions not mantras. Importantly, this feature is central 
to the band’s ability to “fill the head” – or to produce a certain kind of political feeling. 
 
* * * 
 
 In this section I have endeavored to draw out some of the innovation in second 
wave rap lyrics in order to locate how this music produces specific tarab. I have 
suggested that refusals or inversions of dominant discourses of Palestinian struggle can 
readily be found in second wave lyrics, which likely has wider demographic reach than 
live concert culture in Ramallah. Moreover the political potency of this lyrical innovation 
may be able to produce that feeling of “filling the head” because the dominant narratives 
of Palestinian struggle, classed as they are in specific ways, cannot or do not reflect the 
changing, material Palestinian reality. So, this lyrical work may be significant in the ways 
in which it contributes to political discourse. For now however, this lyrical innovation is 
indicative of politics in process: not yet the formation of actual political positions. 
Importantly, the appeal of these lyrics and the rejection of romance in Palestinian 
political discourse cannot be attached to a specific class identity. This is so despite the 
often exclusionary nature of second wave concerts themselves. In the next section, I 




of tarab and the political feeling unique to the second wave. As I will explore, the ability 
of these lyrics to fill the head depends on a negotiation of self and community.  
 
 
Part Three: Al-misfah, Tarab, and Alienation 
 
Al misfah [the filter] 
 
 In Chapter Two, leaning on Judith Becker’s work on listening, I suggested that a 
lyrical analysis of music in the absence of a consideration of how this music is felt in 
performance promises to maintain a Cartesian split between mind and body. Having 
explored how second wave rappers innovate lyrically, my concern is now to round out 
that analysis with an examination of how this music is felt. Here I will build on the model 
built in Chapter Two, which offered that tracing the building of tarab in live concerts is 
an ethnographic technique to recognize ways of being with others that are politically 
potent. In developing this model, I expanded on Gatens and Lloyd’s explication of 
Spinoza: especially the idea of the inseparability of individuality and sociability. That is, 
central to my proposition to trace the emergence of tarab as a way to track politically 
potent sociality is the idea that one’s sense of self is conceptualized through one’s body, 
which is always felt in relation to other bodies.  
 
Thursday. I arrived at La Wain around 10 with an Italian woman I had met 
at a capoeira class and a [male, Palestinian] friend of friends I’d been out 
with before. The cover was 30 NIS [around 7 USD]. Our male companion 




The Italian and I sat at a bar and ordered a beer. It was easy to hear each 
other above the [recorded] music playing.  
 
By the time Boikutt took the mic I lost track of the Italian, having moved 
up within the first two rows of people; energy was concentrated up by the 
stage, maybe a dozen people, very close together, standing, dancing and 
responding to the MC. All were focused forward, listening. It was very 
warm; cigarette smoke was thick.  
 
Despite the warmth, the energy throughout the bar had holes and gaps in 
it. Even close to the stage responses were not uniform. A few people 
danced, a few people smoked, some smiled and tried to make eye contact 
with the MCs, obviously positively engaged. With others body language 
was more reserved. Obvious interest. Boikutt clearly had their attention. 
But it was like each of us was in her own space. Arms folded. Straight 
faces. [See Figure 2] 
 
The crowd was less concentrated immediately behind me. Thin, even. 
People chatting, laughing, sitting, standing, disinterested, allowing other 
things to pull them away from the stage. By 11:30 the musicians had 
stopped. There was no encore. Police crowded the door on my way out, 
confirming suspicions they were responsible for the evening’s abrupt 
finish.100  
 
The concert at La Wain was Boikutt’s release of his album Haiwan Nateq (see Figure 3). 
It happened the same evening the Qalandia International Festival concluded. Earlier in 
the evening, the Ramallah Cultural Palace was mostly full for the indie rock concert of 
Bil3ax, hosting a couple hundred listeners. After the concert, groups of friends connected 
and expanded to greet the weekend. Several hours later at La Wain, there were maybe 
fifty people by the time the concert started, around twenty-five acting as a group of  
engaged samiʿah [listeners]. Even this group dwindled as the concert continued, some 
allowing themselves to be distracted by socializing, going for fresh air, etc. The group  
 
 
                                                






Figure 3.2: “Haiwan Nateq release concert.” La Wain pub Ramallah, November 13, 2014. Photo by 
Alaa Gh.101 
 
that remained gathered tightly to the stage, but conducted a heterogeneous exchange with 
the performers, where their reactions were anything but uniform.  
 The tarab that was present at La Wain that night was not built on a revolutionary 
ethos that appeals to Palestinian identity or anti-Occupation politics in order to engage, 
attract, or gather the largest audience. Rather the rhythmic union built in this concert, like  
in other “second wave” rap concerts, was rather premised on the slightest bit of irritation, 
which was actually designed to alienate a portion of a given audience. This rhythm of 
                                                





filtering is developed through various techniques, some of them sonic, built into the 
music, and some of them performatic, enacted gesturally by the singers/MCs. Sonic 
filtering elements may include sound that’s just a little bit too loud for the space, unclear 
vocals, generated noise. Gesturally, MCs may incorporate a degree of disdain for the 
audience or the fact that they are performing into their act. In our discussions, Al-Nather 
confided that an influential part of Boikutt’s performances, that he’s been paying 
attention to since he was a young teen, is that “when [Boikutt] performs, it’s completely 
his own personality. He doesn’t give a fuck. [It’s not like with other bands] you can see 
how they’re fucking acting.” Similarly, as I explore in Beirut in concerts of Touffar, an 
enactment of disgust is central in the filtering process which produces tarab.  
 Based on my experience at the Haiwan Nateq release concert described above and 
others, I want to suggest that the exchanges in second wave rap concerts can be 
understood as a negative call and response. In Chapter Two, I pointed to the centrality of 
call and response in the building tarab in rap concerts. Negative call and response is a 
variation on that tradition of the rapper calling out and inviting a response of engagement. 
When an MC starts off too loud, or the sound is not clear and audience members leave, 
this too is a call and response, but of disengagement, from which musicians learn and feel 
with their audience. While a balance is required so as not to alienate all listeners, 
successful negative call and response succeeds in making more engaged intimacy, but 
with a smaller percentage of the audience that has gathered. That is, the exchange, despite 
being built on initial invitations to disengage, is nonetheless an active communication 




field notes quoted above. None of the people I came into the concert with were with me 
during the musical climax of the event. 
 This concert is a productive jumping point to explore this musical philosophy in 
more detail. The concept of filtering is Boikutt’s; and the word al-misfah [the filter] titles 
the opening track on his latest album. Boikutt describes how a kind of filtering in his 
work may function by quoting a phrase from his own lyrics: bastafizzek ʿa beat kharra 
zay wijjek. Hard to render in English, the phrase literally translates “I dare to impose on 
you a shitty beat, like your face,” or more lyrically perhaps: “The shitty beat’s in your 
shitty face.”102 Boikutt explains, 
[T]his phrase expresses, if you like, a little about all of my work. […On 
my recent album] the name of the [first] track is “Al Misfah” which means 
“the filter.” This is the concept. It’s part of my message [khitabi], part of 
my “discourse.”103 I like filtering [al-filtera] in music. I believe in this. It’s 
not necessary for everybody to like what I’m doing. There needs to be a 
conscious reaction. Some people hate it, some people like it, some people, 
whatever no reaction. [These reactions] allow me to process, they give me 
a kind of tracking [iqtifaʾ] of my own work. It relieves me that there is a 
real response from people; that they aren’t just waiting for me to finish 
and then clapping politely. No, there are people who like it, and people 
who don’t. There’s “filtering” that happens. It brings out the reality of 
what’s happening. 
 
You don’t aim to reach as many people as possible? 
 
No, it’s not that. It’s just that it won’t work. And I’m not going to change 
myself and how I do things [rasi] in order to be able to reach everyone. 
That’s the point. It’s important to me to do the work that I like, how I like 
it, and that’s why I make music anyway. To connect what’s here [in his 
head] to the outside world... I would love it if everybody liked my work, 
obviously. That wouldn’t upset me. But I believe it’s not possible.104  
                                                
102 “Qabl w Baʿl,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 5:15, posted by “Muqataʿa boikutt,” accessed November 
14, 2015 https://Sound Cloud.com/boikutt/qabl-w-bal. 
 
103 Words in quotations were originally articulated in English. 
 
104 Ticket price for the concert is noted above. Some of this revenue will go to the artist. None of the 
musicians I spoke with in Ramallah make a living exclusively off of their music. They all hold down day 





Here, Boikutt explains how istafaza (or disrupting, disturbing, imposing) and 
filtera (filtering), structure the building of rapport with an audience. Importantly, 
he articulates this as a process between him and a listener [bastafazak], not 
something that happens in a vacuum or in isolation [bastafaz is the verb without a 
direct object]. At the same time, he recognizes and respects, in fact, that this 
rapport built through the music is not an open invitation to just any listener. 
 The rhythm of filtering is built on a negative call and response and actively 
negotiates solitude and togetherness. Second wave rappers and fans consistently recount 
how the iteration of a specific line or a particular flow sequence stops them in their 
tracks, reaches something inside, and shakes out a conceptualization of consciousness 
(wahi, is frequently the term invoked) the listeners knew they possessed but were not 
aware of. The realization that someone else not only feels similarly but articulates it 
powerfully can be overwhelming, the effect of which is frequently not increased 
community but solitude. This explains in part why the filtering philosophy behind this 
music is so appropriate. The tarab I am recognizing is a sort of reverberating return to the 
self that is always connected to the presence of others, even as it actively keeps them at 
bay.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
primarily disseminated on social media and thus is, for the most part, free of charge. In my research, 
musicians making money off of their music did not come up a lot in Ramallah or Beirut, but it did all the 
time in Amman. The musician’s career and the monetization of hip hop and other forms of alternative 







Figure 3.3: “Event Flyer, for the Haiwan Nateq release concert.” The text reads: “A speaking animal 
at La Wain? Boikutt performs with Julmud, Shua, Dakn, and Al-Nather, Thursday 13 November.”  
 
 




Moreover, it is this tension of feelings – disgust, disdain, cynicism, impatience 
irreverence, anger mixed with the delight, surprise, and relief of hearing another 
articulate it, – that constitute the “emotional blending” in this tarab. That is, a feeling 
articulated by an MC of disgust or cynicism about the neoliberal incursions in Ramallah, 
for example, changes when it is heard and received by active listeners. When heard, that 
disgust or cynicism, can relieve, give pleasure, excite or encourage the listener, who 
having heard out loud and delivered powerfully something she thought was hers alone, is 
forced to recognize others were similarly moved by the music. This surprise or relief 
points to how clearly second wave lyrics diverge from mainstream conceptualizations of 
Palestinian politics and just how thirsty audiences are for alternatives that more closely 
reflect their own observations in their city. It is important to reiterate however that, as 
tarab, this feeling is more of an ethos that is felt rather than a specific something 
conceived or visualized. This means for example that the emotional blending I identify as 
political feeling in second wave tarab could happen as a result of listening to any of the 
lyrics I have translated in this chapter, and is not tied to specific subject matter. I consider 
this lyrical work to represent politics in process: I do not consider them articulations of 
specific political positions. 
 
Feeling through space 
 
 In order to avoid romanticizing the presence of this tarab, it is now necessary to 
spatialize its emergence. I conclude this chapter by rounding out an analysis of the 




the accessibility of these concerts in Ramallah. While Al-Nather and Dakn remember 
attending DAM and Ramallah Underground concerts as kids as part of the local nadi, the 
growing and changing nightlife in Ramallah (of which second wave rap is a part) attracts 
a different crowd with different cultures of consumption. Haykal, whose more 
conservative upbringing prohibited him from limited concert culture (at Pianos, for 
example) as a teenager, still resents the bar atmosphere, which he calls “completely 
bourgeois.” Which is to say that even while rappers readily acknowledge that the live 
concert is of the most important opportunities for the building of rapport with their 
audiences, they regularly recognize the limits on the reach of the live concert in 
Ramallah. For example, when I asked Sheʿrab if rap in Ramallah was shaʿabi [popular] 
he laughed. Then he continued: 
 
No, it’s not shaʿabi. It could be, in 20-25 years. People embrace it when 
they hear it, sure. But they don’t hear it everywhere. [Shaʿabi is where] 
people can find it, like at a wedding, or in a car…. [Can you imagine] in 
the middle of a hafleh shaʿabiyeh [a popular party/concert], like at a 
wedding, someone taking the mic and singing a rap song? That’d be 
hilarious. 
 
There are at least two things to underscore in these remarks. First, Sheʿrab assumes a 
particular definition of the term “shaʿabi” – describing musical events like a large 
weddings and the popular music that typically features within them. His laughter at the 
idea of taking the mic and singing rap at such a gathering and his refusal to apply the 
adjective “shaʿabi” to his own work is first and foremost a question of genre and material 
accessibility, not political relevance. This points to my observation above that concert 
culture and lyrical content point to different demographics, not exclusive to each other. 




one has access to it (“people embrace it when they hear it, but they don’t hear it 
everywhere”). His recognition of the limited, material reach of his music despite what he 
considers its potentially much more widespread appeal, is critical.105 Sheʿrab and others’ 
recognition that their work is only slowly reaching poorer audiences (almost categorically 
not reaching them live) is an important articulation of self-awareness.  
 For their part, venue owners and programmers also recognize that they cater to 
specific a specific demographic. What’s particular about their reflections, however, is 
their refusal to apply a class qualification to their clientele. Sami Said reflects, “Most of 
the places that open in Masyoun are upper class restaurants. For our part, we were aiming 
for [something else]. I wouldn’t call it ‘middle class’ and I wouldn’t call it ‘shaʿabi’ 
[popular, of the people]; I’d call it shabab [youth].’” The owners and managers of both 
Beit Aneeseh and La Wain used the word shabab to describe their clientele. Shabab is a 
masculine plural noun, literally meaning young men; is not connected grammatically to 
the adjective shaʿabi. In the context of the general clientele of music venues, it refers to a 
mixed gender grouping, roughly 21-40 years old, to which a class make-up is hardly ever 
ascribed. In an example of this evasion of class, Sami Said offers “youth” as an 
alternative to upper class, middle class, and popular (“I wouldn’t call it ‘middle class’ and 
I wouldn’t call it ‘shaʿabi’”). It is to this evasive demographic that the growing 
“Ramallah bubble” caters. As I have been arguing, second wave rap concert culture 
largely depends on the same demographic. 
                                                
105 His admission is in quite obvious contradistinction to the ethos adopted by more commercial artists, 
DAM prominent among them, who allow themselves to “speak for Palestinians” and seem to be interested 





 I surmise that concert culture is predominantly middle class based on the reality 
of where and when concerts are held (private bars after dark), what kind of venues host 
them (establishments that serve alcohol and employ bouncers that deny entry to groups of 
young men unaccompanied by women), and the neighborhoods in which these are found 
(predominantly the neighborhood of Masyoun, the heart of suburban sprawl in 
Ramallah). I offer these reflections as a contextualization of what I argue is powerful 
political feeling conducted in these concerts, built by sonic, performatic, and lyrical 
elements. That is, in this chapter I have testified to the presence of political feeling in 
second wave concerts, as attested to by audience interactions, musicians’ recollections, 
and my own participant observation. At the same time, I have found it necessary to 
recognize the limited physical access to these sites and the middle class demographic to 
which they are geared. This should serve to limit any new romanticism attached to the 
politics in process I identify here. Considering the political innovation in second wave 
aesthetics as well as the obstacles Ramallah’s new urbanization present in terms of class 
accessibility point to the contradictions of growth – cultural and economic – under an 




“There was this huge revolution at some point here in Palestine. All the shabab 
[young people] became rappers. And then it all died out.” Muhammad Mesroujy, the 22-
year old producer and rapper who goes by Al-Nather tells me. He’s referring to the 
growth in Palestinian rap production in the late 1990s and early 2000s, leading up to and 




emergence and popularity of DAM from Lyd, MWR from Akka, Rami GB from Jenin, 
and the Ramallah Underground from Ramallah. This rap production “died out” as the 
Second Intifada ended (c. 2006), as a host of economic policies focused popular attention 
on growth and development, as political division between Palestinian political parties 
polarized political discourse, and as groups like Ramallah Underground broke up. In the 
wake of the Arab Uprisings (2011-2013), it has been popular to claim that Palestinian rap 
has returned, influenced and encouraged by the nearby revolutions and the explosion of 
cultural production, including rap and graffiti, that accompanied the political stirrings in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.106  
In this chapter, I have proposed a different narrative of Palestinian rap production. 
Like Al-Nather, I recognize that there was a concentration of rap production leading up to 
and during the Second Intifada (2000-2006; what I call the “first wave”). Following this 
however, I have argued here that the period Al-Nather describes as “dying out” (roughly 
2005) to the present (2015) may be productively characterized as a second wave of 
Palestinian rap. Considering that its early coalescence can be noticed as early as 2007, the 
formation of a second wave of Palestinian rap has less to do with the spectacular Arab 
Uprisings as it does with local musical mentorship, patterns of exposure to different 
forms of pop and rap music, and the economy of alternative leisure and live music in 
Ramallah, the latter shaped by the twin forces of neoliberalism and Zionist occupation.  
In the first section of this chapter, I described the shared characteristics among a 
group of collaborating rap musicians that emerge against the backdrop of neoliberal 
incursions in Palestine, structured as they are by Zionism and the Occupation. 
                                                




Establishing that the second wave is heavily influenced by and aligns itself with the 
aesthetic experimentation and lyrical modes of the Ramallah Underground, especially the 
quest for music that “fills the head,” I turned to a contextualization of second wave lyrics 
within Palestinian discourses of political struggle. I argued that the second wave largely 
refuses narratives of sabr [patience], sumud [steadfastness], or mouqawameh [resistance] 
while rejecting outward trappings of turath [heritage]. I argued that these narratives are 
classed in specific ways and that rappers’ refusal of them point to significant politics in 
process.  
In the third section, I moved on to describe the specific political feeling in second 
wave concerts, built through a tarab premised on alienation and what I termed negative 
call and response. I suggested that this alienation works as political feeling by performing 
the inseparability of individuality and sociability: after aurally initially isolating the 
individual, lyrical expression ultimately connects her with other listeners. Finally, I 
spatialized this analysis of political feeling by considering the relatively exclusive venues 
in which these concerts are held. Ultimately, considering what Massey calls “the fact of 
spacing” in the Ramallah Bubble forces the recognition that tarab built on the filter, as 
exciting as it may be to an avant-garde consuming audience, may be exclusivist in 
practice. I argue that this needn’t discredit the genre of cultural production or its 
producers and consumers. But it should recalibrate widely-held assumptions of politics 




Chapter Four: Amman1 







My research in Amman documents the recent emergence of the city as a regional 
cultural hub together with an overwhelming, articulated desire of young people to leave 
Amman behind. The material growth of the city, the growth of a cosmopolitan middle 
class, and the increased number of and attendance at musical festivals has promised to 
make Amman something of a concert hub. This density of cultural production is 
encouraging hints of Amman coming to beginning to catch up to the regional superiority 
                                                
1 Research for this chapter was made possible by an IIE Fulbright Student Research grant. I spent  
approximately nine months in Amman from January 3 through October 10, 2015 supported by the 
International Institute for Education and facilitated by the Jordanian-American Commission for Educational 
Exchange (the Bi-national Fulbright Commission in Jordan). I would like to thank Alain McNamara for 
accommodating an unorthodox start date for my tenure (in order to accommodate research in Palestine) and 
Iman Abdul-Wahid, Hiba Shtayeh, Aya Al-Abdallat, and Abu Firas for their help and support over the 
course of these months in Amman. Thanks also to Jermaine Taylor at IIE in Washington DC for his 
attentive logistical support.  
Figure 4.1: “Bu Kolthoum’s New Year Resolution.” Syrian rapper Bu Kolthoum fled violence in his 
home city of Damascus and has resided in Amman since 2012. The sentiment he expresses in this New 
Years' Resolution posted on Facebook is a good example of the celebration of musical productivity in 
Amman coupled with a desire to leave that I explore in this chapter. Bu Kolthoum’s latest album, 




of Beirut, Cairo, and Dubai and the historical importance of Baghdad and Damascus as 
centers for Arab cultural production. Nevertheless, more than in Ramallah or Beirut, my 
conversations with interlocutors were laced with a recognizable desire to move from and 
beyond the city. Many cultural producers were both proud of the new role Amman plays, 
especially in alternative music production in the region, at the same time that they were 
quick to bemoan the felt impossibility of producing culture, especially live music, in 
Amman. Rappers and producers pointed to the increased opportunities to showcase their 
work live and their growing fan base at the same time that they decried audiences’ ability 
to respect or give back to musicians and their work. 
This chapter is laid out in three parts. The first explores the growth of Amman 
that has made it an increasingly cosmopolitan capital city. I trace the flows of 
demographic and financial capital in the context of regional upheaval that shape the 
growing opportunities for musical production in Amman. In Part Two, I build from 
assumptions of Jordanian “stability,” central to its attraction as accessible regional host 
for cultural production, to explore in more detail the heavy hand of the Hashemite regime 
in discouraging political dissent. In this section, my interlocutors’ conflicting testimonies 
about the presence and degree of state censorship drive my recognition of a political 
feeling of resignation produced in some Jordanian rap lyrics. In Part Three, I explore in 
more detail what “performed resignation” looks like when it is reflected in audience 
behavior. In particular, I am concerned how audiences’ divided attention, especially in 
concerts in public spaces in Amman, impedes the regular emergence of tarab. This drives 





Part One: “Cultural Hotspot” 
 
[Red Bull] labels every country in a tier. There’s a “tier 
three,” “tier two,” “tier one,” and “cultural hotspot.” A 
country like Egypt, because of their theatre and music and 
film scene, they are a “cultural hotspot.” Lebanon is a 
“cultural hotspot” because of [its] nightlife. Since 2013, 
Jordan has been a “culture tier two.” Before that it was 
dead: it was a “tier three.” In the beginning of 2015, we 
moved into “culture tier one.” Because of all the concerts 
and festivals, it’s coming alive with music. So now the goal 
is becoming a “cultural hotspot.” 
~ Raed Serhan, Culture Manager for Red Bull, 
Jordan2 
 
If these guys don’t live off their music, it’s a waste of 
talent. It’s a shame [haram] for someone like El Far3i to 
work a 9-5.3 He’s a crazy drummer, he plays guitar, he has 
a nice voice, he writes crazy raps: he should live off of this. 
But of course he can’t do it alone. He can’t write, and 
record, and make melodies, and do promotion and 
marketing, and book his own gigs. We need an industry. 
Little by little this will become an industry. Why don’t any 
of our rappers have websites? Why are none of our guys 
able to sell their music online? Why is it all free 
downloads? Each one of those artists should be treated like 
products. If [these artists] are going to live off their music, 
it has to go like this.   
~ DJ Sotusura4 
 
Amman’s status as an emerging cultural hub is most readily identified with the 
emergence of a series of successful independent musicians/bands over the past ten years 
                                                
2 Interview with the author, August 23, 2015; all subsequent quotations from Mr. Serhan taken from this 
interview, which was largely conducted in English. 
 
3 In the case of the stage name of Tareq Abu Kweik and the band Morabba3, addressed in this chapter, I 
have used the transliteration the musicians use, which substitutes the number “3” for the Arabic letter ʿain 
(see Transliteration Note). From the musician’s Sound Cloud page: “El Far3i means coming from a branch 
which is a symbol of growth and reaching outwards to the world by feeding from the roots.” (El Far3i 
SoundCloud page, accessed January 19, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/El Far3i.)  
 
4 Interview with the author, September 12, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Sotusura are taken from 





and with increasing numbers of, and attendance at, music festivals.5 Bands like 
Morabba3, Jadal, Autostrad, and Zaed Naes are redefining not only the sounds of Arabic 
indie rock, but non-commercial paths to musical success.6 While Arabic indie rock, indie 
pop, alt-rock, and of course hip hop, have been growing in the region over the past 
decade, much of it has focused in Lebanon and out of Beirut: with bands and trajectories 
like Mashrou3 Leila and singer-songwriters like Yasmine Hamdan and Zeid Hamdan.7 
Since the emergence of Autostrad and Jadal in particular, and Morabba3 most recently, 
Amman is emerging as another important hub of musical production.  
In addition, while small-scale bars have doubled as concert venues or 
“discotheques” in Amman for decades (like Caesar’s for example), influx of capital into 
the city has encouraged the opening of more such venues.8 More than a dozen 
café/bar/lounge venues now host musical acts and DJs in Amman.9 My interlocutors 
                                                
5 Madeline Edwards, “The Promise of Amman’s Independent Music Scene,” Your Middle East, May 13, 
2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/the-promise-of-ammans-
independent-music-scene_32052; Staff, “Rebels Against the Arabic Music Business,” Your Middle East, 
August 12, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/jordanian-band-
wants-to-make-music-thats-true-to-the-arab-street-video_34193; Reuters Staff, “Jordan Music Festival 




6 El Morabba3 BandCamp page, accessed January 15, 2016, https://elmorabba3.bandcamp.com; Jadal 
SoundCloud page, accessed January 15, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/jadal; Autostrad SoundCloud page, 
accessed January 15, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/autostrad; Zaed Naes SoundCloud page, accessed 
January 15, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/zaed-naes.  
 
7 For example: Jad Salfiti, “Mashrou3 Leila: the Lebanese Band Changing the Tune of Arab Politics,” The 
Guardian, September 13, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2013/sep/13/mashrou-leila-lebanese-arab-politics; Stephanie 
Farah, “Breaking Musical Tabbos: Interview with Oscar-nominated Yasmine Hamdan,” Al-Arabiyya, 




8 Interviews with Shermine Sawalha and Raed Serhan. 
 
9 To name a few: Canvas, Bargos, the Flip, Corners Pub, Fann w Shai, Bonitas, Blue Fig, Jadal, Books@, 




suggest this is an increase since around 2011. Over the same period, musical festivals 
showcasing regional talent have established themselves and attract increasing audiences 
every year. The most obvious example of this is the Al-Balad Music festival (held bi-
annually, inaugural season 2011). But the recent Word is Yours Festival (2015), efforts to 
host the local bands listed above, and specific corporate-sponsored initiatives, like Red 
Bull’s “Soundclash” concerts are also a part of this growth.10 This is the energy Raed 
Serhan refers to when he speaks of Amman moving from “tier three” towards “cultural 
hotspot.”   
The curious rating system used by the Austrian energy drink manufacturer is not a 
scientific gauge upon which to base a critical appraisal of Amman as environment for live 
concert culture. But this transparent codification is a succinct articulation of hopes and 
expectations I heard voiced repeatedly by other cultural producers and consumers in 
Amman. The stability Jordan boasts relative to the region and an influx of transnational 
as well as regional capital alongside the emergence of more independent musicians points 
to a hopeful future for Amman’s independent cultural production: the building of an 
infrastructure that would allow Jordan’s musical talent to sustain themselves off of their 
music.  
The emphasis on quantity of production in laying claims to the development of 
independent music production over the particular parsing out of qualitative texture stuck 
out to me in my conversations with interlocutors. Asked about the challenges they faced, 
                                                                                                                                            
functioning venues and in Beirut at time of writing there are also two or three venues available to rappers 
for the live performance of their work. 
 
10 “Soundclash” is a Red Bull “concept” that has been used as concert structure around the world. In 2014, 
Red Bull staged a “Soundclash” between Morabba3 and Autostrad. Both bands played a sequence of 
variations on their own and each other’s work in a concert structure that has been used between different 





most musicians, producers, and events coordinators bemoaned the small number of 
venues (despite these being three and four times what is available in other cities in the 
region) and the paucity of people willing to coordinate events. In other words, just more 
was needed. Serhan’s answer when asked him how a country moves from “tier one” to 
“cultural hotspot” are indicative of this trend: 
You just have to do more. You have to become a point of interest. It has to 
be a place that people actually depend on. Let’s say if there’s a festival 
that happens every year that everybody pays attention to in the region, that 
creates a lot of buzz: that’s the right direction, that’s towards becoming a 
cultural hotspot. 
 
The “doing more” that is making of Amman a “point of interest” is happening amid 
neoliberal incursions specific to the urban shape and political history of Amman. In 
establishing the neoliberal context that audiences traverse to attend hip hop concerts in 
Amman, I am concerned on the one hand with the “industrialization,” to interpret 
Sotusura’s words, of musical talent in Jordan and the hopes and expectations attendant 
upon the establishment of a profitable, independent music industry. On the other, I want 
to pay attention to the patterns of exclusion that are accompanying these changes, and the 
curious negative perceptions that also shadow the hope and excitement of this growth. I 
use my own experiences navigating Amman’s expansion as an initial map to chart this 
neoliberal growth. This offers one reading of the context to Serhan’s comments about 
Red Bull’s grading system. 
I moved eight times in the ten months I spent in Amman in 2015. Seven of the 
eight moves were driven by structural deficiencies in the living space (no heat, no hot 
water, bed bugs), and all eight apartments were located in what is commonly referred to 




Boulevard, marked by the eight numbered traffic circles.11 This part of the city is what 
urban literature on Amman consistently describes as “Westernized (read: Americanized)” 
and where, as one US master’s student told me, life was “as comfortable as it was ‘back 
home.’” 12  
The first flat I lived in off of the Seventh Circle near Dheir Ghbar, one of the 
city’s new gated communities, put me in walking distance of both the upscale Cozmo and 
Safeway markets and a Porsche dealership; close to the airport road and near a half hour 
by car from the bars and festivals that would become the focus of my research. The malls 
and markets within walking distance fit into the model of what Christopher Parker has 
described as the “well-lit and privately policed site[s] of global consumption.”13 The 
covered parking lots and wide streets illustrated the assumed reliance of the area’s 
residents on a private vehicle. That is, along with the “tech city” and the newer Carrefour 
hyper-market and City Mall past the Eight Circle, the first area in which I was living in 
Amman was, its rather bleak landscape not withstanding, obviously catering to globally-
oriented (or at least globalizing) tastes.14  
                                                
11 The traffic circles increase in number the farther west from the city center. So First Circle is closest to the 
downtown area separating “East” from “West” Amman, while the Eighth Circle is the farthest.  
 
12 Géraldine Chatelard puts it this way: “Amman is typically described along two axis, which are presumed 
immovable: the first, economic and geographic, cuts the city into two parts: the prosperous and 
Westernized (read: Americanized) West and the miserable and traditional (almost Islamist) East; the other, 
ethnic/nationalist, separates Palestinians from the ‘native’ Jordanians.” Géraldine Chatelard, “Amman, et 
pourtant c’est une ville” in Jordanie, le Royaume Frontière, ed. Riccardo Bocco (Paris: Autrement, 2001), 
4. Translation from the French is my own. 
 
13 Christopher Parker, “Tunnel-bypasses and Minarets of Capitalism: Amman as Neoliberal Assemblage,” 
Political Geography 28 (2009),” 117. 
 
14 Amy Guttman, “Jordan Banks on Tech, Tourism, Tax Benefits, and a Peaceful Place to Park Money in 







Another flat in Shmeisani, off the Fourth Circle, put me in the center of relatively 
older flows of transnational capital, in the nest of the affluent banking community 
established by the influx of immigration from the Gulf in the wake of the first Gulf 
War.15 It was here that I first saw skateboarders and b-boy dancers in Amman, 
occasionally gathering under the watchful eyes of police, on the wide central plazas of 
Thaqafa Street. Continuing east, the flats in which I resided in Jabal Amman were in one 
of the oldest (West) Amman neighborhoods. Here, the flows of transnational capital were 
visibly manifest in a mixed neighborhood demographic largely unseen in other areas of 
West Amman. African and South Asian migrant labor crossed paths with European and 
North American NGO and US workers, and fruit and gas sellers paraded their wares from 
open bed trucks that blared recorded sale offers. During Ramadan, community drummers 
still woke the neighborhood for sahour [the meal to precede the fast], a tradition no 
longer present in the city’s newer neighborhoods.  
                                                
15 Many Palestinians who immigrated to the Gulf following the 1967 war with Israel were forced to 
relocate again in the leading up to and aftermath of the First Gulf War. This is especially true of the sizable 
Palestinian community in Kuwait (approximately 400,000), who were expelled by Saddam Hussein. 
(Toufic Haddad, “Palestinian Forced Displacement from Kuwait: The Overdue Accounting,” BADIL 
44[2010], accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.badil.org/en/component/k2/item/1514-art07.html.) The 
influx of people and capital to the neighborhood of Shmeisani in the early 1990s reflects this geo-political 
context. See also Laurie A. Brand, "Liberalization and Changing Political Coalitions: The Bases of 
Jordan’s 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis Policy," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13(1991): 1-46. 





Figure 4.2: “Thaqafa Street.” The central plaza running the length of Thaqafa (which means 
"culture") Street in the Shmeisani District. The smooth tile and banisters were occasionally used by 
skateboarders and bboy dancers when they gathered at twilight hours. Most of the time the plaza 
was empty. Photograph by the author.  
 
Nearby, Rainbow Street was the site of perhaps the only successful re-vitalization 
of public space by private organizations to date in Amman. Renovated starting in 2005-
2006 by Rami Daher and the NGO he runs, TURATH, Rainbow is a one-way street 
leading from the First Circle and dead ending in tight streets which lead to the downtown 
(al-balad). It is a one-kilometer, cobblestone street which was developed over the past 
decade to host a dozen nargileh [waterpipe] and coffee shops, several “Western” style 




Jordan River Foundation, and several restaurants offering Armenian, Jordanian, and 
Western cuisine.16 Now for the most part snubbed as “commercial” by the increasingly 
hip alternative scene in nearby Al-Weibdeh, mostly young men and families stroll 
Rainbow Street and the park at its entrance, eating pumpkin and sunflower seeds or corn, 
and smoking nargileh.17 More than any other place in West Amman, it is shaʿabi 
(popular), public space.18  
 Another, very different, privately designed project for remaking public space is 
the much criticized “new Abdali downtown.” While incomplete, Abdali is modeled off of 
the Solidere revitalization of downtown Beirut in the 1990s and has garnered similar 
criticism.19 On land owned by the Jordanian military, the project is slated to host five-star 
hotels, retail and office space, and an open-air “public” boulevard touted as the “new  
                                                
16 The Jordan River Foundation is a royal NGO. The showroom on Rainbow Street displays products from 
the Jordan River Design Project, the Bani Hamida Weaving Project and the Wadi Al Rayan Project – they 
are handicrafts that highlight a range of heritage and environmental concerns. On NGOs and Royal NGOs 
in Jordan see Laurie Brand, “Development in Wadi Rum? State Bureaucracy, External Funders, and Civil 
Society,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33 (2001): 571-590.  
 
 
17 I return to discuss Al-Weibdeh in more detail, below.  
 
18 Furthermore, the range of establishments hosted on the street mean that it is also a place where social 
classes mix. High-end bars hold prime real estate floors above falafel and burger joints. The renowned 
Sufra restaurant, popular with ministers and foreign guests, is steps away from the open-air plaza hosting 
corn and salted lupine bean vendors.  
19 The Solidere projects in Beirut – largely responsible for the post-civil war reconstruction of the 
downtown and Beirut’s Central Business District – have been critiqued for stealing the public downtown 
and transforming it into a playground for Gulf and other foreign capital, barring access to the city’s original 
consumers, producers, sellers. The Abdali project shares designers and investors that backed the Solidere 
project, prominent among them the Saudi Arabian company Oger. The problematic incursions of Solidere 
into Beiruti urban space make up a central consideration in the development of political critique in the 
Beirut chapter, which follows. (See among others, Gildas Coignet, “Régénération urbaine ou 
dégénérescence de l’urbanité?: Le Projet de nouveau centre-ville d’Al-Abdali à Amman, Jordanie,” 
Annales de Géographie 4(2008): 42-61; and Aseel Sawalha, “The Dilemmas of Conservation and 
Reconstruction in Beirut,” in The Emerging Asian City: Concomitant Urbanities and Urbanisms, ed. 






Figure 4.3: “Jabal Amman off of Omar Ben Al-Khattab Street (in West Amman), overlooking Jabal 
a-Nazeef (in East Amman).” The downtown, which separates West and East Amman, starting with 
Ras el-Ein, is located in the valley between these hills. The difference in infrastructure between West 
and East should be discernible, heading down the hill towards the East. Compare especially with the 
construction in Figures 2, 5, and 6 both in West Amman. Photograph by the author. 
downtown.”20 Public is in quotation marks here to underscore the project’s problematic 
vision of replacing the historic and still existing actual downtown of Amman (al-balad) 
                                                
20 MAWARED (the National Resources Investment and Development Corporation)’s accelerated 
development of Abdali rerouted the public transportation system coming out of Amman’s historical 
downtown area, while buying out its original inhabitants. It is financially and administratively independent, 




with a decidedly more private and securitized space. Géraldine Coignet explains that a 
percentage of public opinion holds that the downtown souq is “too popular” [trop 
populaire – with a meaning in French here similar to the Arabic shaʿabi] – that is, too 
close to “the people.” In contrast, she suggests, the creation of a “new downtown 
Amman” is the opportunity for its organizers to “remake the image, discourse about, and 
representations of the city” and is made possible via “an accessibility filter… to the 
detriment of social mixing.” She continues, “The people who, according to the 
‘legitimate’ population, are undesirable in these public spaces, however accessible to 
everyone they are in theory, do not have a place in these future high places of urbanity in 
the Jordanian capital.”21 
 In other words, the Abdali project hopes to remake an image of Amman by 
screening out behavior and actors deemed not modern or cosmopolitan enough for the 
emerging Arab metropolis. Or further, it hopes to do this by attracting Ammanis to a 
completely remade space in which actors are screened and behavior policed to fit into 
cosmopolitan norms. As in the malls of West Amman and unlike the more open 
atmosphere of Rainbow Street, young men without the company of women are not 
permitted entry to the new “public” boulevard by private security services. (I’ll return to 
this shortly.) 
                                                                                                                                            
among other military projects (Parker, “Bypasses and Minarets,” 115). Most alarming, perhaps, is the 
confluence of public and private sectors in the service of non-Jordanian capital in this project. As Parker 
notes, “Stage agencies become ‘entrepreneurial’ in these arrangements by joining forces with, rather than 
acting as an external source of regulation upon, the private sector.” (ibid.) See also Jillian Schwedler, 
“Amman Cosmopolitan: Spaces and Practices of Aspiration and Consumption,” Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 30 (2010): 547-562. 
 
 






On weekend evenings in warm weather, the Abdali “boulevard” is alive with 
people. Thursday and Friday nights hosted small bands on the top of an awkward step-
situation (half of the audiences had their backs to the band, and both halves of the 
audience and the musicians faced a large, open fountain). One of these acts that played 
here regularly were the Nomads, a Libyan-Jordanian outfit headed by Fuad Ramadan 
Gritli. Gritli’s political commentary in sung-form won him death threats in his native 
Libya following the 2011 popular uprising against General Qaddafi.22 In Amman at the 
Boulevard, but also at Blue Fig restaurant in upscale-Abdoun and Corners pub off the 
Second Circle (among others), the Nomads band plays Arabic and Western covers in a 
sing-along, dance-along, family-friendly set.  
                                                
22 Amman hosts a considerable Libyan expat community in the wake of the uprising against Qaddafi, 
boasting a spectrum of political views. On the political resonances of Gritli’s work in the Libyan context, 
see Leila Tayyeb, “Nduwash bel Malgy: Performing the Civil in Post-Revolution Libya,” talk at the Sijal 
Institute, Amman, Jordan, August 12, 2015.  
Figure 4.4: “Vibrant Cosmopolitan Lifestyle.” A sign announcing the promised offerings of the New 




Far from the suburban aesthetics, upscale supermarkets, malls, and development 
projects filling what was empty desert west of the city center, East Amman, starting with 
the open air souq [market] in the downtown is markedly poorer, its social patterns more 
conservative. In contrast to the wide, newly paved boulevards and multiple level parking 
lots of Shmeisani and Abdoun, the streets of Jabal al-Natheef, and Ashrafiyeh are tight, 
steep, and littered with potholes, frequently not wide enough for two-way traffic. 
Children play in the street and between parked cars, noise marks the soundscape, and the 
expanding construction proliferates its pattern of sand-colored, rectangular cement boxes 
with seemingly little regulation or urban planning.23 As Jillian Schwedler has put it:  
Amman today is not so much a different city from what it was a decade 
ago, as it is two cities: cosmopolitan West Amman, where development is 
unfolding at breakneck speed and foreign investment has skyrocketed, and 
East Amman, the bustling, dusty home to a majority of the city’s poor and 
working-class residents.24  
 
The population density of East Amman has been markedly effected by the 
spectacular influx of Syrian refugees since 2012, most of whom have not moved into the 
camps designated for refugees. The increasing pressure the refugee crisis has put on state 
resources in terms of public services and utilities like electricity and water has 
additionally affected the (already significantly lower) quality of life the city’s poorer 
                                                
23 Mohammad Alfdeilat, “Jordan’s Capital Split Between Rich and Poor,” trans. Rani Geha, Al-Monitor, 
February 19, 2014, accessed January 7, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2014/02/amman-
jordan-divided-capital-rich-poor.html.  
 







neighborhoods.25 To be sure, Amman has for decades acted as host to various refugee 
populations fleeing violence or expulsion. In the latter half of the twentieth century these 
refugees were mostly Palestinian, quickly outnumbering the local Jordanian population.26 
In the 1990s, emigration and capital from the Gulf States flooded into Amman, building 
its financial districts and establishing the first of West Amman’s suburban enclaves, the 
neighborhood of Shmeisani. The early nineties also saw the first influx of Iraqi refugees, 
                                                
25 Water is frequently the source of contest between poor communities in Amman and outside of it and the 
influx of Syrian and other refugees have placed considerable demand on this already limited resource. See 
for example, Hal Bernton, “Syrian Refugees Struggle in Jordan, Aid Money Low,” Seattle Times, 
November 19, 2015, accessed January 7, 2016, http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/syrian-refugees-
struggle-in-tense-jordan-as-aid-money-runs-low/.  
 
26 This led to political instability and eventually to a state crackdown, led by then King Hussein, 
notoriously remembered as “Black September” in 1970. See Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making 
of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia UP, 2001), 240-245. 
 
Figure 4.5: “Abdali Boulevard by night.” The four-member band should be visible under the neon blue 
lights of the escalator, center. The audience sits beneath them, however, and faces away from them. 




fleeing the Gulf wars.27 And since roughly 2012, Amman has been host to refugees from 
both Libya and Syria, fleeing the aftermath of civil uprisings in both countries. Al-Zaatari 
refugee camp, located north of Amman was in 2015 home to 81,000 people, making it 
Jordan’s fourth largest city.28 This is only one of any number of spectacular statistics to 
illustrate the role of host Jordan’s stability – relative to neighboring Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, 
Palestine, and Egypt – has conferred upon its capital city. 
Moreover, the influx of refugees and concurrent humanitarian crises has led to 
Amman becoming a more important base for humanitarian, NGO, and UN workers, as 
well as students of Arabic (as a second) language.29 This demographic influx of largely 
European and North American students and workers has put a different stress on both the 
economy and demographic of West Amman: manifest in rising rents, a larger, paying 
clientele for cultural production, demand for luxury services including five-star hotels 
and upscale restaurants, and marked increase in other forms of globalized, cosmopolitan 
leisure. Moreover, if North American and European capital is flowing into Amman in a 
new way since the Syrian, Libyan, and Iraqi quagmires, Arab capital is also taking 
advantage of Jordan’s relative stability. The numerous development projects in West 
                                                
27 Human Rights Watch, “The Silent Treatment: Fleeing Iraq: Surviving in Jordan” Human Rights Watch 
(18) 2006. 
 
28 Phoebe Weston, “Inside Zaatari Refugee Camp: the Fourth Largest City in Jordan,” The Telegraph, 




29 Humanitarian crises attend both the refugees in camps in Jordan and those still in Syria, in Turkey, and 
elsewhere. Amman is a hub to coordinate this aid for crises outside of Jordan as well as inside of it. (Harriet 
Grant, “UN Agencies ‘Broke and Failing’ in Face of Ever-Growing Refugee Crisis,” The Guardian, 
September 6, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/refugee-
crisis-un-agencies-broke-failing; Jackie Northam, “For Syrian Refugees, Needs are Growing and Aid is 







Amman point to the impressive regional capital pouring into the city. Hopes to make of 
Amman a “new Beirut (before 1975)” or “another Dubai” underpin development projects 
from the new “tech city,” to the Jordan Gate Towers, to the new Abdali Downtown.30 The 
influx of all this capital – human and financial – contributes to the feeling that people and 
things are constantly and increasingly arriving to Amman – more specifically that they 
are arriving on the run from somewhere else, and especially that they are perhaps only 
there in transit. This feeling of limbo persists despite the obvious explosion of 
construction this influx of human and financial capital is bringing, to host both poor and 
wealthy clients, consumers, and residents. 
Thus, the neoliberal context in which the increase of rap concerts in Amman must 
be understood is one shaped by both a booming humanitarian economy – in the increased 
presence of NGOs, UN, and related agencies as Amman becomes the regional hub to 
address the Syrian crisis – together with the influx of Arab and other international capital, 
similarly taking advantage of Jordan’s relative stability, and the large and increasing 
numbers of vulnerable persons without material resources or the right to work.31 The 
influx of capital is facilitated by the Jordanian monarchy’s close ties with the West, the 
US in particular, and with Israel, the latter of which facilitates the free passage of goods, 
                                                
30 That is, Beirut before the eruption of its sixteen-year civil war, when its reputation for nightlife and 
leisure earned it the nickname “Paris of the Middle East.” (See for example, Gildas Coignet, “Régénération 
urbaine ou dégénérescence de l’urbanité?,” 53.) 
 
31 Syrian refugees in Jordan have largely been barred from receiving working permits in Jordan, the latter 
reserved for Jordanians. This policy on refugee labor mirrors that of other countries and has dictated policy 
since the 1948 exodus of Palestinian refugees. For example, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, some of 
whom have been there for over half a century, were only in 2010 granted basic work permits. (Jim Muir, 
“Lebanon Grants Palestinian Refugees Right to Work,” BBC, August 17, 2010, accessed January 15, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11004945; Abbas Shiblak, “Residency Status and Civil 





while the former buoys the Jordanian state with aid money.32 The monarchy’s 
participation in the US-led Wars on Terror, in coordination with the draconian Jordanian 
secret police [mukhabarat], have so-far clamped down on civil dissent and disobedience 
and are working hard to stay on top of growing religious fundamentalism.33 Outside of 
Amman, this steadily growing fundamentalism – fueled by decades-old tribal rivalry with 
the Hashemite ruling family – has over the past few years repeatedly pointed to the 
possibility of a more volatile political situation in the future.34 Moreover, the advent of 
the Islamic State, in particular the gruesome execution of the Jordanian fighter pilot 
Muath Al-Kasasbeh in January 2015 (he was locked in a cage and burned alive), have 
increased support for the monarch, whose Schwarzenegger-like gusto in response to Al-
Kasasbeh’s killing has endeared his patriarchal protectivism to international as well as 
Jordanian observers.35 It is important to remember, in the context of alternative music 
                                                
32 Parker, “Tunnel-bypasses and Minarets,” 113.  
 
33 Protests inspired by the “Arab Spring” movements in neighboring countries led to a series of reforms and 
an eventual fizzling out of protest energies. (Sasca Lubbe, “The Brief Jordanian Spring: Interview with 
Tamer Khorma,” Qantara.de, September 28, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, 
https://en.qantara.de/content/arab-protest-movements-the-brief-jordanian-spring.) For a more in-depth 
analysis of the Hirak movement which helped to mobilize these protests, see Ziad Abu-Rish, “On the 
Nature of the Hashemite Regime and Jordanian Politics: An Interview with Tariq Tell,” Jadaliyya, August 
22, 2012, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6979/on-the-nature-of-the-
hashemite-regime-and-jordania; Lama Abu Oden, “Materialist Analysis in the Service of a Nationalist 
Thesis,” Jadaliyya, September 17, 2012, accessed January 15, 2016, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7238/materialist-analysis-in-the-service-of-a-nationali; Tariq Tell, 
“On Jordan, the Hashemite Regime, and the Current Mobilizations,” Jadaliyya, September 17, 2012, 
accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7385/a-rejoinder-to-the-response-of-
lama-abu-odeh_on-jo.  
 
34 See Tariq Tell, “Early Spring in Jordan: The Revolt of the Military Veterans,” Carnegie Middle East 
Center, November 4, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ACMR_Tell_Jordan_Eng_final.pdf. 
 
35 For examples of the enthusiasm greeting King Abdullah II’s response to ISIS, see: Amanda Macias, 
“Eleven Photos Showing King Abdullah II of Jordan Being a Total Badass,” Business Insider, February 5, 
2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/king-abduallh-of-jordan-is-a-total-
badass-2015-2; Staff, “Jordan King Cites Clint Eastwood in Revenge Vow,” Al-Arabiyya, February 5, 
2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/02/05/Jordan-




production the subject of which is frequently political, that the Hashemite monarchy also 
maintains a firm grip on the limits of expression. The mukhabarat as well as the police 
were present at every concert I attended in Amman.  
If Ammani cultural producers hesitate to criticize the State or the monarchy on 
record, they are, like my interlocutors in Occupied Palestine, critical of local and 
international NGOs.36 When I asked what the outside sources of his funding were, Nasser 
Kalaji of the production house Immortal Entertainment responded casually: “Well, 
NGO’s are a no-no for me; and the State is broke. So that’s it. All we have is ourselves.” 
At the same time however, the rush to lambast NGO affiliation, or the simplicity with 
which these opportunities are dismissed in conversation, is often coupled with 
contradictory practice. For example, Shermine Sawalha, a prominent concert organizer, 
told me: 
USAID and NGOs - they’re the ones destroying the world: why the fuck 
would I take their money to create art to make [the world they destroy] 
look better? They’re the same [people] who destroy everything: then, they 
put money into NGOs to hide the effects of their wars. These are [not 
partners] I am interested in. But I would be interested in some projects 
funded by these people who go directly to kids and victims of abuse and 
whatnot.37 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Abdullah II is not Personally Flying Planes against ISIS,” International Business Times, February 5, 2015, 
accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/no-jordans-king-abdullah-ii-not-personally-flying-
planes-against-isis-1486742. For a critical appraisal of this phenomenon, see: Ziad Abu-Rish, 
“Manufacturing Silence: On Jordan’s ISIS War, Arab Authoritarianism, and US Empire,” Jadaliyya, 
February 14, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20856/manufacturing-silence_on-jordans-isis-war-arab-aut.  
 
36 On NGOs and RONGOs (Royal NGOs) in the Kingdom, see Laurie Brand, “Development in Wadi 
Rum?”  
 
37 Shermine Sawalha, interview with the author, June 7, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Ms. Sawalha 
are taken from this interview, which was largely conducted in English. Sawalha grew up in Amman but 
spent many years studying and working in Toronto, Canada. She returned to Amman in 2011. She runs the 





Considering the contradiction in responses like these, it is prudent not to 
exaggerate the politics at work in the refusal of NGOs in Amman. I recognize that there 
are few options for cultural producers outside the neoliberal humanitarian framework 
imposing itself on the region. Theoretically, I agree that neoliberal funds may be used to 
non-neoliberal ends. The refusal of NGOs, when it is enacted, is in part a declaration of a 
political position. However in my observation, this refusal in Amman is largely not 
informed by a larger rejection of neoliberalism or of capitalism. The criticism of NGOs is 
an articulated refusal of (usually US and European) influence and interference, but it is 
rarely coupled with a refusal of private, for-profit capital from the same locales. Red Bull 
(via their Culture Department) and Winston Cigarettes (as “Freedom Music”) in 
particular have a palpable presence in the alternative music scene in Amman. Producers 
and musicians readily attest to their collaborations with both. Further, they consistently 
praise both companies for their support. Sotusura calls Red Bull the “only” company that 
entered Jordan and had a positive impact on cultural expression, specifically in the 
mitigation of risk involved in live concerts.38  
Moreover, the friendships and collaborations involved between Red Bull and 
local rappers are developing without disavowal of the for-profit orientation of the 
company. Raed Serhan explicitly did not hide these motives when he explained to me:  
 
                                                
38 Sotusura told me: “Red Bull is the one company that came to the country and put support behind all of 
those alternative bands: they pushed them and they helped them all do concerts. It was a problem, you 
know, organizing a concert is not easy: it’s not easy to be able to pay for everything a concert requires and 
also pay the musicians. When Red Bull came to support these things, that risk dissipated. It became that 
you can’t lose money doing a concert anymore. It’s ok to do a concert and whoever comes, comes: 
nobody’s going to lose 2,000 lira from his own pocket anymore. No, now the musician can think: Red Bull 
is pushing us and they’re paying for the stage and the equipment, now all that’s on us is to bring our people 





Red Bull started out with extreme sports. Ten years ago they decided they 
should get into culture as well. Basically, [they were] supporting all the 
athletes and sports and everything, but nothing was happening on the 
cultural side. And if you think about it, like 90% of people listen to music. 
But how many people actually play sports? 
 
So it’s about expanding [Red Bull’s] product market? 
 
Let’s say, yea, it’s about reach. […] People are not dumb anymore, people 
are not stupid. They can tell if something [is forced]. If you see an artist 
[holding] a can, the first thing you’ll be thinking is, ‘I wonder how much 
they paid him just to hold that can.’ But when you come to [Red Bull], we 
never do that. It’s about you [the artist]: it’s up to you, if you want to do it, 
do it, if you don’t, don’t. It’s about being genuine. It’s about building 
relationships. Having a relationship with that person and growing that 
person: it always goes back to “giving wings.”39  
 
But what’s the point of “giving wings”? 
 
Once a person has reached a certain status, they’ll appreciate you. And 
you’ll be tagging along with them. 
 
So they will bring your product to other markets? 
 
Yea, without even forcing it. You won’t even have to ask.  
 
The embrace of this private capital by musicians and producers – in the form of 
collaboration with the “cultural departments” of gigantic, transnational corporations is 
significantly different from the embrace of the private sector by rappers and their fans 
that I pointed to in Ramallah.  
In Chapter Three, I identified a trend in musicians’ testimonies in Ramallah. In 
order to avoid concert opportunities offered by NGOs, I suggested that performers were 
turning to the stages of privately-owned bars and venues. In Amman, the venues 
available to artists for concerts were the same with or without corporate sponsorship: 
sometimes concert venues were private bars, sometimes they were public, open spaces, 
                                                





appropriated for the occasion. Sometimes concerts were part of festivals; sometimes they 
were one-off events. Moreover, working with Red Bull or Winston or having either 
company as a sponsor did not necessarily mean that an NGO was not also involved. That 
is, this corporate sponsorship of concerts in Amman did not change the shape of concert 
opportunities except to mitigate the risk on the individuals organizing.40 In Amman, 
turning to private capital (in this case corporate sponsorship) was not an overtly political 
negotiation, as turning to private capital (in privately-owned bars in order to avoid 
affiliation with an NGO) was in the occupied West Bank.  
It seems to me that the much more developed collaboration with Winston and Red 
Bull in Amman rather reflected first and foremost a different emphasis on musical 
production for musicians in this city.41 As I have hinted, rappers working in Amman 
eventually recounted concerns about making a living off of their art. The monetization of 
independent or alternative music production in a city that is becoming increasingly 
expensive drives the shape of affiliation and collaboration. Frequently, this 
industrialization of music is recounted in relation to the eventual opportunity this music 
may provide the musician to leave Amman. This trajectory has become all the more 
tangible in the imagination of many since Tareq Abu-Kweik, (the rapper who goes under 
the stage name El Far3i), successfully transplanted a music career from Amman to 
London (with the experimental collective 47 Soul) in 2014.42  
                                                
40 See footnote 38. 
 
41 Both Red Bull and Winston (as “Freedom Music”) have a presence in the West Bank and inside Israel. 
 
42 47 Soul “is an electro-mijwez, shamstep, choubi band.” It is made up of El Far3i, Walaa Sbeit, Z the 







My interlocutors articulated a range of these feelings of anxiety around departure. 
Many of these were in direct relation to discussions about opportunities in Amman. For 
example, a discussion between Boikutt, Dakn, and Al-Nather (all members of the “-1” 
collective, see Chapter Three) about the opportunities available to them in Ramallah and 
Amman put concert venues and opportunities in direct relationship to the willingness of 
colleagues to stay or leave Amman.  
 
Dakn: In Ramallah, it’s always risky. 
 
Boikutt: Here too, it’s always risky.  
 
Al-Nather: But here there are venues. 
 
Boikutt: True, but it’s not only venues, it’s people. Like Shermine 
Sawalha… She is single-handedly making things happen in Amman. If 
tomorrow Shermine goes to Canada, there will be nothing here.  
 
Figure 4.6: “Jordan is just one big waiting room.” Laith Al Huseini, the rapper who goes by the stage 




Al-Nather: You’re right. 
 
 
In this exchange, Boikutt gently chides his younger colleagues about the differences they 
perceive in the opportunities available to them in Ramallah and Amman. Strongly 
resonating is the point that a colleague’s imminent departure is always possible (“if 
tomorrow Shermine goes to Canada”), without whom musicians feel the infrastructure 
that allows for opportunity in Amman will collapse. This anxiety about there not being 
the infrastructure to receive their work came up with others as well. The rapper Satti told 
me, for example: 
Everybody gets to a point where they feel like they’re not making it. 
Everybody. Even if they’re super active: making music and having shows 
and everything. When you do all that and feel that you’re still in the same 
place you were before, for sure you will want to go and see change.43 
 
In these comments, Satti almost seems to undo Raed Serhan (of Red Bull)’s assertion that 
“just doing more” will suffice. Satti’s feeling of “even being super active” and still 
feeling like “you’re still in the same place you were before” illustrates the limits of 
Amman’s cultural growth.  
Moreover, Satti’s relative ease with the city as this kind of stepping stone differs 
affectively with the feeling of frustration and suffocation that the Syrian rapper Bu 
Kolthoum expressed, for example, while both related a similar desire to move on. In the 
Facebook status that opened this chapter, Bu Kolthoum connected his musical production 
with a relief of the stress he feels living in Amman: this for him was both affective and 
material. The material connection was made by juxtaposing “a new album” with “getting 
the fuck out of here” – implying perhaps that one will lead to the other. Affectively, the 
                                                
43 Interview with the author, August 20, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Satti (Ahmad Yaseen) are 





music had another function: of releasing emotions attached to the frustration of being in 
Amman. Bu Kolthoum explains: 
Every track I work on is a product of pressure. Each track is an expression 
of stress [daghet]. I get home, suffocated, no one to talk to, I write a track, 
I’ll talk to those couple thousand people that listen to my music.44  
 
 This confluence of hope and suffocation; growth and stagnation characterizes 
Amman’s recent and emerging importance as a regional center for cultural production for 
a specific economic cross-section of the population. It is the double bind of wanting to 
build and wanting to leave, and the quickly successive expressions of hope and despair 
that give needed texture to recent declarations and celebrations of the city as de-facto hub 





Rappers’ testimonies about frustration, impatience, suffocation, and disgust 
mirror the everyday reactions and expressions of many of the young Arabs I spoke with 
in Amman. Many, many of the people I met and spent time with in the city also 
expressed a kind of split personality about the city: it was both home and stagnating, both 
comfortable and oppressive, both changing and not changing enough. Many hoped to, 
and some were just returning from, travel. The marked exception to this general rule was 
a handful of very adamant cultural producers to whom I was introduced (though none of 
the musicians I interviewed), who, upon returning to Amman from some time away, have 
                                                
44 Interview with the author, March 31, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Bu Kolthoum are taken from 





made something of a shtick of aggressively attesting to both Amman’s high quality of life 
and the density of its art and cultural scenes. These individuals, almost all of whom were 
educated or had lived outside of Amman, were then building, investing, or otherwise 
helping to expand cultural activities in Amman. I almost only ran into these types in the 
neighborhood of Al-Weibdeh.  
Here, a cozy but populous scene of artists, designers, musicians, or simply 
educated and employed 20-40 year olds drink tea or coffee on the corner sidewalk of 
Rumi café, or on the balcony of the gallery and coffee shop Fann wa Shai (meaning “art 
and tea”), gather for openings in the Darat al-Funun gallery, and party at the newly 
opened Laconda Hotel and Canvas bar. It is here that many cultural producers – 
enthusiastic about Amman or otherwise – attest to feeling the most comfortable. Many of 
the rappers and producers I interviewed, who express a range of attitudes about Amman, 
live in the neighborhood. All attest to a series of drastic changes that have befallen the 
area over the past five-to-ten years. Some refer to these changes positively. As Satti, who 
lives and works in the neighborhood explained to me, recent openings of cafes and other 
places “become a part of you and what you do. It can change how you see your own 
society.” But some of my interlocutors also inferred that this growth of an alternative 
cultural scene in Weibdeh was having negative effects. DJ Sotusura admitted: 
We can say that Al-Weibdeh was ruined because of this growth. It’s the 
first time I see [here] something like what happens in other European or 
American cities: where you have a place where all the artists hang out and 
then all these other people come in – the hipsters and whatever – and the 
artists have to leave. Three years ago, this was the artists’ hangout. Now, 
it’s full of foreigners [Europeans and North Americans]. You come to rent 
an apartment now in Weibdeh, the prices are very high. It’s unfortunate 
because I feel like it’s the one Ammani neighborhood that was nice and 
it’s being ruined. I don’t know what’s the next location that [artists] will 






Sotusura bemoans here both gentrification and Amman (“the one nice neighborhood… 
and it’s being ruined”).  
It is in contrast to preppy Abdoun and moneyed Abdali that the obviously artsy, 
graffitied streets of Al-Weibdeh provide such an insulation to the city’s educated, 
tattooed, artistic, or otherwise alternative population. Historically settled as an Armenian 
neighborhood, its (relatively) lush gardens and stone buildings attracted and were built by 
the city’s elite. Nasser Kalaji, who grew up in the neighborhood, remembers that, “you 
used to look down the street and you could see, this is the minister’s place, or this is that 
business man’s family, and so on.”45 As new construction entered Amman and with the 
establishment of upscale neighborhoods like Abdoun, many residents of Al-Weibdeh 
relocated their families to this new construction. For a time, rents in Weibdeh were of the 
cheapest in West Amman: in comparison to the new construction, these buildings were 
older, more run down, and less desirable. 
The cheaper rents attracted artsy, freelance, self-employed types. Then with the 
influx of North American and Europeans, intrigued by the alternative vibe, rents began to 
climb, as Sotusura noticed, above. All of my interlocutors who celebrate Al-Weibdeh 
were also concerned with the changes to it.  
Some expressed anxiety about the “loss” of Weibdeh’s alternative exclusivity as 
the neighborhood’s popularity extends beyond Amman’s artistic and intellectual 
community, as its rents rise, and as its streets fill with more popular modes of 
socialization. This latter anxiety about the change of the neighborhood’s character is 
                                                
45 Interview with the author, September 15, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Mr. Kalaji are taken from 





inseparable from a class anxiety about the mass culturalization of an elite artists enclave, 
while not entirely reducible to it. When cultural producers worry about the 
“commercialization” of the neighborhood, they are predominantly referring to patterns of 
behavior and consumption, not the scale of private capital invested or mobilized. For 
example, Rumi Café is one project of several owned and operated by the same team 
(including two other “Rumi” locations). All have similar intellectual, or soft, warm 
aesthetics. In contrast, the venue usually pointed out to me as proof of the neighborhood’s 
“commercialization” is Volk’s Burger (also an independent operation, whose prices and 
menu are geared to the same clientele that frequents Rumi). The burger joint has 
fluorescent lights, bright colors, and a predictably “American” fast food aesthetic. That 
this business is connected with the fact that the neighborhood is attracting more foot 
traffic (from outside the neighborhood), or the increase in its vehicular traffic on weekend 
evenings, should point to a confluence of taste and class anxiety. That is, worry about 
losing the alternative “vibe” of the neighborhood in a more “commercial” aesthetic is 
interchangeable with the perceived popularization of Al-Weibdeh.  
 
* * * 
 
In this section I have tried to navigate the split hopes and disappointments 
accompanying a growing music industry in Amman in the neoliberal context of the 
pouring into the city of different kinds of financial and human capital. The discourses 
with which Amman’s emerging role as urban and cosmopolitan center and Jordan’s 




problematic contours of discussions of cosmopolitanism generally (see Chapter Two). 
But the ways in which the city and its growth are classed are actively occluded in 
discussions of growing cultural production in Amman. And this deserves recognition 
considering the undeniable class segregation in this city. In juxtaposition to Amman’s 
emergent urban cosmopolitanism, homage is frequently paid to the city’s “poor” by 
referencing the “refugees” and “the camps.” These latter categories objectify and 
exoticize while reducing a host of social problems (and a considerable economic swath of 
the population) to one political demographic and one particular set of specific material 
concerns. Amman has serious problems with class mixing that are enforced by the city’s 
infrastructure: and this has little to do with the influx of Syrian refugees.46 Attempts to 
address economic diversity in audiences of cultural production usually center around 
“outreach” in and to the refugee camps, not the integration of denizens from West and 
East Amman in a single, shared space. It is in this context that musicians, producers, and 
fans in the know speak of “exposing,” “teaching,” or “educating” “the youth” and 
exposing new sounds to new audiences. Crucially, cultural producers speak of 
introducing them and catching them up to not only genres of music or art, but also the 
socially accepted behavior accompanying the consumption of that art. As Shermine 
Sawalha explained to me when I asked her about her target audience: 
Foreigners love the platform: they feel right at home. Even people from 
here feel right at home. Sometimes we get people from refugee camps, 
Syrians and whatever, that have never been in spaces like this. They feel 
very awkward. I see them: they come a bunch of boys – usually we try to 
prioritize mixed [gender] groups – but I give them all a chance to come 
and learn […] Ninety-nine percent of the time we don’t turn away groups 
of men. But I lecture them before they come in.. I make them wait for a 
                                                
46 For reflections on the General Amman Municipality (GAM)’s infrastructure planning, see Parker, 




little bit and then I give them a brief about what they’re going into and if 
they fuck up what’s going to happen them. Cause I don’t want to turn 
people away who want to come and learn - an education that’s more 
important than any school can give them. If they come in and behave 
themselves and are really into it, they’re hooked, and they’re always 
accepted. We always try to give people a chance.  
 
In these comments, Sawalha offers a good example of the collapsed distinction between 
urban poor and refugee (“Syrians and whatever”)47 – wherein the “other” to Amman’s 
new urban, globally-exposed, cosmopolitan is imagined as refugee.48 Significantly, in 
Sawalha’s remarks about audiences “behaving themselves,” she invokes social patterns 
of behavior that are learned. Sawalha connects the live presentation of independent, 
alternative music – performed by Arabs or others – with patterns of public behavior and 
social interaction with which some communities may not be familiar (“they feel very 
awkward”). “Learning” becomes both about new music and sounds at the same time that 
it means adapting to globalized standards of cosmopolitan social interactions at night: in 
particular in this case, it becomes about learning how to navigate different gendered 
environments than those available in other public spaces in Amman. Speaking more 
generally about how her production work addresses both musicians’ and audiences’ 
needs, Sawalha offered:  
People are dying for content. They are dying to go to shows, to go out and 
dance and learn and go to exhibits and go see things that will open up their 
minds. Since 9/11 there are so many things that are about closing up their 
                                                
47 If these comments also seem contradictory: “foreigners” feel at home but Syrians feel awkward – it may 
be because the word for “foreigners” [ajaneb] invokes non-Arab, not non-Jordanian subjects. This 
understanding of the term is the same across the Levant (and is often more accurate than the “European and 
North American” parentheticals I have been substituting for “Western” in this study – non-European/North 
American nationalities are included in this demographic). 
 
48 Syrian exiles actually make up a significant part of the musical acts Sawalha has hosted with both Malahi 






minds in the region. [Where] it’s all about religion. That’s all fucking 
brainwashing.  
 
The conceptualization of specific kinds of cultural production as a force of 
liberalized modernity and social progress, capable to counteract perceived regressive 
forces like intolerance, religious fundamentalism, and sexism is not unique to the 
Jordanian context.49 In the third section of this chapter, I will return to flesh out the class 
dynamics at play in two musical festivals in 2015, both of which centrally featured hip 
hop acts.  
Before moving on however, I want to offer a point of clarification via comparison 
on the subject of public space. Neither of the other two cities in this study are models of 
integrated class mixing. But both Beirut and Ramallah boast more public space, more 
interaction between classes, and more fluidity between class lines in different 
neighborhoods under the same municipal jurisdiction than Amman. Despite all the elitist 
construction and dispossession of the past fifteen years, Beirutis from all walks of life 
still can and do gather on the open-air Corniche. Throughout the city (and throughout the 
city’s history), neighborhoods of different classes border and flow into each other. In 
Ramallah, while the suburban enclaves of Masyoun and Al-Tireh are expanding and 
different modes of shopping and transportation are becoming increasingly exclusive, 
Ramallahawis are still not completely divided or segregated by geography and habit (and 
they are all subjected to the Occupation). Manara Square and the hisbeh market are 
shared public spaces while Rukab street is a common thorough way regardless of 
economic class. Obviously neither of these cities is a class-less utopia, either. But a 
                                                
49 See for example, Jessica Winegar, “Culture is the Solution: The Civilizing Mission of Egypt’s Culture 




complete dearth of actually public space – to which all citizens regardless of class or 
gender have access and in which they can find some degree of ease – is not something 
Beirutis nor Ramallahawis confront in their cities. The same does not hold true in 
Amman. The almost complete absence of public space, the difficulty of mobility and 
transportation, the hilly terrain, and the lack of sidewalks make moving through the city 
difficult and mixed gathering in public extremely rare. Most obviously, the East/West 
divide coupled with the lack of reliable public transportation makes even seeing how the 
other half of Amman lives unlikely for most – East and West Amman residents, alike.50  
Moreover, attempts to construct public spaces have proved to be divisive. For 
example, the uniqueness of Rainbow Street’s public accessibility in West Amman is 
rendered most visible by the density of young, unaccompanied men. Other, new public 
and semi-public spaces used by Ammanis for strolling or promenading in West Amman – 
the various malls for example, or the new Abdali project – are barred to young men who 
wish to enter without the company of women. One effect of the unregulated public access 
on Rainbow Street is that it is not terribly hospitable to women, veiled or unveiled, 
walking alone or with other women.51 As in other Arab contexts, and as Laleh Khalili has 
noted, “public” places are often laced with an implicit threat for women, and being in 
them need not always be a relaxing, much less liberating, experience.52 The policy 
                                                
50 Importantly, this works in both directions. Familiarity with the opposite “side” of Amman is rare among 
both sectors. 
 
51 In my experience, most unveiled women walking on this street at night were not Arab, unveiled Arab 
women preferring to avoid such encounters. See next note. 
 
52 Laleh Khalili writes, “rules of proper and decent behavior for women demand a certain degree of 
‘privacy’ in public which is not easily provided by unsegregated spaces… where men’s exuberant and 
sometimes aggressive behavior would threaten the women’s ability to partake of a safe conviviality.” 
(Laleh Khalili, “The Politics of Pleasure: Promenading on the Corniche and Beachgoing,” Society and 




barring groups of young men access to spaces like private malls and the new Abdali 
Boulevard is implemented with this reality in mind: in order to police public and semi-
public spaces for gender-specific violence and to prevent group harassment of girls and 
women. At the same time, it nevertheless effectively excludes young men from most new 
leisure spaces in West Amman.53 I return to questions of access in the third section of this 
chapter. Now, I turn to further the political context in which rappers intervene lyrically 
with a look at the political discourses rappers identify in their work and the music and 




Part Two: Performing Resignation 
 
To be honest, people overestimate — rappers especially — 
the influence of hip hop. Like, if I spit this verse there will 
be a revolution tomorrow! No, that’s not how it works. And 
you’re not “waking up” the people, or feeding them 
consciousness, or whatever.  
 ~Nasser Kalaji 
 
During Mounir Troudi’s concert halfway through the Al-Balad festival in July 
2015, the Tunisian singer unintentionally and charmingly acknowledged a particularity of 
the Jordanian context in which he was performing.54 Between songs, during light-hearted 
banter in which he was attempting to communicate with the Jordanian audience in his 
very Tunisian Arabic and French, two uniformed police officers entered the stadium and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
53 In a society where many young men are not permitted to socialize with young women until a formal 
engagement, social outings with peers of the opposite gender that are not family members is predictably 
difficult. (One might surmise that this increases the frustration that causes gender-based violence in the first 
place, but this is unfortunately not the subject of this study.) 
54 Mounir Troudi is a Tunisian jazz musician. He performed with his band Nagouz at the Odeon theatre on 





remained standing, unimpressed, near the entrance, their arms folded.55 Troudi, still in 
Tunisian dialect, made a joke at their expense – something about their seriousness – 
which the Jordanian audience largely didn’t understand.56 Remembering himself, Troudi 
quickly turned his jibe into a public gesture of thanks to the Jordanian military, 
encouraging his audience to offer them a round of applause, which they obliged. Troudi’s 
save, something like when one unknowingly disparages a host in their presence and turns 
it into a compliment, points to another consideration of musical concerts in public spaces 
in Amman. 
 In the first pages of this chapter, I acknowledged the strong hold the Hashemite 
monarchy maintains over civil dissent. The presence of the state intelligence [or secret 
police, as it is often translated, the mukhabarat] and the regular police (in uniform) was 
visible at every concert I attended in Amman. The producer Nasser Kalaji confirmed to 
me: “We see them, the guy who comes with a pen and a note pad, they’ll always be there: 
two guys standing in the back.” But, Kalaji was also keen to dismiss the implications of 
their presence: 
At the end of the day, what’s it going to effect? Five hundred people came 
and heard these couple lines? [It’s like they’re thinking,] ‘Let’s leave them 
be and we can claim we have a high standard of freedom of expression.’ 
You know? It goes both ways. We [the producers and musicians] are able 
to have the show and they [the State] take the credit that we have the civil 
liberty standards of Sweden, or whatever.  
                                                
55 The Tunisian dialect is both different from the Jordanian local dialect (very similar to the Palestinian 
dialect) and quite far from the classical Arabic (fusha), which is the language of the Qu’ran and taught in 
all the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Since the Jordanian dialect is closer to fusha, 
North African Arabic speakers can often understand this dialect. The reverse is not the case. So that 
someone speaking Tunisian, Libyan, or Moroccan Arabic is not easily (or at all) understood by a Jordanian, 
Palestinian, Lebanese, or Syrian audience. Moreover, the colonial history of especially Tunisia and 
Morocco has dictated that French is an easier second language than (in some cases classical Arabic as well 
as) English. In Jordan the opposite is true (English being the second language). So Troudi’s addresses to the 
audience – which were in Tunisian Arabic and French – were difficult for the Jordanian audience to follow. 
 





This kind of tolerated symbiosis was related to me by other event managers, producers, 
and performers as well. Despite personally seeing her juggle and attempt to negotiate 
arbitrary, last-minute police decisions (regardless of having secured necessary permits 
and documentation) at more than one event, Shermine Sawalha also denied antipathy for 
municipal or state authorities, cheerily recounting their rapport was “great,” and that they 
“never had any problems.” The presence of state authorities is something most all of my 
interlocutors were interested in downplaying. Kalaji, who was eager to declare himself a 
“royalist,” told me: 
I find it frustrating sometimes, you know? Especially in interviews with 
people doing academic work, or for a magazine, or whatever. They want 
to give it so much more than what it is. [For some researchers] it’s like, 
you have to be risking your life to do this. Like “there are snipers on the 
buildings and they’ve tapped my phone!” No, man, it’s not like this [...] I 
always mention my political stance in interviews. But people’s reactions 
when I tell them this, it doesn’t fit their framework: like, “Fuck, man! This 
guy is messing up my story!” 
 
In these comments, Kalaji articulates a productive hesitancy around the subject of 
censorship. Perhaps like Janelle Reinelt’s invitation to complicate our understandings of 
what she calls a “common-sense catchword,” Kalaji invites the researcher to trouble what 
an assumedly ominous censorship looks (and feels) like.57 There is no need to exaggerate 
the presence or impact of state censors on rappers’ political expression, their willingness 
                                                
57 Reinelt’s interests are different from mine here. She is interested in investigating the line between 
censorship and free speech (which is almost exclusively presented in her essay in the context of different 
accusations of hate speech). There is very little concern with hate speech in my context here. In my 
estimation, the Jordanian case is more straightforwardly about limiting expression critical of the regime and 
its policies. But I have found that Reneilt’s assertions about how naming censorship “proclaims it” resonate 
with my interlocutors’ testimonies about how political pressure in the Jordanian context operates. (Janelle 






to experiment politically, or listeners’ ability to respond. Indeed, it is significant that 
Amman’s hip hop and rap scene has not faced the kind of physical confrontation with the 
Jordanian state that other alternative music scenes in Jordan have. In the 1990s, Amman 
hosted a sizeable heavy metal scene. Local bands sang in English, playing covers from 
popular US and European metal bands, and large outdoor concerts and festivals drawing 
hundreds were held outside of Amman. The Jordanian state was quick to respond to this 
enthusiasm with arrests and accusations of “Satanism.” The threat and use of state 
violence eventually killed the scene.58 This is not a kind of censorship or suppression that 
hip hop and rap artists and audiences in Amman today face. At the same time, the felt 
presence of the state is an undeniable part of the Jordanian context. If this presence 
doesn’t physically stop rappers from saying what they want, a general atmosphere of 
caution around political subjects in general pervades social interactions in Amman when 
in the presence of strangers. Importantly, however this latter sense of caution is not only a 
product of state control, but the result of the particular confluence of material, social, and 
affective factors in Amman. 
In this section, and somewhat differently from work on censorship and counter-
censorial strategies in other Arab contexts, I begin to locate what I call performed 
resignation in some Jordanian rap.59 This is made up of conscious deliberations and 
active negotiations of political concerns, culminating in a performed tolerance of or 
                                                
58 Unlike in Lebanon, Iran, and Morocco, state force in Jordan was successful in suppressing the 
development of the scene. The Jordanian state police was not dissimilar in kind, just degree, from state 
policy towards heavy metal elsewhere in the region. (Interviews with Tareq Abu Kweik and Raed Serhan in 
particular. On heavy metal in the region see Mark LeVine, Heavy Metal Islam: Rock, Resistance, and the 
Struggle for the Soul of Islam [New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008].) 
 
59 For example, Lisa Wedeen has explored similar dynamics of public deliberation – what she calls 
performing belief and “unbelief” in Syria. (Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, 





resignation to the status quo. Considering how rappers arrive at these positions is an 
important political process: one that demonstrates the contours and texture of politics 
particular to Amman. My concern is to demonstrate how the political feeling of 
resignation built in some Jordanian rap points not to passivity but to politics in process. 
Performing resignation is an active political negotiation, one that is obviously not 
“resistance” to the status quo, but neither does it indicate complete control by the state or 
submission to it, or even that the state is the most prominent censoring force involved. 
Moreover, the significance of performed resignation for my study of rap in Amman is the 
relationship of this political feeling to tarab. What is the effect of apparent resignation on 
the ability of rappers and their fans to connect and communicate in concert spaces? How 
does the feeling of not wanting to rock the boat, or the refusal to confront or challenge the 
status quo engender or impede the flows of tarab described in Chapter Two? What is the 
relationship between resignation and the mode of longing I suggested underpins the 
emergence of tarab in Arabic rap? Is performed resignation congruent to performed 
disgust or articulated refusal in its ability to host call and response between musicians and 
listeners? Is there a difference at all?  
I argue that performed resignation in some rap lyrics is imbued with the same 
kinds of longing I identified in rap in both Beirut and Ramallah – an affective framework 
that led me to propose considering more carefully the textures of politics in progress and 
to build the model of tracking the emergence of tarab in rap concerts in the region. 
However, the obstacles and tensions particular to public space in Amman, incidentally 
some of the same tensions that drive expressions of resignation lyrically, stymie the 




appears much more divided in Amman than it does in either Beirut or Ramallah. This 
reflects back on musicians’ frustrations with and desires to leave the city. Importantly 
however, this configuration of political feeling and audiences’ divided attention need not 
suggest that Jordanian rap is less political or less powerful than rap I discuss in either 
Ramallah or Beirut.  
 In the Ramallah case study, I suggested that second wave lyrical experimentation, 
following in the example of the perceived impact of the Ramallah Underground, seeks to 
“fill the head.” I suggested that successful examples of second wave “filling the head” – 
second wave tarab – work in part by inverting political narratives. For example, turning 
inside out romanticism about resilience or steadfastness [sumud and sabr] and rendering 
it deaf or dumb was able to surprise and engage listeners, despite an adopted aloofness in 
these avant-garde iterations of the genre. In Beirut, as I explore in the next chapter, 
performed disgust in the heart of Ras Beirut excited and engaged listeners who travelled 
from outside the cosmopolitan avenues of capital, following rappers who voiced local 
and ghettoized concerns on central stages of the capital city. In both Ramallah and Beirut, 
kinds of refusal – manifest as cynicism, rejection, impatience, disgust, inversion – drive 
the ability of rap lyrics to surprise and engage listeners, and to “fill the head.” A wholly 
different kind of refusal operates in the Ammani context. 
Rap in Amman approaches decidedly fewer explicitly political subjects than in 
Ramallah and is performed with an almost opposite affect of that in Beirut. Amman 
concerts boast a considerably “lighter” tone. They are not as concerned as Ramallah’s 
second wave with experimental sounds and they are much more concerned with not 




evades the overtly political and carries a lighter mood, consider that Satti’s most recent 
album was entitled “Bars with Benefits.”60 The tracks on the A side of the album relate 
frustrations with dating in a digital world and are underscored sonically with recorded 
laughter. Indeed, the sonic reflection of a retreat from the political is especially 
pronounced in rap in Amman and can be found in the search for “lighter” sounds. 
“Politics can be too heavy” Kalaji told me. The use of “lighter” sounds came up 
repeatedly in my interviews and points to the active negotiation of audience tolerance and 
attention in how politics are articulated and presented. 
The diversification of the sounds as well as subject matter of Jordanian rap is 
frequently credited at least initially to El Far3i. Sotusura, Kalaji, as well as El Far3i 
himself attest that the lighter sounds and quotidian subject matter in the latter’s work 
were easier for Jordanians, especially those not already indoctrinated in hip hop sounds 
and culture, to accept.61 They suggest that El Far3i was able to reach wider audiences in 
his solo rap work not only by using acoustic instead of electronic accompaniment, but by 
rapping about different subject matter: university life, rapport between young men and 
women, neighborhood dynamics, and other elements of work and play. 
Interestingly, my interlocutors referenced the Jordanian or Ammani quotidian that 
appealed to expanding audiences as a shift away from the subject of Palestine in Arabic 
rap. Unprompted by me, rapper after rapper in Amman expressed their refusal to touch 
the political question of Palestinian liberation, which they variously referred to as 
                                                
60 I’m not suggesting the album is free of politics. I am suggesting it is not pointedly inverting political 
narratives in the ways the work discussed in Ramallah and Beirut do. Satti himself acknowledges the 
relative “lightness” of these tracks in his song “Bilaʿtmeh” [“In the dark”], addressed in some length below. 
61 Many of my interlocutors were keen to point out the increasing number of women, especially veiled 
women, attending rap and hip hop concerts as part of the changes of the scene in Amman over the past five 





“mainstream” and “tired,” asserting that “there’s nothing left to talk about.”62 Further, 
rappers and producers testified that rap “trying” to be political quickly picked up this 
subject. Jazz tha Process told me cynically, “any rapper that wants to make it has to rap 
about Palestine.” He identified this move as disingenuous. The Syrian rapper Bu 
Kolthoum concurred: 
How many times have I mentioned Palestine in my music? Not a single 
time. Not once. Why? Because it’s enough, Palestine is understood. 
There’s an occupier, he has to leave. There’s nothing left to talk about. 
Arm yourself and go fight, or shut up about it. At the same time, I’ve 
never lived in Palestine, nor have I visited — though I hope to, of course! 
So, I am not going to sit and write Palestine and sigh and write about 
nostalgia — nostalgia for what? You want to talk politics, be my guest. 
But you want to come and describe to me, and sing me tracks about 
Damascus, and Homs, and Aleppo, and whatever, and you are not Syrian, 
and have no history with the streets of Syria? What are you coming to 
write poetry about? That means you just want views, man. And that means 
you can eat shit.  
 
Here, Bu Kolthoum extends cynicism about rappers’ intentions when they choose to rap 
about Palestine to the Syrian crisis as well. He considers addressing these subjects – 
especially perhaps lamenting the loss of these places (“I am not going to sit and sigh and 
write about nostalgia”) to be sanctimonious and insincere (“that means you just want 
views”). I infer from these kinds of comments that in Amman rappers were especially 
conscious of political posturing in their lyrics despite sharing much of the same politics 
as rappers elsewhere in the region (distrust of NGOs, critical of local corruption and 
nepotism, against the Israeli occupation and for the most part critical of foreign 
intervention). 
                                                
62 Interviews with Mohammed al-Hijazi, DJ Sotusura, and Bu Kolthoum, respectively. The interview with 
al-Hijazzi (Jazz tha Process) was conducted on August 31, 2015. Subsequent quotations from al-Hijazi are 





Significantly in my opinion, the subject of the Jordanian monarchy, even in the 
context of Palestinian liberation, is not the direct concern of a single Jordanian rap track 
of which I am aware.63 In other words, to “make it,” some rappers turn to political 
subjects which they hope will win them listeners: the occupations of Palestine and Iraq, 
the chaos of Syria, orientalism – subjects on which most listeners, despite different 
political strategies, will largely agree. Others are critical of especially the pressure (from 
NGOs and frameworks they perceive as “orientalist” offered by European and North 
American journalists and researchers) on rappers to produce this discourse.64 But even 
these rappers do not seek to address immediate political realities of the Jordanian context. 
They are not turning from the – now obvious – problem of the Occupation to address the 
more complicated issue of Jordanian state complicity with it. Rather, Hijazzi told me for 
example that he is looking for more “subliminal” expression. Bu Kolthoum explained, 
When you want to communicate an idea, and you yourself are this 
wounded [la hal qadeh majrouha], you also want to wound [inti kaman 
bidek tirjahi]. Most of my tracks are full of curses. I swear a lot. For me 
the solution is no longer political. You can’t translate feelings politically.  
 
                                                
63 Readers will recall the role the monarchy played in crushing the Palestinian resistance in 1970-1971. On 
the relationship between Palestinian identity, Palestinian liberation, the “resistance,” and the Hashemite 
ruling class, see among others, Laurie Brand, “Al-Muhajirin w-al-Ansar: Hashemite Strategies for 
Managing Communal Identity in Jordan,” in Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East, 
ed. Leonard Binder, 279-306 (Gainesville, FL: UP of Florida, 1999) and more recently Laurie Brand, 
“Jordan: Unwilling Citizens, Problematic Expatriates,” in Brand, Citizens Abroad: Emigration and the 
State in the Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), Kindle edition. 
 
64 In our interview, Synaptik talked at length about the initial opportunities that he pursued writing raps in 
order to make some money for equipment and travel. These included a competition sponsored by the 
European Voluntary Service, a concert sponsored by the Royal Cultural Ministry and performed in front of 
King Abdullah II, and a competition on a local radio station sponsored by Stolichnaya. He told me “but 
when I started taking myself seriously I started hating my work [the work he wrote for these kinds of 
competitions and audiences].” He told me, it’s just like “being a wedding singer” – except instead of being 
hired to sing popular hits, you’re hired to spout “popular” politics. (Synaptik himself comes from a family 
of popular Palestinian wedding singers.) He concluded, “there’s no such thing as real political rap. It’s all 
lies.” (Interview with Laith al-Husseini [Synaptic], August 31, 2015. All subsequent quotations from 





The shift towards the “subliminal” expression and articulations of feeling without politics 
might seem to follow trends in postmodern lyricism and performance, which have been 
criticized as depoliticized and aloof in different contexts. However, when successful, I 
think the turn to the Jordanian quotidian and the invention of “more subliminal” 
expression (as I elaborate in two examples below) performs an active negotiation of 
politics, rather than points to the development of a politically disconnected or apathetic 
rap culture. Performing resignation is an active refusal with particular political affect. The 
refusal to confront the immediate, Jordanian status quo directly does not avoid political 
feeling, but it affects its texture.65  
Moreover, the retreat from specific political expression, is marked by feelings of 
frustration, impatience, anxiety, and malaise. Satti offered: 
 
Listen, the ceiling on expression here is very open. In a sense, there is 
freedom of speech, let’s say. But like, I don’t want to be just a column in 
the newspaper, you know? Everybody’s really into politics now. People 
read a lot and they are hearing all sorts of different things already… 
What’s it going to change if I come and rap about the same things? This 
stopped being really interesting to me. It’s not about getting in trouble or 
anything. I’m just sick and tired of it.  
 
 
Satti’s hesitancy in these remarks to assert definitively that there is freedom of speech 
(“in a sense there is… let’s say”) is indicative of a kind of second-guessing about the 
existence of censorship that other interlocutors also expressed. In the latter half of his 
comments, he’s also referring to a shift in an approach to political subject matter in his 
                                                
65 As Bassam Haddad has argued in the context of Syria, preference for the “status quo” is a complicated 
negotiation of hope and fear – but also a strategic, logistical navigation of possible gains and losses. 
(Bassam Haddad, Business Networks in Syria: the Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience [Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2012]). Moreover, as Christa Salamandra points out, this is not new. The deliberations over 
sense of self, allegiance, change, and authenticity in the consumption of popular culture are negotiations 
that mark the current period as they have for generations (Christa Salamandra, A New Old Damascus: 





music, especially since the Arab Uprisings. This reflects a change in the sociality of 
political discourse (“everybody’s really into politics now”), something Satti doesn’t feel 
like it’s in his music to compete with (“this stopped being interesting to me”). Moreover, 
his decision not to address politics is marked by exhaustion or frustration (“I’m just sick 
and tired of it”). Khotta Ba expressed similar feelings when he also articulated a retreat 
from politics, saying: 
 
I no longer have the heart to run after politics or go down to protest. 
Khalas [enough]. You feel like you’re not going to have an effect, nor are 
you going to accomplish anything. Because seriously what you’re up 
against is huge, so don’t waste your time. If it’s going to work out, it will 
work out on its own. Not because of me or anyone else.66 
 
Khotta’s resignation here is laden with exhaustion (“what you’re up against is huge, don’t 
waste your time”). Importantly however, as he continued, he also communicated a 
pronounced anxiety. 
I don’t know where I’ll be in a year or two years. You really don’t know. 
Maybe you’ll find yourself doing great and maybe you’ll find yourself 
with nothing in the street. That’s what’s happening everywhere around us. 
Honestly, I don’t know what’s coming. And I don’t feel like what’s 
coming is going to be nice in the end. It doesn’t look that way. 
 
To be sure, part of the concerns addressed by Satti and Khotta Ba reflect a general mood 
of depression, caution, hesitation, or worry that has become more pronounced among 
Arab youth since the counterrevolutionary forces in Egypt, Libya, and Syria seem to be 
gaining the upper hand (2013-2015; see relevant discussion in Chapter Two). But despite 
the caution and confusion about the state of regional affairs many rappers expressed to 
me in all three cities, the remove Khotta and Satti articulate here is quite pronounced. The 
                                                
66 Interview with the author, August 12, 2015. All subsequent quotations from Majd Kamal, whose stage 




damper the spectacular Syrian civil war and accompanying rise of ISIS has put on 
political hopes across the region is considerable. But the political mood of resignation in 
Amman as expressed here by these two prominent rappers is particular to the Jordanian 
context.  
 The feeling Khotta articulated that the undesirable current status quo is 
preferable to some unknown and assumedly dire future (“I don’t know what’s coming 
and I don’t feel like what’s coming is going to be nice in the end”) is widespread. Sarah 
Tobin has suggested that a comparative framework – wherein Jordanians are encouraged 
by state power to consider Jordan’s problems in relation to regional strife is a powerful 
strategy of the Hashemite regime to maintain both a sense of precarious Jordanian unity 
as well as the status quo.67 She writes that the Hashemite government supplements 
“consumerist distractions” with comparison to neighboring countries’ strife to “help 
distract from internal divisions.”68 That is, the political narrative of Jordan’s stability in a 
region wracked by violence and chaos – Jordan as balad al-amn w al-istighrar [land of 
security and stability] – is built by looking warily at the violence next door. Tobin 
suggests that compared to situations in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, “most Ammanis agree” 
that the reforms desired “are not worth” risking another civil war or a US-led invasion.69 
                                                
67 Sarah Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution,” Middle East Policy, 
19(2012): 100-101. I am indebted to Christine Sargent for referring me to Dr. Tobin’s work. Nationalism 
and Jordanian identity did not come up in my interviews with rappers, audiences, or concert organizers, but 
it is a thoroughly researched topic. See, among others: Andrew Shryock, Nationalism and the Genealogical 
Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan (Berkeley: U of California P, 1997); 
Betty S. Anderson; Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State (Austin: U of Texas P, 2005); 
and Massad, Colonial Effects. 
 
68 Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring,” 106. 
69 Economic comparisons at the regional level also play an important part here. Tobin illustrates that the 
idea of Amman as a relatively wealthy space contributes to the appeal of an aspiring and possible “middle-
classness” as unifying project. In this perception of Jordan vis-à-vis its neighbors, widespread poverty is 




The eye cast on the chaos in Jordan’s neighbors is a widespread and demobilizing 
political force. It encourages the feeling of not wanting to rock the boat.70 As Khotta Ba 
said, “If it’s going to work out, it will work out on its own.” This resignation happens 
while not addressing the anxiety that “what’s coming is not going to be nice in the end.” 
Paralysis and anxiety feed into each other.71  
                                                                                                                                            
consider the economic problems to be so great as to risk the country’s relative stability. (Tobin, “Jordan’s 
Arab Spring,” 106.)  
 
70 Tobin’s piece was published in 2012. While the influx of Syrian refugees has grown considerably since 
then with effects on the country’s economy, I do not see reason to suggest that her argument about 
Jordanian perception of wealth (especially in Amman) vis-à-vis the rest of the region has changed much 
since. (Neither does Tobin: see more recently Tobin, Everyday Piety: Islam and Economy in Jordan 
[Cornell, NY: Cornell UP, 2016], 184-194.) Writing about Syria, Lisa Wedeen has suggested a very similar 
kind of ambivalence is a direct result of the shape of neoliberal governance and the aspirations and hopes of 
citizens navigating these incursions. (Lisa Wedeen, “Ideology and Humor in Dark Times: Notes from 
Syria,” Critical Inquiry 39[2013]: 841-873.) 
 
71 The video for Kazz Alomam’s track “Dahab” [“Gold”] is one of few examples that counters this trend. 
The lyrics are not so explicit, but the visual images in the video clearly implicate the narratives of security 
in the suppression and repression of the average Arab citizen, and of the working class specifically. To 
describe it very simply, the video stages a young car mechanic, strapped for money, in a boxing ring up 
against Arab capital (as stereotyped man in suit). Before the hero can throw a punch, two men in black 
masks and hoodies, with the words “amn” [security] and “aman” [safety] painted in white on their backs 
carry the mechanic off. This staging associates narratives of security and safety with corruption (the hooded 
thugs are called in by the man in the suit before he enters the ring); with collusion with Arab elites – that is, 
“safety” and “security” protect the rich, not the poor; with torture or other punishment of dissent (the 
mechanic is dragged off and not seen from again). Most obviously, the video associates the discourses amn 
and aman with violence. At the end, the victor, who invoked safety and security to beat the mechanic, 
shoots off the pistol he was carrying the whole time. It is noteworthy that this negotiation of symbolism 
does not happen lyrically but is only reflected visually in the video.  
 
 
[Figure 4.7 “Screen grab from ‘Kazz Alomam “Dahab,”’” 6:17.] 





 Slightly differently from Tobin, I want to suggest that in order to recognize how 
the wavering towards and away from political positions in rap in Amman functions, it is 
important to acknowledge that this paralysis and anxiety is not only a product and effect 
of the strong arm of the state. The Hashemite regime and its operations are considerable, 
but all my interlocutors identify that its hold on power is only one problem of many 
facing Amman’s denizens, the region, or Arab youth even more generally. Kalaji hinted 
at this when he expressed frustration with narratives of state censorship in Jordan 
(“Researchers want to give it so much more than what it is”), implying that the state is 
not responsible for everything – but importantly, he did not deny the presence of 
problems, either. 
That is, while Kalaji comfortably stated a political position when he called 
himself a supporter of the regime, he also recognized the need for political processes of 
deliberation. He put it this way: 
We Arabs for the last God-knows-how-many-years have not been able to 
express ourselves. And that has created a lot of identity issues, a lot of 
political issues, a lot of racist issues [among Arabs]. We like to say “the 
West doesn’t understand us” but in reality we don’t understand ourselves, 
because we haven’t been talking to each other for the last century. You 
know what I mean? Ultimately I don’t think [hip hop] is about creating 
change. I think it’s about creating the atmosphere first and second the 
inspiration to say whatever the hell you want to say. I think at this stage in 
the Arab world, this is the main push. Because you need to break a lot of 
constraints, and not just from the state. 
 
In other words, despite what I interpret as Kalaji’s pragmatist political positioning 
aligned with the Jordanian monarchy, he also recognized the need (“at this stage, this is 




positive role to play in allowing these processes to take place.72 Important to me at this 
juncture however is his assertion that some hip hop, despite not being able to bring “a 
revolution tomorrow,” is able create an “atmosphere” to express “whatever the hell you 
want to say.” To me this points to the role rap may play in staging political processes.  
El Far3i, stage name for Tareq Abu-Kweik, expressed the censorship situation in 
Amman somewhat differently than Kalaji but he shared the latter’s emphasis on 
encouraging expression. On Skype from London, the Palestinian-Jordanian rapper told 
me:  
The Jordanian government doesn’t need to stop you. We’re born [as 
Jordanians] with the self-censorship. We get it, that we can say certain 
things and we can’t say others. It’s all about finding your way to say what 
you want to say in a way that works with them. But… I… I… I… you 
know… people will tell you like, no you’re not a threat to them, you’re 
just like a bunch of hipsters in some West Amman bar. But the other 
reality is that there are people listening to this all over the place. And you 
know. Because you know that in some neighborhoods in Syria people 
were getting arrested for listening to your shit. You know this for a fact. It 
did get there. […] You yourself know that [in Jordan] you can actually 
push it further but you’re just not ready to go for the fight.73 
 
The potential threat of censorship in El Far3i’s remarks is, like in Kalaji’s, again drawn 
by a regional comparison – to the Syrian security apparatus. But while he is keen to 
recognize that Jordanian security pales to the Syrian one, he stutters to articulate the 
actual impact of this configuration of listening and state power on his own expression. El 
Far3i testifies that the reality that censorship today does not frequently manifest itself in 
the hip hop scene in a spectacular displays of force gives a different, self-policing 
                                                
72 Whether one agrees with him on that issue is a matter of politics. 
 
73 Interview with the author, August 20, 2015. All subsequent quotations from El Far3i (Tareq Abu Kweik) 





dimension to Jordanian state power (“the Jordanian government doesn’t need to stop you, 
we self-censor.”) 
 This diversifies how we might understand state power as one of several forces 
effecting rappers’ expression in Amman. First, implying “self-censorship” is at work 
complicates censorship in ways Kalaji was keen to dismiss. More importantly, however, 
El Far3i’s refusal to call out state censorship as the primary obstacle (“You know you 
could push it further but you’re not ready”) points to other factors holding him back, 
besides state power. His “not readiness” is central to the announcement of resignation I 
identify in rap lyrics: El Far3i’s articulation of a “maybe, but not yet” is indicative of 
politics in progress. Throughout our conversation, El Far3i stayed vague about what 
“pushing it further” might mean, or in what direction one might want to “push” things, 
refusing to suggest that outright criticism of the state is something he wished to articulate, 
but couldn’t. Our conversation remained with in the realm of encouraging a vague 
“expression,” or encouraging others to “express themselves.”  
The “expression” that both El Far3i and Kalaji refer to as important in much rap 
in Amman is significant because it relates active political deliberations. That is, I infer 
that it is more than a simple advocacy of a neoliberal or humanitarian “free speech.” 
Recall that all the rappers I spoke with acknowledged they are relatively free to say what 
they want. At the same time, all also expressed fatigue or boredom with “politics,” stating 
that they were looking for other expressions (more “subliminal”; pure “feeling”; that is 
able to “wound”) in their lyrical work. When rappers relate their attention to the feelings 
of being watched, of not having political options, or of the uselessness of political debate, 




result, they draw attention to externally and internally imposed modes of censorship and 
negotiate between positions that are both exhausted and exhausting. The attention to the 
malaise, the frustration, and the declarations of doing nothing are perhaps the expression 
that both El Far3i and Kalaji want to encourage. These are politics in progress. My 
concern here is how these processes, what I call in the Amman context performed 
resignation, function politically. 
An especially good example of the phenomenon I am addressing is El Far3i’s 
track “ʿAqrab al thawani” [“The Second Hand”], released in early 2014.74 With over 
twenty-nine thousand plays on Sound Cloud, it is one of El Far3i’s most-listened-to solo 
pieces. The song walks through a solitary deliberation and culminates in resignation.  
 
Sitting cross-legged on the floor, in a room where a friend sleeps 
I have a dream and a craft but fate is floating in it. 
Like everything in this country, the subject is paralyzed: 
He promised but did not show; what should I do? 
Of course he called, not once but like ten times: 
What’s this music called? And who distributes it? 
Down with propaganda and dumbed-down rhetoric  
Unfounded suggestions: they found you empty when they peeled you! 
 
Me and my career, we play 1-2 offense 
So that they don’t ask on Judgment Day why we didn’t change things 
You confused the kid when you put him in school 
And then they let him loose in society he got up and got a tattoo 
I’m not hating: that’s the point, to each his own. 
Everyone speaks his mind in his own way, in the way it serves him, 
 
If I change my mind, I imagine I’ll want handala on my back: 
So that when I swim in the Dead Sea, you can see his face on my chest.75 
                                                
74 Sound Cloud tracks do not include the date of publication. The time stamp rather reads backwards in a 
vague articulation of time since it was published. For example, in February 2016 at the time of writing, the 
time stamp for this track read “2 years ago.” “El Far3i- A’qrab El Thawani,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 
3:27, posted by “El Far3i,” 2014, accessed February 28, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/el-far3i/el-far3i-
aqrab-el-thawani. 
 
75 “Handala” is the name of a cartoon by Naji al-Ali, popular in illustrations of Palestinian resistance. The 




We’re still being kicked out, “ethnically cleansed,” so the show’s not over 
Daddy-o, this is the rap of the lowest point on Earth76 
And to the people that see that something’s missing in the write-up: 
Who said that we don’t make broken hearts dance? 
 
“Second hand” : 
You changed my place, 
You switched the meaning 
You made me doubt my history 
 
Who said that we don’t make broken hearts dance? 
Our playground was sold as scrap metal77; I bought a swing instead  
We wanted to entertain the people because the television is a horror film 
And the street is hard; the simplest bite is tiring. 
So who is to blame? It depends. 
 
There are the farmers, but they’re not at market because they got angry; 
There are the merchants clowning cockily to earn a penny; 
And there are those on the western borders, smuggled in crates of grapes. 
More than one request, a log on fire, an angry nerve lives in each of us 
It blocks every photon of light that comes towards us.  
 
A small country but the planet is strange: 
How things come together and, in a push, become a mess. 
So where is the best place in the room to hang the calendar? 
Because tomorrow and yesterday are here asking me about the present. 
Where the changes have put me, I cannot locate my location: 
The clock I have is digital I can’t see the second’s hand! 
Products produced with intention, but the choice is mandatory.  
 
I bought a new car but there’s no front seat; 
How to turn it on to go return it to the factory? 
I am compelled to sit in the back and be subjected to the design!78 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
describes handala tattooed on his back, he’s envisioning the flip side of the cartoon, or the boy’s face, 
appearing through his body (“on his chest”). The Dead Sea is dangerously high in salt content. The best 
way to “swim” in it is to float on one’s back. 
 
76 At some 1,000 feet below sea level, the shores of the Dead Sea have the lowest surface elevation – they 
are the “lowest point” – on Earth. The phrase here has a metaphorical meaning as well, referring to the 
status of “Palestinian” among other nationalities – or equally to the resistance at its weakest. 
 
77 The word El Far3i used, which I translated as “playground,” is “Al Jubeiha” – referring to an amusement 
center in Amman that was closed and sold (personal correspondence with the artist, February 29, 2016). 
 




In this piece, El Far3i’s expression walks the listener through a deliberation that 
ends in resignation. Articulating the process of how he arrives at this “back seat” is 
illustrative of politics in process – his recounted deliberations demonstrate this process 
and the piece points to the activity involved in arriving at resignation. At the same time, 
declaring that he is “compelled to sit in the back” encourages the listener to recognize 
that the artist is consciously not saying more. In this way, El Far3i encourages the 
acknowledgement in the listener of her own resignation, her own self-confinement to the 
back seat. While the piece recounts a self-conscious removal from politics deliberated in 
private, the description of arriving at this position drags politics back into the public 
sphere.  
Sitting on the floor while a friend (which could be another incarnation of the 
speaker) sleeps (another mode of being frozen), we imagine El Far3i in a kind of 
meditative pose. He daydreams, finding his future floating on the surface, “frozen” like 
“everything else in the country.” This light expression of frustration with the status quo 
prompts a paranoid reaction. His mind drifts to an imagined, unknown caller, wanting to 
know about his music and how he distributes it (“he called not once but ten times”). The 
paranoia that someone is asking about his lyrics is countered in the next lines by the 
doubt El Far3i stuttered through in our interview: “Unfounded suggestions: they found 
you empty when they peeled you!” That is, he casts the fear of someone listening as self-
inflatedness: in the end, there is no there there. 
In the next verses, the lack of substance in his own “dumbed down rhetoric” is 
traced to a confused childhood (“Don’t ask on Judgment Day why we didn’t change 




bought a swing – a childish plaything that allows him to move while staying still. The 
images of childhood confusion (“you confused the kid when you put him in school”) and 
impotent attempts at resistance (“he got up and got a tattoo”) carry through to vague 
evocations of Palestinian struggle. El Far3i invokes Palestinian resistance in the boyish 
figure of Naji el Ali’s handala, the boy cartoon, whom he takes “on his back.” This 
seems to imply he’s taking on the resistance, identifying with it, but his support 
(swimming with him on his back) either drowns the cartoon since he can only float face 
up in the Dead Sea (another clear metaphor), or by exposing the cartoon’s face, changing 
the figure of resistance altogether. Further, with this he admits that he, with the 
Palestinian resistance beneath him, is “at the lowest point on Earth.”  
Who is responsible for this state of affairs? He is unable to articulate a subject 
responsible for the malaise he’s feeling (“Who’s to blame? It depends”). Even the 
speaker’s gestures towards possible culprits are so vague that we are unclear whether he 
means actual farmers and merchants, or growers and traders as abstract metaphors for 
political figures or ideologies. As a nod to those looking for a more precise articulation of 
politics (“to those who think there’s something missing in the write-up”), he responds by 
evoking a dull, abstract pain (“who says we can’t make broken hearts dance?”)  
Throughout, the quiet march of time – in the second hand, which he can’t even 
see (“my watch is digital”) – ticks on. The invisible but felt menace of time helps to 
communicate the confusion he feels (“tomorrow and yesterday are here asking me about 
the present”), while a lack of direction is affirmed in the last couplets. He buys a car but 




figure out how to turn it on to return it, compelling him to give up and accept the flawed 
design (“I am compelled to sit in the back and be subjected to it”).  
Musically, the piece is not an example of El Far3i’s acoustic work. On the 
contrary, electronic keyboard and synthesizer score a fast, descending arpeggiated minor 
triad that repeats throughout the track, giving a tense suspense to the piece. The beat, 
alternating clap and snare, enters one verse in (around the 0:30 mark), adding momentum 
and contributing to the build and release of the synthesizer. The tone of El Far3i’s voice 
is confident, persuasive, even accusatory. Which is to say, this is not an example of his 
pieces with “lighter” sounds. It plays like a ballad; making, it seems to me, the political 
positions to which it arrives particularly poignant. Musically in the synthesizer and beats, 
sonically in the tone of the rapper’s voice, as well as lyrically, the track is a good 
example of how performing resignation can be conceived as an active standing-down. 
The performance of resignation – the calling into attention of its arrival or 
enactment – stages a political process. El Far3i’s admission of resignation encourages 
listeners to recognize how they too retreat from politics. The expression of feelings and 
recounting active deliberations before arriving at a sort of temporary defeat (accepting the 
flawed design) is what constitutes performing resignation. The recognition of the listener, 
of the listener’s political expectations, is an important part of performing resignation. 
Indeed, not only do El Far3i’s lyrics interpolate the listener, they recognize the listener’s 
recognition. “To those who think there’s something missing in the write-up,” can be read 
as an articulation of disdain common in hip hop in any language (à la: “haters gonna 
hate!”). But I think it’s more likely that the line serves as a sign to listeners: I am not 




resignation operates. The listener, while she identifies with the line, is similarly instructed 
to play along and “dance.” Broken hearts dance after all, El Far3i reminds us, twice.  
The relationship here between resignation and longing is important. I have been 
arguing in this dissertation that articulation of something missing by rappers is laced with 
longing. This longing encourages the emergence of tarab: a near out-of-body experience 
between the performer and the listener, which can provoke strong physical reactions in 
the latter, marked by seemingly spontaneous interpellations, a feeling of ecstatic 
“emotional blending.” Longing can be seen and heard in the rap lyrics I’ve addressed 
here. The couplet I underscored above (“To those who thing there’s something 
missing/Who said broken hearts can’t dance”) is an articulation of longing, if a defensive 
and guarded one. Longing and resignation is obvious in the recorded tracks of others.  
Kazz Alomam’s track “Ghabareh” [“Dust”] describes a similar arrival to 
resignation; Satti’s track “Bilʿatmeh” [“In the Dark”] relates similar meditations on 
frustration and confusion.79 In the interest of space I will only address the latter of these 
two. Satti’s track is produced by the US-based producer and rapper Russ. It starts like the 
latter’s own track “Goodbye.”80 Both Russ and Satti’s pieces open with a sample of 
Esther Phillips singing “I Wish you Love.” Satti’s track mirrors Russ’s use of the sung 
refrain and then sharp shift into the lyrical rap. But while Russ’s rap involves a not 
terribly complex, largely misogynistic take down of a former girlfriend, Satti bids 
farewell to a former version of himself. This piece among other examples of performed 
                                                
79 “Satti- bil3atmeh – prod by (russ) instrumental,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 3:48, posted by “Satti,” 
2015, accessed March 2, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/ay-satti/satti-bil3atmeh-prod-by-russ-instrumental.  
 
80 “Russ – Goodbye (Official Video),” YouTube Video, 4:12, posted by “DIEMONDOTCOM,” February 





resignation in rap in Amman is especially germane to my discussion here because the 
affective mode of longing alongside performed resignation is particularly pronounced. 
The used sample in this piece reflects the use of sampled tarab I referred to in my 
discussion of “Khaleeni ʿAyeesh” by the Ramallah Underground in Chapter Two. The 
use of the sample in Satti’s track reflects a widespread strategy among rappers of 
softening the beats and rounding out the rapper’s expression with specific emotional pull. 
In other tracks, “tarab” sampling helps to frame an affective longing. The sampling of 
Esther Phillips functions in this way in Satti’s track “In the Dark.” Furthermore, the 
longing affected in Satti’s voice in this track in recording – an affect that is distinct from 
that which he normally produces – is significant. As the song proceeds, he sounds almost 
on the verge of tears, interrupting himself with emotional interpellations of “ya Satti!” 
[oh, Satti!], mimicking the tarab-like responses of an audience that does not exist. As he 
articulates what he’s feeling: a slow recognition of his apathy, he gets progressively more 
upset, so that when he gets to the third iteration of the refrain there is no hiding the 
emotion in his voice. 
The lyrics after the “I wish you Love” sample (“Good bye, no use leading with 
our chins…” etc.) go like this: 
It’s no good to know what you want; they stop you 
There’s always someone to throw something heavy; watermelons thrown 
in the way  
I remember my seat in my room like it’s today; it’s a motivation  
I really feel like I’m at attacker of the goal, I wait for greatness 
See where I was and where I am at now; I’m no longer in my place 
I wrote so many poetic lines you feel like I built buildings  
I paid attention to what I listened to, I was patient ‘til I grew up to never 
screw up 
I know what it means to lose; I buried so many close people with these 
hands,  




If you want the truth, between myself and I, I was ashamed 
My lungs are dying, turned to black from inhaling all this smoke  
This is a local product, nobody touches it, there are no bags in the store 
I’m kinda worried from all the thoughts in my head, it’s getting darker 
The last few songs I dropped stupidly, I dissed myself81  
You know when you’re feeling musical and you feel like composing?  




Who ’s the loser? Look in the mirror 
You no longer have a place at the door of the mosque, like slippers do82 
I’ve started to walk in the dark and I always feel like there is someone 
behind me  




They attacked with open mouths, my eyes opened and turned red from 
anger 
I organized my thoughts but it feels like they are sheep, they wander off to 
graze elsewhere 
I walked barefoot, knowing there were embers and broken glass  
It seems I got used to being overprotective and betrayed  
I don’t know if you’re worth anything if you got no audience  
I don’t know what bitterness is because I’m always forced to foolishness 
Your brother’s no hero, I got used to the idea of submission 
I’ve got to go, I want to piss on the subject, but I can’t the gallstones are 
so bad  
Shooting everywhere, up and down, I feel my life turned into an art 
lecture83  
For three years I’ve been sleeping on the sofa, I’ve forgotten the bed 
Once I got fed up and told myself let me know my destiny  
I tried to read my fortune from a coffee cup and cards; its hipsterism that 
caught me!84 
I felt numb because in my head I was lost, I couldn’t write, so I left a 
fingerprint 
                                                
81 This is the reference to vapidity in his recent work I referred to earlier in the chapter. 
 
82 Shoes are forbidden inside the mosque. Worshippers remove them before they enter, leaving their shoes 
at the door. 
 
83 “Shooting” is pissing, here. 
 
84 Reading coffee grounds is a way of telling fortunes. The cup is overturned once the coffee has been 





I asked the prof; he told me look towards the Vatican, he is wise  
I can’t breathe without spitting rhymes, it’s like I’m a fish with gills 
I’m so high up in the clouds, I lost gravity. I’m on the top of the pyramids 




Like El Far3i’s “Second Hand,” this track also walks the listener through similar 
deliberations and realizations of politics. Specifically, Satti is confronting a “foolish” 
(majbour ʿal-habal) version of himself, castigating his hesitations (“I was waiting for 
greatness”) and his preoccupation with senseless things (“I dissed myself”). He castigates 
himself for his hesitation (“I waited ‘til I grew up not to screw up”) and his “familiarity 
with submission.” The process of recognizing these failings prompts his suggestion that 
the real “loser” is himself, is “in the mirror.” In his iteration, he is more lost than used 
slippers, even these have a place in front of the mosque (where users remove them before 
prayer). The sheer repetition of “I don’t know” and “I feel” in this track is notable, lyrical 
work that underscores the confusion and pain in Satti’s recorded voice. Moreover like El 
Far3i’s track that ends in the speaker giving up and “being subjected to the design,” 
Satti’s track here also succumbs to the aloofness that causes the pain he’s been 
describing: at the end, he’s so high “even gravity” can’t touch him. 
Satti’s emotional self-critique in this piece can be read politically, as in the line “I 
always feel like there is someone behind me” – evoking notions of being watched – and 
in the line “It seems I got used to being overprotective and betrayed,” which seconds the 
kind of paranoia El Far3i also rapped about. Alternatively, the lyrics can be related to his 
development as a musician and related to his musical career, as in the line “I paid 
                                                
85 The Arabic letter sheen [., sh] is topped by three dots in a triangular shape, like a pyramid.  
 




attention to what I was listening to, I was patient until I grew up” and “I don’t know what 
you’re worth if you have no audience.” Indeed, the strength of the lyrical work lies in the 
fact that it’s not clear whether he’s bemoaning the lack of his political development – the 
articulation of a strong stance – or the incompleteness of his musical career. “Good 
people were buried,” “I was ashamed,” “my life is an art lecture” are all expressions that 
can either point to political failure or to frustrations with the music scene and 
collaborations therein. Moreover, the longing he expresses in his voice, aided by the 
sample, is more earnest and less defensive than the affective mode in El Far3i’s track. 
That is, the combination of longing and resignation is more pronounced here. He longs to 
overcome his resignation, his apathy, his foolishness. But it is unclear if he is ultimately 
successful, despite the repeated sample singing “Good bye.” Importantly, Satti locates the 
feeling he expresses as product of his environment: “this is a local product, nobody buys 
it.” This piece in particular makes clear that the lyrical, musical elements necessary for 
the emergence of tarab are present in rap written in Amman. Considering I only rarely 
observed tarab emerge in live concerts in Amman however, this suggests that the 
problems of arousing tarab are specific to the Ammani material context of performance, 
not the music itself. And it is to the material context of the concert that I now turn. 
 
* * * 
 
 In this section I have attempted to pin down articulations that illustrate one 
particular political feeling, that of resignation, in Amman. I have argued that by invoking 




arrival to resignation, which I imagine as an active – and importantly as a performative – 
standing down. In my time in Amman, I initially struggled with the lukewarm posturing 
of many of my friends and interlocutors. Most sure of itself when it is calling out 
orientalism and most vague when it attempts to articulate specific positions or desires, 
this kind of political discourse can seem wishy-washy compared to the political 
observations, refusals, or inversions in both Ramallah and Beirut. I think it would be a 
mistake, however, to suggest that individuals in these latter cities – and specifically that 
Palestinian or Lebanese rap – are “more” political than in Amman. When situated within 
a history Jordanian political culture, this performed resignation points to an active, if 
frustratingly non-committal, negotiation of political concerns.  
Finally, it is not only in the lyrics where the active negotiations of politics in 
process can be discerned. The seeming resignation to the status quo, to avoid 
confrontation, and to avoid politics in public is also arrived at in active negotiations in 
concert spaces and outside them, between concert-goers and those who recognize 
concerts take place and decline to participate – what I call concert observers. In the next 
section, I turn my attention to the pauses, stutters, and stares that emerged repeatedly in 
my observations and discussions in Amman concert spaces. I suggest that these are all 
active negotiations – risk assessments, calculations – not the absence of politics. This 
tension of not really knowing what is holding one back (or holding it all together) is 
manifest in El Far3i’s stutters about the nature of censorship, in Khotta Ba’s “not 
knowing what’s coming,” and as I suggest in the next section, in the distance between 
concert goers and concert observers. This seeming stillness and silence, the performed 




Part Three: Divided Attentions 
 
Basically, I hate dancing. Not break dancing, I don’t mean 
that. And of course head banging is “part of the process,” 
like when you hear a beat, that’s part of it. But it’s 
impossible for me to offer my work [if people] are dancing, 




In the previous section, I suggested that performed resignation in rap lyrics stages 
politics in progress. In this section, I explore to what extent these processes of deliberation 
are received by audiences and reflected in audience behavior. Specifically, in order to 
situate the affect rappers produce musically within the wider landscape of political 
feelings in Amman, I consider affective dynamics before and after concerts (what I called 
“warm up” and “cooling” in Chapter Two), as well as during them. Through thick 
description of concerts at two festivals in 2015, I explore tension in public spaces and 
divided attention of audiences. 
My exploration begins by considering that rappers frequently find themselves not 
the center of their audiences’ attention. I follow musicians’ complaints about audience 
reception in Amman with concert organizers’ reflections about reaching and “exposing” 
audiences. The frustrations about audience reception I find surprising considering the 
musical and lyrical work and astute navigations of politics I suggested in the previous 
section. I consider how refusals to participate in concerts can be read alongside other 
frameworks for understanding social interactions and the consumption of leisure in 
Amman. This leads me to argue that constantly divided attention in public space in 
Amman is not conducive to following along with the performed resignation in some rap 




disrespect while audiences struggle, and perhaps even resent, keeping up with the 
competing demands both on public space and their attention. 
As in Ramallah and Beirut, most of my interlocutors in Amman affirmed the 
presence of tarab during rap concerts. Asked to provide examples of this tarab, however, 
all described concerts outside of Amman. Kalaji discussed its presence in Cairo; Khotta 
Ba described it in Copenhagen; Satti elaborated at length about Beirut audiences’ ability 
to give back to a performer; and Boikutt compared performing in Ramallah favorably 
with performing a very similar set in Amman just months apart.87 That musicians locate 
the best examples of tarab outside Amman does not mean the phenomenon is alien to the 
Jordanian context. Their comparisons, however, point to their disappointments 
performing in Amman.  
At the end of our interview Satti told me,  
The one thing I’d really like to see in this country is for people to really 
give an opportunity to this music, from their hearts, because they’re loving 
it. I want to see people giving this music this energy and respect because 
they really love it. Let’s call it a wish. 
 
Satti’s comments belie real anxiety about reaching listeners and getting the kind of 
feedback in Amman that he has received elsewhere. His frustrations are shared with his 
colleagues. Khotta Ba told me that despite the growth in music production in Amman, 
[People] aren’t used to coming to concerts. They’re not used to knowing 
what to do in a concert. They don’t know if they’re supposed to clap at a 
punch line or what. Some people want the song to be over at a punch line 
and start clapping. They’re not accustomed to a hip hop show where you 
come and enjoy and bob your head and go home. Lots of people 
understand hip hop as poetry, like they want to come listen to a reading. 
Others come too hyped up. 
 
                                                
87 There was one exception to this trend; Kalaji also located tarab in his description of a concert Immortal 





Khotta’s complaints about audience reactions are tangible and reflected in specific 
behavior (clapping and “bobbing your head”) while Satti’s are more abstract (“from their 
hearts, because they’re loving it”). But both rappers’ reflections point to misfires with the 
audience. In other words, a problem performing rap in Amman is not only that “there is 
no fan base” as the rapper and producer Mohammed al-Hijazi of Obsolete Records told 
me in an interview.88 It is also that the desired modes of communicating, of “feeling 
with” the audience are regularly stymied even when audiences do gather. Specifically, 
rappers and DJs recognize this as particular to Amman. 
In a conversation about opportunities in Amman compared to Ramallah, rappers 
and DJs Al-Nather and Boikutt elaborated: 
Al-Nather: It’s better here [in Amman, compared to Ramallah]. Because 
there is culture here. Not culture like we would like, maybe. But there is a 
music culture. There are more people who support music. It’s a much 
bigger city. 
 
Boikutt: […] I don’t agree that there’s more culture here. I don’t see that 
there’s even more people willing to support culture or attend concerts. 
Even the proportion in Ramallah is higher considering the size of the city. 
Like in Jadal [a venue run by Fadi Amireh] the other night there were 
maybe less than half as many people as there were in December at La Wain 
[discussed in Chapter Three].  
 
Al-Nather’s recognition of the presence in Amman of “culture, but not culture that we 
would like” deepens the paradox about the opportunities the city offers its artists, with 
which I opened this chapter. While Al-Nather recognizes that Amman offers different 
(perhaps even “better”) opportunities to perform, there is nonetheless something missing 
                                                
88 Hijazzi explained, “If you have one hundred people listening to you, that’s not a fan base. Last year we 
did a concert… and put fourteen of the rappers with us on the label on stage. Fourteen people, and of them 
the biggest names in Amman, so they say of themselves. One hundred and fifty people came to the show. 
Fourteen people, that’s ten percent of the crowd – on the stage. Don’t tell me there’s a fan base. Where’s 





in these opportunities. Boikutt confirms this with his rejection of the notion of “more 
culture” in Amman, a city home to twenty-three times the population of Ramallah.89 
Moreover, Khotta Ba’s observations about what audiences are “accustomed to” and 
Boikutt’s declarations about “culture” are not abstract constellations about taste. The 
assertion that audiences do not know how to “come and enjoy” are specific complaints 
about the kind of feedback audiences in Amman give and that musicians are able to 
receive on stage.  
It seems to me necessary to ruminate on the frustration musicians expressed about 
the inability of their audiences to consistently react in ways they feel are appropriate. 
This is, after all, a driving reason why some of these musicians are not content producing 
and performing their music in Amman. What is preventing the smooth exchange between 
musicians and listeners during concerts? Why the repeated complaints about a lack of 
listening culture or respect for musicians? In the wake of the hype about Amman’s 
emergent role as host to cultural production, why are audiences not getting it?  
 Learned familiarity with sites of cosmopolitan leisure and the representation and 
performance of selfhood within them has been the subject of fascinating ethnographic 
work in Amman. Jillian Schwedler and Sarah Tobin have addressed how “aspiring 
cosmopolitans” and enacted “middle-classness” function politically in the Jordanian 
context. Schwedler has argued that learning cosmopolitan behavior – how to consume 
global brands and enact pleasure in elite leisure spaces – is central to the identity of both 
Ammani elites as well as segments of the middle and lower classes employed in the 
                                                
89 Demographic estimates put Amman’s population around 1.9 million in 2015. In the same year 
Ramallah’s population (together with neighboring Al-Bireh) was estimated around 82,000 people. 
(Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, accessed March 4, 2016, 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/ramallah.htm and World Atlas, “Jordan,” accessed 




service sector in West Amman. She calls “aspiring” cosmopolitanism those “practices of 
survival, creativity, and reimagination” produced “at the blurry boundary of 
inclusion/exclusion.”90 Her study works to reinsert texture – and agency – into neoliberal 
critiques of exclusion. For Schwedler, the patterns of marking public space that I pointed 
to in the first section need not be exclusively oppressive, as East Ammanis also actively 
negotiate and incorporate neoliberal changes into their perception of self and community, 
progress and opportunity.91 For her part, Sarah Tobin identifies more critically a political 
project in the assumption of cosmopolitan consumption patterns. She calls a “ middle-
class orientation” that which promised to “displac[e] overtly political nationalism and 
replacing ethnic, religious, and other forms of elitism, factioning and sectarianism.” 92 As 
I explore here, this kind of orientation towards consumption intersects with the 
frameworks and presentation of alternative music as cosmopolitan.  
I want to consider here how some Ammanis refuse the invitation to participate in 
cosmopolitanism that is specifically not staged in elite spaces. I do not mean how 
religious authorities oppose certain concerts or festivals. I mean instead to draw into 
relief how Ammanis decide to participate, or not, in outdoor festivals in public space. 
                                                
90 Schwedler, “Amman Cosmopolitan,” 549 and 559. 
 
91 But Schwedler stops short of claiming aspiring cosmopolitanism is liberating, concluding: “Whether 
these sites and forms of engagement are ultimately emancipatory or destructive remains an open question, 
with the answer likely contingent upon one’s own perspective of the liberatory possibilities of capitalism.” 
(Schwedler, “Amman Cosmopolitan,” 549.) 
 
92 Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring,” 100, emphasis added. Schwedler puts it like this: “[W]hat is being 
consumed is not limited to material goods and services, but also includes cultural codes and even spaces, a 
particular cosmopolitan aesthetic.” (Schwedler, “Amman Cosmopolitan,” 553.) This idea of consumption 
as an “equalizing” force, subsuming ethnic or sectarian difference into the desire to shop, has had salience 
elsewhere in the region as well as outside of it. On this narrative in Lebanon see Craig Larkin, Memory and 
Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and Forgetting the Past (Oxon: Routledge, 2012); Lisa Wedeen and 
Bassam Haddad address it in the Syrian context, see: Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination, and Haddad, 





Specifically, I want to consider how refusals to participate are noticed by and effect the 
participation of others. I am concerned with how attention is divided among audiences 
and between concert participants and concert observers. Refusals to perform 
cosmopolitanism or to act “cosmopolitan-ly” need not only suggest the presence of 
conservative forces. They also stage tense but muted contests over city space.  
 
Concert-goers and concert-observers 
 
The Word Is Yours Festival was a two-day “urban street art festival” organized by 
Shermine Sawalha, Tia Thorpe, Nereya Otieno, and Samantha Robinson in October 
2015.93 Day One of the festival hosted live rap, skateboarding competitions, a b-boy 
battle, beatboxing challenges, and skateboard building and painting workshops in the 
newly opened 7Hills Skatepark in the Al-Weibdeh neighborhood.94 Day Two largely 
focused on film screenings and artist talks at the Laconda Hotel, also in Weibdeh. I focus 
                                                
93 Sawalha represented the local Jordanian production company MALAHI and the event platform TBA 
Collective; Thorpe the Danish NGO Turning Tables; and Robinson the British NGO AptART. Malahi and 
TBA Collective, through Sawalha’s work, were responsible for securing local services, many of which 
were donated to the festival free of charge. Red Bull Kuwait and Red Bull UAE sponsored artists travelling 
from those countries (Malikah and Sons of Yusuf). Turning Tables ended up not contributing directly to the 
festival. On AptART – which stands for “Awareness and Prevention Through Art” and their sources of 
funding see http://www.aptart.org/about/, accessed January 15, 2016. The festival was supposed to rely 
predominantly on crowd-funding. However, both IndieGoGo and AfkarMENA campaigns were only 
successful in raising about half the funds requested (less than 42% of the $10,000 goal had been raised by 
October 1, 2015 [“The Word is Yours- Hip Hop in the Middle East,” IndieGoGo, accessed January 18, 
2016, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/the-word-is-yours-hip-hop-in-the-middle-east#/story]).The rest 
Sawalha largely paid out of pocket. (Personal correspondence with Sawalha, January 19, 2016.)  
 
94 The 7Hills Skatepark, largely “run” by Mohammed Zakaria, was built in December 2014 with the 
support of Make Life Skate Life, a Belgian/US NGO that collaborates with “local communities” to build 
skate parks in developing countries. (Unrecorded conversations with the author. See also Hiba Dlewati, 
“Amman Skatepark a ‘Melting Pot’ for Locals and Refugees,” National Geographic, October 14, 2015, 






my remarks here on Day One, when the live concerts – a total of seven hip hop acts – 
were held. 95 
 
Figure 4.8: “Panoramic of the Word is Yours Festival.” The central stage for rap performances was 
under the black RedBull umbrella, far left. Shade was limited to where most people are seated, along 
the near back wall. Photograph by the author (at the 7Hills Skatepark in al-Weibdeh around 5pm, 
October 2, 2015). 
 
In many ways the first day of the festival was a success: for an entire day, the park 
was full of a mix of people: local and expat, from different neighborhoods, men and 
women, with the knowledge of the police and local religious authorities. In many other 
ways, the festival was a failure. The structure of funding meant that travelling musical 
acts were paid while the local acts weren’t. There were last minute changes, cuts, 
substitutions, and contingency plans, leading to mistrust between the performing artists 
                                                
95 They were Malikah (Lebanon/Dubai); Satti (Jordan); Almukhtar (Jordan); Sons of Yusuf (Kuwait); 
Synaptic and Jazz Tha Process (Jordan); Kazz (Jordan); Arab MC’s (Jordan); Bu Kolthoum (Syria/Jordan). 
Showcased artists also included DJs, beatboxers, and bboy dancers. For full line up see “The Word is 
Yours Festival October 2: Street Art, Skateboarding, Live Rap, Beatboxing, DJ’s, B-Boy Battle and 
Workshops!,” hosted by “The Word Is Yours Festival,” Facebook Event page, accessed January 21, 2016, 
https://www.facebook.com/events/400190190170359/. Day Two of the festival featured film screenings 
and artist and producer talk-backs. For full lineup, see “The Word Is Yours – October 3: Artist Talks, 
Workshops, DJ Sets, Film Screenings, Street Art, Exhibitions,” hosted by “The Word Is Yours Festival,” 




(the time of whose sets and the duration were changed multiple times) and the 
organizational team. When Sawalha managed to convince the police to allow the event to 
continue (despite her already having secured the permits to do so), local religious figures 
protested the continuation of music, dancing, and gender mixing in a public space, 
leading to a muted confrontation between the police and the religious authorities.96  
These dynamics of misunderstanding and contest over the power to use the space 
or to declare what kind of behavior was appropriate in it were between the organizers and 
local authorities (civil and religious) and the fall out of these negotiations was largely 
between the organizers and the musicians. But this does not mean the unusual occupation 
and transformation of the park staged by the festival was otherwise harmonious. It would 
be a mistake to pit the festival attendees as a heterogeneous group united in love of 
“urban culture,” facing the censorship and disapproval of state and religious authorities. 
Rather, in my observation, the festival staged a prominent, charged transgression in 
Ammani public space, awareness of which was shared by dozens of disparate groups of 
people, who used the opening the festival provided differently. Moreover, participants 
and observers were aware of others’ decisions to participate and how they chose to do so, 
marking constant negotiations over proper behavior and use and meaning of public space. 
I first noticed the divided attention held by different users of the park the day before the 
concerts, while I, along with other volunteers cleaned up the park.  
 
                                                
96 The police eventually convinced the religious authorities to back down by arguing that the event was 
mostly “for” ajaneb [foreigners]. Needless to say, this insulted the (Arab) musicians and local participants 






Carrying a black trash back between us, Rana and I set out along the South 
end of the park, which runs up on Arar Street.97 We each wore one of the 
pink plastic dish gloves I had brought. We were talking as we worked, 
ignoring the shouts and beckoning of men drinking coffee outside the shop 
across the street. At one point in my gathering of trash, I picked up 
something heavy. It felt like a rug perhaps, but I could not tell what it was. 
I lifted it at arm’s length to see it more clearly. Finally, I understood. It 
was a dead cat. I dropped it and yelped. Rana screamed. Peels of laughter 
rang out from across the street, where the men had obviously been 
watching the whole time.98 
 
These moments in the build-up to the concerts the next day illustrate a distance 
and difference I felt in this festival and others conducted in public spaces between 
concert-goers and what I call “concert-observers.” Concert-goers (and concert organizers, 
volunteers, other participants) come to these public spaces infrequently, with firmly held, 
specific expectations of how to act and what to do in public space. They are noticed by 
concert-observers (everyday users of the space), who tolerate the incursions but markedly 
avoid participating. In this example, the men across the street clearly noticed my and the 
two other volunteers’ presence and recognized what we were doing. To the men, who 
work across from the park, the sight of the (clearly not local) women cleaning the park 
with their hands was humorous (instead of, say, embarrassing).99 Obviously, this wasn’t 
women’s work, whatever the intentions of these newly-arrived “Good Samaritans” were 
– a perception that was confirmed when Rana and I both startled at the sight and touch of 
the dead animal. Similarly, she and I both quietly tolerated the taunts and jeers while 
                                                
97 The park is elevated above the street, making us visible to young and middle-aged men, sitting outside a 
carpentry shop drinking coffee. Rana is not her real name. 
 
98 Author’s field notes, October 5, 2015. 
 
99 Rana is surely not a “foreigner,” having grown up in Amman. I am also Arab. We spoke together in 
Arabic. Nonetheless, our activity (cleaning up garbage), to some extent our dress, or some other 
combination of factors clearly indicated to the men across the street that we were not locals. They called 





remaining fixated on tidying the park, which we both perceived was in the best interest of 
the neighborhood users, despite not having used the park previously ourselves. Neither of 
us – Rana and I nor the group of men – directly confronted the other. Though we did not 
directly acknowledge each other’s presence, awareness of their recognition of our 
intrusion marked the volunteers’ attitude in and towards the space. Their laughter and 
jeering made us aware of our foreign-ess in the space, despite perhaps our own 
perceptions of the value of our presence. 
While the physical distance between the two groups in this instance is 
exceptionally stark (a two-lane road runs between myself and the other volunteer and the 
men in the shop), the dynamic between us was one I also noticed during the Al Balad 
festival hosted downtown, where the distance and division was less extreme. For 
example: 
Crossing the street into the park, my companions and I dodge boys and 
girls with soccer balls, veiled women and young fathers holding babies 
and young children, toy vendors sending lit plastic tops spinning on the 
stone ground or flashing boomerangs soaring into the air. On benches or 
against the walls of the large theatre, young men and teens sit spitting 
seeds and smoking. As we neared the Odeon (the smaller of two roman 
theatres), flags advertising the festival marked a sort of fabricated entrance 
corridor. These flags built a queue for audiences, who stood in between 
them as they arrived and waited to enter or to buy tickets.100 Opposite the 
queues, folks clearly not intending to enter, mostly young men and boys, 
sat on stone structures and quietly watched the queues of people entering. 
Exiting the theatre, the scene was similar to when we entered it. […] I 
wished to use the restroom before and after the concert, something my 
companions advised me against and outside of which they waited patiently 
lest I be left to traverse the square alone.101 
 
                                                
100 The opening night concert was July 29, 2015. The concert was Tarabband: an Iraqi-Swedish folk band. 
Tickets were 10 JDs. For festival schedule, see http://al-balad.org/al-balad-music-festival-2015/, accessed 
March 30, 2016.  
 





Dressed up for a night out, the parade of concert-goers waiting to purchase tickets 
for the Al-Balad Festival concerts was something of a spectacle for the regular users of 
the space, many of whom informally queued themselves to watch this crowd. Here the 
spatial difference between “concert goer” and “concert observer” was less marked. 
Nevertheless, the delineations between “concert goer” and “concert observer” were not 
only obvious, they were actively performed. My female companion’s dress (more 
conservative than she would wear otherwise) was designed to downplay this difference, 
whereas the queue of those watching the actual concert queue made no effort to mask the 
difference they observed. I think it worthwhile to consider the negotiated tolerance 
between these groups in these moments before the concert began and upon its conclusion.  
The refusal to ignore, overtly reject, or embrace the festival and the new arrivals 
to the downtown space points to fissures in organizers’ discourse about reaching as wide 
an audience as possible, not to mention obvious class tension (the divisions are much 
more obviously class-related in the Al-Balad example than they were at the Word is 
Yours Festival in 7Hills). At the same time, my companions’ tight attention to staying 
within the lines the festival organizers had drawn for concert-goers (evidenced in their 
attentiveness and recommendations) recognizes the thin tolerance that concert-observers 
enact. Both recognitions of “the other” – for concert-goers of concert-observers and vice 
versa – under the watchful eyes of different kinds of security, are indirect and muted. 
Importantly, these interactions are not direct confrontations. Again, I am not drawing 
attention here to the repeated complaints by observant Muslims and local imams about 




concert-observers am I referring to the interventions of religious authorities complaining 
about men and women mixing in public space.  
Rather, the affective configuration of concert access and audience behavior 
described here helps to recognize a flipside of aspiring cosmopolitanism and “middle 
class-ness.” Especially in Amman’s expanding music scene, there are staged 
opportunities for the performance of cosmopolitanism – in venues that are specifically not 
exclusive (both spaces described here are public parks) – that Ammanis actively refuse. 
That is, when privately run festivals clearly trading in the “cosmopolitan international” 
enter and appropriate lower-middle-class and working-class space, they are pointedly not 
greeted by the frameworks of aspiring cosmopolitanism Schwedler talks about.102 This is 
not to suggest that aspiring cosmopolitanism does not exist in other places and at other 
times. It is however to note that in particular it does not seem to exist here, at the 
intersection of bifurcated East and West Amman, among ordinary users of park spaces. 
This is so despite or perhaps because of the framework mobilized by concert organizers.  
                                                
102 “Cosmopolitan international” is Schwedler’s phrase. To be sure, Schwedler locates most aspiring 
cosmopolitanism in the malls, traffic circles, and clubs of West Amman, not in East Amman. She doesn’t 
address the negotiations of cosmopolitanism in “shared” public space, like the downtown plaza, that I am 





Figure 4.9: “Dhafer Yousef during the closing concert of the Al-Balad Festival.” This concert was 
held in the larger Roman Ampitheatre, Note the continuation of regular use of the downtown space 
outside of the theatre (beyond the proscenium walls, lit in blue). Entrance to the auditorium is 
through the proscenium walls for both musician and audience. There is no enclosed “back stage” 
space. The smaller Odeon theatre is off to the left in this photograph. Dhafer Yousef is a Tunisian 
jazz musician and composer. Photograph by the author, August 3, 2015.  
 
Raed Asfour, the artistic director of the Al-Balad theatre and of the bi-annual 
music festival of the same name, also spoke of introducing audiences to different sounds 
and to new music. He was keen to emphasize that the festival was for “everyone.” 
Specifically, Asfour told me that the festival’s ideal audience is “the people” [el nass] … 
in every shape and form: age, economic class, education level.”103 Over the course of our 
conversation, Asfour continued to deny any outward characteristic that could delineate 
the make up of el nass (age, economic class, education level). Curiously then, in our 
                                                
103 Interview with Raed Asfour, Artistic Director of Al Balad Theatre; August 16, 2015, Amman. 





conversation about the relationship between the festival organizers and attendees and the 
ordinary frequenters of the downtown plaza where the Roman theatres are located, 
Asfour automatically made a distinction. He told me, “No one goes there to build 
relations with them, to teach them about art… and unfortunately their economic level 
doesn’t allow them to attend a play regularly.”104  
Despite asserting that the festival’s target audience had no “economic level,” 
Asfour here easily identifies real difference between the Ammani citizens who notice the 
festival is taking place – concert observers – and those who actually attend – concert 
goers. Asfour related to me how this difference has historically been embodied in 
animosity, when the concert goers arrive and “steal” the plaza from those forced to 
observe the dispossession: its everyday users. The concert goers’ arrival, typically 
accompanied as they are by the police, internal security, and mukhabarat (because the 
festival is an official event), effects the layout of the public space (corridors are 
constructed, the theatres roped off) as well as changes who has access to which parts of 
the plaza (tickets are implemented). All of this happens without “us” [the festival 
organizers and concert goers] asking “their” [everyday users of the space] permission. 
Asfour concluded, “of course they don’t have the power for you to ask their permission 
anyway. These things are tied up with the municipality.”105 Here is the staging of middle 
                                                
104 Added emphasis. 
 
105 In the late 1990s, the municipality planted trees in the downtown plaza that is historically home to the 
smaller Odeon theatre and the larger Roman ampitheatre (they are both ruins of the Roman city of 
Philadelphia). At night at that time, the plaza was unlit, dark, and very sketchy, known to be the hang out of 
zaʿran [“troublemakers”]. Asfour recalls during their first efforts to host events in this space, people from 
outside the neighborhood (the target audience) refused to attend, and young men and boys from the 
neighborhood regularly threw stones at them. In 2012 the municipality cut down most of the trees and tiled 
the plaza, adding lights. It is now a popular, shaʿabi, space frequented by inhabitants of the neighboring 
hills of East Amman on every night of the week: families, young children, couples, and groups of young 




class consumption as “inclusivity” in full relief. Clearly, organizers are keen to draft an 
“inclusive” cultural product, staging it against the stunning backdrop of Jordan’s ancient 
heritage.106 This is despite the obvious divisions the festival stages between audiences 
and potential audiences in the downtown plaza. 
Asfour claimed organizers offered free tickets to interested parties once they sold 
as many as they could. He took pains to describe to me one pre-adolescent girl who 
attended five concerts for free, accompanied by a female festival volunteer, who would 
“pick the girl up” from her mother (who was in the park around the theatre but did not 
wish to enter) and return her to her family once the concert was over. With the exception 
of Mounir Troudi (Tunisia), Morabba3 (Jordan) and Tarraband (Sweden/Iraq), however, 
the venue hovered around half empty.107 During the hip hop acts performed by Boikutt 
(Palestine), Khotta Ba (Jordan), and El Rass (Lebanon), the theatre was less than half 
full.108 The point here is not only about exclusion at the point of ticket pricing, however. 
                                                                                                                                            
users of the space is improving, a status he described thusly: “They have to get used to the fact that there’s 
[going to be] art there.” Adding, “even if individuals are just hearing from the outside [of the theatre], they 
are still hearing something different – not to say better or worse [than they would otherwise] – just 
different.” This, for Asfour, speaks to the social value the festival brings to Amman and to Jordan.  
 
106 This, Parker elaborates, is part of the Hashemite narrative as well: using Jordan’s spectacular natural 
landscapes and ancient heritage as part of its specific appeal (specifically for its tourism industry) against 
whose backdrop its emergent modernity is all the more precious and spectacular. (Parker, “Tunnel-
Bypasses and Minarets,” 111-112.) 
 
107 The one concert I did not attend was that of the Jordanian indie rock band Zaed Naes.  
 
108 Tickets for Boikutt and Khotta Ba’s concert was 7 JD, the cheapest concert in the festival. This cheaper 
ticket was a compromise with Boikutt who requested a 5JD donation as a condition for participating in the 
concert. My own perception, shared by some of the musicians who performed, is that more could be done 
to lessen the very obvious class barriers operating in a public, Ammani space. Khotta Ba told me:  
 
To be honest I’m against doing a show in a place like this and not letting the 
neighborhood kids in. These kids were running around behind the backstage and 
throwing stones [at us]. Man, let these kids in, the theatre was empty anyway. But that’s 
how the organizers think. At the end of the day, they want to break even. They’re not 





The large refusal to enter the concert space, if Asfour’s claims to offer tickets to 
interested parties for free are truthful (think especially of the mother of the girl Asfour 
mentioned – even to accompany her daughter she preferred not to enter), do more than 
highlight the misfires of the inclusive intentions of the festival organizers. In them we can 
begin to see a pattern of deliberation, calculated negotiation, and certainly palpable 
affective tension conducted between Ammanis in and around concert venues. Importantly 
for the effect it has on musicians and their ability to communicate with their gathered 





 When dusk fell on Day One of the Word is Yours Festival, the environmental 
challenges of the day (the sun, schedule changes, negotiations with local authorities) 
faded. But audience attention remained divided. The gathered crowd nearly erupted in 
fistfights more than once. As Satti, Malikah and Bu Kolthoum took the stage for their 
final sets, groups of boys took to teasing each other. One adolescent in particular nearly 
found himself knocked out more than once after repeatedly spraying water at strangers in 
the crowd. Sawalha herself intervened at least twice. Which is to recognize that even at 
the climax of the event, two experienced rappers still did not hold the audience’s 
attention.  
This seemed obvious enough to the performing rappers. On stage, Malikah 




vis-à-vis problems with sound, rolled eyes at mic problems, sarcasm about the (small) 
size of the stage (making it difficult for her and Bu Kolthoum to move), as well as 
frustration with the crowd itself. She seemed to be rapping over them, above their heads, 
not with and to them. Months earlier, under rain in the garden of the Jadal cultural center, 
Bu Kolthoum was able to hold an affective exchange that was much more focused and 
powerful than the much larger, sprawling audience at 7Hills at night.109 The Word is 
Yours Festival, despite being truly accessible, held in public space, free, inviting a range 
of audiences and modes of interaction, was not able to provide the conditions for a 
widespread, felt connection between rappers and the gathered audience.  
Awareness of how others were using the space constantly absorbed audiences’ 
attention. The teen teasing the audience by spraying listeners with water observed and 
attempted to take advantage of how some were using the space. At the same time, others 
noted with apprehension the behavior of this teen and those who responded to him. These 
contests operate below and beyond the more official deliberations between organizers 
and musicians and between organizers and different Jordanian authorities. Nonetheless, 
these attentions compete with that which rappers seek from their listeners.  
 
                                                
109 At Jadal, I suspect the crowd was much more self-selecting, less heterogeneous (predominantly Syrian), 
and familiar with his work. Here, in a context open to the public, the attention audiences spent on each 





Figure 4.10: “Divided Attentions.” Audiences during Malikah and Bu Kolthoum's set at the Word is 
Yours Festival in the 7Hills Skatepark were distracted from the performers. Photograph by the 
author, October 4, 2015. 
 
 
* * * 
 
The nuances in lyrically performed resignation are missed when audiences are not 
listening, or when other factors compete with their attention.110 As I elaborated in the 
previous section, given that rappers are increasingly invested in more abstract and less 
explicit navigations of politics, their work suffers when audiences are distracted or when 
listening is not focused. The configurations that distract audiences from rappers in 
Amman – the meticulous attention to different attendees and observers, the recognition of 
                                                
110 DJ Sotusura credited the growth in the hip hop scene in Amman to the printing of CDs, which allowed 




divided (and contests over) public space – dissuade tarab from emerging. These same 
factors and the divided audience attention contingent upon them, contribute to musicians’ 
frustration performing in Amman.  
At the same time, when the divisions between concert goers and concert observers 
are as pronounced as they were in the festivals I discuss in this section, the nuanced, 
poetic political deliberations that rappers in Amman offer are competing with muted but 
very real and blatant contests over public space. Audiences’ inability to connect is often a 
refusal of cosmopolitanism and the class package it often comes in. For the most part, 
rappers’ strategies to connect with these audiences and overcome this perception are 
limited to negotiations with concert organizers over ticket prices and recognition amongst 
themselves that concerts are exclusive. Rappers interpret a lack of respect for their work 
in listening behavior that is not focused on, and cannot appreciate, their often quite dense 
lyrical experimentation and contemporary musical innovation. But audiences and 
potential audiences (and especially those potential audiences who refuse to engage) are 
constantly – if with restraint – performing their perception that concerts are not designed 
to respect nor communicate with them.111 This gap of expectations is of course at the 
heart of the neoliberal constellation of cosmopolitanism, growth, and cultural production 
that physically divides the city and that nurtures so much of the malaise, anxiety, 





                                                
111 This is something many interlocutors credited El Far3i with overcoming, ever so slightly, in how he was 





In this chapter, I have attempted to account for some of the affective 
contradictions accompanying the recent establishment of Amman as something of an 
independent music concert hub. In Part One “Cultural Hotspot,” I considered the 
expressed desire to leave Amman expressed by musicians and music producers that 
persists despite the growth of concert opportunities in Amman. I suggested that this 
desire underscores the political quagmire that is worsening in the city, despite, or indeed 
because of recent flows of financial, demographic, and humanitarian capital. In Part Two 
“Performing resignation” I focused on some of the ways in which some rap in Amman 
navigates this political reality. I suggested that one prominent political feeling expressed 
in some powerful rap in Amman is resignation and that performing this resignation points 
to politics in progress. In that section I underscored the musical, affective, and lyrical 
elements in this work that are conducive to the emergence of tarab. 
In the final section, “Divided attention,” I wondered why, despite these musical 
and affective elements, tarab seemed particularly evasive in Amman. Here, my own 
participant observation balanced out rappers’ testimony expressing frustration with 
audience behavior. This led me to an exploration of concert access and audience 
behavior, specifically in an assessment of the tension between concert goers and concert 
observers. Ultimately I argued that divided audience attention in concerts in public spaces 
distracts listeners from the nuances in rap lyrical work, which especially for audiences 
unfamiliar with the genre, often culminates in dismissal or ignoring the performer, 
instead of intense connection with them. At the same time, the cosmopolitanism of rap 




or political intentions of the rappers themselves. These realities influence the affective 




Chapter Five: Beirut 





The state of the Arab world is disgusting. So I said 
 to myself, I’ll throw up on a city filled with shit, 
 that’s paved with grime. 
~Raed Ghoneim (Sot Gilgamesh), 
“Istafrigh” [“I throw up”].1 
 
 
Figure 5.1: “Graffiti on Dbayeh road in Beirut.” Graffito reads, “You disgust us.” Graffiti is almost 
legal in Beirut, a considerable creative industry has sprung up around this fact.2 Photograph by the 
author, September 2012. 
                                                
1 “Istafrigh | Raed Ghoneim ‘Sot Gilgamesh’” [“I throw up | Raed Ghoneim ‘Voice of Gilgamesh”], Sound 
Cloud audio recording, 4:57, posted by “Gilgamesh,” accessed April 1, 2016, 
https://soundcloud.com/sootgilgamesh/s0nt2e9dmty8.  
 
2 For analysis of Beirut’s graffiti and its history see Marwan Kraidy, “A Heterotopology of Graffiti,” in 
Proceedings of the Conference “Inverted Worlds: Cultural Motion in the Arab Region,” Beirut, October 4-
18, 2012, published August 16, 2013, accessed March 18, 2016, 
http://www.perspectivia.net/publikationen/orient-institut-studies/2-2013/kraidy_graffiti and Rasha Salti, 





Like the previous two case studies, this chapter proceeds in three parts. In the first 
section, I establish the neoliberal context of the cosmopolitan growth of the city of Beirut. 
As in Ramallah and Amman, in Beirut I also locate rap concerts within the gentrifying 
energies of the cosmopolitan avenues of the capital city. In the opening section of the 
chapter, I trace the configuration of capital and geography unique to Beirut that has 
allowed for its specific patterns of gentrification. The sectarian configuration of the 
oligarchy, the seeming weakness of the state, the presence and pull of the Lebanese 
diaspora, and growing anti-sectarian protest movements affect how Beirutis conceive of 
and move through the city while determining where concerts are held and who can 
attend. Like recent literature critical of Beirut’s urban development, I suggest that paying 
attention in particular to the rapid growth and death of Monot Street, Gemmayzeh Street, 
Hamra Street, and Armenia Street (Mar Mkhayel) allows for a critical appraisal of 
Beirut’s “creative industries.” Situating rap concerts at the confluence of these 
gentrifying energies helps to understand how audience dynamics in them operated. In this 
section, I also point to affective configurations that have emerged in response to the 
particular constellation of uneven cosmopolitanism and neoliberal incursions in Beirut. I 
suggest widespread articulations of disgust point to particular politics in progress. 
 In the second section, I explore how rap lyrics diverge from Lebanese political 
narratives, especially around discourses and reasoning of power-sharing, identity, 
nationalism, and sectarianism, and romanticism about ideas of the city of Beirut. Starting 
with rap songs that take as their subject the city of Beirut, I explore how articulations of 




the grain of mainstream political discourse. This allows me to begin formulating how 
expressing disgust informs the emergence of tarab in some rap in Beirut. 
In the third section, I build on this analysis of tarab by circling back to an analysis 
of audience dynamics and performer-listener communication. As in the previous case 
studies, in the final section of the chapter I consider how considerations of concert access 
inform a class reading of audience dynamics. In particular, I address how the refusal 
enacted in articulations of disgust are mirrored in audience behavior when audiences 
travel with the performer from outside the cosmopolitan avenues of the capital. Hearing 
and responding to local, ghettoized concerns on central, cosmopolitan stages allows for 
an enactment of disgust in audience behavior that is as politically palpable as it is 
aesthetically integral to rappers’ presentation of their work. 
 Throughout this chapter, I propose understanding the dynamics held in tension in 
rap in Beirut as a product of affective disgust. Disgust is indicative of politics in progress. 
It is affectively different from performed resignation I identified in some rap in Amman, 
but it points to similar grasping for and working through both material and affective 
realities in Beirut.3  
                                                
3 Research in Beirut was conducted intermittently between 2011 and 2016. Two travel grants from the 
Center for American Studies and Research at the American University of Beirut, funds from Professor 
Judith Milhous’ Chair as well as a GC Doctoral Students’ Research grant helped in part to facilitate this 
research. I am grateful for the trust all of these put in my research. Some of the content in this chapter will 
appear in El Zein, ““Resisting ‘Resistance’: On Political Feeling in Arabic Rap Concerts” in Arab 
Subcultures: Transformations in Theory and Practice, ed. Tarik Sabry and Layal Ftouni (London: I.B. 





Part One: “How is there ‘no state’”? 
 
There is a state. And this is what it looks like. 
     ~Jana Traboulsi 
 
People aren’t comfortable but they will still go and 
party. They think like, look, they just hit a Shiʿa 
neighborhood, and then they hit a Sunni 
neighborhood, now it’s the turn for a Christian 
neighborhood. So I won’t go out in Gemmayzeh. 
~Camille “Camo” Najm, owner of 
Yukunkun pub4 
 
This is no capital of culture. It’s a wrestling wring. 




In the protests that rocked Beirut in the summer of 2015, a series of memes 
circulated on social media. Originally created by Jana Traboulsi, they all read “How 
come there is no state? There is a state, and this is what it looks like.”6 The text was 
superimposed over images of police brutality against peaceful protesters.7 The memes, 
which were shared as part of the protest energies surrounding the “#Tol3et_Re7etkom” or 
#YouStink protests following the 2015 garbage crisis, highlighted and inverted the 
                                                
4 Interview with the author, August 28, 2013. All subsequent quotations from Mr. Najm are taken from this 
interview. Translations from the Arabic and French are my own. 
 
5 El Rass, “Borkan Beirut,” on the Kachf el Mahjoub [Unveiling the Hidden] album, released 2012. Lyrics 
translated by Moe Ali Nayel, published in “Exploring Popular Literature: Arabic Hip hop,” edited by 
Rayya El Zein, Shahadat Winter 2012, 64-69.  
 
6 Ziad Abu-Rish and Jana Traboulsi, “Lebanon: What Do You Mean There is No State?,” Jadaliyya, 
August 29, 2015, accessed March 12, 2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22506/lebanon_what-
do-you-mean-there-is-no-state. 
 
7 Outrage over police brutality emerged around the August 19, 2015 turning point. See among others 
Robert Mackey, “Lebanese Police Beat ‘You Stink’ Activists in Beirut,” New York Times, August 19, 






popular Lebanese complaint wein al-dawleh? [where is the state?].8 The meme’s 
response to the question: “there is a state, and this is what it looks like” overlaid on 
different images played with disdain, derision, and outrage in response to the popular 
complaints about the absence of a state that served people’s interest. The meme worked 
to further protest energy by emphasizing that there was a state: a corrupt, dysfunctional, 
powerful state mobilized against its own people.  
The Lebanese government has been crippled by a political stalemate for years. 
Largely the result of an impasse between the “March 14” and “March 8” coalitions, the 
deadlock reflects the “confessional” power-sharing system (muhasasa taʾifiyeh), on 
which Lebanese domestic politics are based. Posts in the government and seats in the 
legislature are distributed according to religious sect as stipulated in the Lebanese 
Constitution (1926) and the Taʾif Agreement, which ended the Civil War (1989). The 
impasse also reflects the power sharing agreements enshrined in the Lebanese 
constitution since independence from the French in 1943 and the continued hold on 
power of a handful of oligarchs and political families (many of which are the same who 
led warring militias during the country’s fifteen-year civil war [1975-1990]).9 The 
impasse finally reflects regional struggles for power: the so-called “March 14 Coalition,” 
led by the Future Movement, is supported by Saudi Arabia and the West while the 
“March 8 Alliance,” led by Hizbullah, is supported by Syria’s Bashar al-Assad (support 
                                                
8 http://www.youstink.org, accessed March 12, 2016. 
 
9 The Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) was catalyzed by the 1967 defeat of the Arab armies in Israel, the 
expulsion of Palestinian fedaʾyeen and the PLO from Jordan in 1970 and the confessionalism built into the 
Lebanese constitution. The war was ostensibly fought on sectarian lines (Maronite Christian, Sunni 
Muslim, Shiʿa Muslim, Druze, and so on) and divided the city into largely Muslim West Beirut and 
predominantly Christian East Beirut, separated by the notorious “Green Line.” On the civil war and 
competing narratives over myth and fact in Lebanese history, see Kamal Salibi, A House of Many 





which has been reciprocated by the intervention of Hizbullah fighters on the side of the 
regime in the Syrian conflict) and Iran. 10 At time of writing, the country has been without 
a president for nearly two years (since May 25, 2014).11 Reflecting the relationship of 
private capital to state institutions that has led Laleh Khalili to refer to Lebanon as the 
“neoliberal state par excellence,” when political deadlock occurs, public services in 
Lebanon suffer. 12 The Lebanese have seen increasing crises in education, transportation, 
electricity, and even basic services like trash collection, as was the case in 2015. At that 
time, the government contract with Sukleen, a waste management company, expired and 
 
                                                
10 “March 14” is so named for the start date of the “Cedar Revolution” which began on the one-month 
anniversary of the assassination of then Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri by a truck bomb on February 14, 
2005. Those responsible for the bombing have never been caught, despite the UN’s Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (as is the case with those responsible for a slate of assassinations of anti-Syrian politicians and 
journalists between 2005 and 2007). The March 14 alliance is fronted by the Future Movement (the party 
of the assassinated Prime Minister – largely Sunni Muslim) and includes the Kataeb party (Maronite 
Christian) and other groups. The “Cedar Revolution” (named for the Cedar tree, national emblem of 
Lebanon and featured on its flag) involved weeks of marches by supporters. One of their primary demands 
was the end of Syrian influence in Lebanese politics and the withdrawal of Syrian soldiers and intelligence 
officers from Lebanese territory. As a result of the demonstrations, Syrian forces completely withdrew 
from Lebanon on April 27, 2005. On the Syrian-Lebanese relationship see, for example, Bassel Salloukh, 
“Syria and Lebanon: A Brotherhood Transformed,” Middle East Report 35(2005), accessed March 12, 
2016, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer236/syria-lebanon-brotherhood-transformed.  
 “March 8” is so-named for counter, pro-Syrian protests that occupied the downtown plaza 
beginning on that date in 2005. It is made up primarily of the Shiʿa groups Amal and Hizbullah, but 
includes other parties and sects as well. The March 8 coalition’s popularity and prestige grew considerably 
following the Israeli bombardment of the South of Lebanon and Beirut in 2006. On the polarization of 
Lebanese political discourse into these two camps, see Maya Mikdashi, “The Space Between: March 14, 
March 8 and a Politics of Dissent,” Jadaliyya, August 6, 2011, accessed March 12, 2016, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2333/the-space-between_march-14-march-8-and-a-politics-.  
 
11 This is not the first time Lebanese parliamentarians have been unable to come to an agreement about the 
role of the presidency. The 2008 election that put Michel Suleiman in the position of president was 
preceded by twenty months of deadlock (during which the position was left vacant). For context on the role 
of the president in the Lebanese constitution, see Elias Muhanna, “The Lebanese Presidency, Twenty-Five 
Years after Taʾif,” QifaNabki, April 26, 2014, accessed March 12, 2016, 
http://qifanabki.com/2014/04/26/lebanon-president2014/.  
 
12 Laleh Khalili, “The Politics of Pleasure: Promenading on the Corniche and Beachgoing,” Society and 











was not renewed, leaving thousands of people without waste collection for weeks. While 
not the first time this had transpired, in the summer of 2015 this garbage crisis catalyzed 
the “You Stink” protests – a spontaneous, non-sectarian outpouring of largely youthful 
protesters, concentrated predominantly on scheduled week-end protests between Riad al-
Figure 5.2: "How is there no state? There is a state and this is what it looks like!" meme by 
Jana Traboulsi (Ziad Abu-Rish and Jana Traboulsi, “Lebanon: What Do You Mean There 
is No State?”) This iteration in the series plays with derision. Note that the policeman on the 
left holds a baton, not a gun. The photograph of the desperate policeman used in this meme 
went viral in August 2015. The effect of its use in the meme was to draw attention to the 




Solh Square and the Serail (Parliament building) in August, 2015.13 Of course the lack of 
public services are only the most recent reason to recognize the twisted shape of the 
Lebanese state. For years, the inability of the state to provide basic security for its 
citizens has been the more pressing concern. 
The most recent mobilizations against corruption and the sectarian government 
are part of ebbs and flows of both capital and confidence in the city’s stability. A detailed 
history of the city, even of just the past ten years, is outside the range of this chapter. But 
pointing to a few significant flows of capital and affective energy will serve to root my 
discussions of specific rappers and their concerts in the pages that follow.  
Many studies of post-civil war Beirut have focused on the oligarchy that led the 
reconstruction of especially the downtown area, re-opening Beirut as a playground for 
Saudi, Gulf, and diasporic Lebanese capital.14 In particular, much attention to and 
criticism of Beirut since the civil war has focused on the private company Solidere and  
                                                
13 The Palestinian refugee camps in and around Beirut have long suffered basic lack of services, including 
the distribution of water and garbage collection. (Rapper, producer and Bourj el Barajneh camp resident 
Osloob recounted how he used to work distributing water in the camps, before blowing out his shoulder 
and injuring a foot and focusing his attention solely on musical production.) In addition, the populations of 
the South of Lebanon as well as the Bekaaʿ have notoriously been neglected by the State. This of course 
has allowed the popularity of groups like Amal and Hizbullah, who besides working to present these 
ignored interests in the state also work as basically social service networks, providing some of the services 
the state does not. This was especially pronounced in the reconstruction of Southern Lebanon following 
Israel’s 2006 bombing. The interruptions in the provision of services in these communities largely have not 
drawn the attention of the general Lebanese populace. But a similar crisis of trash collection did draw 
attention in 2012. See for example, Nora Stel and Rola el-Husseini, “Lebanon’s Massive Garbage Crisis 
isn’t its First. Here’s What that Teaches Us,” The Washington Post, September 18, 2015, accessed March 
12, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/09/18/this-isnt-lebanons-first-
garbage-crisis-and-what-that-should-teach-us/. For wider implications of this, see Nora Stel and Irna van 
der Molen, “Environmental Vulnerability as a Legacy of Violent Conflict: A Case Study of the 2012 Waste 
Crisis in the Palestinian Gathering of Shabriha, South Lebanon,” Conflict, Security and Development 
15(2015): 387-414. 
 
14 The downtown area, which featured an open market and was the city’s foremost mixing ground across 






Figure 5.3:" Solidere will end in 2019." Private contest over space and political power is openly 
deliberated and hashed out in the public sphere. The St. Georges hotel and marina, pictured here, 
was surrounded by a joint venture between Solidere and Stow – what was transformed into the 
“Zaitunay Bay” complex (opened 2011). Unable to force the St. George hotel owner Fady Al-Khoury 
to sell, Solidere instead blocked the St. George’s access to the sea. Since 2009, the abandoned hotel -- 
which ironically perhaps is directly in front of the spot where the former Prime Minister was 
assassinated, marked with a large bronze statue (not visible here) – has sported this giant “Stop 
Solidere” sign. In late 2015 the building’s façade was also outfitted with lights, so that at night 
passersby can see written in block letters above the sign “St George will prevail” in white lights and 
below the sign” Solidere will end in 2019” in red lights. The blue and white trilingual signs in the 
foreground (which appear every couple hundred feet around the property) read, “You are in the St. 
Georges Bay” in English, French, and Arabic. They are part of the attempt of the latter to name and 
claim space. Photograph by the author, October, 2015. 
 
former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri’s influence in that company’s buying and selling 
off of the city’s most touted real-estate.15 This literature has highlighted the continued 
                                                
15 See for example, Aseel Sawalha, “The Dilemmas of Conversvation and Reconstruction in Beirut,” in The 
Emerging Asian City: Concomitant Urbanities and Urbanisms, ed. Vinayak Bharne (Oxon: Routledge, 
2013), 148-157; Saree Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age 
of Solidere,” Critical Inquiry 23(1997): 660-705; C. Nagel, “Reconstructing Space, Re-Creating Memory: 




tension in post-war Beirut, examined how discourses of consumption have attempted to 
unify the disjointed, war torn populace, and focused on campaigns of civil resistance to 
Solidere.16 These studies have importantly worked to trouble the narratives Solidere and 
other developers have imposed on the city, while exploring the tenuously-held together 
reality of the Lebanese state.17 
 On this note, it is common knowledge in literature on Lebanon that the Lebanese 
state has never exhibited features of a Keynesian apparatus common in Western 
contexts.18 For better or worse, an important swath of literature on Lebanon has identified 
it as a textbook example of a “weak” or “failed” state.19 This literature has led Nikolas 
Kosmatopoulos to name Lebanon a “prestige zone [for] theorizing” the concept of the 
failed state.20 To be sure, Lebanon’s confessional power-sharing agreement is in quite 
marked distinction to the authoritarian monarchies and other autocratic regimes in the 
                                                
16 Aseel Sawalha, Reconstructing Beirut: Memory and Space in a Postwar Arab City (Austin: U of Texas 
P, 2010), Kindle edition; Craig Larkin, Memory and Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and Forgetting the 
Past (Oxon: Routledge, 2012). 
 
17 For an application of the theory of the “right to the city” to Beirut’s reconstruction efforts, see Mona 
Fawaz, “Neoliberal Urbanity and the Right to the City: A View from Beirut’s Periphery,” Development and 
Change 40(2009): 827-852. For examples of civil resistance see: Civil Campaign to Preserve the Dalieh of 
Beirut, “Revisiting Dalieh: Beirut-Based Events,” Jadaliyya, May 28, 2015, accessed March 12, 2016, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21737/revisiting-dalieh_beirut-based-events-31-may_-12-j. Laleh 
Khalili, “This Sea is Mine: A Review,” [review of the Dictophone Performance Group’s piece “Why This 
Sea is Mine?”], Jadaliyya, September 4, 2012, accessed March 12, 2016, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7205/this-sea-is-mine_a-review.  
 
18 Marieke Krijnen and Christian De Beukelaer write, “contrary to most Western contexts that have a 
history of Keynesian state interventionism and welfare provision, the state role in Lebanon has never been 
that of a social provider.” (Krijnen and De Beukelaer, “Capital, State, and Conflict: the Various Drivers of 
Diverse Gentrification Processes in Beirut, Lebanon,” in Global Gentrifications: Uneven Development and 
Displacement, ed. Loretta Lees, Hyun Bang Shin, and Ernesto López-Morales [Bristol: Policy Press, 2015], 
288.) 
 
19 See among others: Farid El Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976 (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard UP, 2000) and Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a 
Nation, New Edition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015). 
 
20 That is, Kosmatopoulos criticizes the tendency to over-theorize Lebanon’s failed state status. Nikolas 
Kosmatopoulos, “Toward an Anthropology of ‘State Failure’: Lebanon’s Leviathan and Peace Expertise,” 




region.21 Moreover, the propensity for suicide bombings to paralyze cities or 
neighborhoods,22 for militias to act outside the jurisdiction of the state, not to mention the 
systemic neglect of the South, North, and East of the country,23 has made the subject of 
the state’s whereabouts a constant subject of conversation among Lebanese outside of 
academic circles, as in the discussion of the popular meme that opened this chapter.  
This discourse continues, indeed is amplified by, a volatile security situation 
drawn out over more than a decade. As the club owner Camille “Camo” Najm told me, 
“People aren’t comfortable but they will still go and party,” employing as they do so a 
rationale partly informed by political dynamics, and partly in denial of them. He 
continued, “They think like, look, they just hit a Shiʿa neighborhood, and then they hit a 
Sunni neighborhood, now it’s the turn for a Christian neighborhood. So I won’t go out in 
Gemmayzeh,” as if one can predict, better than, or in absence of a state, how to protect 
oneself. Moreover, the sporadic appearance of a draconian state cracking down on 
individual, peaceful citizens (as highlighted visually in Traboulsi’s memes) further 
structures sociality and mobility in Beirut. For example, in January 2014 Lebanese 
                                                
21 Nora Stel, “Mukhtars in the Middle: Connecting State, Citizens, and Refugees,” Jadaliyya, December 4, 
2015, accessed March 12, 2016, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/23290/mukhtars-in-the-
middle_connecting-state-citizens-a.  
 
22 The bombings of the past ten years – from the truck bomb that assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Al-
Hariri, to the most recent bombing in November 2015 – number in the dozens and have taken hundreds of 
lives. Lebanese performance artist Rima Najdi interrogated the sociability of fear these bombings generated 
in January 2014 with her performance art piece “Madame Bomba.” Strapped in comically-rendered 
dynamite (red cardboard with bright yellow wires), she walked the iconic streets of Beirut, drawing 
attention to the anxious fear Beirutis were carrying with them but not overtly addressing. See: Ellie Violet 
Bramley, “Why is a Woman Dressing Up as a Bomb on the Streets of Beirut?” The Guardian, January 14, 
2014, accessed March 16, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/jan/14/why-woman-
dressing-up-bomb-beirut; and “Madame Bomba,” Facebook Event, posted by “Rima Najdi,” January 12, 
2014, accessed March 16, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/events/1414168678822797/.  
 
23 See for example, Anne Marie Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East: Kin Mutual Aid 





security forces arrested the Lebanese rapper Hussein Sharafeddin, known as Abu Ali 
(Double A) The Preacherman because his beard and baggy pants gave him a “Salafist” 
appearance. He was arrested in the Southern Beirut suburbs of Dahiyeh the day after a 
suicide bombing killed four people in the neighborhood and held in the anti-terrorism 
unit before being released without charge.24 The arrest ripped through Beirut’s rap and 
hip hop community, with friends and observers expressing the same kinds of disbelief, 
shock, and derision that underscore Traboulsi’s memes (as in Nasser Shorbaji [the rapper 
who goes by the stage name Chyno]’s Facebook post, below). In Beirut as elsewhere, 
rappers are keenly aware of, and often fiercely critical of, the involvement of the state in 
“anti-terrorism” operations, initiatives they occasionally related to “Western,” 
specifically US, interference. 
Thus, the privatization involved in the reconstruction of Beirut and the dynamics 
contributing to the fracturing of Lebanon’s “failed” state are two, inter-dependent, initial 
considerations in laying out the political and economic forces shaping Beirut today. A  
third element is the considerable influence of the Lebanese diaspora.25 The size and 
importance of the Lebanese diaspora in local dynamics are relatively unique in the 
region.26 Before I moved with my father back to the city of his youth in 2006, my own  
                                                
24 Staff, “Police Detain Bearded Beirut Musicians over ‘Terrorism’ Suspicions,” Al-Akhbar English, 
January 22, 2014, accessed March 22, 2016, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18340.  
 
25 For a track that explores the diaspora, playing for it, and receiving their feedback, see especially El Rass 
and El Far3i, “Fi el-Jaleed” [“In the Ice”], on the album Adam, Darwin, and the Penguin, released May 27, 
2014. (“Fi el-Jaleed – maʿ el-Far3i” [“In the Ice – with El Far3i”], BandCamp audio recording, 4:48, 
accessed March 18, 2016 https://elrass-munma.bandcamp.com/track/--6.) This track is discussed in further 
detail in the Conclusion to this dissertation. 
 
26 It is an effect of the Lebanese civil war, but also of patterns of migration for at least a century. Famines 
on Mount Lebanon at the turn of the twentieth century propelled a sizable Lebanese exodus to South 
America, for example. A considerable Lebanese population travels to and from Brazil yearly. Brazil hosts 
an estimated seven million Lebanese (Lebanon itself only hosts around four million citizens). Claudio 





relationship with Beirut and with Lebanon mirrored that of much of the Lebanese 
diaspora flung across the US, Europe, Central and South America, and Australia. We 
spent parts of the summer and the occasional New Year with extended family in Beirut, 
meeting up both with family living elsewhere and family permanently residing in 
Lebanon. As my cousins and I grew older, we spent more time discovering the city on 
our own, away from the living rooms of aunts and uncles. 
By 2006, diasporic visits like mine helped, among other things, to shape a pattern 
of socializing on two important avenues in the city: in Monot and Gemmayzeh (on streets 
                                                                                                                                            
March 12, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21573584-business-people-lebanon-fare-better-
abroad-home-tale-two-traders. See also Carolyn Gates, The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an 
Open Economy (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998) and Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon 
(London: Pluto Press, 2012). 
 
Figure 5.4: “Two examples of rappers in Beirut posting on social media about the concerns of 
securitization in the city.” Left, Nasser Shorbaji (Chyno) posts on Facebook with derision about 
Double A the Preacherman's arrest, sarcastically suggesting that a decal of a cartoonish bomb on 
Double A’s car was evidence for arresting him on suspicion of terrorism. (Facebook post, January 22, 
2014). Right, Mazen El Sayed (El Rass) writes, “The rap scene is infatuated with the rapport of black 
Americans with the police. I swear, brother, I have never in my life done a workshop to learn rap from 
Americans, but you should ask the [Lebanese] security forces how many workshops they’ve done with 
the US police.” His comments both refuse accusations that his rap is a “Westernized” product while 
drawing explicit attention to the neoliberal connection and collaboration between US and Lebanese 




referred to by the neighborhood in which they are the main artery). Both Monot and 
Gemmayzeh are one-way streets in otherwise residential neighborhoods that for several 
years attracted intense investment in bars, clubs, pubs and other nightlife establishments, 
sky-rocketing the rents. From 2000-2005, Monot hosted a potpourri of clubs and bars. 
The street showcased the first concentrated investment in nightlife since the 
reconstruction period and capitalized on the neighborhood’s central location. By the 2006 
war with Israel [also called the July War, or harb tammuz] and the occupation of the 
downtown by March 8 supporters in 2006, the street had “died.” From 2002 to around 
2009, Gemmayzeh street emerged and then exploded with popularity. Capitalizing on a 
“pub” aesthetic and leaning heavily on the Francophone traditions in Ashrafiyeh [East 
Beirut], Gemmayzeh countered the relatively more posh club scene of Monot and the 
increasing numbers of high-end roof top bars like “Sky Bar” “Le White” and “Le Gray” 
boasting DJs and requiring bottle-service reservations.27 At the peaks of their popularity, 
both Monot and Gemmayzeh were thronged by people in summer evenings, making it 
difficult to move, much less move a vehicle. Starting in 2008/2009, Beirut’s famous retail 
district, Hamra Street, witnessed a similar pattern of frantic nightlife investment in the 
opening of dozens of small pubs and bars, an enthusiasm which carried through the first 
years of the Arab Uprisings.28 Some of this energy capitalized on the historic role Hamra 
has played as home of Beirut’s intellectuals and the Left.29 Around the same time 
                                                
27 The rapport between Beirut’s Christian community, rooted in East Beirut, and the French has historically 
been stronger than the latter’s rapport with other communities. 
 
28 At time of writing, this nightlife has petered off significantly. Live music is focused at the underground 
Metro Al Madina cabaret-theatre and Mizyan bar/restaurant. 
  
29 This intellectual vibe was historically sustained by the nearby presence of several universities, especially 




(2009/2010), investment picked up past the far end of Gemmayzeh street, on the other 
side of town. On Armenia Street in Mar Mkhayel an especially intense pattern of 
gentrification that started with bars hosting alternative music and hip hop has expanded to 
include galleries and high end apartments that specifically cater to the Lebanese 
diaspora.30 
The development of all four of these districts is related to, indeed in some ways 
hinged on, the presentation of live music. Since 2000, local Lebanese hip hop and rap has 
played on stages and in venues that were part of each phase of growth. The popular ‘Eid 
al Musiqah [Fête de la Musique, annual Music Festival] was staged in the early 2000s in 
Monot and Downtown. Rap acts Fareeq al-Atrash and Katibeh 5, among others, were part 
of the presentation of local music. In Gemmayzeh, hip hop acts played at Behind the 
Green Door, and more recently at Yukunkun (opened September 2012). In Hamra, one of 
the first venues sporting a “local, authentic, not corporate vibe” while “prioritizing 
cultural programming and political freedom with prices accessible for young people” was 
the café, library, and art space Tah Marbouta.31 Katibeh 5, Fareeq al-Atrash, Touffar, and 
bands like Mashrou3 Leila all played at Tah Marbouta between 2006 and 2012. Since the 
cafe was priced out of its original location and moved, Metro al-Madina in the heart of 
Hamra has consistently showcased local, alternative music, including hip hop (it opened 
                                                                                                                                            
Seidman, “The Politics of Cosmopolitan Beirut: From the Stranger to the Other,” Theory, Culture, and 
Society 29(2012): 3-36. 
 
30 Krijnen and De Beukelaer, “Capital, State, and Conflict.” 
 
31 Interview with co-owner Bilal El-Amine, August 30, 2013. All subsequent quotations from Mr. El-
Amine are taken from this interview, which was primarily conducted in English. Tah Marbouta opened in 
2006, days after the Israeli bombardment of Beirut. It initially opened (by accident) as a kind of relief hub 
where different political and non political groups coordinated relief efforts. In 2011 they were bought out of 
their location on the ground floor of the Pavillon Hotel and relocated to the alley between Starbucks and 





New Years 2012).32 Finally, Mar Mkhayel’s gentrification was arguably initiated by two 
important new music venues: EM Chill (named for the “electro-mechanic” auto-repair 
shop which it transformed) and Radio Beirut. It is impossible to ignore how the 
presentation of local musicians, hip hop a constant genre among them, has been involved 
in the frantic, sporadic growth of different areas of the city and the aesthetic development 
of its nightlife. 
If alternative, local music was part of the aesthetic appeal of these gentrifying 
energies in different neighborhoods at different times over the past decade and a half, 
international capital was responsible for its existence at all. It is difficult to over 
emphasize the role the diaspora has played in sustaining as well as driving the climbing 
rents in neighborhoods like Mar Mkhayel and Hamra. Marieke Krijnen and Christian de 
Beukelaer underscore how new apartment complexes in Mar Mkhayel are specifically 
catering and selling to the diaspora.33 Bar owners I spoke with corroborated this narrative 
and emphasized how necessary the diaspora was to their economic survival, as well.34 
                                                
32 Tah Marbouta is still in Hamra but in a different location. The particularities of the space forced the 
owners to focus on the restaurant side of the operation and pulled them away from cultural programming. 
Bilal El-Amine told me: 
 
I really felt like when we left the other space that they had killed us. The whole 
neighborhood was being gentrified and places like us that prioritized cultural 
programming and political freedom with prices accessible for young people was not 
going to be possible anymore.  
 
Metro al-Madina is an underground “cabaret” theatre that opened New Year’s Even 2012 in the small 
theatre of the Masrah al-Madina complex. Since it has opened, it quickly established itself as an important 
venue for local, non-commerical, musical acts and theatre productions. They also intended to open in 2006 
but delayed opening because of the July 2006 war. The theatre’s artistic director, Hisham Jaber, actually 
relocated to Cairo, Egypt for a time before returning to open the venue in 2012. (Interview with Hisham 
Jaber, August 23, 2013. Subsequent quotations from Mr. Jaber are taken from this interview. Translations 
from the Arabic are my own.)  
 
33 Krijnen and de Beukelaer specifically locate the diaspora as one important group of Beirut’s new 
“gentrifier.” (Krinjen and de Beukelaer, “Capital, State, and Conflict.”) 
 




When we spoke, the Swiss-Lebanese co-owner of the basement club Yukunkun in 
Gemmayzeh was concerned about a constricted clientele. When I asked him if the 
neighborhood in which his venue is located was part of the problem (by that time, 
Gemmayzeh was “dying” and Mar Mkhayel was “booming”), Camille “Camo” Najm 
related to me:  
This isn’t a problem of Gemmayzeh or Mar Mkhayel. The problem is 
people are offering big entertainment with which you can no longer 
compete. The second thing is there aren’t tourists in Lebanon. Even the 
Lebanese themselves aren’t coming [back]. And when they do, they aren’t 
spending. 
 
Here, Camo relates the importance of the diaspora in fleshing out both local and foreign 
audiences. Camo’s comments also reflect the competition he feels this frantic growth puts 
on his venue (“people are offering big entertainment with which you cannot compete”). 
Other bar and café owners also readily related that the unsustainability of this kind of 
investment when neighborhoods gentrify may be owed to money laundering. This reflects 
their perception that some of their competition doesn’t seem to be concerned with making 
or losing money to stay afloat.35 
Especially remarkable in comparison to the other cities considered here, the 
gentrification of at least five neighborhoods featured in my research in Beirut.36 
Interestingly, however, this has led not to the proliferation of enduring or reliable venues 
within which rappers are eager to present their work. At time of writing, there are 
effectively two main venues for hip hop concerts in Beirut: Metro al-Madina on Hamra 
Street and Radio Beirut in Mar Mkhayel on Armenia Street. That is, while every few 
                                                
35 Interviews with Bilal El-Amine and Camille Najm. 
 





years over the past decade and a half the returning diaspora was treated to new sets of 
bars in a new neighborhood, this has not resulted in tangibly greater opportunities for 
musicians. The rapper and producer Osloob told me, “There’s no music scene in Beirut. 
There’s no movement. There’s no place for music. You know what’s the dream of the 
musician in Beirut? To play with Ziad Rahbani and Fairouz.37 Of course, they’re fine 
musicians, I respect them too. But there’s no creativity in [this ambition].”38 Countering 
the enthusiasm of rappers from other cities who come to Beirut, Osloob suggests that 
audience exposure and eagerness aside, there still is little infrastructure supporting 
independent musicians in the city. 
Finally, the side effect of the rising rents has meant that less and less of Beirut is 
accessible to its permanent residents. Gentrification in Beirut depends on the 
return/investment of the diaspora at the same time that it dispossesses Lebanese and 
limits resources available to them. The frantic growth of different neighborhoods and the 
official disavowal of others creates what the rapper and producer Osloob called 
“schizophrenia” [infisam] in Beirut. He told me, “Lebanon is schizophrenic [fi nouʿ min 
al-infisam]. The places and sociality are so different from each other. I would have 
invited you to come back to the studio [in Bourj el Farajneh, in Dahiyeh], but it’s all 
checkpoints and security these days. It looks like a different country.”   
I return to explore the implications of the audience dynamics Osloob points to 
here, when audiences travel into the cosmopolitan heart of the city to hear bands voicing 
                                                
37 Ziad Rahbani and his mother Fairouz are arguably Lebanon’s most famous living musicians. For analysis 
of the family’s musical legacy see Christopher Stone, Popular Culture and Nationalism in Lebanon: The 
Fairouz and Rahbani Nation (Oxon: Routledge, 2008). 
 
38 Interview with the author, September 3, 2013. All subsequent quotes from Osloob are taken from this 




local grievances. Moreover, Osloob suggested that this schizophrenia positions rap 
concerts as easier in some neighborhoods and more difficult in others. He told me that 
“it’s easy to do a concert in Hamra, it’s hard to do one in the camps. It’s easy to do a 
concert at Metro [al-Madina, the underground cabaret in Hamra]; it’s hard to do one in 
Tripoli.” These reflections point to the uneven cosmopolitanism in Beirut. Gentrification 
in Beirut seems to happen in strips, radiating in dials pointing away from each other, 
concentrating intense activity on one street for a few years before moving on to another 
street in another neighborhood. The concentration of investment on individual streets in 
West and East Beirut is in marked contrast within a specific neighborhood. At the same 
time, the investment, sociality, and cosmopolitanism in these neighborhoods is wholly 
different from that in Beirut’s “periphery” – in Dahiyeh, Beirut’s southern suburbs or in 
the refugee camps of Sabra, Shatilla, Bourj el Barajneh, and others “outside of” Beirut.39 
The widely different infrastructure and sociality in different neighborhoods engenders the 
“schizophrenia” Osloob talked about. As other researchers have documented, traversing, 
or conversely, being confined to specific parts of the city (either by choice, or by shared 
ideas about safety within neighborhoods) contributes to the sociality of Beirutis and 
defines a geographic understanding of the city that is inherently political.40 It also, as I 
                                                
39 On sociality and cosmopolitanism in Dahiyeh see Lara Deeb and Mona Harb, Leisurely Islam: 
Negotiating Geography and Morality in Shiʿite South Beirut (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2013) and Lara 
Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shiʿi Lebanon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
2006). 
 
40 Samir Khalaf speaks of a “geography of fear” (Samir Khalaf, Heart of Beirut: Reclaiming the Bourj 
[London: Saqi Books, 2006], Kindle edition, locations 2453-2578); Steven Seidman writes of the 
“territorialization” of confessional identity (Steven Seidman, “Streets of Beirut: Self and Encounter with 
‘the Other,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung in collaboration with Idafat: Arab Journal of Sociology, March 3, 2014, 
accessed March 22, 2016, 
https://lb.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2010/09/steven_seidman_streets_of_beirut.pdf; and Craig 
Larkin reproduces young peoples’ testimony recounting their self-confinement to different parts of the city 





will explore below, informs how attending concerts can function politically for ostracized 
residents of the city. Rap has emerged in Beirut that navigates this materially-induced 
social condition lyrically (as in El Rass’s track).41 Moreover, audiences confronting this 
schizophrenia is part of what structures the emergence of tarab in some concerts. 
 Thus, privatization, sectarian oligarchy and a weak state, sporadic gentrification, 
and the diaspora shape the material “uneven”-ness of neoliberal incursions in Beirut.42 A 
final consideration that influences flows of affect among certain demographics in the city 
is the condition of non-sectarian politics. Since 2006 the voices of anti-sectarian 
dissenters flare up sporadically – and I think, following the 2015 protests – it is safe to 
say with increasing vitality. But the inherently fractious nature of this organizing is also a 
part of the political feelings of exhaustion and disgust discussed and articulated by many 
of my more politically active interlocutors. Bilal El-Amine of the café-pub Tah Marbouta 
explained: 
You’ll sit at the table with ten people and they’ll all have wildly different 
opinions about what to do. And there are no traditions that have been built 
up, not even cores of people to navigate these differences. Once relief 
work [in 2006 following the July war] was gone, there was nothing to hold 
people together. Even the Arab Spring, which was the best opportunity for 
people to build something, what was attempted was a disaster. During the 
attempt here [“a-sha’b yureed isqat a-nizam a-taʾifee,” or, “the people 
want the fall of the sectarian regime”] literally in every protest, in every 
meeting, there were physical fights between people, between activists. 
Really nasty, horrible meetings. [First], it was something to open up that 
big: it brought in a whole array of political problems specific to Lebanon. 
And [secondly] the core activists took this kind of ultra-revolutionary 
approach, like they didn’t want to discuss any kind of strategy, they just 
                                                
41 The subject in El Rass’s track “Anti-Schizophrenia” (2013) is not facing different parts of the city but 
different sides of oneself “{Anti-Schizophrenia} El Rass aka El Sayyed,” YouTube video, 3:14, posted by 
“El Sayyed el Rass” January 2, 2013, accessed March 22, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnW165RtZZo&ab_channel=!"لس)ّد%لر%. 
 
42 Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, “Cities and Geographies of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism,’” 




thought it was a revolutionary time and people should just go with 
revolution. I think this kind of atmosphere developing in Lebanon is now 
kind of dead and buried.  
 
El-Amine expresses here not only acknowledgement of the fractious Lebanese history 
and politics (“an array of political problems specific to Lebanon”), he also expressed 
frustration with the attitudes, (what he calls a lack of “strategy”) in new, emerging 
political mobilizations. As it turns out, these independent, anti-sectarian politics and some 
of the accompanying attitudes he identifies did re-emerge in the August 2015 protests, 
despite El-Amine’s assessment in 2013 that anti-sectarian protest was “dead and buried.” 
The “ultra-revolutionary” attitude he bemoaned also returned and similarly alienated 
large swaths of the Lebanese populus, even those supportive of the protests. This attitude 
was also importantly reflected in the rap scene, as I explore in the next section.  
All of these factors – the attitude and fractiousness of anti-sectarian protests, along with 
the factors influencing Beirut’s uneven cosmopolitanism and neoliberal growth identified 
above – converge to influence the structure of political options and political feeling in 
Beirut.  
In her work on Beirut during reconstruction, anthropologist Aseel Sawalha has 
productively located a lingering affective malaise in the post-war city. She identified 
among her interlocutors a state of “limbo” that operated as an “ongoing ‘state of 
emergency.’” Sawalha suggested that the “postwar case of uncertainty” permeated 
through “all aspects of daily life for most residents of the city” and echoed in various 
claims by Beirutis to “wait and see.”43 My own research documented similar patterns of 
anxiety and confusion. My interlocutors’ testimonies mirrored in some ways the limbo 
                                                





Sawalha located. Many of the individuals I spoke with expressed hesitancy about 
investments or next steps, iterating that they would also “wait to see what happens.” At 
the same time, however, I also noticed something else in the tones of voice, expressions, 
and analyses my interlocutors offered. As the Arab Uprisings and the short lived “a-




Figure 5.5: “Map of Beirut showing the four boulevards of gentrification discussed here.” From West 
to East these are: Hamra, Monot, Gemmayzeh, and Mar Mkhayel. Other areas discussed, like the 
Downtown and Dahiyeh, also situated for reference. (Map is drawn by the author and not to scale.) 
 
regime”] occupation of the downtown fizzled out, more and more people spoke of 
leaving Beirut, and a pronounced tin-like tone marked even these more hopeful 





about local racism and local classism, about especially the lack of opportunity for young 
people in Beirut, about the corruption and oligarchy of the government, about the lack of 
electricity and internet, about the lack of support for culture, about the stranglehold of 
NGO funding structures on art production (and other things), about the complicity of the 
diaspora or the dismal social prospects accompanying a move outside of Lebanon, about 
sexism and patriarchy, about religious hypocrisy, and so on. In my fieldwork, I perceived 
that the limbo that Sawalha wrote about in the early 2000s was hardening; it was 
becoming darker, more cynical, more introverted, less hopeful. As Amine Younes, the 
owner of a chain coffee houses, who opened the first local café (not an international 
chain) in Hamra in the 2000s (Younes café), told me, explaining a shift he noticed in his 
café between 2006 and 2013: 
People used to come, students or young professionals, spend half an hour 
order something, and go to their work or back to their studies. Now with 
social media and the Internet, people come and spend three or four hours 
on an espresso or a sandwich. Of course this effected us financially, but 
I’m not talking about this. Socially, the talk is different. There is 
pessimism. It’s not always so serious, of course. But there used to be more 
positive vibes, people would be laughing. Now there’s something negative 
in things. You can see it in people’s faces. Like three years ago (2010), I 
started noticing this change. I cannot explain it. You have to see it, then 
you notice it. It’s in their eyes. Their eyes are empty.44 
 
Palpable in Younes’s comments here was both nostalgia and frustration. Moreover, the  
statement “their eyes are empty” articulates a distance between himself and those he 
spoke about, a distance marked by particular affective register. Importantly, Younes did 
                                                
44 Interview with the author, August 28, 2013. All subsequent quotations from Mr. Younes are taken from 
this interview, which was conducted primarily in English. Like Tah Marbouta, Younes café in Hamra also 
opened right around the Israeli bombing of Beirut in 2006. Younes kept a blog during the heady days of the 
war: who came into the café, what they talked about. He remembers this period as particularly vibrant, 





not really express disgust here. But his comments are indicative of the darker sadness I 
perceived in the testimonies of many of my interlocutors.  
Disgust in Beirut is expressed as the affective result of the tension between the several 
factors I have pointed to in this section. It is the recognition that the city is being stolen 
from its inhabitants; the frustration with the status quo; the utter dissatisfaction with the 
government; resentment towards people who leave; and the identity crises that result 
upon return. As such, I consider that expressions of disgust are specific, active 
navigations of politics. By distancing themselves from dysfunction, corruption, neglect, 
or racism in a particular affective register, the speaker of disgust works around available 
political affiliation by refusing and circumventing in specific ways the trite, disappointing 
narratives of politicians, the humanitarian aid industry, and local as well as regional 
nostalgia. In turn, the listener to expressions of disgust shifts weight, adopts focus, and 
expresses similar or related affect. These are politics in process. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on expressions of disgust in rap lyrics and 
performances of disgust in rap concerts in Beirut. I suggest something politically 
productive operates in these performatives: in both the expression of disgust lyrically and 
its enactment gesturally by MCs in live concerts. My proposal to explore a poetics of 
disgust in rap in Beirut is similar but distinct from Sara Ahmed’s work on what she calls 
the performativity of disgust.45 Like hers, my concern is what happens when 
disgust is articulated. Differing from Ahmed’s model, however, I propose to consider the 
lyrical work of disgust together with its sounding in public. Expressions of disgust 
                                                
45 Ahmed centers her discussion of politics and disgust around the statement “That’s disgusting!” taking in 
particular responses to the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 as an example of these political 




separate subjects and ideas from the affects they typically carry, allowing for a parsing 
out of nostalgia and romanticism.  
 
Figure 5.6: “Graffiti, Bliss Street.” Graffito right reads "state of garbage"; graffito left reads "fall of 
the government of hooligans.” Photograph by the author, February 2016. 
 
Secondly, I suggest that effect of the sound of disgust – when it is voiced out loud 
– is not exactly the formation of community Ahmed writes about. Yes, a community of 
listeners is required and also formed by expressions of disgust. But these expressions 
encourage the articulation of disgust in return. Spitting back is neither necessarily 
indicative of community formation and neither does it automatically reinforce the disgust 
initially articulated. Rather, spitting back as another articulation of disgust furthers the 




speaker as it is to further the initial disgust that speaker articulated. This radiation of 
invention, distancing, and critique in expressions of and listening to disgust is the politics 
in progress I explore in this chapter.  
Like the performance of resignation in some rap lyrics in Amman (see Chapter 
Four), expressing disgust in Beirut navigates material and affective realities and points to 
politics in progress. My attention in this chapter does not suggest that all rappers or all 
Beirutis only voice and articulate disgust, or that they do so in a constant or consistent 
register. Nonetheless, the political feeling of disgust I work to locate and describe is 
palpable both in the way rap lyrics in Beirut function and in the way MCs engage concert 
audiences during live events. In the pages that follow, I work to explain how this disgust 
works. 
* * * 
 
The rapport between gentrification of certain neighborhoods of cities in the 
Levant and rap that I explore in this dissertation was first encouraged by rap I heard in 
Beirut, where the city is itself is a frequent enough subject of rap tracks to count for a 
considerable minority in the genre. More than in Ramallah and in Amman, Beirut is often 
personified as an important figure in the political and social configuration of the worlds 
rappers describe. Beirut emerges as both traitor and confidante, hope and despair, culture 
and barbarity, love and hate, modernity and heritage, cosmopolitan and artless. The 
growth of and sociality in its streets is something rappers consistently take as a subject. 
This oscillation is obvious in the track “Borkan Beiruti” [Beirut’s Volcano], a line from 




wrestling ring.”). El Rass’s lyrics paint a picture of Beirut as ready to explode, in part as a 
result of the tension of holding together all of its contradictions (similar to Osloob’s 
“schizophrenia,” above). The last line of the song is “al-diʿareh wa waraqah el tout/ bi-
medinet beirut ʿalm“ [literally: “prostitution and the fig leaf, in the city of Beirut, is a 
science]. 46 That is, the navigations between impropriety and modesty in Beirut take time 
and perfecting: they are a science. These navigations may be personal, social, or political. 
In this section, I have sought to outline some of the considerations that rappers 
and the audiences navigate in Beirut. In the next section I consider rapped articulations of 
disgust – where the subject is Beirut and otherwise – to flesh out further how rap actively 










In the wake of the Arab Uprisings, Jeddah-based radio host Hass Dennaoui (alias 
Big Hass) started a hip-hop radio blog (now also print magazine magazine) called Re-
volt.47 His initial posts were enthusiastic about the “revolting” youth of the MENA region 
and the connection of urban culture, hip hop, graffiti, break dancing, and other forms of 
                                                
46 Moe Ali Nayel and El Rass, “Borkan Beirut,” 66-67. 





creative expression, to the political changes sweeping the region.48 Reading these pieces 
in 2011 and 2012, I found myself frequently jarred by the use of the word “revolting.” 
While Hass used it to mean “rebellious,” “revolutionary,” and “rebelling,” all I saw was 
“disgusting.” I begin this section by clarifying how I intend to build an understanding of 
expressions of disgust and politics in some rap in Beirut.  
In her book Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal 
Britain, Imogen Tyler teases apart the symbolic synonym I tripped on reading Big Hass’s 
blog. Her subject is the productive tension between political discourses of disgust and 
new mobilizations of protest in the UK.49 Tyler lays out two intersecting interpretations 
of “revolting” from which I want to distance myself here. She suggests that there is 
productive intersectionality between groups cast out as “disgusting” – fearsome, pitiful, 
or otherwise abject (“bogus” asylum seekers, gypsies, the Irish Travellers, the homeless, 
and others) – and new protest movements rising up against the state (including Occupy 
Wall Street-type occupations, anti-war mobilization, and anti-eviction work). In 
constructing her argument, Tyler leans on understandings of political disgust similar to 
Sara Ahmed’s, pointed to above, when disgust is used by conservative politicians and 
social commentators to cast out the “national abject”: the intruder, infiltrator, threat, and 
stain on the body politic.50  
The first distinction to be made is that the disgust I locate in rap in Beirut is not a 
part of this kind of political narrative, the “abject politics” Tyler writes about, even 
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though the affective frameworks of fear, anxiety, and othering that Ahmed and Tyler 
locate in the UK, Australia, and the US are not alien to Lebanese politics. The 
Palestinian, the Syrian, the Southerner, and the Bekaaʿ, all embody a narrow space 
between victim, object of sympathy, and intruder, burden, and threat. The articulated 
disgust I locate in this chapter for the most part works in the other direction. That is, the 
disgust I identify as politically productive in rap in Beirut is often directed at the failures 
of the state, of capital, and of the hypocrisy and failure of “the Left,” “cosmopolitan” 
society, and the hypocrisy of various groups. Sometimes this disgust is articulated by 
those who have been conjured as victim-threats. It is not, however, the disgust of social 
“pollution and contamination” – to use Mary Douglas’s phrase – that conservative 
commentators invoke.51 That is, the disgust I am tracing here is not the disgust that Tyler 
and Ahmed identify as political when they speak of “abject politics.” 
Second, neither is the rap I am interested in Beirut the rap of protest or revolt. 
And here it is actually worth drawing attention to the very recent overlap of protest with 
rap in Beirut, a connection that has in the past year been made more explicit than it has 
been in any city in the Levant at any time in the history of rap in the region. During the 
“You Stink” protests that rocked the city in August 2015, rappers El Rass and Naserdayn 
al Touffar pushed an explicit relationship between rap and protest. The song “Nihna w a 
zibl jeeran” [“We have Shit for Neighbors”] was written during the protests, channeled 
anger directly at the current government, its corruption, and even more specifically 
Solidere by name (“ma fi reehah bi solidere, ma fi zbaleh bi solidere, hiyeh a-zbaleh 
solidere” [There’s no smell in Solidere, there’s no garbage in Solidere, Solidere is the 
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garbage]).52 The track reflected both rappers’ participation in the protests. The video for 
the piece opens with protest footage featuring crowds chanting and ends with protesters 
clearly deliberating how to protect each other from advancing police. Lyrically, the piece 
opens with an incitement to protest, with the lines  
 They strangled you, starved you, estranged you, rise up! 
They spit on you, beat you, imprisoned you, rise up! 
They trapped you, put a price on you, tied you up, rise up!53 
This kind of incitement to protest is related to lyrics in other Naserdayn/El Rass 
collaborations, as in their refrain, “revolution is in the street, not on the screen” in their 
track “Anbaʾ Hammeh” [Important news].54 In August, 2015, pieces by the two rappers 
were regularly referenced by observers to the political developments.55 Further still, 
songs by the duo were actually used during street protests. Their 2013 collaboration in 
                                                
52 “Bu Nasserdyn al-Touffar w El Rass – nihna w a-zabl jeeran – video” [Nasserdyn al-Touffar and El Rass 
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touffar,” August 31, 2015, accessed March 12, 2016 
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53 Following the January 25 Egyptian Revolution, Edd Abbass of the group Fareeq el Atrash collaborated 
with Egyptian rapper Deeb to produce the track, “Rise, Egyptian.” The refrain played with a similar 
incitement to “rise,” though it was sung in a different affective register. (For Arabic lyrics and translation 
see Deeb and Edd Abbas, “Rise, Egyptian!,” translated by Farah ElRewaissti, in “Exploring Popular 
Literature: Arabic Hip Hop,” 16-23; for the track itself, see: “Deeb-qoum ya masree (Stand Up Egyptian) 
feat. Edd,” YouTube video, 4:09, posted by “deebhiphop,”August 5, 2011, accessed March 18, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rIxIHjUWA_I&ab_channel=deebhiphop.  
 
54 “Anbaʾ Hammeh – ma’ Nasserdyn al-Touffar” [Important News – with Nasserdyn al-Touffar], Sound 
Cloud audio recording, 3:18, posted by “El Rass,” early 2015, accessed March 12, 2016 
https://soundcloud.com/el-rass-the-head/anba. 
 
55 See Azza El Masri, “Three Songs to Listen to before the Next YouStink Protest,” Step Feed, August 29, 
2015, accessed March 12, 2016, https://stepfeed.com/more-categories/big-news/the-3-songs-you-need-to-
listen-to-right-now-before-the-youstink-protest/#.VuapTsfF7zI; Elias Muhanna, “The Death of Ideology 
and Beirut’s #YouStink Protests,” Qifa Nabki, September 1, 2015, accessed March 12, 2016, 
http://qifanabki.com/2015/09/01/the-death-of-ideology-and-beiruts-youstink-protests/; and in Arabic: Fadi 
el-ʿAbdallah, “El Rass w el-Touffar w el Rahl el Kabeer: Baheth el-Jeel ʿan Southo,” Ma3azef.com, 
September 1, 2015, accessed April 1, 2016, http://ma3azef.com/(/'(0-/(12'(#-'*(/'(#-/$34'(-5*3-
$%'(/; and Mohammed Ali, “El Rap fi Shawareʿ Beirut,” Ma3azef.com, September 6, 2015, accessed April 





particular, “Beirut Khaybetna” [Beirut, Our Disappointment], discussed in more detail 
below, seemed to prove its resonance with listeners in the street in late August. Footage 
online captures a crowd of protesters reciting Naserdayn’s verse in its entirety in the 
company of the rapping duo.56 (I will return to this shortly.) Lebanon, Palestine, and 
Jordan had not yet seen this kind of explicit connection between rap and protest.57 
 While rappers and audiences testified to DAM and the Ramallah Underground’s 
lyrical work being important political engagement with the Second Intifada (Dakn told 
me: “every line was like what we wanted to hear,” see Chapter Three), none had this 
explicit connection to the act of protest. Even in nearby Egypt, where rap grew 
considerably with the energy of the January 25th, 2011 uprising against then President 
Hosni Mubarak, there was not, to my knowledge, a use of rap lyrics during protests (as 
there was with the lyrics of the singer Ramy Essam, for example).58  
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57 In the summer of 2015, footage of rap in protests in Basra in Iraq also surfaced online. There are key 
differences between the two videos of protest in rap in each city. I explore further the use of rap, its 
aesthetics, and class make up even in protests in the Lebanese case below. The Iraqi context is largely 
outside of my scope in this study. I do want to note however, that the rappers in this video in Basra are 
clearly using the context of the protest to stage their music video. None of the crowd with them – which is a 
mixed aged group of men – from boys to older gentlemen – is familiar with the track. The two rappers are 
constantly pointing their neighbors’ attention towards the camera during shooting, none of whom sing 
along. Musically, the piece plays like a protest anthem and the predominant lyricist is wrapped in a 
kuffiyeh throughout the track. The piece ends with the rappers and the crowd chanting the popular protest 
chant, bil roh, bil dam, nafdeek ya Iraq [With our souls and with our blood we will sacrifice for you, oh 
Iraq]. The Lebanese iteration has none of these qualities in terms of staging, musicality, or integration with 
protest chants, as I explore below. “Aghniya rab maʿ al mutazahireen (ana ʿaraq min intoum)” [Rap song 
with the protesters (I am Iraq, Who are you?)], YouTube video, 4:28, posted by “Fahed al-Basra,” August 
16, 2015, accessed March 12, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3KcdSIu0vr4&ab_channel=&/73'(,81.  
 
58 As was most obvious in his piece “Irhal,” [Leave] which earned him massive popularity as well as torture 
at the hands of the Egyptian authorities. For the song “Irhal,” see “Ramy Essam – Irhal [leave],” YouTube 
video, 1:41, posted by “Ramy Essam,” May 6, 2011, accessed March 12, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QrNIF4gLkvo&ab_channel=RamyEssam; on Essam’s detainment and 




Rap concerts also became explicitly politicized in late summer 2015 in Beirut. At 
the end of their concert at Metro al-Madina in Hamra on August 7, 2015, El Rass took the 
mic and delivered an impassioned diatribe to the gathered audience, urging them to join 
him in the streets the following day for a scheduled protest. The speech was 
uncharacteristically romantic, bordering on revolutionary melodrama (particularly 
surprising for an artist who usually casts himself as intellectual outsider), asking his 
audience to remember those who have less of a voice (declaring at one point, “If Lebanon 
isn’t for all of us, it’s for none of us!”) and culminated with audience and rapper 
repeating “revolution is in the street, not on the screen.”59  
The rapprochement between rap in Beirut and political protests in late 2015 are an 
important part of the history of rap in Beirut and in the region. They are important 
because of the engagement in both explicit politics and specific political strategy. 
However, much of the affective tension held in the pieces mentioned here, and especially 
the concert in Metro on August 7, are not representative of the poetics of disgust I am 
interested in unraveling in this chapter. Rather, the performative disgust I am interested in 
locating and analyzing emerges at a remove from the adrenaline-laden, no-time-for-
strategy, you’re-with-us-or-you’re-against-us attitude the push to the street in August 
2015 demonstrated. I am concerned with expressions and gestures of disgust that allow 
speakers to navigate between options and realities, all of which are unfavorable, when 
there does not seem to be an alternative. The rap that contributed to (but to be fair, should 
                                                                                                                                            
2011, accessed March 12, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2011/03/15/134538629/ramy-esam-the-singer-of-the-
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neither be reduced to) the #YouStink movement, was part of affective political 
production that quickly – and despite my continued support, unfortunately in my opinion 
– closed down options for debating strategy and politics that were not in some way 
manifest in the spectacular representation of bodies in the street. I have been at pains 
throughout this dissertation to suggest that “revolution in the streets” is not the only 
worthwhile political deliberation or engagement at play in the cities I study here (or 
indeed, anywhere). Yet so much of the discourse of protesters, especially in rap written 
and sung and played around it, emphasized this representation of politics at the expense 
of other considerations. In many ways, the affective narrating by dominant voices among 
the #YouStink protesters closed off politics in progress, insisting on a specific incarnation 
of political action “in the streets” – similar perhaps to what Bilal el-Amine decried as the 
“ultra revolutionary” stance of protests in 2011-12.  
So I start this conversation about disgust and politics in Beirut with this distance. 
Others will no doubt take up the affect and enthusiasm of August 2015 – which provides 
ample evidence of “rap as resistance.” There are interesting politics here – especially of 
how this rap and these protests ultimately fizzled, morphed, and retreated from the 
positions and enthusiasm with which they started. But they will not be my concern here. I 
turn my attention instead to those pieces and concerts where the expression of disgust is 
not revolting but performs political deliberation. In these cases, expressions of disgust 
function to release or distance the speaker from the held tension of bad options in the 
political impasse in Beirut. These articulations of exhaustion by, frustration with, and 






Figure 5.7: “Big up to all the Freedom Seekers.” Ashekman, a "street art crew" and "urban design 
studio" specializing in urban street wear as well as Arabic "calligraffiti" art projects and logo design 
posting on Facebook on September 17, 2015. In this post they identify a protester wearing one of 
their t-shirts, which reads “hurriyeh” [freedom] in Arabic calligraphy. Ashekman is a two-man crew 
made up of identical twins Omar and Mohammed Kabbani. See: 
http://ashekman.com/studio/en/about-the-artists/ (accessed March 12, 2016). Their post reads, “Big 
up to all freedom seekers, justice strivers, rightful protesters and to that brave dude (whom we don’t 
know) wearing #ASHKEMAN Freedom #huriyyeh T-shirt in the middle of yesterday’s protests! 
Photo by AP/Bilal Hussein spotted in #Daily Star #Beirut #thestreetisours.” I include this as another 
example of the momentary alignment between Beirut’s hip hop and “street art” scene and the August 
#YouStink protests. 
 
and longing. This is another example of the emotional blending ethnomusicologist A.J. 
Racy attributed to tarab and which I suggest powerfully “fills the head” in some rap in 
Beirut. To do so, I propose what the specific performative I am looking at – spitting – 
looks and sounds like. Spitting is both lyrical and gestural. I explore specific examples of 









 In his book Trials of Arab Modernity: Literary Affects and the New Political, 
Tarek El-Ariss analyzes Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq’s Kashf al-Mukhabbaʾ ʿan Funun 
Urubba [Revealing the Hidden in European Civilization], published in 1863.60 The latter 
work is a travelogue of the Lebanese writer-in-exile’s experiences in England and France 
over a nine-year period. El-Ariss focuses in part on descriptions of what he calls al-
Shidyaq’s “aversion to civilization.”61 El-Ariss suggests that al-Shidyaq’s descriptions of 
revulsion to English food, city living, and rural poverty invert the narratives of 
modernization and civilization English imperialism was at the time forcing on much of 
the planet. He suggests that in al-Shidyaq’s writings, “the body of the Arab traveler is 
staged as a site of ingestion and expulsion, incorporation and rejection of European food 
and ideological models.”62 In making his argument, El-Ariss rejects a psychoanalytic 
reading of the retching, fainting, and queasiness al-Shidyaq describes in his experiences 
in England. El-Ariss, referring to Julia Kristeva’s work on abjection, suggests that al-
Shidyaq’s “visceral reaction to rotten meat and disgusting food could not be reduced to a 
collapse in the ego.”63 Instead, he suggests that the “shameless” omnipresence of decay in 
the conditions al-Shidyaq describes “is never really repressed.”64 That is, disgust in al-
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Shidyaq’s work cannot be read as a Kristevan “collapse” of the self, because the thing 
with “perverse erotic fascination” is in pure view – indeed, it is everywhere. The object 
of disgust in al-Shidyaq’s case is instead “rather constitutive of that which is seen and 
experienced.”65 
My own context is quite different, but El-Ariss’s contextualization of al-
Shidyaq’s aversion within a context of disgust that is “constitutive” of what the author 
lives is crucial to the way I also understand disgust to operate. El-Ariss’s teasing out of 
Kristeva is crucial here in separating how my political account of disgust differs from that 
of both Imogen Tyler and Sara Ahmed, both of whom rely in significant part on Kristeva. 
Kristeva proposes that abjection is a tension of both erotic desire and “primal” revulsion. 
The abject “fascinates desire” while producing revulsion. Kristeva writes that the abject 
“simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes the subject.”66 This tension “draws [the 
subject] towards the place where meaning collapses,” where the border between self and 
other is no longer perceptible.67 Tyler and Ahmed use this reading of ambivalence in the 
abject to theorize how racist political discourses operate. This is valuable in their 
contexts. It is less applicable in mine. 
In my observation, the ambivalent desire that Kristeva talks about – Menninghaus 
calls it a “subconscious attraction” – is not really present in expressions of disgust in rap 
in Beirut.68 In this expression, like in El-Ariss’s reading of al-Shidyaq, the abject is 
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constitutive, not repressed. In Beirut, articulated disgust with the political system or 
disgusted elaborations of a number of its very real problems (which, for me here, 
constitute the abject) does not imply that these speakers of disgust are somehow drawn 
back, despite of themselves, to the scene of corruption, crime, abuse. The specificity of 
how I suggest disgust can also work politically – not to describe the marginalized intruder 
as Ahmed and Tyler do, but to frame systemic problems of corruption, inefficiency, and 
oppression as expressed by those who experience them – hinges on recognizing that the 
ambivalence in abjection that Kristeva describes is not at work here. As El-Ariss 
recognized, there is no hope of “return” to the scene of the abject – the decaying corpse, 
the rotting meat, and so on – because, in fact, there is no exit from this stage of decay and 
rot. The “constitutiveness of decay” that El-Ariss located in al-Shidyaq’s “aversion to 
civilization” also frames the spitting I suggest rappers and their fans occasionally engage 
in when they express their disgust in Beirut.  
Conversations with my interlocutors in Beirut make this omnipresence of the 
abject clear while connecting this reality to a specific understanding of what constitutes 
“the political” in this context. For example, when I asked Mazen El Sayed, the rapper 
who goes by the stage name El Rass [The Head], about “politics” in his work, he rattled 
off a list of things he has addressed in his lyrics, including: women’s rights, religious 
hypocrisy, masculinity, the interference of the Gulf states, and the selling-off of the 
Syrian Revolution. Then he asked me,  
Is this political? I don’t know. For me it’s not. It’s my everyday vecu 
[lived experience], my life. I don’t know if our lives here are too 
politicized. But again I don’t know what that means. We have this 




talk about the policeman taking fifty thousand [LL]69 in his pocket to let 
someone get into the front of line, to me this is not political: it’s what I 
confront everyday. Lucky for the French that don’t have to live that, but 
for me it’s still the case.70  
 
Here, Sayed notes that the political problems he discusses – and which I note below in 
more than a few instances are expressed with disgust – are so omnipresent that they are 
themselves the fabric of his “everyday vecu.” In Sayed’s formulation, the “political” – is 
inseparable from an “exploded reality” where “everything is mixed.” Disgusting realities 
then are not fascinating in their morose appeal (“lucky for the French that don’t have to 
live them”): they are suffocating in their seeming permanence (“for me it’s still the 
case”). Expressed disgust in this context is as much suffocation as it is revulsion, as much 
exhaustion as it is disavowal. Raps that channel this exhaustion or frustration as 
articulated disgust do not so much signal abjection as a “collapse of the ego” as they are 
political performatives that enact the taking in of breath through, not away from, the 
contamination of the pollutant. The “stickiness” of this disgust has less to do with a 
simultaneous desire for the object of disgust as it does an impossible desire to actually be 
rid of it.71 Indeed, one’s inability to rid oneself of the disgusting mess is a big part of why 
it disgusts, thereby driving the lyrical and gestured tfeh! – of spitting. Spitting on the 
disgusting thing defiles it further. But when one spits –not on a beggar or the racialized 
Other – but on social filth, systemic corruption, and institutionalized theft, it is not clear 
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how much distance one actually gets from it when one does so. Especially since, there is 
nowhere to go to be rid of it anyway.  
In any language, rappers, (like good actors) literally spit to enunciate. My 
argument here is that spitting in rap also conducts specific symbolic and affective energy. 
Rappers spit their verses in the cipha, or improvised performance “battle,” and onto 
recordings. To read “spitting” affectively recognizes that lyrical work deconstructs 
rappers’ realities: flung into the cipha, these produce certain affects, which once flung, 
are no longer in the rapper’s control. Spitting starts a political process, or furthers one. In 
turn, spitting back may happen gesturally in live performance – when rappers spit directly 
to specific audiences in particular concert spaces. It may also happen individually, in a 
more introverted manner. This is the capacity of spitting to “fill the head.”  
I am interested in the articulation of disgust – what the spitting in rap in Beirut –
does. Ahmed suggests, “to say something is disgusting is… to ‘make something.’”72 
What does disgust make? Are all declarations of disgust alike? Are there different 
registers to spitting? How do these affective textures differ? My navigation in this section 
of “dissing,” “disavowal,” and “spitting back” – all different strategies of articulating 
disgust – shows how spitting points to politics in progress. 
 
Dissing and disavowal 
 
The past few years in particular have seen a fracturing of Beirut’s rap scene into 
cliques of socialization and collaboration. This has been manifest lyrically as well as 
                                                





socially; rappers have engaged their lyrical energy in so-called “diss tracks” while 
reflecting their allegiances in patterns of collaboration. As I explore here, “diss tracks” 
are composed with either one specific person or a general mode of being in mind. The 
composition of diss tracks is of course not unique to Beirut or to Arabic rap, but the 
development of the sub-genre over the past few years in Beirut is considerable, 
contributing to an increasingly ugly series of falling-outs. It exploded recently in a most 
public split between arguably two of the scene’s heaviest hitters – former collaborators El 
Rass and El Far3i in February of 2016 (I return to this in the dissertation’s conclusion).73 
Diss tracks in Beirut have evolved from more positive renderings of “working on 
oneself” as in Fareeq al-Atrash’s “Njoom ʿam tiʾrab” [“The Stars are Getting Closer”] 
(discussed below) to live improvised street battles, like that between Edd Abass and 
Dizaster in 2014 in Gemmayzeh,74 to virulent expressions of distaste with fellow rappers 
(like the two tracks referred to above, but also Edd Abbas’s “Shou hal mashkleh” directed 
at Nasrdayn al-Touffar in early 2015).75 Diss tracks channel sometimes hyperbolic 
disgust with “the competition,” asserting that one is not bothered while expressing 
disgust with the interference the competitor poses to the speaker’s “mood.” Consider 
Abbas’s verse in “The Stars Approach”:  
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I’ll stay in this mood 
Didn’t I tell you? The stars are getting closer 
I’ll stay in this mood until I touch these stars 
Even if I have to launch an attack on all the stars 




Every time he opens his mouth he spews them out 
He lives in terror and all he does is curse 
I wouldn’t throw him in my garbage, just so you know 
I’ve irritated thousands and never been irritated in my life 
 
Here, the “I’ve irritated thousands and never been irritated” expresses disgust by taking 
the high road. The burn is there even while the tone is positive.  
A similar mode of distancing oneself from “the competition” can be seen in a 
mode of political commentary bemoaning others’ lack of action or apathy. Edd Abbas 
again gives us several examples of this kind of work, as in the very popular collaboration 
with Ramallah-based rapper and producer Sheʿrab (see Chapter Three), “El Rad el Salb” 
[“Negative Response”].76 Consider his verse in that track: 
Sitting between two screens  
Witnessing two disasters  
The first is in Brazil from all the goals that hit the net  
The second is in Palestine, so painful that it shows  
How meaningless the World Cup is compared  
To the death of a people in a battle for their land  
Maybe you don’t see my meaning  
This isn’t juxtaposition  
This one’s for those who stand in the ranks of the resistance  
This one’s so you don’t forget when you’re watching football  
That there’s a massacre happening next door Arab rulers are standing idly by, 
 crushing up painkillers  
Aren’t concerned with anything besides which mall you’re going to have iftar  
It’s so real It constricts the heart, it’s not a game  
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As for the lot of you, the only discomfort you feel is heartburn  
The only thing you’re good for is grazing like goats  
Your fellow Arabs are dying and it’s as if the matter doesn’t concern you  
I’d imagine we’d find your conscience in a toilet bowl somewhere  
Otherwise, you would have expelled the Israeli ambassador from your country 
The least you can do is take a stand You don’t have to be there on the ground 
Indeed, you can raise your voice against it  
Even if you’re not under the bombardment  
You can lend your support with a song  
You can lend your support with a photo  
You can lend support with the truth when you’re told a false rumor  
We’re going through difficult times  
So your silence is not welcome  
We are in need of awareness and ancillary assistance  
They’ve been so cruel to you, Gaza And there’s barely anyone that feels for you 
The Lord has reserved the greatest plots of land for you in paradise.77 
 
Here, Abbas evolves the one-on-one diss of a fellow rapper to expressions of 
disapproval of his fellow citizens (“your silence is not welcome”). He expresses visceral 
disgust for their inaction (“As for the lot of you, the only discomfort you feel is 
heartburn/ The only thing you’re good for is grazing like goats/ Your fellow Arabs are 
dying and it’s as if the matter doesn’t concern you/ I’d imagine we’d find your 
conscience in a toilet bowl somewhere”). The affective distance between the speaker and 
the object of speech is pronounced and the vituperative spitting is sharp. Importantly, the 
“diss” of the listener is a disavowal of their passive political stance. “The least you can do 
is take a stand” - “You can lend your support with a song” implies at least the speaker is 
doing something. Here, it shares characteristics with the diss track, which emphasize the 
speaker’s superiority compared to everyone else. 
Admittedly the lyrical work this track offers a political negotiation– of supporting 
Gaza from afar – that is palatable to a wide Arab audience. But disgust works as 
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disavowal in other, more complicated ways as well. Of the more compelling expressions 
of disgust are those that expel romanticism or idealism. In these, nostalgia and 
romanticism are also spit from the body of the rapper as if illusions contaminate or 
poison the speaker. In the work of the rap duo Touffar, Katibeh 5, El Rass, and others, we 
can see the disgust for certain kinds of politicized romanticism as a rejection of what 
Lauren Berlant calls a “desire for the political.” In this sense, the disgust for and 
articulated disavowal of certain kinds of nostalgia and romanticism is a conscious 
rejection of “cruel optimism.”78  
A younger generation of Beirutis in particular increasingly identify the misfires of 
narratives of pan-Arabism, Beiruti cosmopolitanism (the oasis of “the good life” in a 
region plagued by conservative religiosity and authoritarianism), and reject or refuse the 
optimism these images conjure, identifying them as “cruel” but also as false, 
disappointing, ineffective, pathetic.79 Despite all the damning evidence of the death of 
pan-Arabism, for example, its complete and total prostitution by the league of Arab 
states, it is still regularly held up and spoken to as an ideal. The Arab Uprisings of 2011-
2013 were especially cataclysmic in how they reignited these hopes. Disgust, without 
trying to be “resistance,” productively disavows affects of hope, nostalgia, and 
romanticism. This is similar to the refusal of sabr, sumud, and mouqawameh I identified 
in the context of the second wave of Palestinian rap. 
                                                
78 Berlant writes, “It may be a relation of cruel optimism, when, despite an awareness that the normative 
political sphere appears as a shrunken, broke, or distant place of activity among elites, members of the body 
politics return peridocially to its recommitment ceremonies and scenes.” (Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism 
[Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2011], 227.) 
 
79 Lisa Wedeen has applied Berlant’s concepts of a “good life” to political expression in Syria. Lisa 





 Much rap about the city of Beirut fits into the model of disgust I am building here 
and refuses the romance with the city. “Beirut Khaybetna” [“Beirut Disappointed Us”] is 
a good example of the emotional blending of longing and disgust. The piece is a 
collaboration lyrically between Naserdayn al-Touffar and El Rass, with music and 
production by Wattar, of the Syrian group Latlatleh. Naserdayn’s verse opens the piece, 
the beginning of which berates the “left” of Beirut: 
This is talk of [the Right of] Return, it goes best with mazzeh,  
Jaffa won’t be liberated unless the sushi is fresh  
And the free, leftist revolutionary  
Won’t bring up “the issue” unless there is Alamaza and young women 
You like Najji el-Ali so much? 
The cartoon Handala turned his back [to look] at tits 
The hammer and sickle became an umbrella and the white dove of 
secularism 
But by the order of the religious authorities and history, the color red, 
blood, and the DshK80 turned pink from the ground meat of UNESCO 
Tell me how did the Left become democratic? Money came from Europe 
to keep its voice down 
Brother, return the Left from those who stole it – that guy sweating from 
his forehead, about to break his glass of arak.81 
 
Nasserdayn here berates a particular kind of Beirut sociality, likely situated in the pubs 
and restaurants of Hamra street where self-proclaimed leftists engage in political 
discussion over traditional plates of Lebanese food (mazzeh). Here, with Lebanese beer 
(Almaza) and in the company of sabaya (young women – the open sociality with 
Lebanese women being another romanticized Lebanese stereotype), these “leftist 
revolutionaries” discuss the Right of Return to and liberation of Palestine. But Naserdayn 
calls out this posturing and cosmopolitanism as invested in only a sense of Arabness 
                                                
80 The DshK is a Soviet-era heavy machine gun. 
 
81 “Beirut khaybetna – Naserdayn al-Touffar and El Rass (Intaj Wattar)” [“Beirut Disappointed Us – 
Nasrdayn al-Touffar and El Rass (Produced by Wattar”], YouTube video clip, 5:18, posted by “Naserdayn 





(mazzeh and arak – an anise-flavored alcoholic drink), which is invoked to flirt or worse, 
to womanize (Handala’s back is turned because he is distracted by women’s breasts). 
Naserdayn continues to spit on the failures of the Left (“the hammer and the sickle 
became the white dove”), announcing that revolutionary red (communism), spilt blood, 
and engaged struggle has been diluted (“turned pink”) by the waste (“ground meat”) of 
the UN. His call, “Brother, return the Left from those who stole it!” is both an indictment 
pronounced with disgust at the failures of the Left and what it has become, and a 
statement riven with longing, wishing for the mobilized return of something worth 
believing in. 
 The situation of this critique of the Left within a song entitled “Beirut 
Disappointed Us” makes its statement about the selling out of a political idea (“How did 
the Left become “democratic”) also a criticism of social posturing particular to Beirut. In 
his verse, Naserdayn clearly expresses disgust with talk and no action but also the 
posturing of Beiruti liberals (and their consumption) as they masquerade as vestiges of 
the Left. His verse is an example of recent rap energy in Beirut that is pronouncedly 
Leftist – that is, that specifically invokes the heroes and strategies of the Arab Left in the 
twentieth century.82 Musically, the whole track is underscored by a single ʿoud. The trills 
on the stringed instrument counter the disgust of the lyrical spitting with the pronounced 
expression of loss and longing. As the three musicians declare their attachments to cities 
and places outside of Beirut, the “disappointment” in the track’s title, its chorus, and the 
                                                
82 It is undeniable this lyrical work is developing, but it is hardly representative of the entire scene. Raed 
Ghoneim’s work, quoted in the epigraph to this chapter, is another example. Naserdayn explains his 
reference to the fighter Georges Abdallah (imprisoned in France at time of writing), here: “Naserdayn al-
Touffar – w thaʾqee qaseer li Muhammed al-Jadee,” YouTube video, 8:43, posted by “Naserdayn al 






disgust in the lyrics stages a disavowal of the romance with Beirut as home of “the good 
life,” with “revolutionary leftists” as the vanguard of politics, and with romanticism of 
both of these things together – of Beirut as home to any worthwhile left-leaning 
socialization.83 
This disappointment and disgust with Beirut’s sociality (left-leaning or otherwise) 
is widespread. The sentiments Naserdayn expresses are echoed by my interlocutors 
throughout this chapter – as in Osloob’s diagnosis of “schizophrenia,” and El Rass’s 
lyrics in the track “Beirut’s Volcano.” It appears in the track “Ya bahar khudni maʿk,” 
[“Oh Sea, Take Me with You”], as well. (I return to this track below.) In “Beirut 
Khaybetna,” the speakers are keen to emphasize that their perspectives come from 
outside of Beirut. The three collaborators echo where they are from – Damascus, Tripoli, 
the Bekaaʿ – in the interpellations between verses and in the chorus. These expressions of 
disgust with Beirut are most often voiced most forcefully from these “voices from 
outside.” I now want to examine more carefully how these deliberately “not” 
cosmopolitan voices are consciously cast “from outside” Beirut, and how this effects the 
texture of expressions of disgust. 
                                                
83 Moreover, it is particularly important that this is the verse cameras captured a coterie of protesters 
singing in the streets in August 2015, in the company of Naserdayn and El Rass. I want to suggest that 
tracing this political process – from recorded rap to recorded protest – is vital. A video circulated on social 
media captured the singing of this verse in the street and shows maybe half a dozen young men and at least 
one woman reciting the verse by heart. Their denouncement of the death of the Left while protesting stages 
a particularly excited reclaiming of politics. At the same time, I think it a stretch to suggest the video enacts 
the realization of a specific project pointed to in the rap and then realized in the street. Instead, what I 
suggest is happening here is that the denouncement of the death of the Left itself became romanticized and 
fetishized. The protesters caught up in the adrenaline of protest transformed the political navigation staged 
in expressions of disgust in the recorded piece into the banner itself. Their excitement to repeat the verse 
even seemed at odds with one of the rappers himself, El Rass’s facial expressions show how he is both 
trying to keep up with the crowd and trying to navigate the affective and political paradox in which he 
found himself. (See: “Fi al-yom a-thaleth” [On the third day], YouTube video, 1:49, posted by “Mak Man,” 








As I mentioned above, theorists have explored how disgust is mobilized in 
conservative political discourse narrating the fear of foreign or poor threats to the body 
politic. In the US, Australia, and Western Europe, especially the UK, Sara Ahmed and 
Imgoen Tyler have examined how especially cross-cultural encounters navigate disgust 
and abjection, in the conjuring of what Tyler calls “social abjection.”84 Similar casting-
out of the body politic has happened in Lebanon. The Palestinian, recently Syrian, and 
Iraqi refugee and immigrant populations have long been set apart as the national abject – 
pathetic subjects deserving pity, but also those cordoned off in camps to avoid 
contamination of the “true” Lebanese body politic.85 Understanding that these racist and 
economic discourses have also figured in Lebanese politics helps to unpack how some 
rap refuses dominant political narratives. Here, I want to recognize the affective spitting 
that responds to conservative narratives of disgust. The ways in which refusals of racism 
are articulated spit back at images built for “the Palestinian” and the “camp dweller” in 
important ways. 
 In the track “Hadini iza feek” [“Hold me back if you can”] by the Palestinian 
group Katibeh 5, disgust boils over. The refrain speaks not only to “holding back” but to 
calming – hadini literally means, “calm me down.” This reference to being calmed, being 
told to calm down, or to lower one’s voice echoes repeatedly in rap in Beirut. For 
                                                
84 Tyler, Revolting Subjects, 19-47. 
 
85 On dynamics of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, see among others Julie Peteet, Landscape of 
Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2005) and Laleh 
Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: the Politics of National Commemoration (Cambridge: 





example, Raed Ghoneim, in the track excerpted in the epigraph to this chapter (the song 
“Istafrigh”), raps “biqoulouli wati sotak, shi hadan minhon yismaʿak/ bideesh, ishbaʿt” 
[“they tell me lower your voice, or else one of them will hear you/ I don’t want to, I’ve 
had my fill of that”].86 In the opening verse of “Maʿrktee” [“My struggles”], a track with 
a very different sound but similar expressions of disgust, El Rass raps,  
 
Strangled, I cried a lot inside so much that my chest became a sea 
And the lock to it has been stolen 
It’s possible the skyline is burned up 
It’s possible for ones’ chest to become a trunk 
And its lock in the eyes 
Stop telling me to calm down87 
 
So Katibeh 5’s track “Hadini iza feek” plays with narratives of explosive discomfort and 
reactions to expressions of that distate that appear repeatedly in Lebanese rap. But the 
track also pushes these refusals of politeness further.  
Not simply refusing to be calmed, the MCs dare the listener to do the calming if 
they are able. In this way, the track reinvents the image of the Palestinian in Lebanon: not 
as pathetic victim, but as powerful aggressor. What we have in this track then is disgust 
with disgust. By expressing disdain for and distancing themselves from the abject image 
of the dispossessed Palestinian common in Lebanese society, Katibeh 5 spit back at a 
Lebanese audience. This allows for recognition of the idea with which the Palestinian is 
framed in Lebanon. It also rejects this idea. In so doing, it casts the “abject” in a position 
of knowledge, access and power. Consider when the group raps:  
                                                
86 “Istafrigh | Raed Ghoneim ‘Sot Gilgamesh’” [“I throw up | Raed Ghoneim ‘Voice of Gilgamesh”], Sound 
Cloud audio recording, 4:57, posted by “Gilgamesh | Sot Gilgamesh,” 2015, accessed April 1, 2016, 
https://soundcloud.com/sootgilgamesh/s0nt2e9dmty8.  
 
87 “El Rass w Munma – maʿraktee” [“El Rass and Munma – My Struggles”], Sound Cloud audio recording, 
4:52, posted by “El Rass,” accessed April 1, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/el-rass-the-head/ma3rekti?in=el-




 Great!  
As long as you are taking my point of view seriously  
You’re allowed to be taken aback and to show your irritation 
  Just like you show your irritation at my presence  
Because I am a friend to all the images that are not desirable 
This is how we live out these images and no one chooses their life specifically  
I’ll tell you  
The pressure of bullets and gunpowder does not allow you to move away 
  Experience will guide you on the road  
Hold me back if you can88  
 
When they say, “As long as you are taking my point of view seriously/ You’re allowed to 
be taken aback and to show your irritation,” Katibeh 5 acknowledge the (Lebanese) 
audience listening, anticipating their surprise and irritation. At the same time, they dictate 
the terms of that reception, both “allowing” their surprise, while framing it with derision 
(the sarcastic “ʿaal!” “great!” that opens the verse). The disgust throughout – first as 
derision, then as power (“I am the friend to all images that are not desirable” – casting the 
speaker as accepting hosts [in contradistinction to the Lebanese]), and finally as 
frustration (“hold me back if you can”) is palpable.  
 The track reflects of course the perception of the Palestinian in Lebanese society. 
As Osloob explained to me when he recounted the experience of performing as part of 
the Fête de la Musique in Monot in the early 2000s: 
I mean we knew these were not our audiences. The Lebanese are used to 
seeing the sad, poor Palestinian. We didn’t fit that image. The Palestinian 
that is a little violent: this image bothers lots of people. Not everyone is 
able to stand this idea. I think like sixty or seventy percent of Lebanese 
can’t stand to see a Palestinian in this image.  
  
 Even people coming to your concerts? 
 
Of course. Even Touffar, even Gaafar’s audience and fans. Even this 
audience is not always willing to see a Palestinian in a strong position. The 
                                                
88 For Arabic lyrics and English translation by Rima Najdi and Faysal Bibi, see “Exploring Popular 
Literature,” 74-81; the track itself is on the A-Tareeq Wahad Marsoum [One Way Decree] album available 




Lebanese audience needs to see the Palestinian as a victim. It’s a 
stereotype, of course. 
 
 
Katibeh 5’s track “Hadini iza feek” is one particularly strong example of how the group 
worked to counter these images of Palestinians in Lebanon. Much more recently, Gaafar 
of the duo Touffar released a track one might call “on behalf of” Palestinians in Lebanon 
that doubles down on the disgust and frustration Katibeh 5 point to. Especially notable in 
Gaafar’s track “Ya bahar khudni maʿk” [“Oh sea, take me with you”], produced by 
Osloob, is the explicit pronouncement of disgust – explicitly expressed as hatred – that 
the Palestinian speaker articulates. The first half of the track is Gaafar’s rap. 89 The lyrics 
of the second half of the piece with its chorus, reads like this: 
He has the weakest faith, he who hates something called Lebanon 
I have the weakest faith; I hate that thing called Lebanon 
 
Oh Sea, take me with you 
Oh wave, take me away 
Hope is cut off here 
A hellish life 
 
Hello? They told me that Hassan left for Sweden: there, Palestinians meet 
amongst themselves90 
Our country is narrow; 
The European is expansive, he speaks Hebrew 
And he works in an NGO, spends his money, as Leftists do, in Hamra 
In the camp, time is less narrow 
People are wider, chest-width between the wires 
So what held back those who stayed? 
Hassan left for Sweden he didn’t take you with him 
Because you are not handsome nor European! Hassan met David  
And David is beautiful and blond 
David saw Hassan the informer 
                                                
89 Full Arabic lyrics in Appendix E. Note how the rap reproduced there echoes Naserdayn’s lyrics quoted 
above about left-y cosmopolitanism in Beirut. 
 
90 From here on, the lyrics are articulated in Modern Standard Arabic and spoken by the Palestinian-Iraqi 





And Hassan drew for him a bridge in David’s name: happy Hassan 
Hassan boarded his flight with no tears in his eyes 
Because in Lebanon, there was nothing to see him off but pain  
He left one message on the phones of his friends: 
The Palestinian doesn’t love Lebanon, he hates Lebanon, and he hates the 
Lebanese 
They want us, instead of a bundiqiyyah, to paint over our words of 
Palestine, without work91 
without identity  
and as an insult to refugees 
[…] 
My brothers! You are without tomorrow here 
Follow me to Sweden! The Palestinian does not love Lebanon 
He hates Lebanon and the Lebanese 
The Palestinian does not love Lebanon 
He hates Lebanon and the Lebanese 
 
At the door to the camp, the guard dog stops me 
He craves my meat, my dreams, my knowledge 
The cedar is fuel for the fires of hell, I say 
And the length and breadth of this country, its people and its land, are 
damned 
 
 At the door to the camp, the guard dog 
and the politician 
and the organizations of slavery 
stop me from entering Palestine 
 
 
In some ways, “Ya bahar khudni maʿk” presents an affective paradox. The lyrics 
are so sharp and they are voiced with so much acerbity that, lyrically and affectively it 
seems unlike so many of the tracks I have discussed in the study: the meaning in the 
lyrics is so pronouncedly straight forward, there is little room to interpret ambivalence or 
blending in their meaning. However, precisely like so many of the pieces I have 
discussed, the musical arrangement of the piece offers an “emotional blending” that is 
almost stunning. Jaafar sings a mawwal as the refrain, which he repeats under Abd al-
Rahman Jassem’s poetry. A single, electric cello underscores the whole piece. The 
                                                




musical elements of “Ya bahar khudni maʿk” round out the cold, sharp lyrics and are 
remarkably full of longing, of pain, and of loss. It is the juxtaposition of this loss and 
longing with the pronounced sting in the fast dialogue of the lyrical section that makes 
the piece a spectacular example of tarab, political feeling, and the affect of disgust I have 
been discussing in this dissertation and in this chapter. Even though the last line 
“Prevents me from entering Palestine” is potentially a little predictable, the preceding 
poetry about the dog at the door of the camp, and especially the virulence with which 
“the Palestinian hates Lebanon and the Lebanese” is articulated are especially powerful 
pronouncements of political feeling.  
In this piece, there is also a rejection of the optimism in the narrative of leaving Lebanon 
for somewhere else. The experiences of the Palestinian Hassan, who leaves Lebanon 
behind for Sweden, are articulated with pronounced disdain (importantly, by rappers who 
remain in Lebanon). Likewise, the embrace of Sweden is bitterly sarcastic, reflected in 
the tone of Jassem’s voice as well as the hypocritical interactions Hassan is narrated to 
have with the “blond” David. The combination obviously resonated with listeners. At 
time of writing, the track had nearly forty-two thousand views on Sound Cloud, Gaafar’s 
second-most-listened-to track. 
 
* * * 
 
In Chapter Four, based on my fieldwork in Amman, I suggested that one 
prominent political feeling that is conducted particularly well in rap in that city is 




deliberations culminating in resignation functioned performatively. I asked what did 
admitting resignation do? as a way of understanding politics in progress in Amman. 
Instead of a simple acquiescence to monarchy and state power, I suggested understanding 
performances of resignation as a navigation of the latter alongside social and cultural 
considerations in a city that is especially aware of regional demographic and financial 
flows towards it. My proposal in this chapter has been to consider that different affective 
textures in expressions of disgust work in a similar way. That is, my attention to what 
expressions of disgust do is to testify to active negotiations of political, social, cultural, 
and identitarian concerns. Lyrical expressions of disgust point us to politics in progress. 




Part Three: Disgust and Ecstasy 
 
 As in the previous two chapters on rap in Ramallah and Amman, in this third and 
final section of this chapter on Beirut, I will consider questions of access and audience 
behavior to round out the claims I have been making about political feeling. In this 
section, I consider the particular qualities of tarab related to listening to expressions of 
disgust. My argument is that listening to disgust is able to amplify the emergence of tarab 
in Beirut especially when it is accompanied by particular audience formations. I focus in 
this section on concerts where audiences have followed an MC or series of them from 
outside the most cosmopolitan avenues of the capital city in order to attend a concert. I 




particularly vibrant exchanges and is occasionally able to produce ecstatic responses. The 
emergence of tarab in these situations reflects both the disgust expressed gesturally as 
well as lyrically by the performer in live performance. In addition, it also reflects the felt 
neoliberal incursions shaping the contours of access that impinge on audiences and 
venues on their way to and during the event. I argue that these gestural embodiments of 
disgust by MCs and their fans further the spitting back I located in some rap lyrics. Thick 
description from two concerts in particular illustrates how this operates: one concert of 
Katibeh 5 at Masrah Beirut in ʿAin el Mreisseh in 2004 and one of Gaafar al-Touffar 
with Osloob at Metro al-Madina in 2013. I begin, however, with a contextualization of 
the demographic reach of hip hop in Beirut as expressed by key rappers and producers. 
 
“Leaving the street” 
 
In both Ramallah and Amman, rappers and producers were quick to admit that rap 
in those cities was not shaʿabi – it had not reached widespread popularity and was not 
commonly heard in more populist contexts. At the same time, in those cities, my 
interlocutors testified that the reach of rap had extended more deeply into well-educated, 
globally-oriented and ajaneb [foreigner]-heavy contexts than the poor neighborhoods or 
conservative socialities of many of either of those city’s less cosmopolitan 
neighborhoods. In Beirut, the presence in the scene of the groups Katibeh 5 and Touffar 
in particular – both of which hail from and initially performed in very different but 
equally shaʿabi contexts – have succeeded in adding a different dimension to 




The rap collective Katibeh 5 was made up of five emcees who were, until 2013, 
based in Bourj el Barajneh Refugee Camp in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The camp is 
inhabited mostly by Palestinians who fled Zionist forces in 1948 and 1967, their children 
and grandchildren, and also by poor Lebanese and refugees from neighboring countries. 
The situation for second and third generation Palestinians in Lebanon, especially those 
living in refugee camps, is difficult. The majority of Palestinian refugees do not have the 
papers to work, to vote, or to travel, despite being born themselves in Lebanon. Neither 
does the Palestinian Authority (nor Israel, obviously) recognize them and provide them 
with travel documents. In 2013, Katibeh 5 was invited to perform at the Liverpool Arab 
Arts Festival. Four of five MCs of Katibeh 5 went to Liverpool and performed. While 
there, they applied for and received asylum. They have been in the UK ever since. At 
time of writing, the fifth Katibeh 5 MC, Osloob, lives in France.  
The rap duo Touffar was made up of two rappers from Hermel, in the Bekaa. 
Naserdayn and Gaafar both grew up and worked in Hermel, where the latter still lives (in 
2013 he was working as a painter). Naserdayn at time of writing lives in Beirut. The duo 
split up around 2010. Hermel is a small town in the North Eastern Bekaaʿ Valley that has 
recently been a flashpoint in the Syrian civil war. As a “stronghold” of Hizbullah, it has 
been targeted by suicide bombings and other attacks aimed at affecting the Lebanese 
public’s tolerance of Hizbullah’s involvement in the Syria. At the same time, it is part of 




opportunities for young men are joining Hizbullah or the Lebanese army. Both are 
“choices” that can have serious repercussions.92 
Both Katibeh 5 and Touffar (as a group and individually) have built and boast 
very strong connections with the audiences in the neighborhoods where they live and 
work. They all performed first for their own communities, becoming popular with 
neighbors, before being invited onto the more cosmopolitan stages of Beirut. Musically, 
Gaafar’s work most pronouncedly reflects the context he writes from. Most of his tracks 
feature him singing a mawwal as the loop, opening, or chorus (as in the track “Ya Bahar 
Khudni Maʿk,” discussed in the previous section). This musical difference in the work 
has prompted others to note: “They are rapping, but it’s not really hip hop.”93 That is, 
some of this musical work is quite different sonically – as such, it is easier for listeners 
not inculcated with hip hop sounds to accept and embrace. Moreover, as Katibeh 5 and 
Touffar grew as performing musicians, they began performing outside of the camps (in 
the former’s case) and outside of the Bekaaʿ, in Beirut (in the latter’s). When they did, 
they took their audiences with them. I will return to this question momentarily. 
Over the course of this study, when I asked rappers if and how rap has changed in 
the region over the past ten years, most agreed that it has changed and most asserted that 
rap and hip hop audiences have grown: that hip hop culture is less exclusive and that they 
as rappers encounter less resistance or skepticism. Osloob of Katibeh 5 shared similar 
                                                
92 In Naserdayn’s own words see “Naserdayn al-Touffar – w thaʾqee qaseer li Muhammed al-Jadee,” 
YouTube video, 8:43, posted by “Naserdayn al touffar,” August 20, 2015, accessed March 22, 2016, 
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93 Interview with the author, September 2, 2013. All subsequent quotations from Edd Abbas are taken from 





reflections about the acceptability of rap in Bourj el Barajneh. But he also offered this 
reflection on changes in the scene as a whole: 
Rap developed a lot the past ten years. Rappers stopped using simple 
[tafha] rhymes – like makan, zaman, hanan, hunan what everybody can 
think up. Now there is serious playing with words. This is a development 
in the brains of the rappers. But something else is happening. Hip hop is 
leaving the street. It’s becoming more “white color” [maktab] and 
“cultured” [musaqaf]. These lines like: ithab muhajaran ka il-qurunful w 
inta as-seif w al-qamar.94 What? What are you talking about? Someone in 
the street can’t understand this. Not all rappers are able to get their voices 
to the street, to shaʿabi society or shaʿabi neighborhoods. So when they 
can’t do this, they take it elsewhere. A neighborhood like Hamra, the 
people in it are more ready to accept hip hop than other quarters in the 
city. And there’s a lot of rappers who are not interested in this experience, 
in the trial [of getting the street to accept hip hop]. It’s hard, and 
sometimes it tears you up inside. But it’s worth going through with it. 
Because this is what hip hop is. It’s a lifestyle. If it’s just words not tied to 
the ground, it doesn’t mean anything. Neither the words nor the beats have 
meaning if you are really not present on the ground. If regular people 
aren’t feeling you [ma ʿam bihisou feek]. 
 
In these comments, Osloob ties an essence of hip hop with being able to “feel with 
regular people.” Importantly, these comments also reverse more of the more regular 
commentary I heard about Arabic hip hop’s widening appeal. He does this by specifically 
underlining the dilemma of “uneven” globalization or cosmopolitanism (“people are 
more ready to accept hip hop in Hamra than in other quarters of the city”). This is exactly 
the paradox about the relationship between cosmopolitan opportunity for the presentation 
of hip hop live in the Arab world and its ability to reach audiences. That is, Osloob’s 
comments here make vivid the emptiness of narratives of the Arab rapper as 
representative of the “Arab street” (see Chapter One) when he has to select concert 
venues that are removed from it. Osloob illustrates the hypocrisy of framing rap sung in 
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gentrifying neighborhoods as speaking to “popular” struggle by emphasizing those 
concerts are specifically staged not in the Arab neighborhoods where they would 
encounter resistance from inhabitants less open or accepting of hip hop sounds and 
experimentation. 
 His comments about language are important also. His mocking of the lyrical 
experimentation in more recent rap (the work of El Rass, whose lyrics are particularly 
poetic, comes to mind) – and the distance this implies from the “street.” One might 
discern there is something anti-intellectual in his remarks, but I think in the context of his 
comments, Osloob is more interestingly disavowing a romance with Arabic language as 
necessarily a unifying force among Arab populations – especially perhaps when gaps in 
access, education, and exposure are not considered. Usually, discourse about Arabic 
language and comprehensibility favors the more classical Arabic over the local dialect as 
universally-understood Arabic language (see discussion of the Tunisian musician Mounir 
Troudi in Amman, Chapter Four). This is an almost taken for granted element of Arabic 
language: that its most classical form – that enshrined in the Quran – is able to unite 
Arabs across geography, across tribe, across sectarian difference, and so on. When 
instead Osloob suggests that the more “classical” Arabic expression is incomprehensible 
to the Arab street, he is insisting on a class reading of Arab society (that remains divided 
by economics and, in the case of Palestinians in Lebanon, access to national services 
including education). Importantly, Osloob’s comments deconstruct romance and 
enthusiasm about the direction of recent growth of Arabic rap and its access to audiences. 
His comments help to unpack the significance of audience access to concerts and patterns 






 In a somewhat different register from Osloob, in our interviews, both Edd Abbas 
(of the group Fareeq el Atrash) and Mazen El Sayed (El Rass) spoke with pride about the 
heterogeneity of their audiences and the growth of the scene. El Rass told me: 
I think we should take advantage of every line we can have to every kind 
of people we can access. I don’t believe in this big “other” as in, “I want to 
sing for ‘the people.’” Who are ‘the people?’ Everyone is the people. I 
don’t necessarily want to perform for rich kids all the time, but rich kids 
are people too, they have minds, you know? And I think it’s not 
necessarily linked. Obviously the hip places want to get acts to perform in 
their venue. When they see an act being successful, they draw them in. 
This creates a circle of people that, for example, look like each other and 
belong to the same thing that is linked to this artist in some way or 
another. I cannot say that my listeners are from one social group, at all. 
It’s very obvious in my gigs. Even the shows I do in hip places, there are 
people there who never come to these venues. Who only come to watch 
our gigs. People who sometimes come from remote regions in the 
countryside, who come from Tripoli, normal people, students, people who 
don’t really go out at night – they come. And that’s what’s really cool. It’s 
not like they are concerts for rap aficionados and hip hop heads. It’s not. 
There are people in these concerts that I can assure you don’t listen to rap. 
And besides the few names of Arabic rap that they’ve discovered and are 
attached to, they don’t listen to any rap outside of this.  
 
El Rass’s testimony, quite different from Osloob’s answer to the same question, 
underscores the positives that a concert in a cosmopolitan venue can provide. The rapper 
from Tripoli is keen to emphasize that not all his listeners are hipsters, that in fact he has 
a mixed following from different walks of life. My own participant observation confirms 
this. More specifically, Abbas credited the increasing heterogeneity in the scene with the 
work of the rapping duo Touffar and to some extent Katibeh 5. He acknowledged that the 
different, not typically hip hop sounds these groups have incorporated into their work 




me nor Mazen [El Sayed] would have been able to bring these people. This crowd is not 
going to dig the more experimental stuff.”95 The intersection of different audiences in 
cosmopolitan venues is what I want to focus on in the remaining pages of the chapter. I 
establish how this mixing diverges from much ordinary use of cosmopolitan space before 
exploring how disgust works in the context of this relationship between audiences and 
MCs. 
In 2010, Katibeh 5 released their second album, Al Tareeq Wahad Marsoum [One 
Way Decree]. The release party was held at Masrah Beirut [Beirut Theatre] in the ʿAin 
el-Mreisseh neighborhood.96 Katibeh 5 had been together since 2000, and as mentioned 
above, has a large following in the refugee camps. For many years, they held their haflat 
[concerts] in the camps themselves, playing directly for the audiences to whom their 
lyrics spoke. This was not without its difficulties, as overcoming local conservatism 
against a type of cultural production perceived to be “Western” was not always obvious. 
However, the release party for the second album, like an increasing number of their 
haflat, was held in ras Beirut at the then prominent Masrah Beirut.97 For these 
performances, el shabab [the guys], as they’re often referred to/refer to themselves, 
coordinated a carpool of sorts in order to facilitate their audiences getting to the venue. 
                                                
95 El Rass’s “more experimental” work is arguably his collaborations with the electronic musician Munma. 
But in my observation, El Rass has a particularly mixed crowd of listeners. He told me in our interview that 
“A considerable percentage of the people who listen to me have Islamist tendencies.” He credits this feature 
of his demographic to his more formal use of language. I noticed especially in his concert as part of the Al 
Balad Festival in Amman that his audience diverged from the typically cosmopolitan gathering of that 
festival. 
 
96 For more on dynamics of this neighborhood and political struggles to maintain working class livelihood 
in the face of privatization of the water front, see Sawalha, “‘Ayn el-Mreisse: The Global Market and the 
Apartment Unit,” in Reconstructing Beirut. 
 





Without this coordination, the venue would be less accessible, if not inaccessible, for 
their young fans residing in the camps.98  
As crowds gathered outside the theatre, waiting for entry and for the concert to 
begin, tension grew between youths from the camps who had come for the concert and 
the owner of a nearby store. It was not long before the Lebanese army, which maintains a 
presence in the neighborhood (as they do throughout different parts of ras Beirut) arrived 
on the scene. The scuffle, which amounted to some pushing and yelling, and did not 
come to blows or bloodletting, pitted the Palestinian youths against the local residents, 
historically affiliated with the political group Amal, who had rallied behind the shop 
keeper.99 As the army descended on the theatre, the artists and the crew succeeded in 
intervening to hurry the majority of the audience into the theatre and to convince the local 
residents and the army that the concert should carry on. The concert then began and 
concluded smoothly.  
The tension recounted by participants and witnesses points to specific historical 
and ongoing material conflicts, which generally inform the lyrics of the raps Katibeh 5 
deliver, but which they do not specifically address. (Katibeh 5’s lyrics were more 
concerned with the contemporary conditions of life in the camps, the hypocrisy of NGO 
work, and with corruption, rather than with historical or ongoing disagreements and 
collaborations between specific political parties or religious sects.) The historical 
confrontation between affiliates of the Shiʿa group, Amal, and the Palestinian refugees of 
                                                
98 Movement for young residents of the camps, Palestinian or otherwise, is difficult due to the almost total 
dearth of public transport in Beirut. The vast majority of these teenagers do not own their own vehicles.  
 
99 The animosity between these groups dates back to the so-called ‘War of the Camps’ (1985-1987) during 
the civil war See Julie Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair, 151-155. On the class dynamics of the ʿAin 





Lebanon – especially those in the refugee camps where the massacres of Palestinians by 
Amal and Phalangist forces took place in the mid 1980s – is not something Katibeh 5’s 
lyrics specifically address. The concern in their lyrics is for the general status of the 
second and third-generation refugee in Lebanon and the webs of corruption and 
repression that make for such dim prospects for so many Palestinian youth in Lebanon. 
The group’s work is received by many as refreshing, especially those who also reside in 
the camps, and who recognize themselves in the group’s lyrics. The artists themselves 
speak of producing music that speaks to, and resonates with, their audiences.  
Indeed, an anecdote about audiences seeing themselves in Katibeh 5 helps 
illustrate the value audiences put in seeing what they perceive to be representatives of 
their experience on stage. During our interview, Osloob told me about concerts Katibeh 5 
did all over Lebanon: in the refugee camps of Tyre, Tripoli, and other cities. He recounts 
that often in these concerts, audiences assumed Katibeh 5 were residents of their camp. 
He recalls: 
Like when we went and did a concert in Tyre, the audience thought we 
were from the Rashidiyeh camp. And not a one of us is from Tyre! This 
happened more than once. When we went to Tripoli, to the Baddaweh 
camp, they told us, why didn’t you talk about this and that that’s going on. 
And we were like, really guys, honest, we’re not living here! We don’t 
know about this and that. 
 
Considering the context of the concerts outside the camps like the one in ʿAin el 
Mreisseh I am discussing here, it is easy to extrapolate the symbolism for young fans 
watching in the heart of Ras Beirut. 
The arrival and performance of Katibeh 5 in the established and distinguished 
venue of Masrah Beirut can be read as a progress narrative, pointing to the group’s 




Katibeh 5’s perspective from the camps into the more cosmopolitan center of Beirut was 
and remains a progressive venture. One can read the performance at the established and 
venerated venue of Masrah Beirut as a validation of Katibe 5’s testimony of the lived 
experiences in some in Beirut’s marginalized ghettos. But the affective dynamics outside 
the theatre also illustrate that such a presentation of events is perhaps too simple. Even if 
the theatre’s curators and programmers sought to celebrate and welcome the work of 
these artists from the camps, at the same time expanding the “resistance” perceived in 
their work and a cultural capital of solidarity, the working class neighborhood of ʿAin el 
Mreisseh, where the theatre was located, and the disenfranchised youth who came to 
attend it, carried in their bodies the residue of the material realities which they live (see 
Chapter One).  
Aseel Sawalha has discussed how the neoliberal real estate development of the 
Hariri-backed real estate company Solidere has exercised tremendous pressure on the 
working-class neighborhood of ʿAin el Mreisseh. The neighborhood, traditionally 
dependent on fishing, is now increasingly closed off from access to the Mediterranean.100 
Residents of ʿAin el Mreisseh find themselves wedged between the quickly gentrifying 
neighborhood of Hamra around the American University of Beirut and the ground zero of 
Solidere’s transformation of post-war Beirut in the downtown area. As such, they are 
living their own struggle against the cosmopolitan pressures that estrange them from their 
own neighborhood. At the same time, the stakes for the Palestinian youth, who rarely 
have the opportunity to travel to, or move around in, this part of the city, are also high. As 
the Technical Director of Masrah Beirut Ahmed Hafez, who witnessed and helped 
                                                





coordinate the concert above told me with only a little embellishment, the kids coming 
from the camps may just as soon have been “visiting Paris.”101 This is a recognition of 
what Doreen Massey called a recognition of “the fact of spacing” (see Chapter Two).102 
That is, considering the space and distance between audiences gives texture to the politics 
conducted in encounters on their way to and outside of the venue. Further, it helps frame 
how to understand dynamics unfolding in the live event, as I now explore in one final 
concert. Observation at a final concert in Beirut will round out my discussion here. 
 
“People here are rude” 
 
At around 10pm there are maybe forty-five people in the Metro al-Madina 
theatre, some seated, some standing. In and outside the theatre, Hamra is 
very quiet. […] Gaafar bursts from behind the red curtain and straight off 
the stage. He seems embarrassed or uncomfortable. He moves quickly and 
sporadically, rapping almost to himself […] Osloob stands on stage with a 
mixer and a laptop. He suggests multiple times, in different tones, some 
commanding, some more jocular, that Gaafar slow down or repeat a verse, 
so that people can understand the words. Gaafar refuses [...] Indeed, many 
audience members already know the new tracks by heart. Despite being 
treated with ostensible derision by the performer they are eager to sing 
along with him. Gaafar frequently turns his back on the DJ and the 
audience. He tosses the microphone away dismissively when the sound 
accidentally cuts out of it and screams his verses into the void of the half-
filled house without a mic. The audience shouts their approval. When he 
has finished his set he leaves the stage quickly. He seems tired, irritated, 
fed up. There is no encore.  
 
Outside, after the concert, in front of the theatre, a young woman who 
attended the performance asks to stand next to me until her ride arrives. 
It’s not safe at night, she explains. “People here [in Hamra] are rude,” she 
says and explains matter-of-factly they’ll make fun of her for wearing a 
                                                
101 Interview with the author, January 23rd, 2014. Translation from the Arabic is my own. 
 





veil. I ask her what she thought of the performance and she bubbles over 
with enthusiasm. She has raps of her own she has shared with Gaafar.103  
 
During the concert in Hamra, Gaafar’s pieces, like much of Touffar’s work 
generally, addressed a range of class-based grievances lyrically, incriminating “polite” 
Lebanese society. On top of these lyrics, Gaafar performed physical gestures of “distaste” 
that performatively generated temporary community during the performance. This 
enactment of distaste created temporary ties between audiences and performer – not 
based on education, class, or literacy, as Bourdieu’s formulation of “taste” prescribes, but 
affectively.104 The performer from Hermel almost seemed to be resisting the audience 
itself, if not the very fact that he was performing. He turned his back on them, denied 
requests from them, complained loudly about sound or light onstage, etc. Moreover, this 
hostility, it seemed to be understood, was not directed at audience members or sound 
technicians, but was ostensibly part of the politics of the performance itself. When Gaafar 
performatively relied on enacting a feeling of distaste, he pronounced a specific politics 
that may be interpreted in his lyrics, but which are not always a part of the aesthetics of 
the venue, nor the hip part of Hamra where the venue was located. This was part of the 
performance that his audience came to see and they responded with measured enthusiasm 
to the disgust he spit (lyrically) and the distaste he embodied (gesturally, physically).  
The audience gathered in Metro that night were largely fans of the performer, a 
considerable number of them his family, extended kin, and others from Hermel who had 
explicitly come to hear him, despite the tense and unpleasant political malaise that had 
                                                
103 Author’s field notes, August 27, 2013.  
 
104 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (London: 





settled upon the area of ras Beirut that night. When Gaafar performed disgust, when he 
appeared irritated, fed up, disappointed, or otherwise unimpressed with his surroundings, 
he was specifically connecting with this audience, who may also have been skeptical of 
the hipster-esque dynamics of the (literally) underground theatre in which he was 
performing. In the transmission and reception of this feeling of objection, audience and 
performer embodied a raised middle finger that accompanied the lyrical one, which 
denounced how cosmopolitan and upper middle-class Beirut actively others the Bekaaʿ. 
The vociferous approval that received Gaafar’s gestures of distaste completed this 
affective exchange. In this sense, it is important to note that the affective exchange was 
distinguished from the lyrical one, it did not merely reflect the meaning of the words that 
Gaafar shouted. Lyric and gesture together magnified the performance of disgust and 
furthered the impact of either element in isolation.  
Distaste and irritation were also evident in the stance of the young fan outside the 
theatre. As she lingered next to me, a stranger, until her ride arrived, she objected to the 
notion that its bustling cosmopolitan vibe might be inclusive or festive, trying instead to 
protect herself against it. Her initial mode of reaching out to me was a gesture of distaste 
or distrust. This gesture built on and the distaste Gaafar embodied in the theatre. Her 
expression of distrust helped her navigate the foreign space that was Hamra street. 
 
* * * 
 
 In this section, I have traced articulations of disgust in rap lyrics to gestures of 




demographics in Beirut. In the previous section, I suggested that spitting disgust in rap 
lyrics stages politics in process where speakers deconstruct material and affective 
realities. This process, once started by an act of spitting can encourage others to spit back, 
furthering a political deconstruction, outside of the control of the initial speaker. In 
tracing how concerts in the cosmopolitan center of Beirut attract audiences from its 
“periphery,” I have explored class and other exclusionary dynamics that structure 
cosmopolitan concert opportunities, building on my expose of neoliberal incursions in 
Beirut in the first section of this chapter. At the same time, interlocutors’ testimony about 
mixed audiences encouraged me to look more carefully at the mixing of audiences that 
happens despite the city’s uneven growth and its deliberate. I have thus noted different 
ways in which audiences also spit back: via their simple presence, via their exchanges 





 Time spent in Beirut both while conducting fieldwork over the past five years and 
with family over the past ten years has led me to notice varying degrees and different 
registers of disgust in this city. While the city’s denizens’ navigations of the abject was 
made particularly obvious in the summer of 2015’s garbage crisis, frustration, exhaustion, 
suffocation and different degrees of fed-up-ness have characterized political discourse 
and affect in Beirut for years. In this chapter, I have attempted to locate some of the 




rap – in order to demonstrate how these expressions of disgust may be understood as 
politics in progress. Very often, expressions of disgust are responded to with disgust – no 
small amount of political debates with family and friends also stage this kind of 
deconstruction of logic, options, and possibility. This formulation of performative disgust 
– distaste that is meant to be heard – presents a different way to read politics in this 
affect, diverging from psychoanalytic readings of the collapse of the subject in its 
confrontation with the borders of the abject. It is also, I hope, another way to point to 





 Politics, Positions, Presence 
 
 
In 2011, I imagined that this project would be rooted in and reverberate around 
the affective transformation of revolution: in the breaking of fear barriers, the crumbling 
of apathy, and a (re)turn of the political that the events of that year would herald. In 2016, 
it is clear that the majority of the research, writing, and listening I ended up doing instead 
waded through the anxiety, despair, and despondency of counter-revolution and the 
helplessness of both spectacular racism and spectacular violence. Five years ago, I shifted 
gears to position myself as a scholar who could participate in what seemed to be the 
inevitably new Arab politics that were emerging. In 2016, almost ten years to the week 
after lying awake listening to Israeli bombs shelling Beirut, I – like so many others – 
again admit that more caution than enthusiasm colors the search for logic and possibility.  
 But if in 2011 I proposed a study of the “processes of feeling politics,” it was 
because even during the heady excitement of the fall of Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak, it was clear that the political transformations in motion were far from the neat 
articulations of established political positions and the replacement of one political 
program or ideology with another. I remember, working on a piece Alex Ortiz and I 
edited about the protest signs in the Egyptian revolution, struggling with the caption of a 
photograph of a large banner that had been draped in Tahrir Square. The banner listed 
“our demands,” and they were seven in number. I remember thinking it fantastically odd 
that there could be a specific number of demands; and the number seven kept jumping 




following Occupy Wall Street protests, I leaned up against the bars to ask the other 
twenty or so women in the block, also from the protest, what they wanted or why they 
were there. As soon as the words of the question left my mouth they felt empty. I agreed 
with the requests others voiced, but they felt out of joint. Was campaign finance reform 
really what had compelled each of us – individually and collectively – in a specific 
moment to step into traffic on the Brooklyn Bridge under October rain?  
 If struggling to understand the incredible affective entanglements that pushed 
many of us onto the streets of various cities in 2011 and 2012 helped me conceive of a 
framework like feeling politics, struggling to accept and work through the flipside of 
those feelings following crack down and failure has made me hold onto it. I had initially 
conceived feeling politics would be a framework through which the ethnographer could 
lead the reader to apparent but misinterpreted politics driving recent events and expressed 
in cultural production. Instead, political feeling has become the framework through which 
I have tried to richly illustrate the present (and perhaps the immediate past) as a testament 
to the flows of affect that framed everyday political deliberations and negotiations. If I 
have refused to correlate the music and performance I documented in each case study to 
specific politics and outcomes, it is because, like my interlocutors, I cannot pretend to 
know what is coming. But also because such connections did not seem to me to exist. 
Even in the case of the explicitly more leftist lyrics of some rappers in Beirut (discussed 
in Chapter Five), the production of political feeling that I suggested was so compelling 
was for the most part not explicitly connected to specific political projects. Political 
feeling very much became about processes of engaging with cities, audiences, and artists, 




I want to bring this study to a close with a final meditation on the question of 
political feeling in the immediate context of political events during the writing of this 
dissertation. There are considerations of subjectivism that I acknowledge below while 
addressing more recent criticism of “feelings” in political expression and debate. 
Considering the engagement with intersectionality and solidarity in these critiques, I also 
weave in reflections of solidarity as offered by some of my interlocutors. Here, I am keen 
to explore some of the very real political divisions that have emerged in rap in the Levant 
since the Uprisings. These political arguments – hashed out between rappers, between 
fans, and between both are relevant negotiations of political concerns. I have so far not 
addressed the shape of this particular position-staking in my identification of specific 
political feelings and textures of tarab in the case studies above. Moreover, like the 
politics in process I have lingered on, the claiming of political positions in some rap work 
also roundly refutes simple frameworks of “resistance” in Arabic rap. This discussion 
brings me to a final consideration of the ways in which social media and virtual networks 
are central in the dissemination of this music. I close this study with a more developed 
acknowledgement of the role of technology in allowing and permitting particular 




Despite their ready corroboration of the presence of tarab in rap concerts, political 
invention in rap lyrics, and political processes of listening in both, my conversations with 




between politics and feeling in rap concerts. Consider this exchange with the Syrian 
rapper Bu Kolthoum, in Amman:  
I’m hearing you say that there is a difference between feeling and 
politics? 
 
Of course. 100%.  
 
But this statement “I feel you” - it’s a political idea as well, no? 
 
Maybe, it could be. But look, that’s why people go study Political Science. 
Feeling can’t be studied. It can’t be produced [la yumantiq]. It can’t be 
industrialized [la yousalsal].1 
 
Bu Kolthoum’s separation here of “feelings” and “politics,” in particular his assertion 
that “feeling cannot be studied” reflects in part a Cartesian division between logic and 
feeling. But more importantly, I think, it reflects the distance the rapper perceives 
between the work he does (the “feeling with” listeners) and the “politics” of politicians, 
ministers, and other official representatives. This conceptualization was shared by others. 
Many of my interlocutors – especially venue owners – testified to a “social” not 
“political” impact or effect of their work.2 This reflects a difference in the understandings 
and use of the word “political,” one which the rapper El Rass elaborated on at length 
(quoted in Chapter Five), when he wondered if the issues he addressed in his lyrical work 
were “political” or if they weren’t just part of his everyday life. These testimonies speak 
to a refusal to “politicize,” by drawing into parties, camps, and ideology, the politics in 
process in some cultural production. The issue here is to me not a misrecognition of 
politics; it is a protecting of options and expression by refusing to partake in established 
political discourses. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, these figurations of 
                                                
1 Interview with the author, March 31, 2015. Translation from the Arabic is my own.  
 
2 Interviews with the owners of Beit Aneeseh and La Wain in Ramallah; Café Younes (Amin Younes), Tah 




politics are necessary revisions of the framework of the “political” so frequently 
projected on Arab subjects in cultural studies (see Introduction). 
As one foray into the debate over alternatives, I have argued that looking for 
“resistance” limits an understanding of what politics may be in progress in some Arabic 
rap. In “Chapter One: Locating Politics,” I suggested that looking for spectacular 
behavior that signals the arrival of agency (a protest, a strike, a tattoo, a ballad, a specific 
response to a ballad) promises to continue to ignore the agency of individuals and the 
deliberated politics of agents who do not act out. I suggested the pinning of a theoretical 
framework on the emergence of resistance fails to testify to the texture of deliberations 
that sustain political life in between and during the more spectacular displays of political 
engagement. Against this framework, I set out to build an alternative. In “Chapter Two: 
Feeling Politics,” I suggested that political feeling – held in tension in rap concerts and 
expressed by MCs lyrically and performatically – point to political processes of 
deliberation, negotiation, and refusal. I suggested that paying attention to these processes 
by considering how these feelings are built at the intersections of specific material spaces 
invites an analysis of ambivalence, wavering, failure, and invention. I have favored this 
method of feeling politics over the search for the more spectacular instances of dissent, 
unity, and “hype” that easily evoke “resistance.” 
 Over the course of the case studies that followed, my hope was to have testified to 
the importance of thick contextualization of live events like rap concerts in order to 
reflect on politics in live music – even music as dependent on lyrical invention as rap is. I 
hope also to have testified convincingly to the aural undercurrents that run against the 




cities and their denizens. In this way, these aural subcultural practices reflect fluid 
processes of interrogation and refusal. Without pretending to be harbingers of change or 
revolution, some Arabic rap nonetheless reflects important patterns of deconstructing and 
reconstructing politics and sociality. As Jacques Attali says in Noise: The Political 
Economy of Music, “Our music foretells the future. Let us lend it an ear.”3 I have 
proposed that the ear, but also that feeling is an important barometer to decipher politics 
in process. 
On the one hand considerations of feeling have been echoed in political 
psychology for some years.4 The relevance of emotions in voter behavior, for example, is 
a readily acknowledged, if still understudied, question in US Political Science. My 
research has been invested in and continues to be committed to the notion that how we 
feel about issues, behaviors, and each other determines our political positioning. But my 
study diverges from one of political psychology. I am not interested in how feelings can 
be harnessed for political projects, nor in how emotional responses can be measured or 
quantified. The ethnographic work in my case studies documents tension, elation, disgust, 
resignation – political feelings – without translating these into specific political strategies 
or outcomes. Indeed, part of my point has been that strategies are in formation, it is this 
processual reality that helps to generate the feeling I have documented.  
On the other hand, recent critiques of progressive political discourse have come 
down hard on notions of “feeling” in politics: especially during a US presidential election 
year rife with spectacular racism. Backlash against mobilizing “feeling” in political 
                                                
3 Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, 11. 
 
4 See for example, David P. Redlawsk, ed., Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing 





critique, description, and documentation increasingly circulates among leftist 
commentators concerned with the affect surrounding contentious political issues, 
especially perhaps when intersectionality and solidarity politics are at stake. For example, 
Sarah Jaffe has suggested “feelings-as-politics” – where personal feelings block the 
ability to understand real violence – occlude the mechanisms of oppression in systemic 
racism.5 Similarly, Phoebe Maltz Bovy has explained how “feelings journalism” allows 
even political allies to repeat or duplicate racism and classism.6 In the latter, the author 
projects what others must be feeling without bothering to ask them. These critiques of the 
mobilization of feeling within left-leaning, anti-racist, feminist circles present important 
limits within which the model of feeling politics that I have proposed be understood or 
used.7 The presence of certain feelings I have testified to in this study are not 
substitutions for politics (as in Jaffe’s feelings as politics). I have not suggested locating 
resignation or disgust at the expense of deliberating the real exclusions, incursions, and 
threats that political realities pose to my interlocutors and their communities. Rather, 
these feelings point to how those politics are deliberated. It is worth noting that 
occasional and specific expressions of political positions appear within these affective 
negotiations as well. These articulations of political positions, as I will now argue with a 
                                                
5 Sarah Jaffe, “Are We Mistaking Feelings for Politics?,” Dame Magazine, March 2, 2015, accessed April 
1, 2016, http://www.damemagazine.com/2015/03/02/are-we-mistaking-feelings-politics.  
 
6 Phoebe Maltz Bovy, “The Rise of Feelings Journalism,” The New Republic, February 19, 2015, accessed 
April 1, 2016, https://newrepublic.com/article/121097/feelings-journalism-feeds-jessica-williams-daily-
show-tweets.  
 
7 See also Sarah Ahmed, “You Are Oppressing Us!” and “You Are Oppressing Me!” FeministKillJoys, 






specific series of examples, draws out further the deliberation of political processes 




 Since the start of the Syrian uprising in particular (March 2011), the 
announcement of specific political positions has appeared in some Arabic rap. The split 
among Syrian rappers as some chose to support the regime against the uprising was 
perhaps just the first in a series of public staking of political positions that further how to 
understand politics in process in Arabic rap while definitively furthering the genre from 
categorical expressions of “resistance.” Eslaam Jawaad’s early support for Assad’s 
regime against the protests divided hip hop audiences in the Levant that were largely 
riding the enthusiasm of the so-called “Arab Spring.” The affective and political backlash 
against Jawaad – accusations of treachery went both ways – pinned the artist into a 
reactionary corner long before the Islamic State and other fundamentalist militias coopted 
the Syrian uprising and turned other artists, previously sympathetic, against the 
opposition.8 While the Syrian crisis has cast high stakes for the expression of solidarity, 
the politics in process on other issues have also led to the articulation of specific 
identities or positions. 
                                                
8 See for example, Greg Schick, “Eslaam Jawaad ‘Dudd al-Nizam’ (Syria),” World Hip Hop Market, May 
2, 2011, accessed April 1, 2016, http://worldhiphopmarket.com/video-of-the-day-eslaam-jawaad-dudd-al-
nizam-syria/; and Rania Abouzeid, “Syrian Rappers Urge… Restraint? Protesters Find Little Support in 






 In order to illustrate how the staking of positions is also a part of political 
processes, I want to consider here the very public falling out between two of the Levant’s 
heaviest hitters: El Far3i and El Rass in January of 2016. The growing exchange of “diss 
tracks” I referred to in Chapter Five exploded in a nuanced, though vitriolic debate about 
solidarity, selling out, and Arab identity. In the three tracks disseminated in the beginning 
of 2016, no political party or affiliation is asserted (contrary to the articulation of 
positions in Jawaad’s work in 2011), but very pronounced stances of authenticity, 
identity, and where one positions oneself were debated. 
 In the first, El Rass, the Tripoli-born MC now living in Beirut, raps under the title 
“Watwateh” or [“Being a Bat”].9 He writes, in abstract terms, about the selling off of the 
qadiyeh [the issue]: the Palestinian cause. 
Who do you represent? To what do you assimilate?  
It happens. Who’s your audience? They love you.  
On what grounds? Who makes a distinction?  
You identify, you capture, you evade, you forget it, you count it among 
your achievements:  
That you were behind her at the time of citing  
 
The track proceeds as a cryptic, but clear enough indictment of “giants” – people who 
make it big – and their distance from the Palestinian cause, asserting that “small people” 
are closer to the cause (“Glory to the dwarves, we are the issue”), and aligning himself 
with the latter. Disgust, though a gentler iteration of it, reflective of the metaphor of being 
“batlike,” affectively underscores the piece. The track opens with a series of alliterative 
questions (meen bitmathel /ʿameen bitmathel/ bithasel/ lameen bitwasel) questioning an 
                                                
9 “El Rass – Watwateh | intaj mouqataʿa” [El Rass – Being a Bat – Produced by Boikutt], Sound Cloud 





artist’s or perhaps an activist’s sense of audience, responsibility, and the effect of that 
orientation.  
 It is not the first time El Rass or the producer of the track, Boikutt, have 
entertained similar political questioning and commentary. Recall in Chapter Three, 
Ramallah Underground’s track “Khaleeni ʿAyeesh” [“Let Me Live”] also interrogated the 
intersections of authenticity, distance, and political struggle. In that track, the lyrics 
centered around the hypocrisy of a diaspora that asked more resistance of Palestinians 
that lived in Palestine than those outside of it (the lines “You say you’re Palestinian but 
you’re afraid to come for a visit,” “You turn off the TV we’re still here,” and “You want 
Palestine? So do I. But I’m also a person,” come to mind). These questions of who can 
best defend whose interests are reflected in the subject of much subsequent rap, as 
explored throughout this study. Two tracks in particular – collaborations between El Rass 
and El Far3i, no less – also interrogated dilemmas of audience make up, representation, 
and audience reach. The piece “Fi el Jaleed” [“In the Frozen Land”] stages negotiations 
of identity, community, engagement, and political commitment as the two MCs travel to 
Sweden and Denmark on tour.10 The piece opens with El Rass describing interactions 
with a European border security agent and proceeds to lambast orientalist perceptions of 
the Arab rapper (“Don’t you dare think I came to sing for the Orientalists/ […] to play the 
role of wounded kitten, victim/ And to offer up an original copy of the map of Sykes-
Picot”). But what makes that piece interesting is that it gives voice to a range of 
perspectives in Europe, specifically of the Arab diaspora. El Rass raps, “In Stockholm I 
                                                
10 “Fi el Jaleed – maʿ el Far3i” [“In the Frozen Land” – with El Far3i”], Sound Cloud audio recording, 
4:50, posted by “El Rass,” 2015, accessed April 1, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/el-rass-the-
head/filjalid?in=el-rass-the-head/sets/adb. This track is on the album Adam, Darwin, and the Penguin, 




heard ya ba [a common interpellation] more than I heard ABBA,” continuing, “And 
when the Syrian girl thanked me with a single tear/ I saw the homeland as an immigrant/ 
I saw the revolution was still ongoing.” This lyrical work, in combination with the sounds 
of electronic musician Munma’s scoring produce an engaged interrogation of the 
positions and meaning of “Arab-ness,” all before the current spectacular misery of the 
Syrian refugee crisis (the track was released in 2014). 
 The verse of El Far3i – the Amman-born Palestinian-Jordanian recently relocated 
to London with the mijwez band 47 Soul –follows, and his verse in “Fi el Jaleed” stages 
similar negotiations. He begins by asserting, “Don’t think that the knowledge of the 
homeland is geographic,” pointing to a network of Syrian and Iraqi immigrants surviving 
in “the frozen land.” His verse points to the important diasporic communities that also 
make up Europe. He acknowledges the switches and weakness of language 
accompanying these demographic movements “It’s ok my Arabic is weak… but I still 
pronounce the qaf,” offering an expression of pride even in what is usually considered a 
weak identity position (not knowing the language). In their verses and their attention to 
the experiences of Arabs in Europe, both rappers are clearly conscious of complicating 
positions voiced on a previous collaboration, “E-stichrak” [“Orientalism”].11 El Far3i 
references it specifically in his verse: “we were worried Jimmy would respond with a 
track called ‘Istighrab’ [‘Surprise’]”.  
“E-stichrak” constructs a character “Jimmy” (hanging over whose bed at home is 
a picture of Lawrence of Arabia), who arrives to the Arab world with an NGO job and in 
the name of making things better. He condescends, steals jobs, changes the economic and 
                                                
11 “El Far3i w el Rass – istishraq El Far3i & El Rass – e-stickrak,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 3:11, 





demographic landscape. (As I have discussed in each of the three case studies, the 
political concerns with the presence of NGOs and the accompanying humanitarian 
economy were a regular concern of my interlocutors.) El Far3i raps, “Political Science 
students coming from abroad change the demographic of Ramallah.” Jimmy, El Rass 
asserts, “doesn’t see the difference between himself and the Zionists who infiltrate our 
protests.” The whole piece is underscored sonically with the whistling sound of a rocket. 
“E-stichrak” is based in Amman, Beirut, and Ramallah and features perspectives from 
those localities about the attitudes of those coming from abroad, including those Arabs 
who “return.” “Fi el Jaleed” flips these positions. In the latter they point to questions of 
orientalism but from the position of Arabs in Europe. 
 This is to point to a healthy development of questions of “inside/outside,” 
diaspora and authenticity, and the politics attached to one’s geographic position and 
mobility between these two MCs and in the scene in general. As I have mentioned, in 
2014, El Far3i relocated from Amman to London with the electro-mijwez group 47Soul. 
The group’s music is an electronic interpretation of “wedding music” musiqat el-aʿras, 
setting the mijwiz music of the dabkeh and other folk music of the Levant to hip dance 
beats. The group’s approach to and take on the music has proved appealing to Arabs in 
the diaspora, Arabs in the Arab world, and foreigners. They played to sold-out crowds in 
the UK and elsewhere throughout 2015.  
 The popularization of this traditional music and El Far3i’s relocation from 
Amman to London has not been without criticism, however. For example, while Omar 
Suleiman’s popularity among hipster-inclined audiences that took to his mijwez-techno 




Soul and the accompanying pop-like framing of the music has alienated El Far3i in 
particular from an audience that followed his solo lyrical rap work closely. The attitudes 
of the group’s members – their obvious eagerness about the interest the new sounds 
received, and their assertions about how their work re-invents while speaking for the 
fellaheen [peasantry] – has perhaps not really helped much. Their boyish enthusiasm 
about “making it” has been interpreted as condescending (if not plain absurd) by some of 
their colleagues and accusations of “selling out” have accompanied the group’s assertions 
about their own success.12 Here it is worth noting that the dynamic I observed in Amman 
and wrote about in Chapter Four – about rappers being eager to leave the city – 
confronted different expectations about the role of socially-engaged rap shared among 
various audiences in Ramallah and Beirut, but also in Jordan. That is, the orientation 
toward “making it” that is shared among many rappers in Amman, and that is reflected 
for them in opportunities to perform and make a living off of their music outside of the 
Middle East, ran up against the different expectations of others who, for a host of reasons, 
invest authenticity and political grounded-ness in proximity, in local engagement, and in 
addressing Arab audiences. Finally, the peak of 47 Soul’s summer successes coincided 
with the overtly protest-oriented rap in Beirut surrounding the garbage crisis (discussed in 
Chapter Five). 
                                                
12 For example in our interview, the Amman-based rapper Synaptic (whose family, readers will recall, 
boasts famous Palestinian wedding singers) spoke at length about how he saw the 47 Soul project as a 
betrayal of local, traditional sounds and a selling out of these sounds to orientalist fantasies. In a comment 
on the discussion board of the collaboration track “E-stichrak” [“Orientalism”] on Sound Cloud Synaptic 
wrote without explanation, “47 Soul” in early 2016. El-Far3i responded “hmmm.” This is to point to the 
latter’s obvious awareness of how others have interpreted and received some of his new work. In our own 
interview, El Far3i spoke haltingly about his struggles to retain his former audiences, and his eagerness to 





 It is in this context that El Far3i responded to El Rass’s abstract musings in 
“Being a Bat” in January of the following year as a personal affront. El Far3i clearly 
interpreted the “giants” El Rass ridicules as himself. In response, he scoffs at the extra-
engaged politics of his former collaborator’s alignment with the “little people” who are 
the real defenders of al-qadiyeh [Palestine]. His retort, entitled “Washwasheh” 
[Whisperings] plays alliteratively on El Rass’s title [Watwateh], and starts by spinning 
one of El Rass’s lines rapping, “Glory to the heroes.”13 He continues, rapping 
sarcastically: “Dear committed rapper that has been betrayed… where are you going?” 
The track pokes fun at the seriousness with which El Rass and others in Beirut (which he 
calls cynically, “the city of rebellion”) couched themselves in the midst of the “You 
Stink” protests. “Wow, a café we want to build a fight with our dreams!” he mocks, 
drawing out the hypocrisy of progressive sociality others have also identified in Beirut 
(discussed in Chapter Five). Unlike those Lebanese rappers that also offered expressions 
of disgust with these forms of sociality, El Far3i invokes that hypocrisy not as reason for 
rebellion but reason why the protests were not able to really take off. Sonically, the 
vocals are not clear and El Far3i’s voice is low, as if he is whispering. But the barbs at El 
Rass are pointed accusations of intellectualism and elitism. As in the lines “bihabouha el 
moukh shou bihabouha el moukh, w el nokhbeh nokhbeh w liʾnha aslee.” [“They love the 
brain, how they love the brain, and the elite remains elite because that is its origin.”] Here 
El Far3i plays on the word moukh, which means brain, but also marrow, aligning those 
who like intellectual matters with an elite vantage point on society.14 As discussed in 
                                                
13 “El Far3i – washwasheh | El Far3i –Washwasheh,” Sound Cloud audio recording, 3:39, posted by “El 
Far3i,” February 2016, accessed April 1, 2016, https://soundcloud.com/el-far3i/el-far3i-washwasheh.  
 




Chapter Five, this is similar to the critique Osloob leveled at rap that was “leaving the 
street” as it embraced more formal forms of Arabic poetry. 
 El Far3i’s critique of the intellectual politics coming out of Beirut are welcome, 
especially in the wake of a protest movement that by many accounts did stumble into the 
politics of middle class respectability and accompanying exclusiveness that have played 
out in other cities in the US and elsewhere.15 That is, his criticism of the self-inflatedness 
of some organizers and particularly the political mood accompanying the exclusivity of 
protests in Beirut are on point. But his personification of this problem in his former 
collaborator may have (at least at time of writing) backfired. When El Rass responded to 
El Far3i’s diss (it was impossible not to read it as a personal affront) he mobilized the 
wave of recent skepticism engendered by his work with 47 Soul. His response track, 
“Habout Idtrari” [“Emergency Landing”] denies categorically that he had El Far3i in 
mind writing “Watwateh” and sprays a series of accusations back at his former 
collaborator, in the process revisiting many of the subjects they covered in their previous 
collaborations.16   
The opening sample of El Rass’s response, a dialogue, precisely plays on this 
narrative of “making it.” Heavily distorted sonically, the dialogue stages an interview 
with the press. A reporter asks, how did you meet “Jimmy”? – the character El Rass and 
El Far3i constructed in previous collaborations. The dialogue as a whole mocks a pursuit 
of authenticity and “making it” [the word used is waselet – literally, you’ve arrived], 
                                                                                                                                            
 
15 On the class make-up and class debate in and around You Stink protests, see for example, ʿAmr Mohsn, 
“‘Al hafleh’: ʿan nazret a-tabeqah al-wasta ila nfsha,” Al-Akhbar, August 21, 2015, accessed April 1, 
2016, http://al-akhbar.com/node/241096.  
 
16 “Habout idtrari” [“Emergency Landing”], Sound Cloud audio recording, 5:15, posted by “El Rass,” 





conjuring El Rass as the interviewed artist and El Far3i as the orientalist “Jimmy.”17 The 
recorded exchange frames the expertise El Far3i claims with 47 Soul as an accident of 
being in the right place at the right time (“we met at a wedding”). The piece proceeds 
from here to respond to El Far3i’s jibes, reciting back to him lyrics from their previous 
collaborations. Sonically, El Rass is louder (there is no whispering here), but the whole 
piece is couched in offended but sardonic laughter. There are pages of lyrical and 
political analysis that could be offered here. The debate the rappers stage, despite the 
personal acrimony that they fling at each other, is an important deliberation of what 
counts as political, who counts as political, and who is truly able to represent “Palestine,” 
the “poor,”18 and their musical traditions.19  
The exchange over these several tracks discussed here is a good example of how 
rappers negotiate political positions without aligning themselves with parties, politicians, 
or ideologies. Moreover, the fluidity of these positions – as made especially clear by this 
exchange between rappers who used to collaborate – points to how politics in process, 
reflected lyrically and musically in this genre, is not an oscillation between fixed points 
                                                
17 The dialogue plays like this: 
 - Can you tell us how you came to know Jimmy? 
- I was in this place, and I asked him, ‘What are you looking for?’And he told me ‘I am 
looking for mijwez.’ I told him, well you found it! 
- Ah, you told him “you found it” because you yourself are an expert in wedding music?  
- No, no. I told him, “you found it” because we were in a wedding. We happened to meet 
at a wedding. He told me he was interested in wedding music and we were in a wedding, 
so that’s how we met. 
 
18 A particular good example of this is when El Rass retorts to El Far3i “you’re the one who made el 
felaheen [the peasantry] felaaaheen [drawing out an exceptionally long Palestinian accent].” Here, El Rass 
makes fun of the political representation of Palestine and its resilient stewards through this Orientalized and 
depoliticized figure of the peasantry in the work of 47 Soul. This intersects nicely with the discussion of 
“classing” political discourse in Palestine that I explored in Chapter Three. 
 
19 For an impartial write-up of the exchange in Arabic, see Tareq Azzeh, “Barakeen Taht el Maʾ” 






(with one party or against it). Rather these negotiations point to a wholly different kind of 
motion: wading through realities where there seem to be no options. It is this wading 
through and staking of positions (that then morph) that I suggested in the introduction to 
this study points to the series of “third rails” or third options operating beside the political 
status quo.20 This fluidity also affects how one might conceive of expressions of 
solidarity – as this exchange here has already illustrated. Expressions of solidarity and the 
fact that most engagement with this music, the exciting opportunities of live concerts not 





While I have focused my attention on the live concerts that are the intersections of 
urban change, orientalist representation, struggles over the right to the city, and changing 
perceptions about hip hop and hip hop culture, the vast majority of listener engagement 
with Arabic hip hop and the MCs and producers who make it is not during live events but 
mediated through technology. Sound Cloud, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter are the 
primary sites for hosting and disseminating this material. Bandcamp, Indiepush, and 
Reverbnation, are less frequently used networks. This means that the primary mode of 
interaction between rappers and their listeners are comments on tracks and the virtual 
affectivity of “likes,” “shares,” and so on. My emphasis in interviews on the live event 
often came as something of a surprise to musicians (see Chapter Two). They recognize 
                                                
20 The Khat Thaleth EP featured El Rass, Touffar, Zeinnedine, Al Sayyed Darwish, Yaseen, and Al Haqq 





that most of their interactions with fans are virtual at the same time that their assertions 
about the importance of the concert in “feeling with” their audience are genuine. 
Negotiating the politics of positionality and negotiating physical space during 
years when parts of the Arab world are engulfed in occupation, siege, uprising, or war is 
also a question of determining the shape of solidarity. Indeed, solidarity in these cases is 
often specifically about negotiating engagement when one cannot approach physically: as 
in the case of Lebanese and Syrians wishing to enact “solidarity” with Palestinians, 
whose territory they are forbidden from entering, and vice versa. In Chapter Five, we saw 
how expressions of disgust with an apathetic Arab populace worked as expressions of 
solidarity with Gaza; in Chapter Four, expressions of resignation could similarly be 
interpreted as muted expressions of solidarity with Palestinian struggle. In the most 
recent tracks I have discussed here, how to express that solidarity also emerged as a 
consideration. Solidarity, without being a political feeling, emerged in these cases as 
politics in process. That is, the declaration of solidarity was not a statement but a 
negotiation of and active engagement with the options available. When I asked El Rass 
what solidarity meant to him and his work, if anything, he offered: 
To me, solidarity is the system of how you make sense of your belonging 
to different collectivities. You cannot just make sense by saying that 
you’re in solidarity. Making sense involves a whole process of action, of 
release, of spreading the word, of questioning things, of being critical, of 
sometimes trying to get the morale back, of sometimes saying let’s take 
two steps back so we can see the bigger image, sometimes people who are 
in the struggle are maybe depressed or down, you understand that maybe 
you have to take them to different kind of moods and thinking — I am 
thinking about the music here.  
 
Here, El Sayed offers a refreshingly active view of solidarity, one in which the individual 




prescribed by those with whom one expresses this political affinity. In this way even a 
position becomes a process, one that, with and through technology, is not only not 
prohibited by distance, but in fact may also take advantage of it. Consider this social 
media exchange between a late-night super market checkout clerk’s screen in Ramallah 
and the Lebanese rapper El Rass, just quoted.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: “Exchange between a late-night supermarket clerk in Ramallah and the Lebanese 
rapper El Rass.” Mazen El Sayed, the rapper who goes by El Rass, reposts Ansar 3 AlRifai’s 
photo. His caption reads: “When the guy is working all night in a Ramallah supermarket and 




The caption of the photo reads, “Because it’s a duty to spread culture… The entire 
supermarket must listen to El Rass. Of course people couldn’t handle more than two 
tracks and asked to hear Elissa or Wael Kafouri [Lebanese pop stars].” In response to the 
photograph in which he was tagged, El Sayed’s caption reads, “When the guy is working 
all night in a Ramallah supermarket and decides to make the customers listen to El Rass’s 
tracks.” Here the virtual reality of the two computer screens – the one channeling El 
Rass’s music into the super market and the one reflecting the aural soundscape and 
reactions of the supermarket back to El Rass – emerges as a horizon in which listeners 
and performers can meet despite the restrictions of space. (The ability of rap music to 
play across boundaries is discussed in Chapter Three). 
In the exchange above, the computer screen is figured as the primary medium 
through which listeners receive and exchange with musicians while it simultaneously 
draws the forbidden Lebanese voice into occupied Palestinian space. The clerk stages for 
the viewer expectation, hope, despair, and solidarity – within the recognizably neoliberal 
framework of the all-night supermarket, no less. Because culture is a “duty,” so the 
hourly employee tells us, he weaves in instruction, exposure, and acculturation through 
the tools available to him: the wifi and speaker system in the store. While he does not 
hope to change their opinions overnight (“of course they could only stand two tracks 
before asking for Elissa”), he nonetheless deems the experiment successful enough to 
share it with a public audience – and to specifically bring it to the musician’s attention. 
For his part, the musician is touched enough by the effort that he reposts it, with his own 
interpretation of the impact – political and aesthetic – of his own work. This exchange on 




affective political spectrum within which this study was composed. It also points to how 
technology, and social media in particular, is able to generate and transmit presence, 
substituting for the call and response of the live concert when geopolitics and logistics 
render such embodied exchanges impossible. 
  
* * * 
In these pages I have attempted to draw this study of ongoing political processes, 
aesthetic experimentation, and lyrical invention to a close. The moments in which these 
pages were written affected the ways in which I interpreted the processual politics I heard 
expressed and negotiated online, in live concerts, and in my recorded and unrecorded 
interviews. The politics I observed and participated in have only stayed still long enough 
to be captured in analysis. Nonetheless, in a world in as much flux as ours, listening has 
suggested this is perhaps all one can ask for. Having recorded what I heard, it is now for 








بحا45 .نسى .لح#ا/ .لماض#ة 
 بس بحط .=د; في جب#بتي 5 فاض#ة
 5 .مي لسا مش @.ض#ة
 خل#ني .ع#ش 5=ن ما .@F5 في نقطة تفت#ش
بتبNد4 حتى لو مع#ش سالF .5 حش#ش 
5 بد=ش .خد من .; حاP بخش#ش 
قبل ما .مد .=د; لحدR بنNي ح#اتي بسحب .لف#ش 
بس في .مل 
حا 5قف على @جلي 5 مش @.N= Fزني .لر=ح متل .لجبل 
ما]لش 5قت للNبل 
عقر[ .لساعة ب#سابق للمستقبل 
5مش @.F .قبل .; شي .قل من حقي .لكامل 
مش @.F .جامل 
@.F .نفجر `; .سلحة Pما@ .لشامل 
فا .c. بدb .تغامر 
 d@صا fلمجنو. ;` Fد.ء 5 .نت مرتاNمش ح :d@عا fكو
بي قولولي .نساRb 5 ساكت#ن مش عا@ف#ن =عبر5  
عن حالNم  بالكلماj .للي  مش عم ب#طلعو 
 bالمسا. ;`
 bتنتشر النو “بو=كت” .جا F.@ بس .لرسالة
 خل#ني .ع#ش 5=ن ما .@F5 في نقطة تفت#ش
بتبNد4 حتى لو مع#ش سالF .5 حش#ش  
 (l x)
عامل حالك فلسط#ني بس خا=ف ت#جي `=ا@/ 
 خا=ف =رF5 عل#ك .لب#ت .لكب#ر 5 .لس#ا@/
o#ب .n .c#كR .شلح .لحطة 5 تحك#ش باسمي 
 بتخر[ من بع#د بس .لطلق ببفوj بجسمي
 بتحكي س#اسة؟
 .حنا منحكي كالr شو.@q 5 خبر/
 من 5جNة نظر ناs بتعرd ناs من قبر/
 fفلسط#ن؟ 5 .نا كما bبد
!425
 fنسا. fبس .نا كما
 r5 .نا Rشخ. R]شر. Rبد; .كل
 rسال bبس .نت ما بد
 بدb .ننضلنا .نحا@[ 5 كل nي .الفالr .لمحر5قة
 5 .نت قاعد بامر=كا 5 .@5با بتحكي عن .@ضك .لمسر5قة
.ال5ضاq .لس#اس#ة .لحال#ة مخنوقة 5 مشنوقة 
 bناn حنا منضل. fنت بتطفي .لتلفز=و.
 بدb .تحر@ فلسط#ن 5 .حنا .نرF5 ننتاb؟ ال!
النو nي .الحالr شي =وF.@ r تاكلك 
 5 .نا .صالً n#ك n#ك مش مرتاحلك
fكم من مل#و. bز#o تحت 
 شكلy .لوضع عم بز=د على P.خلك
 bلو=ن .لمصا@; بتاخد dشو
بتج#بك 5 بتوP=ك 
c. 5. حا5لت تتذكر .شي من ماض#ك بتنس#ك 
بتج#بك 5 بتوP=ك 
 c. 5. كنت متذكر .شي من ماض#ك بتنس#ك
 خل#ني .ع#ش 5=ن ما .@F5 في نقطة تفت#ش
بتبNد4 حتى لو مع#ش سالF .5 حش#ش  
 (l x)
!426
 “Let Me Live”
  Ramallah Underground
 I try to forget my past life
But I put my hand in my pocket, and it is empty 
And my mother still is not at ease 
Let me live; wherever I go there is a checkpoint 
 I am given a hard time even though I have neither weapons nor drugs
 And I don’t want to take a bribe from anyone
 Before I reach my hand out to anyone, I will end my life as a friend of nothingness
 But there is hope
 I am going to stand on my feet, just like a mountain, the winds will not move me,
 There’s no time for foolishness
 The hour hand is racing the future
 And I will not accept anything less than my full rights
 I won’t flatter
 I will explode like weapons of mass destruction
 So if you want to be dealt in
 Know this: I will not represent you while you relax
 They tell me to forget about you, and they are silent, not knowing how to express
themselves with words that don’t come 
 As if they are constipated
 But the message is going to get out because Boikutt is coming for you
Let me live; wherever I go there is a checkpoint 
 I am given a hard time even though I have neither weapons nor drugs
 (x2)
You pretend you’re Palestinian but you’re afraid to come for a visit 
Afraid to lose that big house and car 
 If that’s the case, you can take off the kuffiyeh and don’t speak in my name
You mess things up from afar, but that distance invades my body 
You talk politics? 
We have street talk and experience 
With one glance people distinguish each other from the grave 
 You want Palestine? So do I.
 But I am also human.
 I need to eat, drink, piss, and sleep.
 But you do not want peace.
You want us to keep fighting like in all those played out films 
!427
While you sit in the US or Europe talking about your stolen land 
 The political situation has been hanged and strangled
 You can turn off your television; we stay there
You want to liberate Palestine while we are extinguished? No! 
 Because these dreams will one day eat you up
In any case I’m not at ease with you 
How many millions are you sitting on? 
Looks like the situation is increasing your income 
 See where money will take you
 It brings you and it takes you
 And if you try to remember anything from your past, it lets you forget
 It brings you and it takes you
And if you remembered anything from your past, it forgets you 
Let me live; wherever I go there is a checkpoint 
 I am given a hard time even though I have neither weapons nor drugs
 (x2)
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 {=ش nا; .لمز=كا {سمNا؟ ` م#ن {لي نشرb؟
 فشرj كل .لبر5باغند. 5 .لرسائل .لمباشر/
bفاضي لّما قّشر bشر/ لقا.P j.حاء=}! 
 Åنا 5 .لح#ا/ .لعمل#ة `; ما تقو4 منلعب 1 -2
 بالÖ "=وr نسأ4" .لو.قع ل#ش ما غ#ّرتو.
Üق#ّدتو áاNح#ّرتو. للشب لما بالمن 
 "لّما على .لمجتمع فلّتوÜ قاr فاàP 5 q "تتّو
yو كل 5.حد حر بحالNت بس مNنا مش بÅ 
yة بالطر=قة {لي بتحالل=Å@ ;كل 5.حد ب#بد 
 لو غ#ّرÅ@ j=ي بتصو@ بدà حنضلة على ]Nر;
 عشاf لّما Åسبح بالبحر .لم#ّت تشوفو. 5جyN على صد@;
 لّسا منتعّر~ للطرP فما {نتNى .لعر~
 5 =ابا nذ. .لر.[ تاo5Å qى نقطة على .أل@~
  5 للنّاs {لي شا=فة {نy في {شي ناقص باألoر5حة
 م#ن {لي قلّك {نا ما نرقّص .لقلو[ .لمجر5حة
  q | عقر[ .لثو.ني
 شأ | شقلبتلي مكاني
 شأ | شقلبت .لمعاني
 شك | شككتني بزماني
 م#ن {لي قا4 {نا ما منرقّص .لقلو[ .لمجر5حة؟
 بقلك سكر.[ ".لجب#Nة" {نباعت {شتر=ت مرجوحة
 حبّ#نا {نسلّي .لشعب إلنy .لتلفز=وf فلم @عب
 5 .لشا@q صعب Åبسط لقمة بدnا تعب
 فإc. على م#ن .لعتب؟ مNو بقلك حسب
 في عند .لمز.@q بس برå .لحسبة إلنy غضب
 5 في عند .لتاجر ب#تNبّل غترÖ فكسب
 5 في {لي على .لحدP5 .لغرب#ة سّحل بكسة عنب
 Åكثر من oلب حطب نا@ عصب غضب ب#سكن ف#نا
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 بسّو; أل; فوتوf ب#تقّر[ منا حجب
 بلد صغ#ر بس .لكوكب عجب
األمور كيف بتترّكب و بكبسة بتتكركب
فوين أحسن مكان بالغرفة الرزنامة فيه تتعّلق
إلنه بكرة و مبارح قاعدين عم بسألوني عن هأّل
التّغيرات وين حطّاني مش قادر أحدد مكاني
!الساعة إلي معاي "ديجيتال" مش شايف عقرب الثواني
منتجات مصنّعة خّصيصا بس الخيار إلزامي
إشتريت سيارة جديدة بس مافيها مقعد أمامي
كيف أشّغلها و أطلع عشان أرّجعها على املصنع
!مضطّر أقعد بالخلف و للتصميم أخضع
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“The Second Hand” 
El Far3i 
Sitting cross-legged on the floor, in a room where a friend sleeps 
I have a dream and a craft but fate is floating in it. 
Like everything in this country, the subject is paralyzed: 
He promised but did not show; what should I do? 
Of course he called, not once but like ten times: 
What’s this music called? And who distributes it? 
Down with propaganda and dumbed-down rhetoric  
Unfounded suggestions: they found you empty when they peeled you! 
Me and my career, we play 1-2 offense 
So that they don’t ask on Judgment Day why we didn’t change things 
You confused the kid when you put him in school 
And when they let him loose in society, he got up and got a tattoo 
I’m not hating: that’s the point, to each his own. 
Everyone speaks his mind in his own way, in the way it serves him, 
If I change my mind, I imagine I’ll want handala on my back: 
So that when I swim in the Dead Sea, you can see his face on my chest. 
We’re still being kicked out, “ethnically cleansed,” so the show’s not over 
Daddy-o, this is the rap of the lowest point on Earth 
And to the people that see that something’s missing in the write-up: 
Who said that we don’t make broken hearts dance? 
The second hand 
You changed my place, 
You switched the meaning 
You made me doubt my history 
Who said that we don’t make broken hearts dance? 
Our playground was sold as scrap metal; I bought a swing instead  
We wanted to entertain the people because the television is a horror film 
And the street is hard; the simplest bite is tiring. 
So who is to blame? It depends. 
There are the farmers, but they’re not at market because they got angry; 
There are the merchants clowning cockily to earn a penny; 
And there are those on the western borders, smuggled in crates of grapes. 
More than one request, a log on fire, an angry nerve lives in each of us 
It blocks every photon of light that comes towards us.  
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A small country but the planet is strange: 
How things come together and, in a push, become a mess. 
So where is the best place in the room to hang the calendar? 
Because tomorrow and yesterday are here asking me about the present. 
Where the changes have put me, I cannot locate my location: 
The clock I have is digital, I can’t see the second hand! 
Products produced with intention, but the choice is mandatory.   
I bought a new car but there’s no front seat; 
How to turn it on to go return it to the factory? 






  مش من#ح تكوf عا@d شو بدb غ#رb موقفك
  P.=ما في حد. برمي شغلة ثق#لة بط#خة بلقفك
  بتذكر قعدتي بغرفتي `; .ل#وr 5مخل#Nا Pفعة
  كث#ر بحس حالي مNاجم عالجو4 بستنى .لرفعة
  شوd 5=ن كنت 5 5=ن صرj بطلت مكاني
  oلع مع كث#ر ب#وj بتحس .ني خلصت مباني
  j@P بالي على c.ني صبرj تا كبرP5 jخلت
  بعرd شو .لخسا@/ بإ=د; ناs عز=ز/ Pفنت
fقاضي @.سي باأل@~ مش غلطا r.5قفت قد  
fلصر.حة ب#ني 5ب#ن حالي كنت خجال. bبد  
fخاP نفس jخذÅ قد ما /Pسو j@تعبت .لرئة صا  
fبالدكا sا] منتج محلي ما بنشا4 ف#ش ك#اn  
  شو; قلقاf من .للي بر.سي كل مالNا بتعتم
  èخر كم Åغن#ة nجمت على حالي q غبى مستلحم
dمستلحن 5جا; عبالك تعز fلما تكو dبتعر  
dتعر fم عشاn5فا s.بنفس .لر fتكو r`ال  
  م#ن خسر.o. fلع عالمر.;
  بطل .لك مكاf عبا[ .لجامع `; حفا;
  صرj .مشي بالعتمة .حس P.=ما في حد. 5@.;
  قد ما ببعد بحكي 5برP عحالي n#ني جا;
  nجمو ثمامNم فتحو ع#ني شر.@ قدحو
  مر/ @تبت .الفكا@ بس حاسسNم غنم @جعو سرحو
  مش#ت حافي 5عا@d في جمر 5جز.` مكسو@
 شكلي تعوjP على قصة .ضل ناقز 5مغد5@
  مش عا@d شو بتسوå لما تكوf بدf5 جمNو@
  مش عا@d شو .لمر عشني P.=ماعNبل مجبو@
  .خوb مش بطل بس تعوP مNو .لبعصة حاصلة
  `حماf بد; .شخ عالموضوq مNو .لحصو/ عاoلة
  .لطخ فوà 5تحت حاسس ح#اتي حصة نحت
  .للي ثلث سن#ن نا=م على كنبا; نس#ت .لتخت
  مر/ 5حد/ .نجن#ت 5قلت خل#ني .عرd .لبخت
 فتحت .لفنجاf 5كرn j5ا; nبستر/ .نفضحت
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 تخد@j قد ما .نفصمت فا بصمت عشاني غش#م
  سالت .لبرd5 قالي شوd .لڤات#كاf عشانy حك#م
  مش عا@d .تنفس بدf5 تف عند; خ#اش#م
 قد ما .نا فوà @.حت .لجاcب#ة .لNرr بحرd .لش#ن
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ّ“In the Dark” 
Satti 
It’s no good to know what you want; they stop you 
There’s always someone to throw something heavy; watermelons thrown 
in the way    
I remember my seat in my room like it’s today; it’s a motivation  
I really feel like I’m at attacker of the goal, I wait for greatness 
See where I was and where I am at now; I’m no longer in my place 
I wrote so many poetic lines, it’s like I built buildings  
I paid attention to what I listened to, I was patient ‘til I grew up to never 
screw up 
I know what it means to lose; I buried so many close people with these 
hands,  
I stood there in front of a judge, staring at the floor, not guilty  
If you want the truth, between myself and I, I was ashamed 
My lungs are dying, turned to black from inhaling all this smoke  
This is a local product, nobody touches it, there are no bags in the store 
I’m kinda worried from all the thoughts in my head, it’s getting darker 
The last few songs I dropped stupidly, I dissed myself  
You know when you’re feeling musical and you feel like composing?  
You need to be in the same state of mind and understanding in order to 
know: 
Refrain: 
Who’s the loser? Look in the mirror 
You no longer have a place at the door of the mosque, like slippers do 
I’ve started to walk in the dark and I always feel like there is someone 
behind me  
As far as I go, I say and respond to myself, I’m coming 
(repeat) 
They attacked with open mouths, my eyes opened and turned red from 
anger 
I organized my thoughts but it feels like they are sheep, they wander off to 
graze elsewhere 
I walked barefoot, knowing there were embers and broken glass  
It seems I got used to being overprotective and betrayed  
I don’t know if you’re worth anything if you’ve got no audience  
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I don’t know what bitterness is because I’m always forced to foolishness 
Your brother’s no hero, I got used to the idea of submission 
I’ve got to go, I want to piss on the subject, but I can’t the gallstones are 
bad  
Shooting everywhere, up and down, I feel my life turned into an art lecture  
For three years I’ve been sleeping on the sofa, I’ve forgotten the bed 
Once I got fed up and told myself let me know my destiny  
I tried to read my fortune from a coffee cup and cards; its hipsterism that 
caught me! 
I felt numb because in my head I was lost, I couldn’t write, so I left a 
fingerprint 
I asked the prof; he told me look towards the Vatican, he is wise  
I can’t breathe without spitting rhymes, it’s like I’m a fish with gills 
I’m so high up in the clouds, I lost gravity. I’m on the top of the pyramids 
just like the dots in the letter sheen. 
Who’s the loser? Look in the mirror 
You no longer have a place at the door of the mosque, like slippers do 
I’ve started to walk in the dark and I always feel like there is someone 
behind me  
As far as I go, I say and respond to myself, I’m coming. 
!436
APPENDIX D 
 ”=ا بحر خدني معك“
 جعفر الطفار و عبد الرحمن جاسم بالشتراك مع خضر سالمه
باص:زياد صادر
s5 .لعالم .لكال y#لبرست#ج .لكل#ش. 
s.لدعا@/ بالفن .لر.قي ما بتعبي .لر. 
  فناf .للحظة .لسع#د;
s.و/ س#جا@/ جر=د; 5 قعد/ عالترNق 
 مش كوف#ة بااللو.f شرشف oا5لة
 شلكة حلقة بمناخ#ر. 5 .=د. oا=لي
 لبناf .لو.P; .الخضر بالعلب .لمعفّنة
 {قتصا5P من .لس#احة 5 .لنسا .لمز=نة
 ت#بس Å@~ .لسNل
 نربى نحن بعل
 تقتلني 5 بدb تقنعني .نو نحن nÅل؟
 .لحكي عالمنجعي سNل 5 .لفالF بأ@~ .لسNل عا=ش بأ@ضو غر=ب .بنو بز5.@=ب
  متل ما بتطل .لشمس متل ما بتغ#ب
fشي .سمو لبنا Üكر= fضعف .ال=ماÅ 5عند 
fشي .سمو لبنا Üكر. fعند; .ضعف .ال=ما 
 =ا بحر خدني معك
 =ا موá ب#عدني
 مقطوn qوf .المل
 ع#شة جNنم#ة
 . قالو. لي fÅ حّساnc fب {لى .لسو=د؛ nناb =لتقي .لفلسط#ن##وf ببعضNم
 ض#قةٌ nي بالPنا؛
  5R.سعةٌ أل5@5بي =تحدî .لعبر=ة
 5مو]ف جمع#ة =صرÅ dمو.لy =سا@.ً في .لحمر.
ً   Rفي .لمخ#مR .لوقت Åقل ض#قا
bمر ب#ن .ألسالÅ ً.@5سع صدÅ sلنا.R  
 P5Rعنا .بن خالٍة قبل ÅسبوRq لمستy .لكNرباء
 فما oÅا4 .لبقاء؛
 مجر5@ م#اÜ ال حل لRy =حدثك كلما .قتربت
yمع bب {لى .لسو=د ال =أخذnc fحّساR 
  Rألنك لست بN#اً 5ال 5Å@5بي! حّساf تعّرd بد=ف#د
 P5=ف#د جم#ٌل بNي .لطلعة Åشقر
  PR=ف#د @åÅ حساf مخبر.
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fحّسا Fفر Rف#د=P جسر. بسم yسم@ f5حسا  
qموP f5P /كب .لطائر@ fحّساR  
 Rفل#س في لبناf ما =وPعy غ#ر .أللم
yصدقائÅ و.تفn سالةً 5.حد/ً على@ bو ترn:  
yلnÅ Ü5=كر fلبنا Üكر= Rfلفلسط#ني ال =حب لبنا. 
  R=ر=د5ننا {ما ببندق#ٍة نخضب كالمنا بفلسط#ن f5P عمل
 n f5PRو=ة
 5باnانة الجئ#ن
 Rنشحذ منNم سقف =ومنا
 !=ا Åخوتي: Åنتم بال غٍد nنا
fلحقوني {لى .لسو=د! .لفلسط#ني ال =حب لبنا.R 
yلnÅ Ü5=كر fلبنا Üكر= 
fلفلسط#ني ال =حب لبنا.R  
yلnÅ Ü5=كر fلبنا Üكر= 
  على با[ .لمخ#م =وقفني كلب .لحر.سة
  =شتNي لحمي 5حلمي 5علمي
 .أل@` 5قوP جNنم Åقو4
  n5ذÜ .لبالP بطولNا 5عرضNاR بشعبNا Å5@ضNا لألفو4
  على با[ .لمخ#م كلب .لحر.سة
 5@جا4 .لس#اسة
  5منظماj .لنخاسة
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